The development of trans-European transport infrastructure is one of the main material interventions aimed at achieving a sustained level of integration across the European Union (EU).Footnote 1 This network requires concerted and long-term planning commitments from member-states as well as from the EU’s core institutions, including the European Commission (EC) and subsidiary agencies. Talk of a common transport policy has been a feature of member-state negotiations throughout the post-war period, but it was only after the Maastricht Treaty that such policies were codified and institutionalised under the Trans-European Network (TEN) platform, covering transport (TEN-T), energy and telecommunications.Footnote 2
This article focuses on the development of TEN-T networks, drawing on the case of the New Lyon–Turin Line (NLTL), a flagship infrastructural project that will result in a new railway line across the French-Italian border. The most prominent part of the project is a so-called base tunnel, which is a double-barrelled railway tunnel drilled at the base of the mountains connecting the two Alpine valleys of Valsusa (Italy) and the Maurienne valley (France). The project has been included in the TEN-T initiative since 1994, and, while it is still far from being completed, it has already begun to influence the broader development of the regions involved, primarily through political shifts in the role and remit of megaproject planning. The project aims to address perceived ‘missing links and bottlenecks’ along trans-European corridors through the construction of a new, state-of-the-art railway line that is meant to accommodate both passenger and freight transport.
As this article shows, however, the question of resolving these bottlenecks is less about the actual purpose of infrastructure as such, and more about changes to the regulatory arrangements that govern the involvement of member-states. Thus, the article does not assess the merits (or lack thereof) of current megaproject proposals but rather focuses on the work of planning in the current context of European integration, as it is articulated at the national, supranational and local levels. Megaproject planning development has had a specific influence on each of these three scales, which are brought together here as complementary perspectives that allow the issue to be explored from different angles, especially by providing insight into how the practice of sovereignty has evolved in Europe in recent decades.
This multilevel perspective has also been chosen as a way of unpacking the paradox of neoliberal planning, or as it is referred to further below, planning for neoliberalism. On a surface level, these two concepts, neoliberalism and planning, belong to completely different ways of understanding the role that institutions have in shaping society. In popular understanding, neoliberalism is often equated with laissez-faire capitalism and a somewhat libertarian belief in free markets, whereas planning usually evokes the notion of a rather centralised and technocratic way of making decisions that are implemented from the top down in order to shape society at large. Yet, we live in a world where both of these concepts have evolved together in practice. As far as the European case is concerned, the EU may have been built on the principle of expanding free trade and enabling the liberalisation of member-state economies, yet the role and relevance of state planning has not, in fact, disappeared. Thus, the article sets out to address this apparent paradox and asks four interrelated questions. How is the productive tension between neoliberalism and planning resolved? More specifically, how have neoliberal reforms affected the practice of state sovereignty, and what effects have these reforms had on relations between state and supra-state institutions? Further, what have been the consequences of these neoliberal reforms as far as the practice of sovereignty is concerned? Finally, on a practical level, what does planning for neoliberalism look like?
The article makes two main arguments. The first is that infrastructural projects like the NLTL trouble linear conceptions of state sovereignty because they are embedded within a neoliberal reorganisation of development and planning. Thus, the article discusses the concept of neoliberal planning in relation to contemporary megaproject development and frames infrastructure megaprojects as part of a broader process of neoliberalisation. Neoliberalisation is often portrayed as a major sea-change in policy; however, it is perhaps best understood following Evrard as an ‘ongoing, uneven process […] shaped by evolving institutions and policy instruments’,Footnote 3 that is, as a process that involves many of the tools of planning that have long been used by state-builders and network-builders, in Europe as in the rest of the world.Footnote 4
If there is something distinctive about the process of neoliberalisation, it may be in the fact that, as Bear puts it, ‘state provision of public works [has turned] into a new frontier for accumulation’.Footnote 5 In other words, the neoliberal reorientation in the role and remit of megaproject development does not equate to a diminished role for the state. Instead, the practice of sovereignty is increasingly entangled and scattered across different public and private institutions at the regional, national and supranational scales. The TEN-T network is a telling example of this reorganisation, and the NLTL – as a project that has consistently been framed by state and supra-state promoters as a cornerstone of the TEN-T initiative – provides a remarkably detailed case study to examine how planning has been put to work as part of a broad project of neoliberal reform that, among other things, aimed to ‘inoculate capitalism against the threat of democracy’.Footnote 6
The second argument of the article is that the effects of this process are revealed most clearly at the local scale. Taking the example of the current presence of the NLTL in Valsusa (Italy), megaprojects of this kind have the potential to become de facto guarantors of territorial development writ large, subsuming local public actors to the emergent rule of cross-border partnerships. Faced with commitments that are taken at much higher and far more influential levels, municipalities and territorial institutions have to deal with significant restrictions in their capacity to act, which raises important questions about democratic accountability in the decision-making process around megaprojects like the NLTL. The NLTL may be a project for a new train line, but in order to understand the impacts of the project on the practice of territorial governance, one must decouple the project from its intended purpose and focus squarely on the work of planning as such.
The theoretical perspectives that inform this article draw on broad debates in the social sciences, especially in social anthropology, history, and human geography. Thus, the ‘Megaproject Development and the Practice of Sovereignty’ section of the article frames the concept of infrastructure (specifically infrastructure megaprojects) in relation to the concept of neoliberalism, placing both within the broader world-historical context of capitalist globalisation. The section considers the place of the state and of state sovereignty within the contemporary neoliberal conjuncture, and sets the question of megaproject development in Europe within a broader context in which the practice of sovereignty is not exclusively restricted to the state but is rather scattered among different kinds of actors.
