Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don’t come here. … The right to be different. The duty to integrate. That is what being British means. And neither racists nor extremists should be allowed to destroy it.
(Tony Blair, Reference Blair2006)Introduction
In a 2002 interview exploring the darker side of modern Western secularism, Talal Asad suggested that instead of trying to fit contemporary Islam within the liberal secular paradigm we might want to ask, ‘What exactly does the liberal mean by tolerance?’ (Shaikh, Reference Shaikh2002). Despite the overwhelming abundance of literature conceptualising liberal tolerance, Wendy Brown’s latest book shows that Asad’s question is far from commonplace or rhetorical. Regulating Aversion dissects the anatomy of contemporary liberal discourse of tolerance, challenging the truism that tolerance is an unconditional transcendental virtue, something that has for so long been taken for granted.
Initially conceived as a study of United States domestic discourses of tolerance, Brown’s exploration evolved in the context of post-9/11 developments and thus brings to light the imperial aspects of the tolerance project as tolerance is ‘continuously remade and redirected by encounters with new historical turns and new objects’ (p. ix). In this way, the book unpacks the specificity of the ‘important features of our political time and condition’ (p. 4), a specificity of the world which is not only generically (late) modern, but uniquely contemporary.
Paul Gilroy’s endorsement on the book jacket claims that Brown’s new monograph is ‘a worthy successor to her best and most politically astute contributions’. Indeed, the thrilling suggestiveness of the title, Regulating Aversion, is already reminiscent of her best-known work, States of Injury. This latest contribution is also more than merely a sequel in the project of exposing the fictitiousness of liberalism’s claim to neutrality, which has been central to Brown’s much celebrated scholarship over the last twenty years. It is also an exciting new turn in Brown’s critical thought as it interweaves liberalism with the recently resurrected discourse of civilisation.
The book will no doubt provide rich ground for theoretical engagement as well as criticism in various circles. The aim of this review is more modest: it is to probe the relevance of Brown’s critique outside its original context, United States domestic discourses of tolerance. This aim will be pursued as follows. First, an account of the book’s chapters is provided as an incursion into the trajectory of Brown’s thought is necessary in order to grasp the logic of her argument in its entirety. This will be followed by some general concerns regarding the book’s approach and some areas in the argument which warrant further elaboration or development. Finally, one area will be specifically explored: the currently topical issue of Islamic dress codes, which will test the relevance and potential of Brown’s arguments.
The Argument
Like Brown’s earlier work, Regulating Aversion is written in her very own ‘slightly old-fashioned genre of political theoretical critique’ (Brown, Reference Brown1995, p. 3), with chapters that are both self-contained essays and pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that overlap and hinge on each other. As the seven chapters represent different aspects of tolerance, the picture becomes accomplished as the book’s sense of forward motion gradually builds up, culminating most forcefully in the final chapter.
At the outset, Brown asks: ‘How did tolerance become the beacon of multicultural justice and civic peace at the turn of the twenty-first century?’ (p. 1). Rather than setting out to conduct a comprehensive study of the political phenomenon of tolerance or its historical ascendance, the inquiry is a more narrow one, defined as how tolerance is employed in today’s United States (and beyond), and what this analysis can tell us about the ‘discourses of liberalism, colonialism, and imperialism circulating through Western democracies’ (p. 4). This question is explored by examining ways in which tolerance ‘constructs and positions liberal and nonliberal subjects, cultures, and regimes; how it figures conflict, stratification, and difference; how it operates normatively; and how its normativity is rendered oblique almost to the point of invisibility’ (ibid.). In other words, tolerance is explored as a historically and geographically variable practice of governmentality which often blocks ‘the pursuit of substantive equality and freedom’ (p. 9). This is how this exploration unfolds.
Chapter One ‘Tolerance as a Discourse of Depoliticization’ provides some crucial foregrounding for comprehending contemporary operations of tolerance. An important point is that ‘tolerance as such is not legally or doctrinally codified’ (p. 11), even though it conceptually undergirds many Western laws and is mentioned in the preambles to international human rights instruments. Despite being ‘among the panoply of goods promised by a universal doctrine of human rights’ (p. 9), there is no such thing as a ‘right to tolerance’. This means that tolerance functions largely in the social realm, not ‘by law’, but ‘in addition to the law’ (p. 12). Tolerance is always beyond the legal purview as it is adduced for practices and beliefs that are deemed appropriately private and hence are not directly outlawed.Footnote 1 According to Brown, tolerance occurs in ‘a space remaindered by liberal legalism’, ‘off the radar screen of the formally political’ as ‘the legal and the political are generally conflated in liberal democratic thought’ (p. 13). Tolerance thus works to depoliticise certain issues and is itself depoliticised.
Much in line with Brown’s earlier work (in particular, Brown, Reference Brown2001), depoliticisation is defined as an eschewal of power and history in the representation of the subject, which inevitably cements certain ‘ontological naturalness or essentialism’ (p. 15) in our understandings of the sources of deep political and social problems. Historical injustice is thus reduced to the phenomenon of difference, so that it is the identity itself, constitutive of certain ‘practices and beliefs’, which is being tolerated. A sure sign of the depoliticisation of tolerance is its nearly universal, unquestioning embrace: endorsed by the Right and the Left alike, ‘tolerance knows no political party’ (p. 3).
Chapter Two ‘Tolerance as a Discourse of Power’ explains that the contemporary rhetoric of tolerance is, by and large, an asymmetrical tool. Tolerance presumes certain magnanimity, which is always a luxury of power. Moreover, tolerance is an attitude and a practice of a very peculiar sort: it is a strategy for coping and co-existence, rather than one of resolution or transformation. Its everyday as well as different technical usages suggest that tolerance is ‘necessitated by something one would prefer did not exist’ (p. 25). Thus, the very adoption of tolerance by multicultural discourse suggests that it is ‘something other than a happy community of differences’ (p. 28).
Brown’s examination of the genealogy of tolerance helps understand the context in which it operates today as ‘the objects, subjects, and place of tolerance in liberal governance have undergone significant transmogrifications’ (p. 34).Footnote 2 The ‘group tolerance’ model has been historically overshadowed by the liberal version of tolerance, associated with the notions of individual consciousness and moral autonomy, in other words the ‘Lockean version of tolerance that radically individualizes and privatizes religion, and therefore is also most closely fitted to Protestantism’ (p. 34). However, the revival of tolerance in multiculturalist discourse brings together the group and the individual modalities of tolerance: what it tolerates now are individuals as representatives of particular groups. According to Brown, this ‘flags an interesting moment of anxiety and potential incoherence within liberalism’ (ibid.) as the latter traditionally values autonomy and choice over group ascriptions or attributes. This is precisely why liberal multiculturalists insist that members of an ethnic, religious or cultural community must have their rights of ‘exit’ (including multicultural feminists; e.g. Shachar, Reference Shachar2001; Benhabib, Reference Benhabib2002).
