Eastern and Western scholars are yet to reach agreement on the rise of China, and on the feasibility of operating balance-of-power policies in East Asia. Has the rise of China pushed its neighbours to form a coalition, or to increase their defence budgets? Is there sufficient proof to support the core arguments of balance-of-power theories? Will balance of power prevail in East Asia, and should the United States seek to engage or to contain China? Looking for Balance by Steve Chan offers some answers to these critical questions. From a context-sensitive perspective, this book explores the extent to which East Asian states' policies derive from balance-of-power theories. It reveals the non-occurrence of the outcomes expected by the core arguments of balance-of-power theory, and argues that the credibility of balance-of-power theories is limited in the context of China.

This well-documented and thought-provoking book has eight chapters. Chapter 1 illustrates the study's research methodology, and provides an outline of each of the following chapters. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the literature of balance of power, power balance and balancing, from a critical perspective, with power shifts being a primary concern. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 question the claim that China's neighbours have formed a coalition in response to the rise of China. They highlight the negative impacts of balance-of-power policies, and reveal the legitimacy and regime survival sustained by economic interdependence. In chapters 6 and 7, Chan explores whether the United States should contain the rise of China, and introduces institutions of multiculturalism as an approach to strengthening credible commitment. Chapter 8 provides concluding remarks, and suggests that balance-of-power theories based primarily on Western experiences are largely inapplicable in a Chinese context. As Chan concludes, East Asian states “are not hardwired to balance against rising powers but tend to be conditional cooperators” (163).

Chan argues that the policy practices of East Asian states “are not structurally determined but rather depend on contingent factors” (61). China's neighbours' responses to the rise of China are context-sensitive; in individual cases, states may fail to act as expected by theories pitched at a systematic level, and their actions may not produce the expected results. Moreover, in East Asia, “secondary and minor states are more concerned about relations with their immediate neighbours and historical rivals” (71). Following this argument, it is unsurprising that other major powers did not act earlier to contain the rise of the United States in East Asia. Thus China's rise is not unique, but has a counterpart in the rise of the US in the region. At present, there is insufficient evidence that China's neighbours are balancing against China.

By arguing that “international and domestic bargains interact” (17), Chan's work distinguishes itself from a number of previous studies on balance of power which focus on external conditions and structurally determined factors. He then introduces domestic variables to explain why there is significant nonoccurrence of the outcomes expected by balance-of-power theorists in East Asia. Leaders advocating balance of power sometimes “exaggerate their capabilities, bluff their resolve, and stake out negotiation positions that they are unable to concede” (131). Also, East Asian foreign policies are often influenced by the “elite's strategy for survival and legitimacy” (119). In most East Asian states, performance-based legitimacy is still essential to a government's survival. In many cases, these East Asian elites would like to prioritize self-restraint and mutual restraint, in order to maintain their legitimacy and domestic support. In the eyes of these elites, China's sustainable economic growth “provides motivation for continued cooperation by promising even greater returns in the future” (227). Following this logic, they would actively seek policies of self-restraint, and promote cooperation as a means of engendering trust and reducing suspicion.

Chan also questions the argument that armed conflict between China and the United States is an inevitability, providing insight into the United States' future policies towards China. Chan asserts that balance-of-power theorists stress the competitive aspects of international relations. As a result, American exceptionalism and worst-case assumptions about China's rise often dominate the literature. In actual fact, in an East Asian context “alliances need not be motivated exclusively, or even primarily, by a balancing agenda” (73). Balancing power is just one of many approaches to managing an existing hegemony, whilst many more extensive policy alternatives are available. In the case of US–China relations, armament (internal balancing), alignment (external balancing) and engagement could coexist; they could “rise and fall over time and vary across specific ties” (31). For instance, credible commitment might be an alternative solution. This is based on sustainable commercial and financial ties, and reduces the probability of conflicts. Another, less desirable, solution open to policymakers is a self-enforcing arrangement, “when the punishment for noncompliance is simply the termination of the exchange or cooperation itself” (211).

Two points of omission deserve to be mentioned. First, though this book highlights that specific East Asian contexts, such as nationalism and sovereignty, will make balancing policy more likely in the future, it shows fewer concerns about another trigger factor: the rise of the private-security industry. This has become an alternative security guarantor in East Asia, and could be a contributing factor to East Asian states' intentions to undertake balancing policies in the near future. Many of China's neighbours, including Japan, India, South Korea and Indonesia, have been establishing their own private military companies, or hiring foreign private military contractors. They have subcontracted or outsourced many military tasks to private military contractors, whilst keeping their defence budget at a comparatively low level. In such cases, it is hard to judge whether China has been targeted by its neighbours. In addition, Chan is too optimistic about the persistent reduction of US military personnel stationed in Asia. If account is taken of private security contractors in East Asia, many of whom are retired US military personnel and continue to work for the US, it is arguable that the strategic influence of the US military has not reduced in East Asia.

Additionally, this book might demonstrate a concern for how long China can maintain sustainable economic growth. As Chan stresses throughout Looking for Balance, economic growth and development are the main drivers of credible commitment in East Asia, which increases cooperation and reduces security concerns. In other words, East Asian states are conditional cooperators. However, no state can maintain sustainable growth forever, and China will not be an exception. If China's economic growth is slower than that of other East Asian states in the future, how will China guarantee that the prospective benefits for its neighbours will exceed the prospective costs for them of balancing against it? There is a critical need to answer this question.

Overall, Looking for Balance succeeds in connecting international relations with domestic political economy. It will be of great value to students, scholars and foreign-policy practitioners interested in China's rise, and in US–China relations in an East Asian context.