Chater and Christiansen attribute humans’ complex cultural systems of the past and the present to social tinkering, a process that is (a) nearsighted (myopic) and (b) directed toward solving problems. Several aspects of cultural change fit this description, but several others do not. Although Chater and Christiansen do not intend their framework to apply to every instance of cultural change, is the number of instances omitted by their framework great enough to undermine its usefulness? Below, I will discuss two important sources of cultural change that are not accounted for by their framework.
First, cultural change can be farsighted rather than nearsighted. To make this point, it is necessary to define these terms. The authors do not provide explicit definitions but generally refer to “nearsighted” as responsive to immediate challenges, meaning that “farsighted” would pertain to non-immediate, distant, or anticipated long-term challenges.
For many of Chater and Christiansen’s examples of nearsighted cultural change, there are counterexamples that qualify as farsighted. The authors discuss Nicaraguan Sign Language as being nearsighted because it emerges due to immediate communicative goals. However, on the other end of the spectrum are constructed languages (“conlangs”) that are deliberately created to achieve long-term goals. Esperanto, for example, was constructed by L. L. Zamenhof with the goal of providing a means of international communication (Li, Reference Li2003). In addition to conlangs, several coding languages are deliberately designed to achieve future goals rather than emerging spontaneously in a bottom-up manner through tinkering. These coding languages provide the basis for an enormous number of subsequent farsighted innovations, such as the development of technologies for space exploration. There is even a term for such farsighted planning that, like the construction of some ancient cathedrals, may not culminate in a completed product for many generations: “cathedral thinking” (Holtorf, Reference Holtorf2026; Krznaric, Reference Krznaric2020).
As another example of nearsighted cultural innovation, Chater and Christiansen discuss rules. They claim that agreements established to resolve short-term disputes accumulate over time to, incidentally, produce complex systems of policies and laws. Although this is one way in which rules can develop, many rules are developed in a farsighted manner to address long term and anticipated issues. For example, we create rules to mitigate the long-term effects of human behavior on climate change, motivated to leave a better planet for future generations rather than to obtain immediate rewards. We create institutions, with associated protocols and regulations, to safeguard against potential future catastrophes. For instance, the Svalbard Global Seed Vault houses seeds in case they are one day wiped out by wars, natural disasters, or disease. We even create rules to address scenarios that may never occur, such as protocols for conduct in the case that extraterrestrial intelligence is detected (Billingham, Michaud, & Tarter, Reference Billingham, Michaud, Tarter, Heidmann and Klein1991). It does not seem accurate to characterize these rules, or deliberately designed systems of communication such as conlangs or coding languages, as “the incidental by-product of many momentary and myopic human actions” (target article, sect. 2, para. 1).
Chater and Christiansen acknowledge some of these limitations: “social tinkering can sometimes look beyond immediate objectives…” but “such attempts have very limited scope, typically building incrementally on what has gone before… and often lead to unanticipated outcomes” (target article, sect. 2.4, para. 7). This statement illustrates the necessity for clear definitions. If the definition of “farsighted” pertains only to the time-scale of the challenge being addressed, as opposed to its impact (incremental vs. revolutionary) or the presence vs. absence of unanticipated outcomes, then the caveats the authors mention do not weaken the claim that many innovations are farsighted. The authors also acknowledge some highly impactful changes that do not fit into their framework, such as invasions and revolutions. Thus, it is clear that social tinkering provides a useful framework for understanding some, but not all, cultural changes. Whether it accounts for most is yet to be determined.
Second, in addition to myopic, Chater and Christian characterize social tinkering as directed toward solving problems in an intelligent way. They note that some innovations arise in an undirected manner, such as accidental discoveries, but claim that such discoveries must be followed by long periods of directed tinkering before proving useful. However, I would argue that undirected, accidental discoveries can be immediately useful. Consider cases in which an individual ate or drank a new substance that provided an unexpected benefit to their physical or mental health, then shared this discovery with their community. Additionally, in other instances of undirected cultural change, playful misspellings of words can become popular, as can quirks of speech such as vocal fry (Wolk, Abdelli-Beruh, & Slavin, Reference Wolk, Abdelli-Beruh and Slavin2012), and styles of fashion, music, dance, writing, and other kinds of art may emerge spontaneously as creative expressions rather than directed solutions to challenges.
The authors recognize that social tinkering may not be the optimal framework for explaining “the spread of taboos, urban myths, lexical items, tunes, and much more,” but state that “it is the active engagement of intelligence to directed innovation and selection that allows the rapid accumulation of cultural complexity” (target article, sect. 5.2, para. 5). However, for this argument to be compelling, the authors would need to provide a clear definition of “cultural complexity” – one that is capable of excluding things like taboos (a norm), tunes (a form of art), and lexical items (such as words), while including examples that the authors invoke elsewhere in the paper such as other moral and social norms, rituals, religious beliefs, art forms, notations, and aspects of language.
In summary, cultural change can occur in many ways. It can be myopic and directed, as in the case of social tinkering, or it can be farsighted, planned, random, undirected, and everywhere in between. Establishing that cultural complexity arises primarily from social tinkering, as opposed to these other forms of cultural change, would require more evidence.