Brown insists that today’s tolerance is far less about religious dissent or dissident beliefs than about a wider array of ‘difference’, which includes ‘sexuality, ethnicity, race, nationality, and subnationality, as well as religious affiliation’. This is an important paradox as ‘belief, desire, and ascriptive identity are not equivalent problematics, either from the perspective of individual freedom or from the perspective of governmentality’ (p. 35). According to Brown, the process of ascriptive identities becoming the primary objects of tolerance makes sense if examined through a Foucauldian lens: Michel Foucault’s (Reference Foucault1981) classic example of the modern invention of the homosexual species illustrates how practices have become equated with essential subjectivity. In this way, one is defined not simply by one’s belonging to a group or a certain community, but by ‘an identity rooted in desire and behavior’ (p. 41), with ‘the combination of the identity and the experiences’ (themselves issuing from the identity) being treated as foundational to views and beliefs (p. 42).Footnote 3 This is so ‘even if the beliefs that are the sign of this difference are given up’ (ibid., original emphasis) – much in accord with Brown’s earlier work which theorises this sort of moralism and the attribution to individuals of the responsibility for their ‘community’ as a peculiar sort of the anti-politics characteristic of our time (Brown, Reference Brown2001). In this way, ‘the project of tolerance becomes fully inverted from its original aim to license diverse belief’, providing instead a potent way of ‘inscribing essential otherness’ (p. 46).Footnote 4
Brown’s account appears to be in stark contrast with much of the (highly abstract) liberal theorising on tolerance, which insists that essential attributes such as race, ethnicity or skin colour ought not to be eligible for tolerance because they cannot be helped and thus cannot be wrong – that is, precisely because of their essentiality (e.g. Castiglione & McKinnon, Reference Castiglione and Mckinnon2001; Forst, Reference Forst2004). This conventional liberal account does not make sense if one recalls that contemporary preaching of tolerance is founded on the hypothesis that the cause of all intolerance is irrational prejudice (which Brown explores in some detail in Chapter Five). Indeed, Brown’s account of the peregrination of tolerance from belief to identity and of the conflation of the two resolves this classic ‘paradox’ of tolerance as it divorces liberalism’s reality from its high-minded normative claims. The tolerated are simply those who deviate from the norm, and they are tolerated insofar as their difference does not threaten the norm’s hegemonic status.
Chapter Three ‘Tolerance as Supplement: The “Jewish Question” and the “Woman Question”’ explicates the ill-fittings of gender within the liberal paradigm of tolerance. Gender, Brown contends, is rarely constructed as a matter of tolerance, despite being ‘often included on lists of differences towards which tolerance is to be practiced’ (p. 47). In contrast, equality is the conventional rubric for addressing women’s subordinated status. Brown traces the origins of this anomaly to classical modernism, culminating in the nineteenth-century processes of sexualisation (of women) and racialisation (of Jews). Crucially, the liberal notion of equality presumes sameness – while tolerance is for managing difference. Women were able to become candidates for equality due to two specific modes of the dichotomous thinking characteristic of the time: the Cartesian mind/body split and the separation of the public and private spheres. As is well known from feminism’s history, the ‘new’ discourses of gender, which proliferated throughout the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, represented women as thoroughly saturated with their sex. First-wave feminists only contested the totalising reach of this sexualisation: women were eligible for equality as far as their mind was ‘sexless’ – to fit with the abstract, disembodied figure of man/citizen. Women could be equal with men in the public sphere insofar as they remained women – wives and mothers – in private. This meant ‘literally splitting the female ontology, parceling it out for different social spaces in which different social activities occur’ (p. 65). In this way, women were not asked to give up anything to become equal with men: indeed, ‘any effort to desex women would be seen as making them monstrous’ (p. 66).
Jews were another matter: their emancipation depended on assimilation, which implied certain transformation of the Jew. Jews had to give up their transnational Judaic fealty in order to become proper citizens of a European nation. Around the same time, in the nineteenth century they came to be marked by race, rather than religion – which kept the Jewish species from disappearing ‘no matter how secular’ (p. 54). The racialisation of the Jew was achieved through a variety of discourses, ‘ranging from anthropological and biological to philosophical and literary’, which firmly established ‘the enduring fact of Jewishness’ (p. 55). This fact was highly essentialised as ‘race conjured putatively objective traits rather than subjective attachments to matters of consciousness’ (ibid.). This essentialisation was entwined with individuation as racialised Jews were constituted as ‘individuals incorporable by the nation-state rather than as a community of believers potentially alien to or alien within the nation-state’ (pp. 55–56). In Brown’s words, the object of tolerance discursively relocated ‘from belief to ontoi’, with the belief itself being ‘separable from yet also derivable from the ontics of race’, which she claims is ‘critical in formulating subjects of tolerance today’ (p. 58), as theorised in the previous chapter.Footnote 5
If the racialisation of Jews produced their ‘natural’ association with one another, sexualised women were cast as ‘individual complements or opposites of individual men’ (p. 70), naturally belonging to the family, different from men, but never a solidaristic group. As women are firmly positioned in the heterosexual ontological hierarchy and within the gendered division of labour, their difference does not threaten to disappear and therefore needs not be managed in the way the Jewish difference does. The latter is dangerous precisely because it threatens ‘men’s relations with one another’ (p. 72). In this way, tolerance is ‘an index of this very capacity for mixing and of the perceived threat to a social norm that it portends’ (p. 73). This is why gender needs to be tolerated only if ‘detached from a heterosexual matrix’ (p. 75).
Chapter Four ‘Tolerance as Governmentality: Faltering Universalism, State Legitimacy, and State Violence’ highlights how tolerance operates as a mode of governmentality in uniquely contemporary contexts – as a ‘policy discourse that is largely nonlegal without being extralegal, as a state speech act that is only occasionally an enforceable rule, and as a popular discourse that circulates in and among schools, churches, civic associations, museums, and street conversation’ (pp. 78–79).
