Three major continental powers, China, Russia, and India are now moving their competition to the world's oceans, argues Geoffrey F. Gresh in his study of Eurasian navalism. The use of naval power by key states in the region is to enhance their status and position. Much like the period leading up to World War I, Gresh sees naval competition contributing to greater maritime insecurity and increasing the risk of unintended naval conflict. Since the “Great Game” emerged in the nineteenth century, Eurasia has long been seen as the focal point for geopolitical competition and Gresh's study breaks new ground in its focus on the naval dimension.

Gresh begins by outlining two classic approaches to naval power. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), author of The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1600–1783, wrote that states should project sea power to enhance their global influence. Conversely, Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922), focused on the power of the purse (trade) and argued that access denial was key to crippling the opponent's trade (7). In his study Gresh sees India, China, and Russia employing a mixture of both approaches—projecting their own naval power but seeking to deny access to other competitors.

Gresh is particularly adept at documenting China's quest for global port access. Readers of this book no doubt will be familiar with Chinese investments in the Greek port of Piraeus, Djibouti, at the intersection of the Red and Arabian Seas, and Pakistan's Gwadar and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, but Gresh's research shows convincingly that China has expanded its port access in most of the world's oceans, with unpredictable political consequences. The book also details similar Russian efforts in the Black Sea and Indian activities in the Indian Ocean—maps assist the reader in finding the less well-known ports. While the book focuses more on power projection moves by the three countries, even more interesting is the discussion of the “grey zone” threats—non-traditional methods to engage in sea denial—such as China's use of maritime militias, or the vulnerability to sabotage of the more than 200 undersea cables needed for global communications.

What motivates rising navalism in Eurasia? According to Gresh, the three countries are motivated by geoeconomic goals, the quest for prestige and status, and the aim to secure sea lanes of communication (SLOCS). This is a complicated tale due to the nature of the relationships among the three countries under study. Gresh deftly examines how Sino-Russian partnership has motivated their naval cooperation, but also notes the potential for their maritime competition in the Mediterranean and Arctic.

By contrast, the impact of the India-Russia relationship is not addressed as fully, though Russia has sought to promote trilateral India-China-Russia cooperation for several decades. Russian efforts have achieved limited success—we only have seen some trilateral discussions along the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (in which India has been a full member since 2017) and in the BRICS emerging economies. However, Russia provides military technology to both India and China, perpetuating their competition, including in maritime space. Russia and India are also creating a maritime corridor of their own, linking Chennai and Vladivostok, at the same time that China is pursuing its Maritime Silk Road, which India has opted not to join. The Sino-Indian conflict has always had a continental dimension (as have Sino-Russian tensions), and the discussion of their maritime competition would benefit from this broader context. India's current emphasis, directed against China, on maritime power projection and sea denial, needs to factor in the June 2020 Sino-Indian border clashes, for example.

Gresh concludes with recommendations for US policymakers. One innovative idea involves deploying US Treasury officials across the globe to help foreign central banks deal with their debts to China and help them avoid undue dependence. Other proposals involve encouraging greater NATO and Indian attention to maritime challenges. Gresh also urges greater attention to non-traditional security threats from Chinese paranaval groups and securing underwater communications cables. The book ends with a warning—Russia, China, and India will fill any void created by a diminished US maritime presence, contributing to greater naval competition among these states. This intriguing study will be of interest to naval experts as well as scholars with a research interest in international relations in Eurasian, Chinese, Indian, or Russian foreign policy.