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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
The dissertations in the Allan Nevins prize competition have often been read as tea leaves to discern the future direction of the profession. Collectively, those submitted covered diverse subjects, as represented in this panel by topics ranging from colonial currency to food safety regulation to World War II antidiscrimination legislation. The time-periods covered in the works were also spread broadly, although none centered in the nineteenth century, which has traditionally dominated the attention of economic historians of North America. The pivotal period for Claire Priest is the 1730s and 1740s, for Marc Law the 1900s and 1910s, and for Ryan Johnson the 1930s and early 1940s. The new works should serve to widen our time-horizons. Another feature unifying these dissertations is that all three study (to one degree or another) the effects of policies and their enforcement on the economy. We learn of the balance between the courts and the regulators and of the gaps between the stated goals of legislation and the results actually achieved.
But the exercise of tealeaf reading is probably just seeking patterns where none exists. It neglects the true virtues that make each of these dissertations worthy of inclusion in this panel—namely, that each starts with an interesting question and takes impressive steps towards providing answers. I focus my remarks on what I found most exciting about these dissertations.
I should admit I face some risk in discussing these dissertations because each addresses a topic far outside my area. I have learned much from each dissertation—perhaps too much given that the bulk of what I now “know” about these topics is derived from the authors' work. There is then a risk that I will expose my ignorance—or still worse lead you to adopt it as your own—by venturing some unsupported claim or issuing some criticism long dismissed by those with greater learning. Given this, I will begin with the topic nearest to my own and then proceed into areas I admit to knowing less about, indeed little before reading these dissertations.
Marc Law's dissertation is actually about this very issue—what happens as the scope of specialized knowledge grows and the information gap between producers and consumers widens. His study is set in the turn-of-the-twentieth century U.S. economy as it is experiencing a growing national market, increasing urbanization, a greater division of labor, and the rising importance of science.
This innovative work is sweeping in scope. It starts with the specific and local—examining food regulation at the state level—then moves to the national level to investigate the operation of the Food and Drug Administration, and then explores the more general issues of the rise of professions and the impact of occupational regulation. The questions about regulation are broadly framed in the market power versus efficiency debate. Do the regulations and regulatory agencies operate to restrict competition to benefit the economic groups that have captured the legal process as Clayton Coppin and Jack High suggest or do they operate in the public interest to relieve market failures, such as those due to problems of asymmetric information.1
Coppin and High, Politics.
Although Law employs statistical analysis, the papers are not set up in the classic cliometrics showdown where the hypotheses from the existing literature face-off in a grand econometric confrontation (a duel by regressions employing the newest data and the latest techniques) and after a careful tallying of significant t-statistics, a victor is declared. Rather, Dr. Law uses the statistical tests as pieces of evidence, in combination with narrative evidence and qualitative arguments to advance his case incrementally.
In general, he does not find much support for the anticompetitive effects of the food safety or occupational regulations. Instead in the chapters on food safety, Law argues quite plausibly that well-equipped labs and superior training gave government scientists a comparative advantage over the typical consumer in detecting food adulteration. He further asserts that state enforcement of labeling regulations—and for Law, the key was the presence of an enforcement agency rather that mere laws on the books—helped solve the lemons problems for the benefit of both sides of the market. Such problems were growing more severe as urbanization and commercialization increased the gap between food consumers and producers just as the advance of science was creating new chemical additives that provided low-cost means of “extending” products—adding glucose to liquid honey—as well as new preservatives to prevent decay.
In his exploration of city-level prices over the 1890–1903 period (for butter, cheese, milk, sugar, molasses, and vinegar), Law found that the presence of a state enforcement agencies did not have a statistically significant effect in raising prices, slowing their decline, or reducing variance, as the market-power hypothesis would suggest. The only possible exception is butter, where the effects of restrictions on oleomargarine are well known. Law also used the 1903 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics survey to examine the relationship with food regulations and household consumption patterns. If enforcement of pure food laws reduced information costs (as he suggests), per capita consumption of potentially adulterated products should be higher in states with stricter legislation. This prediction is confirmed for butter, tea, and coffee.