The following sections explore the infrastructural territorialisation of neoliberalism in Europe across scales and examine the development of the NLTL from different perspectives. The ‘Planning for Neoliberalism: The Case of High-Speed Rail in Italy’ section looks at the history of high-speed rail development in Italy since the mid-1980s, tracing the emergence of a ‘regulatory and contractual architecture’ in which private and public–private actors were afforded a level of autonomy that became the norm for megaproject procurement in Italy from the early 2000s onwards. The ‘TENs: Bottlenecks and Missing Links of Sovereign Entanglement’ section addresses policy discussions at the European level, focusing on the negotiations that took place from the mid-1980s up until the Maastricht Treaty and on how these negotiations influenced state infrastructure and transport policy in the following decades. The ‘Conclusion: The territorialisation of planning across nation-state borders’ section centres on the NLTL proper, and in particular on the presence of the project at the local level in Valsusa. It examines the negotiations around the allocation of compensation funding that took place from the 2010s onwards, showing how the processes outlined in previous sections have cemented the role of the NLTL’s promoters as the privileged intermediaries for the allocation of public funds, directly as a result of the NLTL’s status as a ‘strategic priority’ megaproject.
Megaproject Development and the Practice of Sovereignty
As Scott writes, large-scale developments tend to be driven by a ‘high-modernist ideology’ premised on ‘self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature […] and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws’.Footnote 7 Infrastructure megaprojects, defined as ‘large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a billion dollars or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people’, are a key site in which the claims of high modernism are framed.Footnote 8 Claims of this kind are integral to the modern practice of sovereignty, and they are embedded in planning decisions that influence development processes both at the national and supranational levels.
One of the foundational driving thrusts of the EU was that planning decisions should be taken with the explicit aim of promoting free trade and expanding the single market, two aims that align with a broadly neoliberal outlook on political economy. Yet, while neoliberal planning in the EU has bolstered the prominence of ‘the market’, this should not be understood as a cut-and-dry erosion of the role or relevance of the state. In an influential text on the history of neoliberal thought, Slobodian shows that the hegemony of the market was never understood by proponents of neoliberalism as the rise to dominance of laissez-faire capitalism at the expense of state sovereignty, but rather as a reorientation of society in such a way that states, laws and other institutions may be redesigned to protect the market.Footnote 9 As he writes, this highly influential worldview held that ‘markets are not natural but are products of the political construction of institutions to encase them’.Footnote 10 The state, in other words, plays a fundamental and undeniable role in the neoliberal reorganisation of society.
In this sense, Slobodian's argument appears to contradict many of the common narratives that surround neoliberalism. Policies of deregulation, privatisation and (more recently) financialisation, often associated with shrinking state budgets in the name of structural adjustment and austerity, are taken as evidence of the state's diminished role in a world that is supposedly increasingly governed by self-regulating markets.Footnote 11 According to this perspective – which is found as easily among critics as among proponents of neoliberal economics – the growing role of supra-state institutions such as the EU or the International Monetary Fund is the flipside of a reduced role for state institutions.Footnote 12 Depending on whether one feels positively or negatively about these kinds of developments, state-level neoliberal reforms might be seen as no more than a top-down imposition on behalf of supranational and unaccountable bodies, or as policy proposals that are conducive to agendas of market liberalisation.Footnote 13 This is a story that has often cropped up in the case of the NLTL: indeed, one of the most commonly held justifications for the NLTL, which has been reiterated by Italian state officials of almost every political persuasion each time that the project has become subject to public debate, has been to shift the blame on the EU. ‘Europe is asking us to do it’ (ce lo chiede l'Europa), as countless newspaper headlines have put it over the years.Footnote 14
The problem with this view is that it portrays sovereignty as a zero-sum game: if the market (or if a supra-state institution working to promote market interests) were to gain a more dominant role in governance, then as a result the state must find its role diminished, even just by pooling its sovereignty upwards into supra-state institutions, as in the case of the EU. The actual state of affairs is somewhat different. Indeed, as Sheehan notes in the case of the history of European sovereignty, one must distinguish between the theory of sovereignty, which is premised on the unambiguous (and mutually exclusive) autonomy of a political authority, ideally with neat borders dividing self-enclosed nation-states, and the practice of sovereignty, in which political authority, with its boundaries and powers, is subject to compromise and negotiation.Footnote 15 While the former usually corresponds to a certain Westphalian spatial imagination of sovereignty as a set of hermetically sealed containers, the latter is a more accurate representation of the varying degrees to which sovereignty is actually exerted by different actors working at different scales.
In more general terms, scholars examining the place of megaprojects in relation to neoliberal statehood have chosen to conceptualise sovereignty less as ‘an abstract concept that a state clearly possesses or lacks’, and more as ‘a set of attributes, competencies, and powers that are actively and routinely produced through a series of unequal interactions and negotiations with other actors, including other state and extra-state actors’.Footnote 16 Thus, scholars working in this direction have begun to append qualifiers to the concept of sovereignty, proposing that we speak more precisely of ‘articulated’ sovereignty or of sovereign ‘entanglements’.Footnote 17
According to scholars working in the field of infrastructure studies, infrastructures are best understood as what Larkin calls ‘abstractions and material assemblages’, that is, as artefacts that provide the material undergirding for greater interconnection in modern societies, even as they fulfil a purpose that goes beyond the technical function of the infrastructure as such.Footnote 18 Larkin shows how this process of infrastructural ‘doubling’ combines the technical with the aesthetic and the symbolic, and rearticulates social constructions of space and time in the process.Footnote 19 Put differently, as infrastructures go through stages of planning, construction, operation, abandonment and/or dismantlement, they reflect shifts across different arrangements of state and non-state power.Footnote 20 This has been the case long before the ascendance of the neoliberal order. For instance, as Monson documents, the development of a railway line between Tanzania and Zambia in the early 1970s enacted emergent forms of postcolonial statehood, reframing the two countries’ relations with global hegemonic and anti-hegemonic power centres such as the USSR, China and the European powers that formerly ruled over African countries.Footnote 21 With the rise of neoliberal globlisation, the political subtext of megaprojects has also shifted. As Lesutis notes in the case of Kenya, megaprojects today have a paradoxical place in the territorialisation of the state. They are central to state territoriality, and yet they are also subject to specific pressures coming from global, neoliberal capitalist relations. As a result, in the context of infrastructure megaprojects, the state ‘shapes – but never fully determines – historically and geographically specific forms of state territoriality’.Footnote 22
Neoliberal policies have reframed the role of the state as one among a multitude of state, non-state, public and private actors involved in the work of planning; however, this in itself does not mean that the relevance of state sovereignty has shrunk. As Sheehan notes, the boundaries of autonomous state sovereignty have never actually been fully fixed and immutable, but instead have long been porous sites of negotiation and compromise, well before the recent rise of neoliberal globalisation.Footnote 23 Neoliberal planning is best understood as a set of political relations in which the technical work of designing standards and setting norms becomes the channel through which far-reaching societal reform is achieved, specifically the kind of reform that can ‘encase’ market interests and shield them from political challenges.
