John Ciorciari's new book offers a timely and welcome treatment of the role of major powers like the United States and China in Southeast Asia. For three decades, scholars have lavished attention on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a toothless regional organization essentially irrelevant to Southeast Asian countries' bilateral relations among themselves and with major powers outside the region. The overall effect of this “ASEANology” has been to render the study of the international relations of Southeast Asia an intellectually and politically narrow field of inquiry and debate, lowering the standards of empirical research and theoretical discussion and limiting understandings of the international politics of the region to formal diplomatic activity. With few exceptions, writings on the contemporary role of, say, the United States or Japan in Southeast Asia since the mid-1970s have been largely restricted to journalists and activists, remaining essentially outside the realm of academic research and discussion.
Against this backdrop, the publication of Ciorciari's book in 2010 was long overdue. The preceding decade, after all, saw growing attention to the expansion of Chinese economic and military power across Asia and beyond, with increasing interest in the projection of Chinese influence in the South China Sea and in Southeast Asia. The year 2010, moreover, saw the U.S. government not only reaffirming its hegemonic position in Northeast Asian regional security arrangements but also reasserting its power and prerogatives in Southeast Asia as well, most notably with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's public expressions of U.S. national interest in the peaceful resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute and in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. In this context, observers of Southeast Asia's international relations are finally beginning to examine the varying nature of American and Chinese influence across the region, and to determine how far the United States will succeed in enlisting Southeast Asian support for its strategy to contain China's projection of its power across the Asia-Pacific.
Such observers and other scholars would do well to consult The Limits of Alignment as they try to read the proverbial tea leaves about possible international realignments in Southeast Asia. Ciorciari makes a commendably clear and straightforward argument: Developing countries in regions like Southeast Asia tend to favor limited alignments, rather than tighter alliances with higher commitments and more binding security linkages, in their relations with great powers. Here, the book's title signals what the author sees as an original contribution to the international security literature, where terms like “soft balancing” and “hedging” have already achieved wide currency. “Limited alignments,” in Ciorciari's definition, “typically include arrangement for preferential arms sales, joint training exercises, and other forms of military aid. Such relationships are usually public but they do not carry a general pledge of military support in the event of a crisis or a general commitment to engage in joint combat operations. Limited alignments seldom give a great power basing privileges. Instead, great-power partners may enjoy commercial access to military facilities and some degree of logistical or technical assistance. Examples include contemporary U.S. ties to Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia” (p. 8).
Ciorciari proceeds first by deducing the “risk-and-reward calculus” that leads to states' adherence to a strategy of limited alignment, stressing the advantages of preserving exit or alternative options as a form of insurance under conditions of uncertainty, with the rewards of protection and assistance accompanying great-power alignment tempered by the hazards—diminished independence, alienation of other states and domestic actors, and risks of entrapment or abandonment—that tighter alliances entail (p. 9). Limited alignments, he surmises, allow states in the developing world to reap the benefits of alliance with great powers while preserving flexibility, leverage, and autonomy (pp. 16–55).
The author then treats patterns of great-power alignment by 10 Southeast Asian states—Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—from 1975 to the present day. Successive chapters chronicle major trends and developments in relations between various Southeast Asian countries and the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Here, he deserves commendation for providing a broad overview otherwise lacking in the literature. Unsurprisingly, he also presents this overview as evidence confirming his theory: If one considers each country's alignment posture for every year as a single observation, “Southeast Asian states pursued limited alignments in 239 observations—about 71 percent of the time” (p. 129). Tight alliances were adopted only 18% of the time, and nonalignment was even more rare (11% of the time). In the post–Cold War era, the tendency of Southeast Asian states to adopt limited alignment grew more pronounced, with a frequency of 82%. Taken at face value, Ciorciari's exercise in hypothesis testing thus appears to confirm his theory of limited alignment, at least across the diverse countries of Southeast Asia over a 35-year period, suggesting its potential applicability to a broader range of developing countries today and marking the book as a major contribution to the study of both Southeast Asia in particular and international relations as a whole.
On closer inspection and reflection, however, the limits of The Limits of Alignment also become apparent. “Limited alignments” are so broadly construed, vaguely defined, and frequently found as to render their prevalence unsurprising and uninteresting, and to raise suspicions as to the validity and value of Ciorciari's analysis. Singapore's enduringly intimate relationship with the United States, for example, is designated as a limited alignment even as it has expanded its naval facilities to accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers and warships and otherwise proven the depths of its loyalty to Washington; Thailand's limited linkages with China are implausibly treated as equivalent to its long-standing deep ties to the United States. Ciorciari's very definition suggests that limited alignments could well be overdetermined, if U.S. ties to Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also fall into this category.
Even the most generous reading of this account begs the question: If limited alignments are so commonplace and cover such a broad range of relationships, then how can we explain fluctuations within their wide ambit? Ciorciari tries to cover the ebb and flow of alignments across the region, but his analysis is ad hoc and inconsistent, biased in favor of a putatively “benign” United States, and superficial in its rendering of national contexts. As with ASEANology, his account obscures the breadth and depth of economic, military, and political linkages between the United States and both states and dominant blocs of social forces in most countries in the region, dating back to the construction of conservative authoritarian regimes—and ASEAN itself—during the Cold War. The extent of Southeast Asian acquiescence in American hegemony and integration into a U.S.-dominated global order thus remains unacknowledged and unproblematic. But unlike the ASEANologists, Ciorciari has revealed the limitations of his own scholarship: If limited alignments are indeed the rule, then much closer, more careful, and more critical investigation and analysis of U.S. (Japanese, and now Chinese) power in Southeast Asia is clearly in order, and a new agenda for empirical research on the international relations of the region is plain for all to see.
