Contrary to popular perception, the watershed in the recent history of India's political economy lies in the early 1980s, rather than a decade later when stealth reforms were hurriedly ushered in under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank. It was in the 1980s that India finally left behind the “Hindu” rate of growth and commenced its ascent towards “Confucian” rates of growth in what has been accurately described by some observers as a policy shift that was “pro-business rather than pro-market.”Footnote 35
The book under review elaborates on this view, in the process successfully challenging hegemonic arguments to the effect that India is one more example of the success of free-market policies.Footnote 36 It also demonstrates in a compelling manner that this growth has come at the enormous cost of rising inequalities of power and wealth, making but a little dent in long-standing mass poverty, unlikely to disappear in any foreseeable future, given the obdurate policy predilections of India's ruling coalitions, cutting across party lines.
The primary thesis of Atul Kohli's rigorously argued book is that over the last three decades, “the Indian state has prioritized economic growth as a goal and established a partnership with Indian business groups in order to achieve this growth” (p. xi). So it comes as no surprise that rapid economic growth has indeed been happening, but in a manner that neglects a disturbingly large proportion of the people, which ultimately undercuts the goal of growth and development itself. “Growing inequality along rural-urban, regional, and class lines has limited the impact of growth on poverty alleviation” (p. xi).
The book's great strength is its comparative perspective. The growth-and-distribution performance of different states within India (especially “neo-patrimonial” Uttar Pradesh, “developmentalist” Gujarat, and “social-democratic” West Bengal; chapter 3) as well as that of India as a whole in relation to other developing countries (especially those of East Asia and China) receives systematic treatment. In the process, the varying politics of development in different contexts emerges in sharp relief. Does rapid growth require the suspension or subversion of democracy? Does India's political economy during the last three decades represent a unique case of a “democratic developmental state” (p. 219)? The preliminary verdict offered in this book is skeptical, arguably agnostic. Unlike other instances of rapid growth in Asia, where a confident authoritarianism ensured open collaboration between the state and business elites, presiding over repressive labor regimes, the political pressures of electoral democracy in India have meant that “the alliance of state and business elites needs to be more covert” (p. 220).
If, as the book argues, “there is no historical evidence to suggest that unguided markets on their own can create a more inclusive society” (p. 227), does not the structural secession of the globally integrated mainstream economy from the fate of the poor make it well-nigh impossible for the latter to come about?
This fine book's greatest weakness is its very inadequate treatment of the mechanisms through which inequalities of power and wealth are being exacerbated in the “New India.” There is no discussion of the enormous role of global finance both in the making and the maintenance of policies, as well as in its workings in such areas as the bloated real estate market, crucial to understand dispossession among both the rural and the urban poor.
Likewise, in examining the causes of long-entrenched rural poverty, where the vast majority of India's working population still lives, the book correctly hypothesizes that stagnation of agriculture (both in terms of growth as well as distributional outcomes) has much to do with the decline in public investment, especially the chronic neglect of irrigation, since the early 1980s. However, the analysis overlooks the policy-enforced credit crunch (after the termination of priority sector lending by cooperative and public sector banks in the 1990s, following Washington Consensus guidelines) which lies at the bottom of the quarter million farmer suicides. The harsh truth is that small-holder agriculture has been rendered uneconomical, thanks to hostile policies of successive governments eager to corporatize agriculture, falsely persuaded by the experience of the West, where only a miniscule fraction of the working population is employed in agriculture. The book also underestimates the significance of the timing of farmer suicides, which began in the late 1990s, after India had signed the Agreement on Agriculture under the WTO.
Anyone concerned with distributive justice needs to worry urgently about the fact that even as farmers are being urged to quit farming by successive governments, few jobs are being created in modern industry or services. Kohli notes this, but stops short of drawing the full implications of India's embrace of a capital-intensive model of industry. How long can the present—lopsided—growth process be sustained in a vocal democratic polity under such conditions? Given India's very young population, the famed “demographic dividend” is all too likely to turn into a lasting curse, unless a far-sighted new government (nowhere in sight) finds the faith and courage to fundamentally alter the model of industrialization India has been following. The state's own data reveals that between 1995 and 2011 the total number of jobs in the organized sector of the Indian economy has grown abysmally, from 27.5 to 29 million (of which 17.5 million jobs are in the public sector), the private corporate sector, for all the hoopla made throughout about growth being necessary for job creation, having created a mere 3.5 million jobs (net) in these sixteen peak reform years of high growth. This has happened during a period when the workforce has grown by over 100 million!Footnote 37
The other great silence in Poverty amid Plenty concerns the absence of any mention—in conformity with most of the mainstream literature on the subject—of development-induced displacement. How can a book so centrally concerned with distributive justice fail to take cognizance of one of the chief routes (dispossession) through which inequalities are being aggravated in India today? At a time when land acquisition battles have been in the headlines throughout, the corporations constantly complaining about the hurdles this poses for their projects (states like Jharkhand and Orissa having signed scores of memoranda of understanding with corporations that have yet to be realized on the ground), such an omission greatly weakens the otherwise compelling force of this book.
Finally, and again in keeping with traditional scholarly writing on development, there is not a whisper of ecological concerns. While the shadow of the climate crisis (on agriculture and much else) looms larger with each passing day, vital rainforests are lost to accelerated mining, and topsoils and coastlines vanish under the pressure of high growth, how can a serious book on development take the Fifth? “The Environment” is but an afterthought—if that—in the thinking kit of most scholars of development. This is no longer conscionable or wise.