Brown is keen to point out problems with Foucault’s formulation of governmentality: most relevantly, his counterpositioning of governmentality and sovereignty. She explains that Foucault’s downplaying of the role of the state, although an understandable strategy in the conditions in which his theories emerged (Brown suggests that governmentality was intended as a critique of the then prevalent accounts of state sovereignty and juridical power), is insufficient for contemporary theorising of political power in general and the tolerance discourse in particular. As Brown elaborates more extensively elsewhere, the operations of today’s state, however fragmented and governmentalised, cannot be theorised in terms of Foucault’s governmentality alone as the state not only still retains sovereignty, but ‘remains an important site of political legitimacy in late modernity’ (Brown, Reference Brown, Dryzek, Honig and Phillips2006, p. 78).Footnote 6 Thus, Brown suggests that a more adequate account of governmentality ought to also attend to the problem of legitimising the construction and positioning of subjects by the state. She argues that ‘the deployment of tolerance by the state is in part a response to a legitimacy deficit and, in particular, to its historically diminished capacity to embody universal representation’ (pp. 83–84). At the same time, ‘delegating’ the task of tolerance to the citizenry (as Brown shows is happening in the United States today in respect of both homosexuality and Islam) means that the role of the state in reproducing dominant norms is masked. Despite the best wishes of the liberal proponents of tolerance,Footnote 7 Western democracies have not moved ‘beyond tolerance’ – to the contrary, Brown shows how tolerance palpably reappears in both popular and state discourse.Footnote 8
An important uniquely contemporary feature of tolerance is that today’s ‘subnational’ identities are also in a certain sense transnational, while tolerance ‘seeks to lessen if not eliminate the transnational dimension of the identity at issue’ by countering it ‘with an acceptable nationalism’ (p. 94). Brown uses the example of President George W. Bush’s speeches in which he commended those American Muslims who ‘love the country’ and ‘salute the flag’: here, fealty to transnational Islam has to be secondary to the fealty to the American state expressed through love of a symbol. The French doctrine of laïcité can be invoked as an obvious parallel: in contemporary France, fealty to the state is forged through elimination of ‘religious’ symbols from the secular public sphere.Footnote 9
Chapter Five ‘Tolerance as Museum Object: The Simon Wiesenthal Center Museum of Tolerance’ is based on Brown’s own visits to the museum and is a fascinating reality illustration to what was theorised in the preceding chapters. Apart from highlighting ways in which tolerance is used to promote the Zionist political agenda of the Los Angeles-based Wiesenthal Center, Brown uses this case-study to show how tolerance as depoliticisation might operate in practice. Apparently, the ‘classic essentializing and depoliticizing moves’ (p. 117) are performed already in the lobby of the museum as the docents define tolerance as ‘the acceptance of practices and beliefs different from our own’, while prejudice is defined as ‘judgments … about people based on how they look’ (p. 116). While Judaism in Christian Europe is ‘the model for the problem of tolerance’ (ibid.), race, gender, sexuality and so on are likened to Judaism as they also are understood to be constituted by ‘practices and beliefs’ – and hence are strongly culturalised. This leads to almost comical absurdities in the museum’s depiction of issues of intolerance.Footnote 10
Brown describes the implicit conundrum of the museum as follows: ‘How to produce a moral and political consensus – even how to be doctrinaire – when the rubric of the museum is respect for different beliefs and practices, for difference as itself the essence of humanity?’ (p. 125). The museum purports to resolve this conundrum by adopting the Manicheanism characteristic of contemporary tolerance discourse, which ‘simultaneously casts tolerance as mutual conduct (accepting differences) and as that which distinguishes the good from the bad, the allies from the foes of civilization’ (p. 118). This is achieved through a series of highly moralistic and didactic devices, such as short videos on current social problems, interactive voting and multimedia installations. Brown stresses that despite their ostensible purpose of emphasising ‘individual agency, thoughtfulness, and responsibility’ these strategies ‘do not embody the respect for moral and deliberative autonomy on which tolerance as a value is founded’ (p. 119) as issues are presented in a way that precludes any possibility of arriving at alternative conclusions.
The Museum of Tolerance is an ironic and convincing illustration to Brown’s theorising of the depoliticisation of tolerance as power and history are completely eschewed in the museum’s depiction of ‘intolerance’, which prompts skewed ‘solutions’ to such problems. With no mention of the political conflicts that have led to eruptions of terrorism across the globe, terrorism is presented as a singular phenomenon and its own cause, promulgated by the desire to destroy ‘our way of life, our civilization’ (p. 123)Footnote 11 (tolerance’s function of demarcating the civilised from the uncivilised is examined in the following two chapters). Brown warns that the ‘especially pernicious interchangeability between religion, culture, ethnicity, and race’ (p. 193) in the museum is not simply an effect of extending the model of Judaism to everything else. Rather, it is indicative of the very late modern essentialisation of identity in which ‘belief and practice are derived from blood and phenotype’, with culture, ethnicity, race and religion all being ‘part of the generic problem of difference’ (p. 144).
Chapter Six ‘Subjects of Tolerance: Why We Are Civilized and They Are the Barbarians’ changes tack slightly. In this chapter, Brown examines Sigmund Freud’s (Reference Freud1952, Reference Freud1961, Reference Freud1975) seminal account of group psychology, which she argues underlies the late modern configuration of the group as the antithesis of individual autonomy. In liberalism, the opposition between the group/community/culture and individual moral autonomy (individuation) requires that culture must be subdued by autonomy. Brown explains that this is made possible by the strong Kantianism underlying liberalism’s ideology, in which liberalism figures as uniquely capable of being ‘culturally neutral and culturally tolerant’ (p. 151). Brown explains that, within liberalism, the possibility of an ‘optional relationship’ with ‘culture’ is secured by the conceit that ‘the individual chooses what he or she thinks’ (p. 152), which figures ‘culture’ as extrinsic to the subject. In this scheme, it is only liberal individuals for whom culture and religion become mere ‘background’, a house one can enter and exit, while for organicist creatures (such as non-Western peoples) culture is ‘saturating and authoritative’ (p. 153).Footnote 12
Freud’s work provides an interesting vantage point for liberalism’s distinction between the ‘tolerant liberal self and its intolerant organicist Other’ (p. 154). Brown criticises Freud for his ‘equation of individuation with both ontogenic and phylogenic maturity, and of solidarity or organicism with primitivism or regression’ (p. 155) – which prepares ground for the civilisational discourse examined in the final chapter. But she also highlights the destabilising potential of Freud’s theory: he implicitly acknowledges the contingency of groups as he ascribes the source of their members’ solidarity to affect rather than to essential traits, which is potentially deconstructive of the ontologisation of ‘identity’.
