Michael Temelini promotes a comparative, dialogical reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein, an approach he claims has been neglected by most of Wittgenstein's commentators, especially “sceptical” therapeutic readings which have privileged Wittgenstein's comments on training. The study makes a useful contribution by way of seeking to think through anew the political implications of Wittgenstein's remarks. There is a particular focus on forging spaces for deliberative negotiation and conflict resolution within diverse societies.
In exploring the political relevance of Wittgenstein's work, Temelini first takes aim at a number of prominent Wittgensteinians, arguing that they provide only a partial interpretation of Wittgenstein's work. Temelini then builds his case with no small measure of ambition by drawing on the substantial work of Charles Taylor, Quentin Skinner. and James Tully to show the family resemblances between their dialogical approaches, and the ways in which their methods have been influenced by Wittgenstein's later work (in particular, Philosophical Investigations [PI]). In doing so, Temelini's study returns to debates about whether philosophy can be in useful conversation with the discipline of politics. Temelini explores this potential but might wish to extend his dialogue to and with some of the New Wittgensteinians, who have already been grappling with such questions and about whom he tends to overgeneralize or to neglect.
More broadly, there are problems with his interpretation of Wittgenstein, which, in some important respects, is demonstrably wrong. He writes, for example, that Wittgenstein says it's impossible for someone to invent a game that no one ever plays (47). Wittgenstein in fact says quite the opposite (see PI s. 204); naturally so, for Wittgenstein is determined not to make revisionist or metaphysical claims. Also, Temelini seems to assume that all words are “family-resemblance concepts” (77), thus committing the grave sin (from a Wittgensteinian perspective) of overgeneralization, indeed, of a kind of essentialism.
The two biggest issues with Temelini's interpretation of Wittgenstein—in that they underpin and determine the course of his argument—are these.
(1) He takes it (79–80) as an overinterpretation to suppose that Wittgenstein meant anything by his comparison of philosophical methods to therapies (PI s. 133). But it is clear from the German that just such a comparison is deliberate. Indeed, this is now brought out explicitly in the “authoritative” new translation of Philosophical Investigations by Hacker and Schulte: they render the famous final line of PI s. 133 thus: “There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were.” Thus Temelini's exegetical lynchpin against broadly therapeutic readings of Wittgenstein is mistaken. (2) He relies on a deeply questionable interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of “form of life”: a concept that, strikingly, Wittgenstein hardly ever used, being wary of its functioning as a sociological-cum-metaphysical term of art. Yet this is exactly how Temelini, drawing on Taylor and Tully, uses it, over and over again. Wittgenstein saw form of life as something so basic that hardly anything at all could be said about it without miring oneself in nonsense. By contrast, Temelini uses “form of life” almost interchangeably with “culture” in the sense of one culture as opposed to another. But for Wittgenstein “form of life” simply does not function as a contrastive term, but rather as a “reminder” of something beyond and before question (PI s. 127). If he ever does genuinely contrast it, it's with beings very different from ourselves: such as nonhuman animals.
So Temelini, like many before him, misinterprets Wittgenstein. But does that matter, if the actual use of Temelini's ideas holds promise for innovations in “political science/theory”? In the latter part of the book he makes a series of rather bold moves to apply Wittgenstein's comments to concrete political problems—such as exploring a just resolution for the Quebecois minority in Canada. The arguments in favor of listening to what agents say (and thereby understanding what they are doing) is a logical one within a Wittgensteinian and speech-act approach to the political. Indeed, the New Wittgensteinian approach to philosophical praxis is precisely that which Temelini seeks to elevate in his study—but without acknowledging that this is what he is doing, because he misreads the New Wittgensteinians. The import of listening and the practicing of interpretative charity are the central commitments of the New Wittgensteinians' approach.
Equally, attention to other political theorists influenced by Wittgenstein may have helped, for example, to provide an alternative to Temelini's problematic rendering of Wittgenstein's concept of a form of life. It would, for example, have been helpful to explicitly recognize the political ideologies that inevitably shape our world, but that are seemingly absent throughout Temelini's study (see M. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach [Oxford University Press, 1996]).
There is moreover a substantive danger in Temelini's championing of this dialogical approach, not in philosophy but in real politics. The danger is of a kind of idealism, the same kind of abstraction from realities of power and oppression that mars the work of Habermas and Rawls. It may be well and good to recommend listening as a practice for resolving problems of identity in contemporary Canada: Temelini would know better than us. But he (over-)generalizes this recommendation, in an ungrounded fashion. Are the underclass and the superrich in need mainly of respectful mutual dialogue? Is dialogue necessarily the answer for Palestinians being driven out of their land? Should Syrian revolutionaries be invited to “listen” to the voice of their “sovereign government”?
Temelini's mode of application of Wittgenstein inadvertently brings out the methodological limits of attempting to take Wittgenstein's remarks and brandish them as all-purpose tools for social and political inquiry, instead of more deeply reflecting on the nature and shortcomings of the ways in which we actually conduct our research. Such shortcomings are most acutely set out in Peter Winch's work, but Temelini throws that work into a bin marked “sceptical therapeutic readings” of Wittgenstein, reductively misunderstanding Winch's contribution to questioning the very idea of a social science.
We are not saying that Winch's work is without fault. But Temelini caricatures Winch as a relativist; and (18) he similarly, quite wrongly, commits Cavell to a dogmatic generalized scepticism about the existence of other minds. Temelini's adherence to a dialogical approach falters in his own persistent dismissal or neglect of some of the most pertinent work which has already been done in seeking to transpose Wittgenstein to the everyday, concrete, political world.
In conclusion: Temelini does an excellent demolition job on the second-raters who for far too long have dominated the reception of Wittgenstein in political thought, such as the woeful “conservative” readers of Wittgenstein. What he fails to do is to lay a glove on the first-raters: Cavell, Winch, the “New Wittgensteinians,” some of the “Marxian Wittgensteinians.” Properly understood, they are in fact his allies in the enterprise of developing dialogical understandings and uses of Wittgenstein.
