The Rights of the Defenseless is a beautifully crafted, intellectual-cultural history of law and society in the Gilded Age. It provides a novel and persuasive answer to a question that has puzzled scholars of American social welfare since the early twentieth century: why were societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals established before similar child protection associations were created? To frame her analysis of this perplexing historical problem, Pearson uses the famous 1870s case of Mary Ellen Wilson, who had to be rescued from an abusive home by the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Her book carefully presents a layered argument about the cultural assumptions linking animals and children, the meaning of cruelty, and how discourses about dependency and liberalism led to the policing of social behavior in innovative and intrusive ways. Ultimately, she demonstrates that the combination of sentimentalism and liberalism in the late nineteenth century, which she labels “sentimental liberalism,” explains the establishment and workings of humane societies that handled the cases of both animals and children and created new justifications for the expansion of state power in the 1870s and 1880s.
Gilded Age reformers such as Elbridge Gerry, who followed in the footsteps of antebellum abolitionists, embraced the motto, “We speak for those who cannot speak for themselves.” They sought to eliminate violence against the helpless because it was a relic of barbarism. “As many reformers sought to create a society free from suffering,” Pearson explains, “they adopted a theory of violence that linked cruelty to animals with cruelty to human beings … because both stemmed from the same dark place in the human heart” (56). After revealing how an ideology of domesticity connected animals and children in the minds of Gilded Age reformers, she examines the consequences of turning to the law, instead of relying only on moral suasion, to combat a social problem.
Much as Hamlet explained to his mother, “I must be cruel only to be kind,” reformers in the Gilded Age believed that punishment was the necessary first step toward reformation. Pearson shows how they secured the passage of state legislation that made cruelty and neglect statutory crimes (89). In the process, they tried to move beyond the common law rationale based on protecting owners' property rights over their animals. Instead, they wanted to use the law to shield the animals themselves from suffering. The same associations that lobbied for these laws were delegated enforcement powers by the state. Members of private associations thus performed state-like functions, which included wearing police badges and issuing arrest warrants.
Pearson's findings about the expansion of state power in the 1870s and 1880s are a significant contribution to the scholarly reassessment of the period from the end of Reconstruction until the First World War. Instead of distinguishing the “laissez-faire Gilded Age” from the “state-building Progressive Era,” she demonstrates why Rebecca Edwards is right to describe the late nineteenth century as part of a “long Progressive Era” (17).Footnote 1 Pearson's findings about the blending of private and public in American governance may also help to solve other historical puzzles. For example, why have so many Americans viewed the imposition of the death penalty as the community, not the state, killing an offender? And why do Americans name criminal laws after the victims of horrible crimes?Footnote 2
Pearson also provides a valuable perspective on how conceptions of rights and dependency changed in postbellum America. For example, she brilliantly analyzes the cultural logic and impact of first-person animal narratives, such as Anna Sewell's Black Beauty (1877), and visual representations of animal suffering. Building on the work of Barbara Young Welke and others, Pearson reveals how new ideas about dependence and governance in the Gilded Age undergirded Progressive Era experiments in state building.Footnote 3 In the field of child welfare, for example, this included the establishment of the nation's first juvenile justice systems that emphasized the needs of children, separated children from adult offenders, and downplayed the traditional due process safeguards designed to protect the individual from state actors exercising arbitrary and unchecked power.
Although I am persuaded by Pearson's overarching argument about protecting animals and children in the Gilded Age, I question her assertion that among “the candidates for helplessness … only the link between animals and children proved institutionally persistent” (28). She even poses the question, “Why not women and children?” (28) Yet there was a protective agency for women and children in Illinois and legal aid societies provided similar services elsewhere. Morever, in Muller v. Oregon (1908), the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that, like a child, “though not to the same extent, [woman] has been looked upon in the courts as needing especial care that her rights may be preserved.” Second, Pearson overstates the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment in postbellum America. She writes, “Because the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights to the states, all Americans experienced a profound transformation in the nature of citizenship and the role and reach of the federal government” (101). Although there is a strong historical argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to incorporate the Bill of Rights and overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the majority of justices on the Court in the nineteenth century did not accept that interpretation.Footnote 4 The incorporation of the Bill of Rights is largely a twentieth-century story, with occasional chapters still being written.
These two quibbles aside, The Rights of the Defenseless is strongly recommended for all scholars and students of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.