Europe has a long tradition of ‘technocratic internationalism’, built around cross-border working practices involving technical experts, planners and decision makers.Footnote 24 These processes, which first began in the nineteenth century, have created widespread ‘epistemic communities’ that ‘aimed to carve out decision-making spaces […] by technifying political discussions’, among other things.Footnote 25 What makes the practices described here specific with regards to the current historical conjuncture is how planning in the context of the EU has been put to work – at the national and supranational levels – to achieve what geographer Barry has called a ‘frictionless space of the neoliberal political imagination’.Footnote 26
The TEN initiative is one of the most emblematic examples of this process in action. Pursued explicitly as a ‘market-based solution’ and a key step towards the ‘economic unification of the continent’, the new infrastructural network has served to recast relations among nation-states and between the national and the supranational level, becoming a concrete arena for contemporary entanglements of sovereign power.Footnote 27 Pursued as a matter of priority by state actors in coordination with EU-level bodies, projects that are part of the TEN initiative are underpinned by a vision of European unification that prioritises mobility and the construction of a cosmopolitan imagined community, all the while being fundamentally grounded in the project of achieving the ‘economic unification’ of the European continent.Footnote 28
Planning for Neoliberalism: The Case of High-Speed Rail in Italy
The construction of a high-speed rail network in Italy ran roughly in parallel with the emergence of the TEN-T initiative. On one side, the process of deliberation, approval and financing that led to the development of high-speed rail in Italy largely followed a trajectory of its own, influenced at the state level by prominent private actors and soon firmly institutionalised from the turn of the century onwards as part of a sweeping set of neoliberal reforms. Yet, the outcome of this process, as seen in the technical achievement of a new network and in the privileged role assigned to private actors on behalf of the state, is remarkably aligned with the guidelines set out at the level of the EU.
Up until the mid-1980s, there was no mention of developing high-speed rail in Italy. Projects like the French TGV, although technically admirable, were seen by Italian rail planners as too expensive and inefficient with regards to the actual transport needs of the country. Unlike France, which has a relatively small number of large cities separated by long stretches of generally flat countryside, Italy is made up of dozens of mid-size cities, with an uneven geography that is predominantly hilly or mountainous. Thus, for Italy to follow the French example, the only way to guarantee that trains could actually reach the peak speeds of 250 km/h and above that would qualify them as high-speed would be by constructing many new tunnels and viaducts, which would significantly increase the cost of each new high-speed rail line.Footnote 29
For decades, Italian rail operators had come up with their own innovations that were adapted to Italy’s peculiar geography, including the highly successful Pendolino train, first developed in the 1960s as a tilting train that could negotiate curves without losing speed. The Pendolino was specifically designed to travel at speeds of more than 200 km/h along existing railway tracks without requiring any dedicated infrastructure. However, by the early 1980s, Italy’s rail system was in need of an update to keep up with growing transport demands. Looking for inspiration on how to improve Italy’s rail set-up, planners in the state-owned State Railways (Ferrovie dello Stato [FS]) were largely drawn to the models adopted in Germany and Switzerland, where relatively lower speeds than the TGV (reaching a maximum of 225 or 250 km/h) were compensated for by a denser network that could service a larger pool of passengers.Footnote 30
In 1984, a General Plan for Transport (Piano Generale dei Trasporti [PGT]) was approved by the Italian parliament, sketching out the main guidelines for the future of Italian rail, but without providing any technical or technological indications. The main thrust of the policy was the need to quadruple the carrying capacity of the lines along the Turin–Venice axis stretching from East to West across the North of Italy, and the Milan–Naples axis connecting the South to the North.Footnote 31 Shortly afterwards, FS assigned the task of planning and development to Italferr, a planning company that was formed for the specific purpose of developing the plans outlined in the PGT.
Economic historian Ivan Cicconi details how Italferr was heavily influenced by the lobbying work of Italian corporations, which steered the direction of planning towards the French model of high-speed rail, and consequently towards the construction of a new dedicated network for high-speed trains.Footnote 32 Among the companies involved in this lobbying work, the Turinese auto giant FIAT stands out, not only because FIAT would go on to become one of the main contractors for the subsequent development of Italian high-speed rail in the 1990s (alongside the state-owned holding IRI and the energy conglomerate ENI)Footnote 33 but also because the Vice Chairman of FIAT, Umberto Agnelli, was among the founding members of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), the corporate lobby that was most closely involved with pushing for high-speed rail at the level of the EC.Footnote 34
By 1991, Italferr’s plans were discarded as part of a major restructuring of FS leadership and the project for Italian high-speed rail was entrusted to a newly founded company that was simply called TAV, or High-Speed Rail (Treno ad Alta Velocità). This was the first time in Italy that the concession for developing public transport infrastructure was assigned to a private actor, and indeed, as Cicconi writes, the great difference between the post-1984 Italferr project and the new TAV project was the inclusion of private financing. Up until then, the 1984 PGT had made no mention of private financing whatsoever, implying that works would follow the standard model of public infrastructure procurement through state-run calls for tenders.
