The subtitle of Timothy Caspar's book declares it to be A Commentary on Cicero's “De Legibus,” but it is not a line-by-line philological commentary in the traditional classicist style, such as that by Andrew Dyck (A Commentary on Cicero, “De Legibus,” University of Michigan Press, 2004). It is instead a discursive yet exclusively philosophical commentary on the arguments of the dialogue itself, following Caspar's stated Straussian principle that one should “seek to understand [Cicero] as he understood himself” (13). The book's structure congenially follows Cicero's, with three substantial chapters—one for each of the three books of Cicero's Laws—between an introduction and conclusion. The text is clean and reads well (with the exception of some Latin errors: populos for populus [65, 98, 163 twice, 188], optimatii for optimates [184], principum for principes [195]).
The result is a lot more daring than it sounds. Cicero claims that the purpose of his De legibus (literally On the Laws, but not inappropriately translated simply as Laws) is to provide the laws for the ideal regime set out in his De re publica (On the Republic, or, simply, Republic). Significantly, Plato's Laws is declared to be his model. But Plato's Laws does not prescribe the laws for his Republic, so Cicero's claim to imitate Plato's work appears problematic, with the result that neither he nor his Laws have been taken very seriously for their political philosophy. Caspar's commentary readily exposes the many fallacies of this traditional approach. He demonstrates through repeated and interlocking arguments that Cicero imitates Plato's form rather than his content, that Cicero praises Plato but presents his own Laws as his teaching, and that Cicero's Laws is a unified and coherent statement of the principles and statutes of the ideal natural law republic outlined in his Republic. Cicero's natural law replaces Plato's ideas/forms, and his thought is grounded in a practical politics that seeks to reconcile differences in a world of philosophical opinion that has fragmented since Plato. The laws of Cicero's Laws are not offered as reworkings of actual Roman laws, but rather as applications of natural law in accordance with what is honorable. Cicero thus emerges as a political philosopher in his own right, a vital link in the chain of ideas between Plato and Augustine, for he “in some sense thinks of himself as offering a teaching that completes what the Greeks had begun” (177). Caspar seeks nothing less than to redefine the place of Cicero in the history of philosophy, and he offers a compelling case for how and why.
But if Caspar delivers more than might have been expected with the book's subtitle, his main title (Recovering the Ancient View of Founding) is more puzzling. Cicero does articulate the founding principles of a natural law republic in book 1 of his Laws, followed by the promulgation of a specific code of laws concerning religion (bk. 2) and magistrates (bk. 3). But Caspar firmly argues that Cicero's Laws is not philosophizing about the act of founding in itself, but is concerned only with defining in speech the ideal regime outlined in his Republic. An ancient view of founding should therefore not be sought from Cicero's Laws, and Caspar in fact discusses it only occasionally. What Caspar instead stresses in his conclusion is that the “whole conversation [of the Laws] is an exercise in persuasive rhetoric, designed to win over those members of the nobility who would sacrifice their republic for personal glory—it calls the best men of the republic … to heed the lessons of political philosophy” (203). It is as orator, not as philosopher, that Cicero speaks as a founder (204). Cicero's Laws are thus perhaps best characterized, to use Caspar's perceptive phrase, as “the rhetoric of the natural law statesman in action” (60).
Caspar is no slight rhetorician himself, and his arguments press upon his reader consistently and persistently. Overall, this is a strength of the book and does credit to the fact that Cicero had a literary mind as well as a philosophical one, but there are places where Caspar's voice threatens to obscure Cicero's. Caspar characterizes Cicero, for example, as claiming that “history, at least as practiced by the most famous historians, is as unreliable as poetry when it comes to discovering truth” (30; compare Laws 1.5). First, Cicero does say that there are innumerable fabulous things in historians such as Herodotus and Theopompus, but that concession should not be read as invalidating the entire contents of their histories, nor should these two authors be allowed to represent all of “the most famous historians.” Can Thucydides be deemed full of fabulous tales? Second, this concession follows Cicero's larger point, which is that history aims at truth (ad veritatem) whereas poetry aims at pleasure (ad delectationem). Caspar includes these quotes in his discussion, but the way he then overstates Cicero's concession causes him to misrepresent Cicero's characterization of history as overall more reliable than poetry.
A different kind of concern arises when Caspar articulates the difference between “right reason” in Cicero's Republic and “highest reason” in the Laws without any further mention of a Ciceronian text, citing only Federalist, No. 49 as a parallel (46 and n100). The distinction Caspar offers is not without merit, but it is not as convincingly Ciceronian as it should ideally be, particularly for a commentator who began by stating that one should “seek to understand [Cicero] as he understood himself” (13). I often found it necessary to toggle back and forth between Cicero's and Caspar's texts in order to see where Cicero's claims stopped and where Caspar's interpretations of them continued. I also found it illuminating to compare Caspar's interpretations to Dyck's: Caspar cites Dyck's commentary relatively rarely, given its importance, and he thereby misses multiple opportunities to clarify his argument against the scholar whose work seems most likely to be triangulated with his own.
Because Caspar's arguments are broadly conceived yet tightly applied to individual passages, no reader is likely to agree with all of them. I am thoroughly unconvinced, for example, that book 2 of Cicero's Laws “anticipates in some sense the later rise of monotheism” (202). But overall Caspar offers a very successful challenge to the conventional view that Cicero's Laws is a derivative or misconceived work of political philosophy. His claims for the work's unity and consistency are perhaps too dogmatic, but this weakness is more than matched by his demonstration that Plato is as much Cicero's rival as his model, for from this redefinition of their relationship Caspar realizes the means to articulate the many ways in which Cicero's Laws is a substantial work of philosophy in its own right. By doing so much to return Cicero to the prominent place in the canon of ancient political philosophers that the Renaissance and the Enlightenment regularly awarded him, Caspar has done the contemporary study of political philosophy a great service.
