This briskly-written study explains how Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere, prioritized national unity over personal rights and political freedoms. Paul Bjerk believes that national unity and sovereign government require the consent of citizens to limits on personal freedom. Obtaining such consent, he argues, was an urgent priority for new African nations as they emerged from colonialism with their sovereignty and legitimacy still far from fully formed. He describes how Nyerere addressed this priority in the first years of independence by building institutions and framing political ideology that achieved both domestic legitimacy as well as international acceptance of Tanzanian sovereignty. Nyerere realized, argues Bjerk, that he must balance ‘discipline and consensual legitimacy’ (263). Thus the purpose of this study is to reveal both the discursive interventions that achieved popular consent and the intense pressures which, in Bjerk's view, left the Nyerere government with no alternative but to restrict personal and political freedoms.
Among the threats to national unity, Bjerk focuses largely on two issues familiar to historians and another, which is less familiar. The familiar threats were racism (expressed particularly in demands for Africanization of the civil service and military) and ethnicity. The less familiar issue was organized labor. Not only were its leaders recklessly populist and racialist, he argues, but they joined an aborted coup attempt during the military mutiny of January 1964. The assertion that labor leaders joined the mutineers is likely to be one of the more controversial in this book. President Nyerere responded to these threats, argues Bjerk, by drawing upon the ethic of consensus and communal control of land that he had known as a rural youth. It now became the foundation of ujamaa, his version of African socialism. Having formulated a legitimizing socialist ideology, President Nyerere acted decisively in defense of national unity. Fearful of class and racial conflict, he destroyed the independent labor movement; convinced that private landholding corroded communal traditions, he abolished it; and, wholly opposed to open political competition, he created a one-party state. Bjerk traces the origins of ujamaa villagization and compulsory national service and also examines Tanzanian foreign relations, concentrating on the struggles against apartheid and Portuguese colonialism in the early 1960s that Nyerere regarded as essential for the defense of national sovereignty.
Bjerk recognizes that Nyerere's policies caused the ‘sacrifice of democratic debate’ and ‘undermining of democratic principles’ (95). Nevertheless, he believes that Nyerere was correct in prioritizing national unity. Probably most Tanzanians today would agree, though a current of dissent has persisted from the 1960s to the present. Certainly persistent division among Tanzanians over the status of Zanzibar will lead some to question the book's favorable assessment of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. They will likely feel that the rich detail presented by Bjerk confirms the view, long held by proponents of Zanzibari autonomy, that Nyerere trampled the Zanzibari right of self-determination in his haste to fend off Western intervention. Another area that, in my view, deserves further inquiry concerns Nyerere's decision to destroy the independent labor movement. When we consider how the lamentably low earning power of today's fragmented and voiceless labor force drags down consumer demand, restricts tax revenue, and retards social improvement, should we not ask whether eliminating the unions as an independent political force was truly wise?
Bjerk's chapters on ujamaa ideology and villagization will be essential reading for historians of Tanzania. By showing how President Nyerere found inspiration in Tanzania's rural cultures, he goes far towards explaining why his call for ujamaa resonated across the new nation. Yet, perhaps this view risks overestimating national consensus during the ujamaa period. As an ideology that celebrated its own connectedness with traditional culture, ujamaa inspired a wealth of imagery about agrarian Tanzania. Not all of it was sympathetic or accurate. As Bjerk points out, villagers were imagined as politically naïve ‘uneducated masses’ (82) who were said to subscribe, among other beliefs and values, to ‘the widely held idea that young men were by definition available for quasimilitary functions’ (157). Skeptical interrogation of such images might well reveal, however, that villagers often understood their government well enough to be disappointed when it decided to impose national service, for it interrupted the education and careers of the very children whom they had struggled so ardently to send to school. Bjerk has clarified the stakes in debate about Nyerere and the ujamaa period. His study will leave historians well poised for the challenge of fully incorporating into their stories critics as well as proponents of ujamaa.