The key innovation, spearheaded by the godfather of Italian high-speed rail Lorenzo Necci, was to outsource the strategically indispensable work of procurement and planning to a private company, TAV, marking a clear shift away from the public sector. The project that was developed under the umbrella of the TAV initiative introduced more than just a series of proposals for technologically advanced high-speed rail lines. It signified the beginning of what Cicconi calls a new ‘contractual and financial architecture’ in the procurement of megaproject funding, wherein the delivery of infrastructure megaprojects would be assigned by TAV to corporations identified as general contractors (in this case, as mentioned above, FIAT, IRI and ENI), that would then carry out the project by issuing contracts and subcontracts to firms working in the infrastructural development sector. In public statements, the aim of this new contractual set-up was presented as a way of easing the public cost of megaproject development, ensuring that up to 60 per cent of the cost of developing new infrastructure would be covered by private capital in the form of loans underwritten by the state, similar to what had been done in the case of the Eurotunnel beneath the Channel.
Megaproject procurement for public works soon turned into an accumulation regime in its own right, and before long, the costs on the state’s balance sheets began to grow exponentially. What began in the early 1990s as an investment worth just under 30,000 billion Lira (€15 billion according to the 2002 exchange rate), of which 60 per cent was supposed to be covered by private investment, eventually grew to four times as much and counting.Footnote 35 While critical observers such as Cicconi have roundly condemned the lack of transparency around the true public costs of high-speed rail, calling it among other things a swindle (truffa), these contracting arrangements are best understood as the essence of neoliberal planning, as has become commonplace across the world. The issue is not so much the presence of private investment in public infrastructure development, which has been common in European policy-making since at least the nineteenth century. Rather, what marks these developments as decisively neoliberal is the substantial and deliberate reorientation of the public sector in such a way that significantly benefits the ‘market’. The kind of contractual arrangement that was introduced in Italy under the aegis of high-speed rail fully aligns with contemporary practices in megaproject planning, especially given the introduction of public-private partnerships in which the public bears the onus of the costs of delivering the works while private actors typically act as for-profit service operators.Footnote 36
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the business model introduced to govern the planning and execution of high-speed rail was institutionalised as the default form of procurement for all megaprojects, bringing the new contractual and financial architecture of neoliberal planning fully into the fold of Italy’s institutional set-up. The so-called Target Law (Legge Obiettivo), enacted by the Berlusconi government in 2001, was a sweeping reform that introduced the notion of ‘strategic infrastructures’ into the law. Virtually overnight, the Target Law became the ‘programmatic frame of reference for the development of infrastructure in Italy’.Footnote 37 Many of the practices that were first introduced with high-speed rail under the TAV project, including the contractual set-up in which planning and execution procedures are outsourced to general contractors in the private sector, became simply the way in which megaprojects were to be done in Italy.
One of the most significant consequences of the Target Law reform – and what makes it specifically a neoliberal reform – is that it largely centralised the decision-making power around infrastructure megaprojects, creating a separate, ‘extraordinary’ stream of approval and project financing that promoters could appeal to, a fast track approval process directly handled by the relevant ministries. What is more, the category of ‘strategic priority’ had a certain elasticity of its own. When the reform was first brought into law, 276 infrastructure projects (including the NLTL) were listed under Target Law jurisdiction, for a total cost of €125 billion.Footnote 38 In the following 15 years, the number of projects grew to 418, with spiralling costs on the state's balance sheet and little in the way of results. By 2017, when the Target Law was superseded by a new law dubbed the Tender Code (Codice Appalti), the cost had grown to €375 billion, with only 4 per cent of projects having actually reached completion.Footnote 39
In addition, the enactment of the Target Law led to a further sea-change in the relation between megaproject promoters and the local communities on the receiving end of such projects. Among other things, this is because the Target Law also brought changes to the procedure of Environmental Impact Evaluation (Valutazione di Impatto Ambientale) that any new development must secure. This authorisation is normally put to the test in a deliberative mechanism known as the Conference of Services (Conferenza dei Servizi), a technical forum in which local bodies as well as project promoters and regional- and state-level institutions are summoned to assess the contents of a given project and its planned impacts. In the case of ‘ordinary’ projects, local bodies can intervene at the Conference of Services to request binding changes or affirm certain red lines. However, with the enactment of the Target Law and the introduction of ‘extraordinary’ approval procedures, the role of local bodies has been relegated to making non-binding observations, which are then sent to the relevant ministries. Only the advice of regional- and state-level institutions has any legal standing in forcing changes to a project.
In the case of the NLTL, this process has done much to tip the balance of power at the level of the local territory to the benefit of project promoters and of state and supra-state institutions. Yet, while the NLTL’s trajectory mirrors much of the process that occurred in Italy, it also exceeds this process in certain key aspects by virtue of its status as a binational project. Throughout the 1990s, the project was lobbied for by prominent economic actors – notably FIAT, which, aside from being one of the most influential Italian companies, also had a direct interest in pushing for a new high-speed railway line in its backyard – and was firmly inscribed in 2001 as one of Italy’s strategic priority infrastructures as set out in the provisions of the Target Law. Further to this, however, the NLTL was also the subject of a prominent binational agreement between Italy and France, also ratified in 2001, which established the project as a strategic cross-border collaboration.Footnote 40 The agreement led to the creation of an Inter-Governmental Commission presided over by the transport and infrastructure ministries of both countries and by project promoters, and led to the consolidation of the project as a binational and trans-European enterprise, with an equal buy-in from Italy and France and the promise of anywhere between 40 and 55 per cent of EU funding for the cross-border section of the new line.