Brown notes a paradox in Freud, which is also shared by many liberal theorists: on the one hand, the self is always prior to the group (the lone savage), while on the other, the modern individuated subject emerges out of its earlier organicist (i.e. collectivised) state. She suggests that Freud’s reconciliation of this paradox is hinged exactly on this a priori status of the individual: the unindividuated man is regressed to his own more instinctual psychic state, to a lowered superego, rather than is merged with the group. What unites group members in this schema is a common attachment to something external, such as a leader or an ideal, rather than attachment to one another. Thus, a group is held together by mutual identification in love. Love, as is well known from Freud’s work, is always aim-inhibited sexual desire, which involves rerouting libidinal energy onto the idealisation of the beloved, which is in turn a projection of the ego’s own need to be loved. In this way, the group works ‘to the extent that individual ego ideals have been replaced or absorbed by a common object’ (p. 162), while the unattainable and non-sexual status of the beloved keeps the natural rivalry of individual group members at bay.
If this is right, any individual, no matter how educated or ‘civilised’, can regress to such an organicist state, ontogenic and phylogenic ‘childhood’ in which rational capacity and impulse control are radically diminished. Indeed, this ever-present possibility is vividly demonstrated by the recent history of European fascism, for instance. This valuable aspect of Freud’s theory, however, tends to be underplayed in liberal thinking.Footnote 13 Rather, liberalism hinges on Freud’s pathologisation of the group and group behaviour as inherently dangerous just because ‘non-individuation signals a libidinally charged psychic economy that constrains rational deliberation and impulse control’ (p. 164). Accordingly, organicist societies are problematic because this primordial affect saturates their public sphere and formal laws – unlike in liberalism which purports (or course, unsuccessfully)Footnote 14 to confine love to its proper place – the private and familial domains. Needless to say, love here is coterminous with culture. Thus, non-liberal orders are dangerous simply because they signify an uncivilised condition, in contrast with civilised individuated individuals who are rational and self-regulating.
According to Brown, this is what enables President Bush to describe the Fallujan incident, in which American civilians were brutally murdered, as ‘barbarian’ or the ‘true nature of the enemy’, whereas the torture of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib was not, in his opinion, ‘the nature of the men and women who serve our country’ (p. 159). In contrast, Freud’s description of the regression to organicism would clearly apply to both episodes. Indeed, as Sherene Razack (Reference Razack2004) argues in the context of the Canadian 1990s peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the typical, recurrent nature of imperial violence and its obsessive photographing and video-recording make it difficult to believe that such events are ‘the actions of a few bad apples’ (Merry, Reference Merry2006, p. 241).
Chapter Seven ‘Tolerance as/in Civilizational Discourse’ is a development of the themes raised in Chapter Six as it highlights a particularly contemporary feature of tolerance: its imbrication with the recently resurrected discourse of civilisation. The chapter shows how tolerance covers almost all ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ practices that are seen as ‘chosen’ within a liberal paradigm, but is withdrawn from those ‘seen to be imposed by culture inscribed as law’ (p. 171, emphasis added), as well as from whole political regimes which are seen as saturated with culture and religion. Formal legal autonomy and formal secularism (i.e. formal banishment of culture and religion from the state and public sphere) denote the threshold of what is tolerable and the threshold of civilisation. Accordingly, Western legal practices are rendered immune from the charge of barbarism, while ‘intolerable’ non-liberal regimes and practices become the legitimate target of Western aggression in the name of promoting tolerance.
Brown notes that the binary pairs ‘free–fundamentalist’, ‘civilised–barbaric’ and ‘individualised–organicist/collectivised’, although not identical, are co-constitutive of each other as liberal autonomy, tolerance, secularism and civilisation work in association. Tolerance as the beacon of civilisation ‘draws from and entwines postcolonial, liberal, and neoliberal reasoning’, and as such ‘encodes the superiority of the West and of liberalism’ (p. 202). Tolerance and civilisation mutually define each other as well as define what is outside of both, constituting ‘a strand in an emerging transnational governmentality’ (p. 182).
As Brown showed in the previous chapters, the liberal discourse of tolerance denies its own involvement with cultural norms while promulgating and protecting a specific Western mode of Christianity and bourgeois culture. (Western) liberal regimes are presented as exhaustively defined by tolerance, while non-liberal regimes harbour intolerance as their saturating and organising principle. Brown describes how the political and philosophical liberal preoccupation, ‘What should be the attitude of the tolerant toward the intolerant?’, is embedded in civilisational discourse. This much-rehearsed (see e.g. Castiglione & McKinnon, Reference Castiglione and Mckinnon2001; Habermas, Reference Habermas2003, Reference Habermas2005; Forst, Reference Forst2004) question not only suggests that tolerance has a limit, but acts to convert differences into ‘dire opposites’ and to attribute ‘a distorting essence to each’ (p. 190). In this scheme tolerance operates as a principle of demarcation, with the limits of tolerance signifying the limits of civilisation itself (which is converged with the danger to civilisation). Brown thus strips the liberal dilemma of tolerating intolerance of its paradoxical status.
Civilisational discourse is invoked ‘to broker the tolerable’ (p. 191) across the political spectrum, so that the worries of neoconservatives and right-wing Christians about the decline of the Western civilisation converge with those of liberals, human rights activists and feminists who advocate zero tolerance towards ‘cultural’ practices such as female genital cutting or veiling. Brown forcefully criticises liberal feminist scholarship which repeats the ‘disturbing colonial gesture’ of targeting the ‘legally sanctioned cultural barbarism’ rather than imperialism and economic exploitation (p. 198). The configuration of tolerance as conceivable only where individual autonomy is a ‘core political principle and juridical norm’ (p. 199) also precludes the possibility of non-liberal forms and practices of tolerance which would attach themselves to other values.Footnote 15
Concerns
Brown’s novel and at times uncharacteristically forceful argument is bound to provoke much controversy and disagreement. Indeed, a recent review claims that the book is ‘open to severe criticism’ (Hall, Reference Hall2007, p. 1449), including on account of its configuration of tolerance as an attitude of superiority. I suspect, though, that this type of criticism is easily rebuttable if considered carefully against Brown’s insistence that her claims are specifically limited to the uniquely contemporary context of the mobilisation of tolerance rhetoric, as shaped by the ‘discourses of liberalism, colonialism, and imperialism circulating through Western democracies’ (p. 4). She repeatedly states that the tolerance she describes bears little commonality with tolerance as it was conceived in early modern Europe (let alone with pre-modern or non-Western historic modalities of tolerance, which she contends are very different).
It has also been pointed out that ‘too much guilt at our own failings is expressed’; Brown’s argument suffers from Foucauldian ‘idealism’; and her ‘own positive politics are murky’ (Hall, Reference Hall2007, p. 1449). Such – perhaps obvious – criticisms are likely to be recurrent, but they are dispellable. It is simply misconceived to interpret Brown’s stance on tolerance as meaning to perpetuate feelings of guilt. The whole of Brown’s work criticises contemporary identity politics for precisely its profound inflection with guilt.
