The diverse studies collected in The Empire of Credit, ranging over both monetary and financial history and the history of monetary theory, share a common theme: the interaction between the fiscal requirements of national defense and the rapid evolution of monetary and financial institutions from the late seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century, the period in which Great Britain unexpectedly displaced France as the chief European military power, while gaining a far-flung intercontinental empire, only modestly diminished by the loss of thirteen American colonies in 1783. What enabled that interaction to produce such startling results were economies achieved by substituting bank-supplied money (banknotes and, increasingly, bank deposits) for gold and silver. The world leader in the creation of these new instruments, Britain reaped the benefits of reduced transactions costs while simultaneously creating a revenue source (through the establishment of the Bank of England) that could be tapped by the Crown and Parliament to fund the British military, thereby enabling conquests against rivals (especially France) that lagged behind Britain in the development of flexible monetary institutions.
Though flexible, British monetary arrangements were based on a commitment to a fixed value of sterling in terms of gold, a commitment that avoided both the disastrous consequences of John Law’s brilliant, but ill-fated, monetary schemes in France, and the resulting reaction against banking that may account for the subsequent slow development of French banking and finance. However, at a crucial moment, the British were willing and able to cut the pound loose from its link to gold, providing themselves with the wherewithal to prevail in the struggle against Napoleon, thereby ensuring British supremacy for another century.
The essays in this volume cast important light on a number of the monetary and financial aspects of the British financial ascendancy. Of especial interest is the essay by Daniel Carey, “John Locke, Money, and Credit,” a thorough and insightful study of Locke’s contributions to the British debate over monetary reform in the 1690s, during England’s war with France, to eliminate underweight silver coins from circulation, the underweight clipped coins having displaced the full-bodied coins via operation of Gresham’s Law. Locke advocated restoring a full-bodied silver coinage at the old standard, while others, such as William Lowndes and Charles Davenant, favored a devaluation of the standard to reflect the actual state of the coinage rather than increase the silver content of the coinage, with its deflationary consequences. Providing a judicious assessment of Locke’s arguments, Carey exposes the internal inconsistencies in Locke’s case, while defending him against misinterpretation by some recent critics.
An important element of Locke’s argument was that devaluation could have repercussions on the borrowing cost of the government. To be able to discharge its obligation to defend the realm, the government had to avoid causing lenders to lose confidence that they would be repaid in money of equal value to that which had been lent. However, Locke failed to grasp that a temporary lapse of the standard would not necessarily compromise the ability of the government to borrow if confidence in ultimate restoration of the standard was maintained, as proved to be the case when the convertibility of Bank of England notes was suspended during the Napoleonic Wars and restored subsequently at the original par.
Paul Tonks, in his paper “Leviathan’s Defenders: Scottish Historical Discourse and the Political Economy of Progress,” discusses the contributions of four less well-known figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, Patrick Colquhoun, James Sinclair, William Playfair, and George Chalmers, who built upon the “preoccupation with commercial modernity” of their place and moment (p. 76). Colquhoun et al. supported the suspension of gold payments by the Bank of England, distinguishing the responsible policy of the British government in suspending the convertibility of Bank of England notes from what they regarded as the radical and irresponsible issue of unbacked paper currency by the French revolutionary government and the American Continental Congress. Conversely, they also took exception to the extreme bullionism of Thomas Paine, who, regarding all paper money as illegitimate, favored a strictly metallic currency. The Scotsmen also wrote approvingly of Alexander Hamilton’s attempts, under the new American constitution, to nationalize the war debt and to create a national bank, modeled on the Bank of England, judging it a responsible and conservative strategy for restoring the new country’s finances.
A somewhat different perspective on American monetary arrangements is provided by Roger Fechner’s essay “‘The Sacredness of Public Credit’: The American Revolution, Paper Currency, and John Witherspoon’s Essay on Money.” Witherspoon, a native of Scotland, a cleric, theologian, and philosopher, who dealt with political economy at length in his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, was president of the College of New Jersey (now Princeton University) and a pro-independence member of the Continental Congress and the Articles of Confederation Congress, serving on the Committee on Finance. Having opposed the issue of paper money by the colonies, Witherspoon also opposed the issue of paper money by the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War. However, Witherspoon did somewhat warily acknowledge the benefits of the issue of private banknotes in the course of discounting commercial paper, and even conceded, after the fact, that the issue of paper money by the Continental Congress had been an important source of revenue in the War for Independence.
The importance of finding monetary alternatives to specie is illustrated especially well in the essays by Robin Hermann (“Money and Empire: The Failure of the Royal African Company”) and by Hermann Wellenreuther (“Britain’s Political and Economic Response to Emerging Colonial Independence”). Hermann offers a fascinating account of the failure of the Royal African Company, which had been granted a monopoly in 1660 over British trade with the West Coast of Africa in the expectation that it would send gold from African mines to Britain and African slaves to the American colonies. However, two monetary obstacles proved fatal for the Royal African Company. First, prevented by mercantilist regulations from exporting gold from Britain, the company, competing with Portuguese slave traders with access to Portuguese gold mines in South America, lacked gold to purchase slaves from African suppliers, the British mines of the African Gold Coast having turned out to be an inadequate source of gold. Neither were British exports in sufficient demand among the indigenous population for the company to obtain the local currency with which to purchase slaves. Second, because the Royal African Company had no use for local American currencies, and because of a chronic shortage of precious metals in the British colonies, most sales of slaves, except during harvest time, had to be made on credit or in exchange for sugar to be exported to Europe. The high cost of finance and debt collection ate up much of the profit margin on the company’s slave sales; the high fixed costs of the company’s African trading and imperial infrastructure ate up the rest.
In his essay, Wellenreuther explains how the rapid growth of the colonial economies over the first half of the eighteenth century dramatically altered the relationships between the mother country and the colonies. By the middle of the century, most of the colonies’ exports, agricultural and manufactured, were destined elsewhere than Britain, while exports to America accounted for over 40% of British manufactured exports by 1770. The dependency of the British economy on the American market had become critical. Partly because of mercantilist restrictions on the export of specie, the colonies suffered from chronic currency shortages, which led many of the colonial governments to issue paper currencies. Because payment in colonial paper currency was inconvenient for British exporters, Parliament enacted laws (the Currency Acts) aimed at suppressing the local paper currencies, which, in turn, provoked colonial resentment against Parliamentary interference in the colonies’ internal affairs. But, given the growing dependency of the British economy on exports to America, the British legislation was truly a self-inflicted wound, because preventing the colonies from remedying the domestic shortage of currency by issuing paper money left a restriction of domestic demand as the only alternative, implying an increase in American exports competing with British exports and a reduction in American imports from Britain. The Currency Acts not only provoked an outraged political response at British interference, they damaged the manufacturing interests that they were meant to protect.
The remaining essays of the volume include a philosophical investigation by Christopher Finlay of “Commerce and the Law of Nations in Hume’s Theory of Money,” and four essays about aspects of money and credit in Ireland in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Charles Ivar McGrath provides an account of the creation and maintenance of the Irish national debt from 1716 to 1745; Sean Moore explains the not wholly innocent role of the established Church of Ireland in supplying credit in colonial Ireland; C. George Caffentzis explains Bishop Berkeley’s proposal for an Irish national bank; Kevin Barry examines the view of the suspension of cash payments during the Napoleonic Wars in Maria Edgeworth’s “national” novels.
The two latter essays in particular indicate how the question of providing a useful medium of exchange other than a metallic coinage was engaging some of the finest minds of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The other essays in the volume show that there was good reason for such engagement.