TENs: Bottlenecks and Missing Links of Sovereign Entanglement
The TEN was first officially announced by the EC in a prominent 1994 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, which came fast on the heels of the Maastricht Treaty on the EU. This section retraces the trajectory of the ideas that were put forward in the 1994 White Paper and situates the NLTL within its proper context. What is most striking about the portrayal of the TEN initiative in this White Paper is the use of vivid dichotomies of flow and blockage, the network versus the bottleneck. The visual language that accompanies these claims is highly evocative, but it should not be taken as a literal description of a material state of affairs. Rather, the proposals advanced to address the deficiencies in Europe’s infrastructure network focus more on interventions around planning, authorisation, financing and regulatory process than they do to the materiality of infrastructure itself.
The acknowledgement that a unified transport policy was the necessary material means for establishing a lasting connection across the European continent only became an explicit priority for European policymakers in recent decades. The creation of the European Community with the Treaty of Rome in 1958 saw the first concrete steps taken to create a common transport policy, but these early attempts largely failed to produce any substantive results. Moravcsik notes that this was partly due to low levels of member-state support, whereas other scholars argue that transport experts attempted to keep the question of European transport policy as a matter of technical deliberation, and therefore separate from the political agenda of European integration.Footnote 41 It was only with the deliberations and reforms that culminated in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 that any significant headway was made to cement transport integration as a political priority. These reforms incorporated many of the proposals included in the EC’s 1985 White Paper on trade liberalisation, specifically with regards to the aim of creating ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured’.Footnote 42
The liberalising thrust of the SEA dovetailed with some of the more pressing concerns of the chief executives of Europe’s largest corporations and multinational firms, who saw Europe as lacking in competitiveness on the world stage.Footnote 43 One group in particular, the ERT, brought together a small number of highly influential companies who lobbied member-state governments and the EC for internal market liberalisation. For them, the drive to liberalise trade that was at the heart of the SEA went hand in hand with the creation of dedicated infrastructure networks in telecommunications, banking and, especially, transport, through high-speed rail.Footnote 44
Initially formed in 1983, the ERT was comprised of CEOs representing many of Europe’s largest companies, including Volvo, Bosch, Philips, Nestlé, Unilever and FIAT, among many other household names. In 1984, the ERT published its first report, titled Missing Links: Upgrading Europe's Transborder Ground Transport Infrastructure.Footnote 45 This report was highly influential and was distributed widely to national and supranational officials. In particular, the French members of the ERT could count on privileged relations with Jacques Delors, first in his role as France’s minister of finance and then as president of the EC.Footnote 46 The ERT’s lobbying efforts throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s played an important role in setting the agenda for the EU's infrastructure policy, as it is laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. Partly, this was because the ERT was the first body to express in detail the perceived inadequacy of Europe’s transport infrastructure.Footnote 47 However, the ERT’s goal was about more than building a new network of transport infrastructure. ERT members believed that if Europe was to maintain its competitive edge in a global market, what was needed most of all was a comprehensive ‘political-legal framework’ that could steer the direction of European development for decades to come.Footnote 48 In their view, a new pan-European infrastructure network would lay the foundations for this framework.
The EC’s 1994 White Paper was prepared in close collaboration with members of the ERT, and set out for the first time in full the EU’s position on TENs through a ‘master plan’ of recommendations and guidelines on how member-states should update their transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure.Footnote 49 A key part of the rationale presented by the EC was the need to overcome the ‘rigidities, procedural slowness and malfunctions’ that were supposedly to blame for a slowdown in infrastructure investment that hindered the full development of the EU as a system of open and competitive markets.Footnote 50 In the chapter dedicated to TENs, the White Paper develops its diagnosis of Europe’s ailing infrastructure, declaring that ‘networks are the arteries of the single market. They are the lifeblood of competitiveness, and their malfunction is reflected in lost opportunities to create new markets and hence in a level of job creation that falls short of our potential’.Footnote 51
Thus, the plan to develop TENs directly addressed what were perceived to be ‘bottlenecks and missing links in the infrastructure fabric’ of the European continent.Footnote 52 Citing the need to introduce ‘new types of partnerships between private and public financing’ in the initiative, the authors of the White Paper cited the ‘inherent sluggishness of the preparation, planning, authorization and evaluation procedures’ as one of the main obstacles to the success of the initiative.Footnote 53 Further on, specific attention was also given to the kinds of infrastructure links that would be prioritised in the emergent TEN initiative, especially with regards to ‘transfrontier links of a strategic character’ such as transalpine routes.Footnote 54 The Appendix to the White Paper presents several maps that illustrate this ‘network’ view of Europe, including an early version of the map of what would later become the NLTL (Figure 1). In the following years, the initial roadmap was updated through a number of other key documents, such as the EC’s 2011 White Paper on the topic of transport, which led to the creation of the Connecting Europe Facility in 2014, a major financing instrument that currently governs all infrastructure projects in the TEN-T programme.Footnote 55 The EC’s representation of TEN-T networks is a further example of Larkin’s concept of ‘infrastructural doubling’: expressions like ‘bottlenecks and missing links’ are concrete metaphors that evoke images of endless queues if not structural disconnect, and yet what they actually refer to are abstract notions that are more about project financing than anything else.
An early map of Trans-European Networks, showing planned high-speed railway lines.

Figure 1 Long description
The map shows the European continent with a criss-crossing network of train lines announced as part of the EU's TEN-T initiative. On the right-hand side of the map, a legend describes the network as partly made of new lines, marked in red, and lines to be upgraded, marked in pink. The Turin–Lyon link is marked in red, and the route is circled to show it is a key link of the EU’s plan.
