Galileo Observed is best begun at the end. ‘By recognizing that the Bible contains what is necessary for salvation, but that all that it contains is not necessary, and by acknowledging that science provides us with know-how but not moral guidance, we may be on the road to rediscover the records of moral experience we find in religion’ (p. 200). From which the reader will gather that the authors, the Galileo professor of history of science at the University of Padua and the dean of the Ecclesiastical Faculty at the University of Navarra, hold that science and religion (meaning the Roman Catholic Church) have no fundamental opposition and that Holy Writ should not be set aside lightly by those who wish to be saved. Some people think that the assertion of biblical authority, no matter how restricted, must lead to conflict, however mild. The purpose of Galileo Observed is to show that even the condemnation of Galileo and the Copernican world system by the Catholic Church does not exemplify an essential opposition between faith and reason.
Shea and Artigas argue by correcting historical errors in treatments of the ‘Galileo affair’: the outmoded and outrageous books of Draper and White, the artistic accounts by Koestler and Brecht, the scholarly work by Fantoli and Brandmüller and the silly conclusions of the commission summoned by Pope John Paul II to put the affair to rest. The authors stress three points: (1) Galileo did not have a physical proof of Copernicanism; consequently, (2) Cardinal Bellarmine and Pope Paul V acted reasonably in condemning it (or allowing it to be condemned) in 1616 as contra scripturam; (3) Galileo's disobedience of an injunction not to teach, hold or defend Copernicanism, served on him in 1616, was the main cause of the debacle of 1633. From (1) and (2) we are to understand that, since Galileo had not put forth real science (that is, demonstrable knowledge according to the strict test of Aristotle and Bellarmine), his claims and the theological objections to them did not represent a fundamental conflict between science and religion. And from (3) we recognize that Galileo had challenged the authority of the church, and thus that Urban's Holy Office had every right to punish him.
This line of argument leads quickly to the realization that Galileo's judges knew more than he did about the nature of science. Shea and Artigas criticize Walter Brandmüller's Galileo e la chiesa (Vatican City, 1992) for defending this opinion and its equally surprising flip side, that Galileo had bested the theologians in hermeneutics. (The Church later adopted the principles of biblical interpretation that Galileo developed to defeat the passages in Scripture literally opposed to a resting Sun and moving Earth.) The criticism rings hollow, however, since Shea and Artigas approve the finding of John Paul's commission, which complimented Galileo on his exegesis and the inquisitors on their epistemology. According to the Pope, the commission's finding showed that the Church and Galileo had collided over a ‘tragic mutual misunderstanding’ that persists in the erroneous notion of warfare between science and religion.
Papal commissions are not likely to go beyond the mealy-mouthed finding of John Paul's because they do not like to criticize popes. Shea and Artigas write that Urban reacted ‘humanly, perhaps too humanly’, to what he considered, justifiably, as Galileo's betrayal of their friendship. Urban did indeed act ‘too humanly’, and also very imprudently and improperly, in using his supreme power as Christ's Vicar to avenge a personal affront in a way that permanently damaged the institution entrusted to him. No doubt Galileo had defied the Inquisition. It had many remedies, however, short of the trial and recantation ex vehementi to which it subjected him, and which resulted in the fatal implication that Copernicanism was an irremediable heresy.
A milder punishment was contemplated following a plea bargain negotiated by Galileo and his official prosecutor. Richard Blackwell summarizes these negotiations and also the proceedings against Copernicanism in 1616, Galileo's deteriorating relations with the Jesuits, and the relevant epistemologies, as a prelude to his valuable translation of Melchior Inchofer's Tractatus syllepticus (1633). Shea earlier called attention to this work by a Jesuit whose first assignment in the affair was to draw up, for a special committee reporting to the Holy Office, a demonstration that Galileo had indeed taught, held and defended the Copernican system prohibited as contra scripturam. The demonstration might well have helped destroy the plea bargain and strengthen the hands of the unknown persons who composed the official, but inaccurate and misleading, summary of Galileo's sessions with the prosecutor on which the Cardinal Inquisitors relied.
While engaged in this pious work, Inchofer wrote his Tractatus probably with the encouragement of, and perhaps on commission from, high Vatican officials. In it he tried to show that belief in a stationary Sun and belief in a moving Earth were each separately heretical because in conflict with the literal meanings of biblical passages. In this he went beyond the theologians of 1616, who could not find compelling texts against the Earth's motion, although they found several against the Sun's rest. Neither could Inchofer find such texts. He made do with a theological category of his own invention, ‘probable heresy’, which signified a belief implicitly at odds with Scripture. Blackwell points out that Inchofer's Jesuit confrères did not approve of his extension of the domain of matters of faith into the probable; they refused their imprimatur to another work of his in the same spirit and, eventually, had to jail him for maligning the society. That put an end to a stormy career that had begun with the condemnation of his claim that a certain letter preserved in Messina was an autograph of the Virgin Mary.
Armed with the reports of the special committee and the fraudulent summary, and, perhaps, Inchofer's discovery of probably heresy, the Holy Office and Pope Urban decided to prosecute Galileo as ‘vehemently suspected of heresy’. Here is where they ran, and Shea and Artigas run, off the rails. Of what heresy was Galileo suspected? In 1616, when still a cardinal, Urban had argued successfully and prudently against judging Copernicanism to be heretical: it would have been foolish to tie the church irrevocably to a cosmology already seriously eroded by astronomers whose disconcerting discoveries might not be at an end. That was a good administrative decision. But then came the trial, the plea bargain, the false summary and the personal and institutional tragedy: ‘I, Galileo … have been judged vehemently suspected of heresy, namely, of having held and believed that the sun is the centre of the world and motionless and the earth is not the centre and moves. Therefore, desiring to remove … this suspicion … I abjure, curse, and detest the above mentioned errors and heresies.’
The prohibition of Copernicanism for the reasons given in this recantation realized the ever-present potential of a clash between belief systems obedient to conflicting authorities. Not all scientists are uncompromising realists and not all religious leaders are fundamentalists. But with the right protagonists the radical incompatibility of science and religion when pressed to fundamentals will show itself, as it has in recent controversies over creationism and stem-cell research. Fortunately, in Western democracies neither side has the power or right to punish the other for views contrary to its faith.