In States of Injury, she argues that late modern liberal subjects are constituted by what Friedrich Nietzsche (Reference Nietzsche1969) terms ressentiment, a condition of slave morality. Ressentiment channels the subject’s otherwise unendurable suffering into ‘a negative form of action’, deploring the nature’s ‘true reaction’, ‘that of deeds’, as well as denouncing power and action themselves as morally wrong (Brown, Reference Brown1995, p. 70). She thus characterises identity politics as ‘the moralizing revenge of the powerless, “the triumph of the weak as weak”’, which ‘is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis … as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment’ (ibid., pp. 66–67, 71).
In Politics Out of History, Brown invokes a combination of Nietzschean and Freudian perspectives to suggest that guilt has psychically shaped late modern political subjectivities that oscillate ‘between the desire to punish and the desire to be punished’ (Brown, Reference Brown2001, p. 61), which all too often results in moralism (including silencing intra-group dissent) as a symptom of deep distrust of political action. Rather than perpetuating such political paralysis, Brown’s aspiration is to develop more promising modalities of political discourse, which would admit open expressions of one’s always already situated viewpoints while resisting their moralising mandate.
More generally, some familiarity with Brown’s earlier work might provide a clearer sense of her intellectual and political orientation and her ‘own positive politics’. Rather than endorsing any singular political viewpoint, her work is about ‘defusing the trap of existing discourses’ (Brown, Reference Brown2001, p. 43), meaning a commitment to critical scrutiny of what is routinely taken for granted and to a vision of politics in which the absence of unifying truth claims needs not paralyse democratic struggles.
It is with this in mind that Regulating Aversion needs to be read. At both ends of the book, Brown reiterates that her exploration is not meant as an impulsive and wholesale rejection of liberalism, but as a sober incursion into its darker side, intended to encourage liberalism’s connection with its Other and its own ‘always already present hybridity’. She is hopeful of a ‘positive political strategy of nourishing counterdiscourses that would feature power and justice where anti-political tolerance talk has displaced them’ (p. 205).
Perhaps the following four points could be advanced as somewhat more specific concerns. First, in theorising tolerance as a mode of governmentality, Brown makes the point that Foucault’s strategic eschewal of the state needs to be revised in light of the palpable resurfacing of state sovereignty and juridical power in the twenty-first century (as demonstrated by her account in Chapter Four of the role of the American state in the debate around same-sex marriage and the war on terror). What perhaps requires some further exploration is how the role of the state might be conceived given that tolerance is an emerging variety of transnational governmentality.
Giorgio Agamben’s (Reference Agamben2005) theorising of the emerging phenomenon of the state of exception might offer one way of cutting into this problematic.Footnote 16 Unlike emergency, exception does not imply a formal suspension of constitutional or international human rights safeguards; rather, rights and freedoms are restricted on the pretext of protecting or even expanding them. (Indeed, Brown shows in Chapter Four how the state is able to utilise tolerance rhetoric to pursue rather intolerant policies, as those promulgated by the war on terror.) Notably, the state of exception, as a palpably new and characteristic manifestation of state sovereignty, often extends beyond the territorial boundaries of the state and involves pervasive regulation and control ‘beyond the law’ (with Guantánamo often cited as the archetypal paradigm). This last aspect has, in turn, been problematised on the grounds ‘that the exception to the law is itself of the law and that the exception’s attendant sovereign rule is constituted by law’ (Fitzpatrick & Joyce, Reference Fitzpatrick and Joyce2007, p. 65; see also Johns, Reference Johns2005; Hussain, Reference Hussain2007).
Mahmood Mamdani’s (Reference Mamdani1996, Reference Mamdani1999) exploration of African colonial rule and its transmogrifications could also cast some light on the (hidden) pervasiveness of the (Western) state in today’s complicated global power structures. Historically, European colonial states practised ‘indirect rule’, under which traditional, local power structures in the colonies were subsumed into the colonial administration, which generated a peculiar form of governmentality, characterised by Mamdani as ‘decentralized despotism’ (Mamdani, Reference Mamdani1996, chapter 2). According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, we are now witnessing ‘new indirect rule’ – a form of decentralised despotism which ‘does not clash with liberal democracy, [but] rather makes it increasingly irrelevant for the quality of life of increasingly larger populations’ (Santos, Reference Santos2007, p. 21).
What remains to be explored is what this new focus on the state and sovereign rule can tell us about orders such as international human rights lawFootnote 17 or supranational organisations – discourses which used to provide perfect instantiations of ‘regulation without the regulator’ (Brown, Reference Brown1997, p. 87). The European Union presents a particularly valid set of concerns as its relatively novel human rights and democracy rhetoric is acquiring an unmistakably imperial edge.
The second feature in Brown’s book that could benefit from further elaboration is transnational market rationality. Brown discusses the role of globalised capitalism in the work of tolerance towards the very end of the book. She notes the enthusiasm of liberal theorists such as Bernard Williams and Joseph Raz for the ‘erosion of nonmarket practices and customs’ by the combined effectiveness of ‘raw Western liberal imperialism and neoliberal globalization’, which implies certain ‘ease with which tolerance can be exported to nonliberal sites’ (p. 201). However, she contends that this is not the full picture as others, such as Will Kymlicka, do not appear to believe that embracing tolerance is an automatic market-generated process because tolerance requires the imposition of individual autonomy as a primary value (p. 202). Might this inconsistence be productive for counter-hegemonic globalised movements? For example, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Reference Santos, de Sousa Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito2005, Reference Santos2007) advocates ‘subaltern cosmopolitanism’ as a cognitive and social justice project ‘whose claims and criteria of social inclusion reach beyond the horizons of global capitalism’ (Santos, Reference Santos2007, p. 23). In a slightly different vein, Balakrishnan Rajagopal (Reference Rajagopal2003) explores Third World practices of resistance to the Western preoccupation with the ‘science of development’, which is ‘increasingly administered through international institutions’ (Merry, Reference Merry2006, p. 244). It remains to be explored whether such movements and resistance practices might be a desirable way of ‘nourishing counterdiscourses’ which Brown would like to see.
My third point hinges on Brown’s depiction of the Museum of Tolerance. The museum’s position is that prejudice causes intolerance, but eliminating prejudice is not possible. Hence, giving up one’s prejudice is not a prerequisite for becoming tolerant; rather, the task of tolerance is to manage one’s prejudices. Brown’s criticism of presenting prejudice as the cause of all intolerance is convincing: surely, presenting individual prejudice as the cause of intolerance depoliticises the problem as one of ‘remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power’ (Brown, Reference Brown2001, p. 40), which leads to simple solutions in which a ‘justice project is replaced with a therapeutic or behavioral one’ (p. 16).