The TEN-T maps that illustrate the scale of the initiative showed the still-to-be-constructed portions of the network as bold or dotted lines with existing links often erased altogether, as if there were none to speak of. These maps have continued to be updated, all the while maintaining this visual representation of an incomplete network (Figure 2). In the case of the NLTL, this is plainly untrue: the rail link across the route has been in service since 1871, and currently serves high-speed trains from Paris to Milan at a rate of 5–7 round-trips a day, not to mention freight trains and local passenger trains. One of the key claims put forward by the NLTL’s promoters was that, in the absence of a new line, the existing infrastructure would reach saturation within a matter of years. Yet, the trend across recent decades has been one of declining use rather than saturation, with actual data on cross-border traffic throughout recent decades repeatedly showing that the line is under-utilised and working well below capacity (Figure 3), contrary to promoters’ initial projections.Footnote 56
A map of the Mediterranean Corridor in the context of the current map of TEN-T corridors. The NLTL route is marked as a dotted line.

Figure 2 Long description
The map is based on a satellite picture of the European continent, and it shows just one portion of the Trans-European Network, the so-called Mediterranean Corridor, as a green line extending from the Southern tip of Spain all the way to Budapest, in Central Europe. The cities of Lyon and Turin are highlighted on the map, and the portion of the line extending from Lyon to Turin is cross-hatched, suggesting it is a route under construction.
A graph of traffic projections compared with actual traffic data. Early projections published by the NLTL’s promoters claimed that the line would soon reach saturation, whereas actual traffic in the years leading up to 2010 shows that the line was actually operating steadily below capacity.

Figure 3 Long description
The graph shows a solid line indicating actual traffic data between 1950 and 2010, and several dotted lines indicating the projections released by developers. The graph also includes a horizontal line showing the maximum carrying capacity of the existing rail link. The solid line rises slowly until approximately the mid-to-late 1990s, then begins to fall. The first dotted line, a projection from 1999, rises steeply from the peak of actual traffic data (approximately 50 per cent of the maximum carrying capacity) and continues rising well above the horizontal line. A third line, representing a projection from 2004, starts from a lower point on the graph, but also rises well beyond the horizontal line. The final line represents a projection published in 2003, which rises above actual data but stays below the threshold of maximum carrying capacity.
However, the underlying priority of proposals made under the umbrella of the TEN-T initiatives was less about promoting infrastructure in the sense of built, concrete forms, and more about the political and economic project of establishing the EU as a space of open and competitive markets. Promoters of TEN networks in the EC and the ERT pushed for infrastructure to become a political priority as a method for promoting competitiveness and economic growth. Their stated aim was to enable a supranational authority to play the disciplining role of the ‘friendly watch dog over European, national and municipal authorities’, as noted in Missing Networks, the ERTs 1991 follow-up to the highly influential 1984 report.Footnote 57
The remarkable accomplishment of this project is that infrastructure did not even need to be constructed for planning to do this kind of work. The NLTL belongs as much to the Italian and French states as it does to the supranational organisation that is the EU, all while being deeply embedded in the specific interests of the companies and lobbying organisations that make up Europe's industrial and economic elite networks. Far from being an outlier in the evolution of planning in contemporary Europe, the NLTL is a project that is indicative both of the substantial continuities in the role of planning as a site of cross-border negotiations, as well as of neoliberal transformation in megaproject planning at multiple levels of scale. Planning thus emerges as a concrete arena of sovereign entanglement that does not exclude the state, but rather moves beyond it in key ways while involving both supra-state and non-state actors in the process.
A Masterplan for a ‘Smart’ Valley
The NLTL was first proposed in the early 1990s, around the time of the restructuring of FS. It soon became part of the package of new high-speed rail links at the core of the EC’s 1994 White Paper that first set out the terms of the TEN initiative. The project is comprised of three distinct sections: an Italian section from the outskirts of Turin to Susa-Bussoleno (Valsusa), a cross-border section from Susa-Bussoleno to St. Jean-de-Maurienne, and a French section from St. Jean-de-Maurienne to the outskirts of Lyon. As of the mid-2020s, the Italian and French sections, which are handled by each country's respective rail developers, still only exist on paper. To date, the only part of the project that has seen any substantial development is the cross-border section from Susa-Bussoleno to St. Jean-de-Maurienne, which is currently set to be completed – according to promoters’ estimates – by the early 2030s.
Since the 1990s, the cross-border section of the NLTL has been overseen by a succession of binational promoters, each of which was set up with the exclusive purpose of facilitating the NLTL’s planning, development and construction stages. The first of these, Alpetunnel GEIE, was set up in the 1990s to carry out prospecting surveys. The second, Lyon–Turin Ferroviaire (LTF), began its mandate following the French-Italian binational agreement of 2001 that established the NLTL as a strategic infrastructure priority, and was in charge of securing official approval for the plans and overseeing the beginning of construction works.Footnote 58 In 2015, LTF was dissolved and replaced by Tunnel Euralpin Lyon Turin (TELT), which has since been in charge of all aspects relating to the completion of the cross-border section, from worksites to tenders to compensation plans.
The NLTL promises to double the capacity of the existing transalpine railway line between Italy and France by drilling a base tunnel at a much lower altitude than the existing railway line, which was completed in 1871 thanks to a tunnel that connects Bardonecchia and Modane (Figure 4). The new tunnel, known as a base tunnel, features two shafts, each measuring 57.5 km in length, cutting directly beneath the mountains, and is intended both for passenger and freight transport. The cost of the cross-border link is unclear: while promoters claim a figure of around €11 billion, estimates published in 2012 by the French Court of Accounts set the likely figure at €26 billion, not accounting for inflation or for the worldwide increase in manufacturing and energy costs since the early 2020s.Footnote 59 The NLTL is part of the Mediterranean Corridor of the TEN-T initiative, and has long been considered one of the cornerstones of the programme, despite also being one of the projects to have performed the worst in terms of delays and cost overruns, as per recent reports by the European Court of Auditors.Footnote 60
The NLTL’s base tunnel compared to the existing railway tunnel. The figure shows the much lower altitude of the base tunnel compared to the existing one, as well as the different lengths and steepness of the inclines.

