Chapter 1
Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin propose a naturalistic theory of cognition called Radical Enactive Cognition (REC), which entails that minds do not contain or process informational content; rather, human cognition can be explained in terms of how an organism interacts or directly relates with its environment. They contrast their theory with Jerry Fodor’s and Fred Dretske’s intellectualist approach, that holds that the existence of contents in the brain is a necessary requirement for cognition. The authors call this “Content Involving Cognition” (CIC). REC holds that there is no way to distinguish between the inner theatre of the mind and the outer world of objects because cognition is an activity involving direct interaction of body, brain, and the world. They argue that REC has much more explanatory power than CIC theories and the CIC notion of informational content is “too metaphysically extravagant to be accepted by hard-nosed naturalists.” (21)
Chapter 2
Here the authors distinguish their position from other forms of enactivism. Sensorimotor Enactivism does not mesh with REC because it assumes one needs knowledge to experience the world. Autopoietic Enactivism fails because it claims that responses create and carry meaning, but REC “abandons talk of contents and meanings.” (34)
Chapter 3
Fodor argues that all activity requires planning, and planning requires computing and representation, thus REC is unable to account for intelligent action. The authors present findings from work in Artificial Intelligence and biology that show that behaviour-based robots and crickets exhibit successful navigation because they interact with their environments directly with no need for a mediating representation/mental model of the world. They argue that CIC explanations of action face the problem of explaining how the mind is able to adjust to very specific and constantly changing features of the environment with accurate models and plans to execute a particular act.
Chapter 4
In this chapter, the authors attempt to deal with “the Hard Problem of Content” (HPC): the problem of explaining content within a naturalistic framework. They also answer the information processing challenge: how to counteract the dominant view in cognitive science that mentality is informational. Their response to the latter is to break down the CIC approach and argue that examples of natural content are really examples of information-as-covariance, which cannot do the work of information-as-content. Covariant relations are simple relations where one state of affairs stands in a binary relation to another and does not say anything about the other state of affairs.
So, the CIC and CEC naturalists face a dilemma; they must either accept the information-as-covariance and thus deny that cognition involves information-as-content with truth bearing properties, or to solve the HPC, they can accept that content exists and try to find a naturalist explanation for it. The second option requires positing “metaphysical extras” that fit within the natural world. But that approach requires one to abandon physicalism, which is much too metaphysically expensive for a naturalist. If the CICer is committed to explanatory naturalism, then they cannot posit information-as-content because that would be to deny the “Muggle constraint” of explanatory naturalism.Footnote 1
Chapter 5
The CIC naturalist still has one more move to make: he/she can say that the phenomena discussed so far does not need to be explained by CIC because any phenomena that can be explained by REC using informational covariance or biological function is not the kind they are trying to explain. CICers could appeal to perceptual experience and argue that if anything requires mental representation, it is perception. But this still leaves us with no answer to the HPC and thus it fails the test of explanatory naturalism.
Chapter 6
Here the authors argue that biological proper function is insufficient to explain accurate or inaccurate perception. That an organism is properly functioning does not entail that the device knows the truth about the world. It is worth pointing out here that if they take this view, they are wide open to Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. Roughly, if naturalism is true, we have much less reason to think that our cognitive capacities are aimed at truth, and thus we cannot know that naturalism is true.Footnote 2
Chapter 7
Finally, the authors provide an explanation of their theory of Extensive Minds. Minds are not brain-bound or internal but rather extend throughout the brain, body, and the world. Although they argue that basic minds lack content, they do hold that representational contents emerge at the level of language use, but this is “dependent upon shared, scaffolded practices.” (152) In other words, we use a shared set of rules to manipulate external symbols among users. Thus, minds never require internal content to think, but they may use external content to communicate with other minds.
Chapter 8
“The Hard Problem of Consciousness” is the difficulty in explaining how physical/brain states are related or connected to phenomenal experiences. The authors argue that this Hard Problem should be avoided altogether. It is impossible to solve because it begins with the wrong assumption: that there is a metaphysical difference between the mental and physical. They deny the difference and so deny the need for an explanation. Although they deny that basic minds have content, they maintain the existence of “phenomenal concepts” which refer to and represent things in the world, but only because others have had similar experiences and have developed common external symbols to refer to that experience.
Critical Analysis
The strength of this book is its clear examples illustrating that REC has more explanatory power than CIC. However, one main problem with this theory of mind is that there is no clear explanation of exactly how phenomenal concepts arise. How does language use, which requires triadic (mediated) relations, emerge from binary (direct) interactions between the world, the brain, and the body? A sign could not represent something other than itself if the ontology of basic minds makes representation impossible. Their argument is also weakened by their dogmatic commitment to explanatory naturalism. Their arguments would have greatly benefitted from even one good reason for accepting the “Muggle constraint” of explanatory naturalism. They imply that every move in the philosophy of mind must not transgress from physicalism simply because to step out of this constraint is too “metaphysically extravagant.” To begin an inquiry assuming that no discovery we make could possibly imply that physicalism is false, obviously begs the question. Those working in philosophy of mind should be honestly looking to find out whether it really is the case that physicalism is true. This book fails to take this approach.