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Chater and Christiansen attribute humans’ complex cultural systems of the past and the present to social tinkering, a process that is (a) nearsighted (myopic) and (b) directed toward solving problems. Several aspects of cultural change fit this description, but several others do not. Although Chater and Christiansen do not intend their framework to apply to every instance of cultural change, is the number of instances omitted by their framework great enough to undermine its usefulness? Below, I will discuss two important sources of cultural change that are not accounted for by their framework.
First, cultural change can be farsighted rather than nearsighted. To make this point, it is necessary to define these terms. The authors do not provide explicit definitions but generally refer to “nearsighted” as responsive to immediate challenges, meaning that “farsighted” would pertain to non-immediate, distant, or anticipated long-term challenges.
For many of Chater and Christiansen’s examples of nearsighted cultural change, there are counterexamples that qualify as farsighted. The authors discuss Nicaraguan Sign Language as being nearsighted because it emerges due to immediate communicative goals. However, on the other end of the spectrum are constructed languages (“conlangs”) that are deliberately created to achieve long-term goals. Esperanto, for example, was constructed by L. L. Zamenhof with the goal of providing a means of international communication (Li, Reference Li2003). In addition to conlangs, several coding languages are deliberately designed to achieve future goals rather than emerging spontaneously in a bottom-up manner through tinkering. These coding languages provide the basis for an enormous number of subsequent farsighted innovations, such as the development of technologies for space exploration. There is even a term for such farsighted planning that, like the construction of some ancient cathedrals, may not culminate in a completed product for many generations: “cathedral thinking” (Holtorf, Reference Holtorf2026; Krznaric, Reference Krznaric2020).
As another example of nearsighted cultural innovation, Chater and Christiansen discuss rules. They claim that agreements established to resolve short-term disputes accumulate over time to, incidentally, produce complex systems of policies and laws. Although this is one way in which rules can develop, many rules are developed in a farsighted manner to address long term and anticipated issues. For example, we create rules to mitigate the long-term effects of human behavior on climate change, motivated to leave a better planet for future generations rather than to obtain immediate rewards. We create institutions, with associated protocols and regulations, to safeguard against potential future catastrophes. For instance, the Svalbard Global Seed Vault houses seeds in case they are one day wiped out by wars, natural disasters, or disease. We even create rules to address scenarios that may never occur, such as protocols for conduct in the case that extraterrestrial intelligence is detected (Billingham, Michaud, & Tarter, Reference Billingham, Michaud, Tarter, Heidmann and Klein1991). It does not seem accurate to characterize these rules, or deliberately designed systems of communication such as conlangs or coding languages, as “the incidental by-product of many momentary and myopic human actions” (target article, sect. 2, para. 1).
Chater and Christiansen acknowledge some of these limitations: “social tinkering can sometimes look beyond immediate objectives…” but “such attempts have very limited scope, typically building incrementally on what has gone before… and often lead to unanticipated outcomes” (target article, sect. 2.4, para. 7). This statement illustrates the necessity for clear definitions. If the definition of “farsighted” pertains only to the time-scale of the challenge being addressed, as opposed to its impact (incremental vs. revolutionary) or the presence vs. absence of unanticipated outcomes, then the caveats the authors mention do not weaken the claim that many innovations are farsighted. The authors also acknowledge some highly impactful changes that do not fit into their framework, such as invasions and revolutions. Thus, it is clear that social tinkering provides a useful framework for understanding some, but not all, cultural changes. Whether it accounts for most is yet to be determined.
Second, in addition to myopic, Chater and Christian characterize social tinkering as directed toward solving problems in an intelligent way. They note that some innovations arise in an undirected manner, such as accidental discoveries, but claim that such discoveries must be followed by long periods of directed tinkering before proving useful. However, I would argue that undirected, accidental discoveries can be immediately useful. Consider cases in which an individual ate or drank a new substance that provided an unexpected benefit to their physical or mental health, then shared this discovery with their community. Additionally, in other instances of undirected cultural change, playful misspellings of words can become popular, as can quirks of speech such as vocal fry (Wolk, Abdelli-Beruh, & Slavin, Reference Wolk, Abdelli-Beruh and Slavin2012), and styles of fashion, music, dance, writing, and other kinds of art may emerge spontaneously as creative expressions rather than directed solutions to challenges.
The authors recognize that social tinkering may not be the optimal framework for explaining “the spread of taboos, urban myths, lexical items, tunes, and much more,” but state that “it is the active engagement of intelligence to directed innovation and selection that allows the rapid accumulation of cultural complexity” (target article, sect. 5.2, para. 5). However, for this argument to be compelling, the authors would need to provide a clear definition of “cultural complexity” – one that is capable of excluding things like taboos (a norm), tunes (a form of art), and lexical items (such as words), while including examples that the authors invoke elsewhere in the paper such as other moral and social norms, rituals, religious beliefs, art forms, notations, and aspects of language.
In summary, cultural change can occur in many ways. It can be myopic and directed, as in the case of social tinkering, or it can be farsighted, planned, random, undirected, and everywhere in between. Establishing that cultural complexity arises primarily from social tinkering, as opposed to these other forms of cultural change, would require more evidence.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dennis L. Krebs for helpful feedback.
Financial support
KKD is funded by the Santa Fe Institute (Complexity Postdoctoral Fellowship).
Competing interests
None.