Figure 4 Long description
The figure shows a cross-section of the mountain where the NLTL base tunnel is supposed to be drilled. A series of black horizontal lines show the different altitudes of the mountainside as it rises to the peak. The names of local towns are mentioned on either side of the border. A solid yellow line above the 1000 metre mark represents the existing rail link, with steepness inclines marked as percentage points. The maximum incline of the existing line is given as 26 per cent, yet this is incorrectly marked in the legend produced by developers as 33 per cent. A solid red line at around the 500 metre mark shows the projected base tunnel, with a maximum steepness incline of 12.5 per cent.
Ever since the NLTL’s inception in the early 1990s, it has also become one of Europe’s most hotly contested megaprojects. In Valsusa, the No TAV (No to High Speed Rail) movement’s opposition has focused on the ecological harms caused by tunnelling works, as well as on the social and political consequences of adding more megaproject development to an already infrastructure-dense mountainous region.Footnote 61 As an alternative to the new project, campaigners in Italy and in France call for logistical improvements to existing rail infrastructure, which they claim would be far cheaper and less impactful than developing the new line.Footnote 62 The local dispute around the NLTL is one of the most long-standing grassroots mobilisations in contemporary Europe. It is a thirty-year-long saga that has unfolded as much in the streets and woodlands of the valley as in public assembly halls and municipal offices, and that has seen the growth of a broad counter public that managed to articulate a sharp criticism of megaprojects such as the NLTL, which is perceived as useless and imposed.Footnote 63 Since the 1990s, the megaproject has had a profound impact on the Valsusan territory, although the infrastructure itself – be it a new railway line or even the base tunnel that is supposed to resolve this transalpine bottleneck – is still far from being completed. So far, the NLTL’s presence has made itself known in the opening of new worksites, in land expropriations, in multiple forms of surveillance and policing that have been put in place by state authorities in response to local protests, and in the daily movement of hundreds of rubble disposal trucks on local roads.
There has also been a less visible (but no less significant) shift that relates to changes at the level of municipal government. These shifts bear out some of the consequences of the neoliberal reorientation of planning that was outlined in the previous sections, and they first began in earnest following a momentous wave of protests in late 2005 that brought the Italian segment of the NLTL to a grinding halt.Footnote 64 Developers found themselves at an impasse, having lost virtually all buy-in from the local community, yet still having to proceed with national, binational and supranational agreements that presented the NLTL as a strategic priority for Italy, France, and the EU. LTF, which at the time was in charge of overseeing the project, navigated its way out of the impasse by convening an Observatory (Osservatorio) that brought together project promoters, representatives of government ministries, of the Piedmont regional government and of the Turin city administration, as well as local municipal administrators.Footnote 65 While the Observatory was presented as a deliberative, technocratic and apolitical body, a requirement for municipalities to take part in the deliberations was not to call into question the actual realisation of the NLTL.Footnote 66 The question of whether or not the NLTL ought to be built was off the table; at most, it was a question of deciding on how.
The Observatory’s claim to be an apolitical and technocratic body is a powerful political claim in its own right, and over the years it has contributed to consolidating the role of the NLTL’s promoters – LTF first, and TELT later – as an authoritative presence in the governance of the valley, often at the expense of democratic participation.Footnote 67 A striking example of this is found in a series of documents first presented in the early 2010s to the valley’s municipalities and in particular to the municipality of Susa, the unofficial capital of the valley and the chosen site for the largest NLTL worksite on the Italian side of the border. One of these documents, a slide deck addressed to Susa's municipal administrators, speaks of a ‘Masterplan’ for Susa, in which the NLTL is presented as the ‘driver and common thread’ in the town's transformation.Footnote 68 In other documents, the use of the English buzzword ‘smart’ – evoking the image of so-called ‘smart’ cities – signals a forward-thinking, entrepreneurial attitude in the overall approach to the valley's development.Footnote 69 As the Observatory writes, the value of this approach is to combine ‘investments in human and social capital and in infrastructures – both traditional (transport) and modern (ICTs and energy) – thus orienting and fostering a sustainable economic development and a high quality of living, combining the sensible management of natural resources with a participatory method of government’.Footnote 70
Beyond the buzzword-heavy jargon of the Observatory’s pitch, what these documents outline are a number of different development interventions to be facilitated by the NLTL’s compensation funds. In 2013, a first round of funding delivered €10 million to the municipalities of the two towns directly affected by the works at the time, Susa and Chiomonte. These funds were mainly destined for local improvements: new roundabouts, renovations to roads and public buildings, and new parking lots. Then, in 2017, as part of a major reorganisation of the project, a further €100 million in state financing was promised for a second round of funding to be agreed by the regional government and TELT for the purpose of municipal developments.Footnote 71 In line with the expansion of the project’s worksites, this second round of financing was much more ambitious in scope, involving a larger number of municipalities and further consolidating TELT’s role as a sponsor of local development. In 2021, a list of projects was published with an overall value of €32 million, representing the first batch of compensation funds following the 2017 enlargement of the project.Footnote 72 The list included improvements destined for all the municipalities affected by works for the base tunnel (Bussoleno, Salbertrand, Mompantero and Giaglione, in addition to Susa and Chiomonte), plus a number of other municipalities that, while not directly implicated by the NLTL, had taken part in the Observatory’s deliberations, and were thus involved in this broader project of territorial development led by the NLTL’s promoters.