Nonetheless, I wonder whether it might be worthwhile producing a different reading of the museum’s conviction that elimination of prejudice is impossible. It seems transparent that suppressing prejudice has its own dangerous ‘psychic costs and palpable social effects’, the full extent of which is perhaps yet to be comprehended. According to Brown, individuals in liberal formations are enfranchised on the condition that their ‘belief world’ be left outside of public life. Consequently, we are witnessing a palpable crisis of liberal secular arrangements which have become extremely vulnerable ‘to fundamentalist and other counter-hegemonic social movements’ (p. 93) – precisely because ‘all nonsecular sources of moral and ethical judgment’ (ibid.) are shunned from public discourse.
Thus, openly admitting prejudice (including as part of such non-secular sources) into public discourse, as ‘democratically contestable, partial, provisional political judgments’ (Brown, Reference Brown2001, p. 29), might be preferable to the moralising rancour of political correctness and hate speech laws that Brown so convincingly deplores throughout her work. Arguably, releasing one’s otherwise suppressed prejudices as a legitimate theme for political discussion and contestation could help foster ‘skills for speech that is neither confessional nor normative in a moralizing sense’, but ‘willingly proffers ideas one would argue with and modify according to other characterologically public (as opposed to confessional) arguments’ (Brown, Reference Brown2005, pp. 96, 97).
Rather than reifying prejudice, an honest acknowledgement of its deep-seated unfathomability might even contribute to the ‘project of connection across differences’ (p. 89) that Brown advocates. To reiterate, she criticises Freud’s theorising of group psychology for its pathologising effects, but she also appropriates it for its non-essentialist potential – the potential for liberalism to acknowledge ‘the Other within’ and thus to connect to its external others. According to Brown’s reading of Freud, all humans, liberal and non-liberal alike, are susceptible to radically diminished rationality and impulse control. If this is right, then the ever-present danger of giving in to one’s ‘prejudices’ connects people across the spectrum of ‘differences’.
Fourth, the final two chapters, in which Freud’s group psychology and civilisational discourse are invoked to explicate the liberal opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’, are undoubtedly of particular value as they add a further dimension to Brown’s theory. She thanks Mahmood Mamdani for reminding her that ‘the discursive practices emanating from the settler–native encounter are distinct from liberal democracy’s practices for managing its internal others’ (p. ix). Arguably, this insightful distinction underpins Brown’s conceptualisation of the limits of tolerance. It could, however, benefit from a more specific account of how in today’s world the colonised might (not) amalgamate with liberalism’s ‘internal others’.
For example, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Reference Santos2007) provides an interesting paradigm for thinking about this phenomenon. According to him, there is a double dichotomy of two drastically distinct modes of managing populations: what he calls regulation/emancipation and appropriation/violence. The dichotomy of regulation and emancipation closely resembles Foucault’s governmentality model and is conceived as universal, indeed, the ‘twin pillars of modernity’ (Santos, Reference Santos1995). However, this putative universality also renders invisible the ‘other side of the line’ where a very different dichotomy is at play: that of appropriation (‘incorporation, cooptation and assimilation’) and violence (‘physical, material, cultural, and human destruction’) (Santos, Reference Santos2007, p. 8), which were historically practised in colonial territories where the laws of the civilised were not deemed to apply. Although this invisible division corresponds to the traditional distinction between the metropolis and the colony, ‘the metaphorical cartography of the global lines has outlived the literal cartography of the amity lines that separated the Old from the New World’ (ibid., p. 11). ‘The other side of the line’ has now permeated ‘this side of the line’ (notably, in the figures of the terrorist, the undocumented migrant worker and the refugee) in such a thorough and porous way that the lines separating these two metaphorical worlds have become truly impossible to trace.
Although appropriation and violence are increasingly practised on what used to unconditionally be ‘this side of the line’, they are not perceived as an encroachment upon democratic rights and freedoms due to what Santos terms practices of ‘social fascism’, in which increasing powerlessness and disenfranchisement of large numbers of people take forms that are irrelevant to (rather than incompatible with) liberal democracy. On the contrary, the universality of the dichotomy of regulation and emancipation is reinforced rather than challenged.
Talal Asad’s recent study of the Western reaction to the phenomenon of suicide bombing provides further clues. He highlights how humanitarian discourse that denounces unnecessary suffering ‘rests on assumptions both of what is unnecessary and of what constitutes suffering’ (Asad, Reference Asad2007, p. 32, original emphasis), which leads to constructions of an increasingly wide range of human suffering as necessary. He argues that the liberal debate which tends to concentrate on the efficiency of imperial violence in effect produces two categories of humans – what he calls, after Graham Greene (Reference Greene1958), torturables and non-torturables. Asad suggests that ‘perhaps there hasn’t been a shift after all in popular Western notions of what is shocking’ (Asad, Reference Asad2007, p. 34) as the numerous atrocities committed or condoned by Western governments continue to concern torturables only – that is, the uncivilised, rather than liberalism’s ‘internal others’.
Tolerating Islam(ic dress)
One particularly rich area in which Brown’s argument could be appropriated and built upon is the special place of Islam in contemporary tolerance discourse, as is manifested in the currently topical legal, political and popular debate over Islamic dress codes.Footnote 18 Indeed, the debate routinely constructs Islamic clothes as an issue of (in)tolerance. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has had notable difficulties reconciling ‘the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and … equality and non-discrimination’.Footnote 19 Rather less subtly, the Sunday Times has written that ‘[a] woman shrouded in veils represents deliberate cultural separation, voluntary apartheid, a pre-Enlightenment religion and a view of relations between the sexes that the mainstream culture in this country can no longer accept and rejects in law’ – which is exactly ‘what many people fear about Muslims, no matter how tolerant they would like to feel’ (Marrin, Reference Marrin2006). There is much to be unpacked in these constructions.
In Chapter Four, Brown briefly discusses the special position that Islam has assumed in the post-Cold War era (see also Mamdani, Reference Mamdani2004). It may be useful to recall that marginalisation of Islam began earlier. Talal Asad (Reference Asad2003) highlights that the now widely-used term ‘Judeo-Christian civilisation’ is, in fact, a post-Holocaust construct: the inclusion of Jews into the contemporary Western civilisational paradigm has inevitably reinforced the exclusion of Muslims. With the onset of the ‘War on Terror’, however, the process has become accomplished as Islam has become the complete antithesis of the West on different (but non-contradictory) levels. Various forms of Islamic clothing, and most notably the ‘veil’, have come to embody this antithesis as they are ‘widely represented as simultaneously alien intrusions on Western ground, premodern holdovers, and antimodern threats to what we have achieved today’ (Valenta, Reference Valenta, de Vries and Sullivan2006, p. 465, original emphasis).