Several aspects of this analysis caught my attention. First, Law sought to explain his exceptional cases rather than treating them as statistical freaks. Second, these price data have been available forever but Law displayed an admirable ability to make “old” data do new tricks. If I must be critical, I would note that none of these results is overwhelmingly powerful and that although the study is focused on state-level regulation, it relies predominately on federal sources to summarize these efforts. He does not exploit the wealth of state- and municipal-level sources that might hold keys to generating stronger findings.
Adopting the national perspective is far more appropriate for his study of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act and its effectiveness in stemming the interstate trade in adulterated and misbranded products. Law goes beyond theorizing to examine the cross-product variation in enforcement activities of the FDA as revealed in its annual reports. Again Law finds the market-power explanation lacking. The Pure Food and Drug Act worked primarily through labeling requirements with only limited restrictions on food products “not fit for human consumption.” Thus it appears to create a level playing field rather than restrict competition among the players. The act's authors (chiefly Harvey Wiley) sought to avoid direct confrontations with the producers of patent medicines, although the FDA did not shy away from pursuing misbranding cases when they arose. Law finds that FDA enforcement efforts were focused on those food products most subject to deception about quality—canned tomatoes, seafood, and condensed or evaporated milk—just as his information-based hypothesis suggests.
He further argues that the FDA chiefly gained compliance chiefly through using noncoercive means—ex ante advice and certification—instead of relying on forceful ex post enforcement. Many producers cooperated with the FDA to attain low-cost signals of quality—as in the voluntarily program at its Color Investigation Laboratory that certified the safety of coal-tar based food dyes and its agency's inspection efforts for the canned seafood industry. The threat of bad publicity also kept some of the food producers and drug makers in line.
This discussion called to mind the memorable exchange at the 1994 Clio meetings between Joel Mokyr and Richard Sutch over the economic gains versus culinary losses resulting from the invention of the tin can.2
Mokyr and Stein, “Science,” as presented at the 1994 Cliometrics Meeting, Phoenix, AZ.
Finally let me briefly draw a link that I think deserves elaboration between the last chapter on the rise of professional training and the earlier two chapters on food safety. For an economist operating in an intellectual environment influenced by the public choice school, the obvious and difficult question is why the regulator would enforce the rules honestly or nonopportunistically. Why is he or she not just one more grasping hand seeking a bribe or perhaps just a complete do-nothing? The answer would seem to come from the regulator's membership in a profession, one requiring a lengthy investment in training and certification and one holding frequent meetings (not unlike the EHA) and providing honors and demerits.
Such a training process serves to inculcate the values of the profession and weed out some who fail to adopt them. Once completed, this training allows the professional to receive a stream of rents above what one can earn (ex post) in other activities. However, if one violates the professional codes of conduct, one is decertified—e.g., disbarred as a lawyer—and loses this earnings stream. The dichotomy between efficiency versus market power addressed in the final chapter on the rise of professions then appears to be slightly misleading. It is threatened loss of the ex post rents (resulting from barriers to entry) that helps hold the professional hostage and limits opportunist performance. These are just poorly informed speculations, but I wonder what forces Dr. Law believes work to keep the food safety regulators on-task.
In his praise-worthy dissertation, Ryan Johnson taps into the wealth of information available at the state level that can help address questions that national data cannot address. He creates a valuable public good by assembling a new data set on manufacturing and mining in Pennsylvania in the period bracketed by the World Wars. The annual nature of this data provides extra leverage for analyzing key issues regarding business-cycle conditions and policy shifts that cannot be easily answered with the existing IPUMS cross-sections.
Pennsylvania is just one state, but it is nearly ideal for investigating the issues at the intersection of race, unionization, and employment. The Keystone State had the largest black population in the North, was the second leading industrial state circa 1929, and a leader in industrial unionization in the 1930s and 1940s.
As in Dr. Law's work, Dr. Johnson's chapters are organized in the form of articles, including some repetition, but allowing for easier separation for publication, which is smart. Another aspect of the work that I liked was that the results allowed Johnson to enter directly into outgoing debates, specifically with William Collins on the impact of Fair Employment Practices Commission during the Second World War and with William Sundstrom on the origins of the black-white unemployment gaps.3
Collins, “Race”; and Sundstrom, “Last Hired.”