The process through which this list was produced exemplifies how TELT has succeeded in developing an outsized level of power and influence compared to its municipal interlocutors. Indeed, before the negotiations between municipalities and project promoters even began, the question of how to allocate the compensation funds had been the subject of a long bureaucratic process that involved promoters (LTF first, and later TELT), the Observatory, the Piedmont regional government, and the Ministry for Infrastructure.Footnote 73 The compensation projects to be funded were selected by the Observatory and later approved by the Piedmont regional government. The list was then submitted for approval by the major decision-making bodies of the state: the CIPE (Interministerial Committee of Economic Programming, now known as CIPESS), the Italian Court of Accounts, as well as both chambers of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.Footnote 74 The accounting mechanism for how these compensation funds are paid out roughly works as follows: the money for these projects is accounted for within the budget of the NLTL as a whole, and is paid out by the Ministry for Infrastructure to the regional government, which then allocates it to the municipality in question for the precise purpose that has been agreed. This means that municipalities only came to these deliberations at the very tail-end of the process, by which time there was little room left to push for a different outcome other than refuse the compensation funds outright. As mentioned above, the provisions outlined in the Target Law, which qualify the NLTL as a ‘strategic’ priority eligible to benefit from ‘extraordinary’ authorisation procedures, meant that municipalities could at best make non-binding observations on the impacts of the NLTL's plans.
Thus, TELT has succeeded in securing a de facto leading role in promoting local development projects in Valsusa. Further, this process speaks to one of the explicit objectives laid out in the EC’s framing of TENs, specifically with regards to the perceived need to streamline approval and regulatory procedures around public works. In this way, the territorialisation of an infrastructural megaproject also coincides with the territorialisation of a distinctly contemporary form of neoliberal rule, which differs from other forms of governance not only for the way in which economic interests are shielded from democratic accountability, but also in how, in practice, sovereignty finds itself entangled and scattered across different institutions and scales.
Conclusion: The Territorialisation of Planning across Nation-State Borders
Thirty years after its initial inclusion among priority TEN-T projects, the NLTL is still far from delivering on its promise to resolve the transalpine bottleneck on the route between Lyon and Turin. At the time of writing, even the compensation funds promised by TELT and the Observatory are yet to be paid out to municipalities. Nonetheless, the NLTL's promoters have been very successful in cementing their role at the level of the Valsusan territory as providers and intermediaries for public funding. Today, the actual substance of the NLTL’s planning work extends beyond the narrow remit of infrastructure and instead covers a much wider scope of territorial development. What this article has shown is that this expansion in the role of megaproject developers vis-à-vis issues of territorial development is part of a broader neoliberal reorientation that has occurred both at the state and supra-state levels.
The work of planning has become one of the prominent mediums through which neoliberal politics are territorialised, subsuming local communities and municipalities through the establishment of ring-fenced procedures that divert public resources towards so-called ‘strategic’ infrastructure megaprojects as a matter of priority. A focus on planning highlights several features of neoliberal politics in practice, in particular with regards to the state. While many accounts of neoliberalism point to a diminished role for the state, this article argues that what has actually occurred is a reorientation of state sovereignty, wherein the state finds itself entangled with actors beyond the state (be it in the private sector or in supra-state organisations), while still retaining a key role. This reorientation becomes particularly evident in the area of planning policy around megaproject development.
The case of the NLTL shows that this process has been enacted through major shifts in the contractual set-up governing megaprojects. In the Italian context, these shifts have tended to privilege the role of private intermediaries: general contractors who have been empowered by the state to develop megaprojects and manage multi-billion-euro budgets on behalf of the state through contracts and other forms of negotiation. Here, the state is not sidelined for the benefit of private economic actors. Instead, the creation of fast-track, ‘extraordinary’ approval procedures for projects that are considered strategic has significantly centralised the decision-making role of state institutions, all the while marginalising the bargaining power of local authorities and communities who may have legitimate grievances over the social and environmental impacts deriving from megaproject development.
The territorialisation of infrastructure megaprojects in contemporary Europe thus does not amount to any significant erosion of state sovereignty. Certainly, there is a significant historical continuity here with prior trends in European development, and this process is best understood as part of a longer tradition of cross-border work around technical standards and forms of regulation. Yet, the greater role assigned to supra-state and private interests in the planning of these interventions – as seen in the trajectory of the TEN-T initiative ever since the ERT’s foundational work in the 1980s – should be read as a significant departure specifically for the kinds of neoliberal shifts they have enacted. Most prominently, these include the encasement of economic interests within the design of planning institutions in order to shield them from democratic challenges, and the articulation of sovereignty as a set of capacities, claims, and counterclaims that are unevenly spread out across public and private actors working at different scales.
In connecting the supranational scale to the local scale, the article contributes to contemporary theorising of planning and its relation to transnational networks of expertise, influence, and capital. This ‘vertical slice’ approach – long privileged by anthropologists seeking to understand the actual effects and articulations of power in today’s world – affords not only a precise understanding of the macro-level evolutions and negotiations that involve state and non-state actors, but also of the conflicts and contentions that these settlements produce when they hit the ground.Footnote 75 Further, it allows us to set the European context within a world-historical conjuncture, in which state provision for public works is increasingly taken as a new frontier for accumulation that actively seeks to shield itself from the perceived threat of democracy.
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the Hamburg Institute for Social Research and to my former colleagues at the Institute for the interest and support they showed for the research that has gone into this article. In particular, I wish to thank Aaron Sahr, Carolin Müller, Friedo Karth, Philipp Müller, Tobias Eule, Stephan Malthaner, Thomas Hoebel and Wolfgang Knöbl. As a doctoral scholar at the Institute between 2019 and 2023, I had the privilege of being able to engage in conversation with scholars who were coming from very different backgrounds to me, which greatly helped me to broaden the outlook of my initial doctoral research and sharpen the focus of my contribution. These conversations, along with the summer schools, colloquia and seminars that I took part in during my time in Hamburg, have done much to guide the direction of my research at several crucial stages.
Gabriel Popham was awarded a PhD in Anthropology from the University of Sussex in 2024, and was previously a doctoral scholar in the Monetary Sovereignty research group at the Hamburg Institute of Social Research. He is currently based in Northern Italy, where he works freelance as an educator, translator and researcher. His current research centres on how large-scale development processes are experienced at the local level, with a focus on post-war and contemporary Italy.