Yet this opposition between the modern and the pre-/anti-modern (which closely reflects the opposition between the civilised and barbarians that Brown theorises in the final chapter) is also being projected onto Islam itself. In its crudest form, it is the opposition between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ Muslim (Mamdani, Reference Mamdani2004), i.e. between ‘modernised’, ‘liberal’ Muslims and the fundamentalists. The acceptability of Islam in the ‘civilised world’ thus depends on the plausibility of its construction as compatible with the modern, liberal values of the West. As Saba Mahmood notes, in explorations by even Muslim scholars themselves, ‘Islam bears the burden of proving its compatibility with liberal ideals, and the line of question is almost never reversed’ (Mahmood, Reference Mahmood2003, p. 1). It has become conventional to emphasise the need for the transformation of Islam from an anachronistic, totalising and irrational religion into a democratised one, in which sacred texts are malleable to (re)interpretation. Indeed, Islam’s capability of reinterpretation is central to any effort to rescue it from the charge of barbarism as well as to many efforts to reconcile it with the international human rights doctrine (e.g. An-Na‘im Reference An-na‘im1990, Reference An-na‘im, An-Na‘im, Gort, Jansen and Vroom1995; Bielefeldt, Reference Bielefeldt1995).
This opposition between modern and pre-/anti-modern, liberal and fundamentalist (or what Brown might also term civilised and barbarian) Islam is closely reflected in the different legal constructions of Islamic dress codes. A leading judgement of the European Court of Human Rights concerning prohibitions of Islamic headscarves in Turkish universities refers to ‘extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts’Footnote 20 as a danger which justifies banishing headscarves from the public space. A seminal House of Lords judgment,Footnote 21 in contrast, casts headscarves and shalwar kameez (which are widely acceptable forms of dress in the United Kingdom) as non-threatening for the liberal democratic order. Yet, the construction of these clothes as harmless depends on the banishment of other, ‘stricter’ forms of Islamic dress (such as the jilbab which was at issue in the case). Following the Court of Appeal,Footnote 22 the House of Lords judgment explicitly subdivides all Muslims into ‘liberal’ (those who wear headscarves) and ‘very strict’ (those who prefer to cover themselves more thoroughly). These euphemistic categories clearly correspond to what Mamdani calls ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims.
The debate around the introduction of the notorious French law prohibiting religious symbols in public schoolsFootnote 23 is no less telling. Writing about the French situation, Seyla Benhabib describes the ‘complex symbolic negotiations’ ‘behind the simple act of veiling’ (Benhabib, Reference Benhabib2002, p. 97). She appears to share the vision of the veil of the French sociologists Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar as ‘the vehicle of passage to modernity within a promiscuity which confounds traditional distinctions, of an access to the public sphere which was forbidden to traditional women as a space of action and the constitution of individual autonomy’ (Gaspard & Khosrokhavar, Reference Gaspard and Khosrokhavar1995, pp. 44–45, translated by Benhabib, Reference Benhabib2002, p. 97, emphasis added; see also Werbner, Reference Werbner2007). Other, more explicitly liberal, commentators openly insist that, for Islamic dress codes to become fully acceptable, Islam needs to reinvent itself in a way compatible with the ‘fundamental principles of Europe’ (Gallala, Reference Gallala2006, p. 593). In this way, tolerance proffered for the practice of ‘veiling’ depends on the latter’s ability to be presented as a symbol of Muslim women’s liberal transformation, their transition to modernityFootnote 24 – and accordingly on its ability to convincingly repudiate the charge of ‘traditional’, ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘very strict’ Islam.
According to Saba Mahmood (Reference Mahmood2006), constructions of Islamic dress as a signFootnote 25 of women’s autonomy or transition to modernity (as espoused by Benhabib, Reference Benhabib2002) are indicative of a particular ‘singular relationship’ between the subject and a religious text whereby the text is a collection of signs to be interpreted by the subject. Such ‘secular hermeneutics’ are essential to ‘remaking certain kinds of religious subjectivities … so as to render them compliant with liberal political rule’ (Mahmood, Reference Mahmood2006, p. 328). Conversely, a traditionalist, ‘unquestioning mentality’ (ibid., p. 333) is threatening for the liberal order (as Brown indeed explains in Chapter Six, where she employs Freud’s account of group psychology), and thus religion has to be secularised as a system of signs and symbols not to be taken literally. This is exactly what many (Islamic) human rights scholars aspire to do. For example, Abdullahi An-Na‘im’s method is ‘to reexamine the scriptural imperatives in the Qur’an to make the dictates of Shari’a consistent with international human rights norms’ (An-Na‘im, Reference An-na‘im1990, p. 13) as he is:
challenging the failure of contemporary Muslims to appreciate the impact of historical context upon the interpretation and application of … fundamental sources of Islam. I argue that given the historical contexts of both initial revelation and subsequent interpretations of the texts of the Qur’an and Sunna, some texts are no longer applicable while others need to be interpreted differently. I believe that divine revelation must be understood and applied in historical context because it addresses us in our human condition and circumstances which change over time.
(An-Na‘im, Reference An-na‘im1990, pp. 13–14)The point here is not to deride such efforts to reconcile Islamic scriptural imperatives with secular values and international human rights norms. Rather, it is to simply highlight how they may inadvertently cement the unquestioning embrace of Western-type liberalism and secularism and thus further marginalise other, non-compliant ‘religious subjectivities’, from which tolerance is routinely and legitimately withdrawn. As Brown argues, tolerance acts as a principle of demarcation, which converts differences into ‘dire opposites’ and attributes ‘a distorting essence to each’ (p. 190), with the limits of tolerance denoting the limits of civilisation.