The study's data is a panel of annual observations on over 300 manufacturing and mining industries over a crucial 35-year period from the Pennsylvania “Report on Productive Industries.” (I am not sure why but the academe was not considered a “productive” industry.) The Pennsylvania data do not have everything one might desire—the units of observation are industries rather than plants or individual workers. And although the data set includes the composition of the labor force (black, native white, and foreign-born white; male and female) by industry and average wages, it does not have race-specific wages.
Despite these limitations, Ryan Johnson uses his data set to generate a number of valuable, novel, and robust findings. These include, first, that the degree of industrial segregation, while initially high in Pennsylvania, did not display the rigidity that characterized Southern manufacturing. A major increase in integration appears to occur after 1935. Second, blacks were disproportionately hired in high-wage (not low-wage) industries until the mid-1940s. This surprising finding raises serious questions with the industrial-crowding hypothesis that dominates the literature. Occupational and education differences, not industry segregation, must explain black-white income differentials in the region in 1940. One of the aspects that I liked most about this analysis is that Johnson cross-checked his findings with the IPUMS sample and then rechecked to see whether the results were due to the operation of compensating differentials (for example, whether blacks were in disproportionately dangerous industries, they were not.) The annual nature of the Pennsylvania data allows Dr. Johnson to show blacks were clustered in the more cyclically volatile industries—those that experienced disproportionately rapid growth during the booms of the 1920s and disproportionately rapid declines during the 1930s.
If he were to link his data set to the U.S. Census of Manufactures, which is available biennially over the period under exploration, I think Johnson could push his analysis a little further by exploring the relation between segregation and plant size—were black workers less common in industries with small plant sizes? In such industries, interactions with white workers might be different than in industries with large plants.
When examining the emergence of racial employment gaps (which Sundstrom found in 1931 but not 1910), Johnson focuses on the role of policy. He extends the work of Harold Cole and Lee Ohanion, others who showed that New Deal policies slowed the desirable deflation of wages to argue that the high-wage policies worsened economic conditions for blacks.4
Cole and Ohanion, “Great Depression.”
See O'Brien, “Behavioral Explanation.”
The study on the integration of blacks into Pennsylvania manufacturing during the Second World War takes Johnson into another vital area of recent research. In a series of important papers, Collins has argued that African-American who entered the defense industry during the war and then remained employed there in 1950 earned 14 percent more than their observationally equivalent counterparts, that the legal action of Roosevelt's wartime Fair Employment Practice Commission appears to have opened doors to these jobs for blacks, and that the more racially tolerant CIO unions helped push the antidiscrimination agenda before, during, and after the war. By linking his panel data set with industry-specific information on the extent of unionization and on FEPC case files, Johnson can explore whether Collin's story is the Pennsylvania story. The ability to use annual data on favorably resolved antidiscrimination complaints allows Johnson to claim greater leverage in identifying the effects of the agency. He finds minimal effects. The CIO is also cast in a more neutral light, without as strong negative effects on integration as the AFL or nonaffiliated unions, but not a powerful force for change either.
As I said above, I think the great aspect of this work is that Ryan Johnson is ready to step in directly to several important policy debates that we will all find stimulating and insightful. There is also substantial potential to push the analysis back to examine the labor market during the First World War and to investigate the competition between blacks and foreign-born whites in the 1910s and 1920s. I also see many fruitful avenues for extending this work by linking to other state and national datasets.
From these two works on twentieth-century economic history, Claire Priest takes us back far into the colonial period to examine the colonists' early money troubles and their impact on New England's legal and economic evolution. Although this dissertation is grounded firmly in its time period, a period remote from us, I was struck as I read this work that many of the underlying issues are timeless. Consider a recent example (June 2003) in Iraq. After the forces from the “Coalition-of-the-Willing” overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein, U.S. authorities confronted complaints from the civilian population about shortages of money, especially of the small-denomination 250-dinar notes. The money of the old regime continued to circulate (perhaps locals believe the Saddam was only temporarily deposed). The 250-dinar notes used in day-to-day trades were so scarce that they exchanged at a substantial premium (one-third) above their face value with 10,000-dinar notes. The eventual disruption to trade and accompanying banks riots became so severe that U.S. authorities opted in June to “solve” the problem by printing 250-dinar notes of the old style, that is, bearing the picture of Saddam Hussein.6
New York Times, 21 June 2003.
