This book draws on Adorno’s conception of the aims and present condition of philosophy to present a critique of contemporary philosophical naturalism. By means of a sustained conversation with contemporary pragmatists like Robert Brandom and Neohegelians like Robert Pippin, Bowie argues that Adorno’s novel conception of philosophy provides a valuable point of departure for understanding nature, human freedom, and the importance of art and aesthetics for philosophy itself. Part of a recent trend within scholarship relating Adorno to issues and figures in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, this book should prove valuable to those with interests in Adorno and 20th century European philosophy, German idealism, and metaphilosophy.
Bowie’s central focus is on Adorno’s conception of philosophy. On Bowie’s reading, Adorno believes that, while engagement with mainstream philosophical questions is an essential part of philosophical inquiry, it is only a part. The central worry that Bowie identifies in Adorno’s critique of traditional philosophy is that focusing solely on a set of abstract questions or arguments can obscure or, worse, damage the particularity of human experience. While Adorno recognizes that philosophical questions are genuine ones, responsive to real disagreements that emerge in the course of discussion and debate, he argues that it is unreasonable to expect philosophy to resolve these contradictions on its own, for example, by arguing for the truth of realism over anti-realism, or libertarianism over determinism. Instead, Adorno traces the roots of these philosophical disagreements to an extra-philosophical source, specifically the historical developments that give rise to “modernity” (30), for example by identifying the real roots of the free will debate in social circumstances in which individuals actually experience themselves as either free or compelled. Given this embrace of historical particularity and contradiction, Bowie acknowledges that we might worry that Adorno’s approach condemns him to a form of historical relativism. However, he contends that this historical approach to philosophy does not require that we give up the idea of truth, or come to believe that the contradictions that come to the fore in philosophy could not be resolved. To be sure (echoing Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’) Adorno believes that we should not hope for the resolution of those contradictions through abstract philosophical reasoning, but rather through concrete changes to the social institutions and practices that give rise to them. And on Bowie’s account, Adorno acknowledges a critical potential in philosophy in contributing to that social resolution. While the meaning of philosophical concepts can be obscured by unjust or oppressive institutions—as, for example, the meaning of freedom in a capitalist society can come to be identified solely with the freedoms of the market—in identifying real connections and relations between concepts, philosophy can contribute to the retrieval of their genuine meaning. In this way, Adorno believes that aesthetics should play a central role in philosophical discourse, since he holds that works of art can uniquely both embody and express the truth about the social world, while at once pointing to the emancipatory potential to overcome its present limitations.
Bowie’s study comprises six parts. Following an introductory discussion of Adorno’s view of the nature of philosophical investigation, Bowie devotes a chapter each to Adorno’s relation to Kant and Hegel. The final three chapters each address a central theme in Adorno’s works, with separate discussions of nature, freedom, and art and aesthetics. Bowie advances his portrait of Adorno by pointing out deficiencies in the approach of what he calls “analytical philosophy.” (2) Due to its atomism, its inattention to non-linguistic forms of meaning, and its uncritical adoption of a scientistic-naturalistic metaphysics, Bowie argues that analytical philosophy fails to grasp the essentially social and historical character of philosophical concepts, so it ends up being complicit in repression and distortion at the level of particular human experience.
Instead of focusing his account on the works published during Adorno’s lifetime, which are notoriously difficult and controversial (sometimes bordering on hyperbolic), Bowie anchors his interpretation primarily in Adorno’s lectures, some of them published, and some drawn from the Adorno archive. This approach is largely helpful since, as Bowie notes, the lecture context requires Adorno to find engaging and helpful ways into his central questions, in comparison to the often obscure and hermetic published texts. Bowie’s account of Adorno works on a number of parallel tracks, on the one hand drawing heavily on Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and other major figures in German idealism, and on the other bringing Adorno into conversation with prominent figures in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, like Brandom, McDowell, and Cavell. While his account of the relation between Adorno’s thinking and German idealism is generally very strong, Bowie succeeds, in particular, in demonstrating the continuing importance of Adorno’s critique of Hegel’s practical philosophy.
By and large, Bowie also succeeds in arguing for the continuing relevance of Adorno to philosophy. In general, it is doubtful that this book will win many converts to Adorno’s approach from those who currently count themselves as naturalists. Indeed, Bowie could have strengthened his case by engaging more directly with some definite proponents of naturalism within philosophy. His characterization of “analytical philosophy” may fit very well with some of the prominent trends in Anglo-American philosophy in the first half of the 20th century, but Bowie seems to take it for granted on some level that the atomism and linguistic focus that he criticizes continues to predominate in academic philosophy. He spends more time engaging critically with approaches like those of Brandom and Pippin that already reject that conception of philosophy than he does with actual contemporary proponents of naturalism.
As a piece of Adorno scholarship, Bowie’s account is measured. In general, Bowie is an engaging and clear writer, and there is much that is exciting in his account of Adorno. While he is not uncritical of Adorno on some prominent points, he stakes out no major disagreements with other work on Adorno’s philosophy. (The exception is his defense of Adorno against Pippin’s critical interpretation.) For this reason, while Bowie’s text presents strong reasons for the continuing importance of Adorno, its contribution to Adorno scholarship is less clear. For example, while his account focuses primarily on the lectures, Bowie does not devote significant attention to showing the extent to which we find development within Adorno’s thought from the lectures to the published works, instead mostly arguing that the differences are ones of emphasis rather than substance. Moreover, while Bowie seeks roughly to identify the roots of contradictions within philosophy in specific historical developments in “modernity,” his accounts of those historical details are, while not inaccurate, fairly general. Given the potentially controversial nature of the claim that we ought to make these sorts of historical and social developments a central component of philosophical reflection, Bowie’s defense of Adorno’s approach would have been strengthened by presenting one or two historical cases more directly.
On the whole, this book is another welcome contribution to a growing number of recent accounts of Adorno’s philosophy in English.
