The process of judicial reasoning, the method by which the judge interprets legal norms and applies them in the resolution of disputes, remains one of the most enigmatic aspects of legal theory. It remains a subject for which the theory continues to drift a long way behind the practice and experience. Klatt addresses his book to this notoriously difficult field, and his objectives are certainly ambitious. The author explores the connections between legal argumentation, interpretation and the philosophy of language, particularly by applying Robert Brandom's philosophy (See Brandom, Making it Explicit (Cambridge, Mass., 1994)) to these central problems of legal theory. In the process he claims to illuminate the differences between the application and making of law, to clarify the proper limits of judicial freedom, and to address the challenges posed by legal indeterminism. Moreover he purports to introduce a new and important legal method, the “further development of the law”, to English jurisprudence. Unfortunately, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the product falls short of these lofty goals.

In many ways this book is defined by its own history. An English translation of a German monograph, that translation, between languages and between legal cultures, dominates the reading of the book. The style, form and structure of the writing, together with many of the sources, are foreign to the English reader, and serve to obscure an already difficult topic. Perhaps more importantly, though, the transposition highlights the differences between the legal cultures and jurisprudential thinking. Were these differences exposed and explored, there would be great potential for a meaningful dialogue. Unfortunately though, bald assumptions are too often left as the basis for assertions upon which complex edifices are built. Across legal cultures, these assumptions often appear weak, undermining much of Klatt's work. For the purposes of this edition, a new introduction was added, and the first and third chapters were slightly shortened. These changes are insufficient to successfully transport the material to the different legal context. The new introduction sits uneasily with the style and form of the rest of the text, and while it is more accessible, it is also at times more frustrating. The author boldly claims to introduce a new and superior form of legal reasoning to Anglo-American jurisprudence, yet by devoting a mere 7 pages to the English legal method he supports neither the distinction, uniqueness nor need for this method. There are many opportunities, such as the discussion of Structuring Legal Theory, which would have benefited from an engagement with the common law approach rather than simply reproducing the section from the German edition. This lack of adaption undermines the effectiveness of the translated edition.

The author begins by accepting the abandonment of the myth of judicial discovery of an objective law, acknowledging “the inevitability of judicial law-making”. However, he rapidly accelerates away from this foundation, arguing that judicial law-making may threaten the very foundations of constitutional order, that nothing “less than the possibility of the rule of law is at stake” (p. 18). Klatt seeks to avoid these alarmist consequences by identifying the principle source of legal indeterminism in the vagueness of language, and appeals to the philosophy of language to resolve these challenges. In doing so, he implicitly sidelines the view of legal norms as socially-embedded and responsive, and never grapples with incompleteness and changing social circumstances as sources of indeterminism. This appeal to language makes “interpretation” central to the author's thesis, which he claims is regulated by the doctrine of “the limits of the wording”. To complement this interpretive method, Klatt introduces the method of “judicial development of the law”. This method applies as “soon as an application of a legal norm cannot be reconciled with its wording” (p. 5) and empowers the judge to “develop” the law beyond the semantic limits of the words of the statute (p. 12). The extent and manner of this development is never fully explored, and the crucial sharp division between “interpretation” and “development” is merely asserted rather than defended. Particularly given that neither the French nor European Court of Justice jurisprudence distinguishes between interpretation and development in this manner, the claim that this insight alludes to a new, separate and necessary legal method for Anglo-American jurisprudence is unconvincing. Rather than adequately argue for this position, the author takes for granted a particular German conception of the judicial role that is never fully articulated nor tested.

The rest of the book develops the doctrines announced in the introduction, though with a far weaker narrative than the more recently written introduction. The second chapter explores the doctrine of the “limit of the wording”, exploring the connection between language and meaning. Unfortunately, the bulk of the chapter is spent reviewing the literature, and like much of the original material, is inaccessible to those who are not already familiar with the relevant materials. Klatt ultimately argues that the key arguments against the doctrine of the “limit of the wording” are rooted in the philosophy of language, and thus may only be refuted by language-philosophical reflections. The third chapter seeks to engage in that reflection, focusing on the normativity and objectivity of linguistic meaning. The author argues that indeterminacy can only be avoided if language has an objective meaning, and defends this thesis by reference to Brandom's theories. The chapter becomes heavily mired in philosophy of language, and presumes a neat overlap between that field and jurisprudence. Not only is the potential for divergences between these fields not appreciated, the cross-disciplinary approach requires a clarity of presentation that is lacking. In the final chapter the author attempts to apply the conclusions developed to legal interpretation, examining the semantic normativity of law. The strongest element of this chapter is Klatt's conclusions regarding the objectivity of legal rulings. The author argues that the “limit of the wording” gives a definite meaning to a legal norm, allowing the objective application of law. Drawing support from Dworkin, the author argues that “objectively-correct answers exist to legal problems”. However, this conclusion is never fully defended and, moreover, appears to fit uneasily with the doctrine of the “further development of the law”. If words can convey definite and exhaustive meaning, the need for judicial development requires clear justification. Unfortunately, Klatt avoids this issue, stating that these fundamental debates regarding legal positivism are beyond the scope of the book. This avoidance is deeply unsatisfying as these issues seem to go to the very heart of Klatt's thesis.

The style of the book, abstract and theoretical with little development of examples or implications, makes for a difficult read. The book is at its strongest when the author defends his own position, though it too often simply reproduces and surveys other schools. Assertions are too often based upon assumptions that are never really made explicit. Moreover, there is a suspicion that different legal cultures are frustrating the conversation between the reader and the author. Language and linguistic meaning certainly provides a key constraint upon the decision-making freedom of the judge, rendering the insights of philosophy of language useful. However, it seems unlikely that such a method can provide an “objective” meaning sufficient to guide the judge in all, or even most, disputes. Klatt appears to both overplay the role of the philosophy of language in interpretation so as to obtain certainty and objectivity, then sidelines this certainty through the escape clause of “development”. The division between a constrained and objective ‘interpretation’ of the written law, and a wildly subjective judicial “development” to complement and enhance that stage, appears arbitrary and unsatisfactory. In the end, this book perhaps best serves to highlight the very difficulties it seeks to resolve.