There is something a little strange about money both in theory and in practice. In monetary theory, money is a magic lubricant for trade, one drop of which is all you need, given flexible prices, to avoid the inconveniences of barter. In practice, the concept runs into trouble given that you need small denomination notes to carry out day-to-day transactions.
Now good money is better than no money, but bad money (based on broken or soon-to-be-broken promises) apparently has value too. And bad money is far easier to produce. Bad money tends to depreciate, leading to trade disruptions and complaints of shortages of small-denomination notes (recall the stories of the German hyperinflation), which weak authorities “solve” by issuing still more bad money.
The participants in the story Claire Priest tells can at least claim that, because paper money was relatively new, they were not simply repeating past mistakes. Before 1690, Massachusetts existed as cash-scarce, semibarter economy where high transaction costs limited specialization. Citing numerous colonial pamphlets and texts, Priest demonstrates widespread private and public support for paper issuance. In 1690 Massachusetts began to issue paper bills of credit to provide back-pay for soldiers, promising the notes could be used to pay future taxes at a 5 percent premium. This experiment proved so successful that many other colonies soon followed suit (South Carolina in 1693; Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York in 1709; Rhode Island 1710; and North Carolina 1712). In 1712 Massachusetts granted its bills legal tender status and in 1714, began to print bills to loan out at interest. But the purported scarcity of bills in this period led the colonial government in 1715 to ignore provisions to retire the bills and instead issue more. The real fun began as the good money went bad.
One recalls the quote from Benjamin Franklin that appeared in Paul Samuelson's Economics textbook: “About this time there was a cry…for more paper-money…I was on the side of an addition, being persuaded that the first small sum struck in 1723 had done much good, by increasing trade, employment, and number of inhabitants…Tho'…there are limits beyond which the quantity may be hurtful.”7
Samuelson, Economics, p. 316.
Priest's fascinating account of the currency crises of the 1720s and 1730s leaves me with numerous questions: by what objective measure are the currency crises (1720/21, 1726/27, 1733/34, 1738–1741) dated? How did each specific episodes end? When the legislature eventually (in 1742) replaced the common law doctrine of nominalism—the idea that the payment of nominal value of a debt satisfies one's legal obligation—on what precedent or prior example did they act? And how precisely did they form the schedule underlying their price indexation scheme? It would appear that not only did the American colonists introduce paper money to the modern world, but COLAs (cost-of-living-adjustments) as well.
Her account calls into question two of the major approaches to colonial legal history. On the one hand, it bowls over the traditional view advanced by Morton Horowitz that sees in colonial legal structure a pre-industrial mentality aimed at maintaining community harmony.8
Horowitz, Transformation.
On the other hand, her account challenges the competing modernization view advanced by Bruce Mann and Cornelia Dayton.9
Bruce Mann, Neighbors: and Dayton, Women.
See Mann, “Law,” for his response to Priest's work.
But for me, the payoff of the dissertation was its path-breaking analysis of the origins of Shay's rebellion, one of the major catalysts for replacing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution. The rebellion is seen not solely as a revolt against taxes or debt but more specifically as a revolt against the court system that was costly, inefficient, and lacking a mechanism by which debts could be secured. To quote directly: “Shay's Rebellion was a reaction to the high cost of credit and court fees in an environment of deflation and recession.” The underlying problems were not resolved until General Court passed the Confession Act of 1786 allowing debtors to register debts with the justice of peace for a small fee. Priest argues Shay's Rebellion gives lie to the debt-recording interpretation of the modernization theory. Why was the Confession Act passed if a suitable recording instrument was in place for 50 years?
More generally, Priest's study highlights the Massachusetts legislature's power (for good or ill) over the region's economic conditions through its use of currency policy and shows convincingly that struggles over court reform have as long a history in this country as the better-known phenomena of tax and debt revolts.