The irony of the liberal/fundamentalist dichotomy is, of course, that the two are not quite as diametrically opposed as they appear. According to Jean-Luc Nancy (Reference Nancy2007), liberal secular orders are just as inflected with affective attachments to some sort of external ideal as other political cultural formations are.Footnote 26 Albeit in a rather different vein, this vision is much in line with Brown’s reading of Freud in Chapter Six which suggests that all, both liberal and non-liberal, humans are equally susceptible to radically diminished rationality and impulse control, in which individual ego ideals are absorbed by an external object. More to the point of Islam, Lila Abu-Lughod’s (Reference Abu-lughod and Abu-Lughod1998) study of Islamist political currents in twentieth-century secular Egypt highlights the dynamics of what she calls ‘selective repudiation’. According to her, contemporary Islamist movements’ positions on such matters as marriage and the family are deeply, if unrecognisably, imbued with modern liberal values, which have reshaped Egyptian society since British colonisation. Ironically, much of today’s Islamist family ideology is heavily indebted to earlier modern Western feminist ideas on exclusive companionate marriage and informed child rearing (see also Najmabadi, Reference Najmabadi1993; Hatem, Reference Hatem1994; Kandiyoti, Reference Kandiyoti and Abu-Lughod1998). In light of these lessons from history, Foucault’s famous characterisation of the 1978 Islamic revolution in Iran, in which women’s movements played a significant part, as ‘postmodern’ (Sullivan, Reference Sullivan and Abu-Lughod1998, p. 227) (as opposed to pre-modern or anti-modern) makes perfect sense.
The ‘veiling’ debate is also profoundly shaped by the liberal notions of autonomy and choice, which are central to contemporary tolerance rhetoric in the West. Talal Asad’s (Reference Asad, de Vries and Sullivan2006) exploration of French secularism highlights the ‘coerced/freely chosen’ binary, prevalent in parliamentary as well as popular discussions of why Muslim girls and women in France may veil. A little more subtly, the judgment of Baroness Hale in the British Denbigh High School case expresses concerns over the ‘free will’ of Muslim girls who may want to adopt such attire as ‘genuine individual consent to a discriminatory practice or dissent from it may not be feasible where these girls are not yet adult’.Footnote 27 Indeed, it has long been assumed that ‘veiling is in and of itself an inherently oppressive practice’, with the possibility of ‘choosing’ to veil being ‘beyond comprehension’ (Hirschmann, Reference Hirschmann1998, p. 349) and hence intolerable.
In the final chapter, Brown briefly discusses ‘veiling’ as the archetypal anti-liberal practice signifying total restraint of autonomy and choice. She forcefully criticises liberal feminists, such as Susan Moller Okin (Reference Okin1999), who use the paradigm of women’s choice to sheath Western cultural chauvinism. Such feminists construct culture and gender as complete antagonisms, with ‘culture’ being markedly non-liberal and incessantly conflated with ‘religion’. At the same time, they appear to believe that Western liberal legal orders are uniquely capable of upholding and advancing gender equality. Both culture and patriarchy thus are positioned as ‘always elsewhere from liberalism’ (p. 195), and their perpetuation of women’s inequality in the rest of the world is deemed so uniquely serious because it is formally inscribed in (non-liberal) law, which ‘openly avows its religious and cultural character’ (p. 197).Footnote 28
Brown highlights how the formal existence of choice within liberalism is valued regardless of its actualisability, reinforced by ‘strict quantification of sexism’ (‘more there, less here’) and ‘inattention to the varieties of male superordination’ (pp. 195–196, original emphasis). According to Brown, limiting freedom to choice ‘sets loose, in a depoliticized underworld, a sea of social powers nearly as coercive as law, and certainly as effective in producing subjectivated subjects’ (p. 197). She invokes ‘a combination of Marcusian and Foucaultian perspectives’ to recall how choice becomes ‘a critical instrument of domination in liberalist capitalist societies’, which ‘both cloaks and potentially eroticizes the powers it engages’ (ibid.). To illustrate the point, she uses the example of ‘the nearly compulsory baring of skin by American teenage girls’ as ‘our own form of compulsory feminine dress’, which however is commonly represented as ‘absolute freedom of choice’ (p. 189).Footnote 29
Brown asks: ‘What makes choices “freer” when they are constrained by secular and market organizations of femininity and fashion rather than by state or religious law?’ (ibid.), and suggests that it is the putative legal autonomy of the subject and the putative autonomy of the law in the West that enable the construction of Western women as free and their non-Western counterparts as utterly lacking in agency. These insights may help foster political strategies that would challenge both the fetishisation of choice in the constructions of veiled women and ‘the belief that power is only and always a matter of law and sovereignty’ (ibid.), which is implicit in this fetishisation.
Interestingly though, ‘market organizations of femininity and fashion’ converge with secular state law in formal prohibitions of Islamic dress in the West. Arguably, the ‘feminist veneer’ (Motha, Reference Motha2007, p. 162) of these laws has patent capitalist undercurrents as they prescribe that ‘feminity be exhibited’, that the putatively emancipatory ‘circulation of the feminine body necessarily comply with the market paradigm’ (Badiou, Reference Badiou and Badiou2006, p. 103, original emphasis). In this way, veiling may be so intolerable also because it confines women to a ‘restricted economy’, thus resisting the hegemonic ‘generalized model’ of ‘prostitutional circulation’ (ibid., pp. 102, 104).
Finally, constructions of Islamic dress codes are firmly imbued with a public/private division, which Brown also highlights in her account of the depoliticisation of tolerance in Chapter One. Various Islamic dress prohibitions in Europe commonly relate to the public sphere, notably public educational establishments. Interestingly, the human rights framework within which challenges to such prohibitions have been brought, further entrenches this public/private separation. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects freedom of religion, has been widely used as the most plausible legal basis for such challenges. This legal provision implies a distinction between the right to hold a belief (which is absolute) and the right to manifest a belief (which can be qualified).Footnote 30 The courts in Europe have established that wearing Islamic clothes falls within the right to manifest a belief, which is generally treated as a public expression of the (private) right to hold a belief.Footnote 31 These judicial constructions depoliticise Islamic dress by assigning it to the private sphere and refusing to tolerate it in public, in exactly the same fashion as Brown theorises.
Conclusion
Brown’s book is both a refreshingly new perspective on one of liberalism’s most fundamental values and a valuable additional dimension for her own critical project. Her loosening of the ‘analytic noose around liberalism’ (p. ix) makes some welcome room for the discourses of colonialism and civilisation, implicated in contemporary tolerance talk, which together help ‘to reveal important features of our political time and condition’ (p. 4). Brown’s study highlights different aspects of tolerance, showing that tolerance rhetoric, although ‘semiotically polyvalent, politically promiscuous, and sometimes incoherent’ (p. 3), has its own logic of governmentality.
This review has been concerned with the operation of Brown’s argument within what she calls the ‘international discourse of Western supremacy and imperialism’ (p. 7). A few themes in the book’s argument have been highlighted, which could be advanced in further directions, including in light of Brown’s earlier theoretical work. It has been suggested that the current Islamic dress debate is one particularly rich area in which Brown’s theorising of tolerance could inform legal and political strategy. The book’s insights could help problematise the unhelpful liberalism/fundamentalism and choice/coercion paradigms that palpably frame this topical issue.
