This erudite work presents a novel interpretation of Machiavelli's republicanism, and then seeks to trace its influence on the thought of several seventeenth-century English writers. Of these, Hobbes and Milton will be most familiar to readers; James Harrington and Marchamont Nedham are less well known. These five are the most obvious subjects of the book, but Rahe weaves a vast cast of other thinkers into it, including other English Republicans and anti-Republicans, their European contemporaries, and medieval Arabic philosophers.
Rahe argues that Machiavelli is not the classical republican many have mistaken him for, but rather the first modern republican. Rahe's Machiavelli rejects the classical republican assumptions of a common good, of “differential rationality” (25), of a “foundation in nature for right and wrong” (29), of human educability and improvability, and of logos (45). For Rahe's Machiavelli, logos is replaced by self-interested calculation, everyone is equally capable of it, and this selfishness, paradoxically, is collectively beneficial. In addition, the political strife that classical republicans sought to eliminate becomes the key to political stability and prosperity, and fear replaces reason as the instrument of politics. Aspects of this Machiavelli can, of course, be found in earlier treatments, but Rahe marks the difference between classical and Machiavellian republicanism particularly clearly. One quibble, though, is that some aspects of modern republicanism, even on Rahe's own account, do not yet figure in Machiavelli's republicanism—for instance, a commercial character, or well-developed institutional checks and balances. It seems, then, that Machiavelli's republicanism may be better understood as something of a way station—a postclassical populism between classical and truly modern republicanism.
In the course of addressing Machiavelli's “decidedly unfriendly” (100) attitude toward “the cultural hegemony of revealed religion” (83), Rahe also investigates the relationship between Machiavelli and his peers and the falāsifa, the loose group of medieval Arab philosophers influenced by the ancient Greeks. This inaugurates a thesis that recurs later in the work—that there are unnoticed links between a variety of Western thinkers, especially those concerned about church-state relations, and the falāsifa. There are undoubtedly similarities between Machiavelli and, especially, Averroës—both acknowledge the imbrication of secular and sacred in monotheistic states, for instance, and worry about what this means for politics and the practice of philosophy. But Rahe is not wholly convincing in his efforts to demonstrate a direct link between the two. Much of his justification for such a link seems to be the conviction of Tommaso Campanella (not always a generous reader of Machiavelli) that Machiavelli was an Averroist, and the evidence that can be found in Campanella, and elsewhere, that an Averroist brand of Aristotelianism was abroad in Machiavelli's Florence. It is also left somewhat unclear what the implications are if Machiavelli did indeed draw on the falāsifa.
The exposition and interpretation of Milton's thought is superb. Rahe reads him largely as a classical republican, though a complicated one: Milton is accepting of monarchical government for licentious or servile citizens and committed to a popular enlightenment at odds with his “endorsement of the classical principle of differential moral and political rationality” (194). Especially striking is Rahe's conclusion that Milton was a member of none of the various Christian sects to which he has been thought to belong but rather “a thoroughgoing and highly circumspect infidel” (174) concerned to defang Christianity and make it as harmless to “philosophic freedom” and his pedagogical project as a revealed religion could be made. But it is puzzling that Rahe would feature Milton, whom he reads as a classical republican, as in any way part of a Machiavellian republican tradition he has reinterpreted as anticlassical. Furthermore, Rahe writes that Milton did not find “anything of value in Machiavelli” (137) that he could not already find in his classical sources, and that he was “in the end quite reluctant to follow Machiavelli's lead” (100). And he describes several points of active disagreement between them—Milton prioritized domestic, Machiavelli foreign affairs; Milton was a “political moralist of the sort most abhorrent to Machiavelli” (119). The only respect in which Milton and Machiavelli did concur was in their suspicion of priest-craft. But the attempts to connect Milton's anticlericalism to Machiavelli's are a little strained—they depend either on pointing to common sources (Lucretius) or to later European readers of Machiavelli whom Milton may also have read (Paolo Sarpi). This is true also of the tie Rahe seeks to establish between Milton and the falāsifa. That “Averroism had become the common property of speculative men” (153) in the sixteenth century may be true, and Milton may have absorbed some of it specifically from his interactions with Pierre Charron, a primary conduit for Averroism into Europe. But this does not seem to be enough to establish that we miss much about Milton if we don't read him as some kind of Averroist.
Rahe shows Nedham, a professional pamphleteer and therefore not always his own man in print, to be a clear inheritor of Machiavelli. But Nedham modernized and adapted Machiavelli's populism for English circumstances. While he accepted the utility of tumult for class equilibrium and the preservation of liberty, he argued also that elections might be an even better way for a population to exercise an appropriately “extreme jealousy” of its liberty (236). He approved of a militia, but wanted it manned by citizens. And his marriage of the “prosaic, bourgeois element” in Machiavelli's populism to the native English concern with personal and property rights pushed republicanism in the commercial direction Harrington would further emphasize.
Like Milton, Hobbes (certainly the later Hobbes) found Machiavelli more foil than sage. A youthful flirtation with republicanism gave way by the time he was forty to his mature monarchism, and Rahe even claims that Hobbes modeled his Fool on Machiavelli. Still, Hobbes did share with Machiavelli a skeptical attitude toward religion and the view that the political world could be analyzed, given the educated guesses that could be made about its inhabitants. But he had no taste for tumult, or for popular control over the sovereign, and Rahe's treatment suggests that Thucydides, Lucretius, Epicurus, and Bacon (who, admittedly, appears as thoroughly Machiavellian) were more important to Hobbes. The crucial point Rahe does make, though, is that there is a very strong family resemblance between what Machiavelli and Hobbes take to be the “effectual truth” of the world, even though Hobbes, sensitive to the fragility of social order in a way Machiavelli never was, elaborated a very different argument, and in a very different way, on the basis of those assumptions.
Rahe's book surveys an enormous swath of intellectual history and political thought, far more than the title would suggest, and relates much of it in novel, complex, and challenging ways. It is, in more than just its subject matter, Pocockian. Rahe establishes that though Machiavelli is thought against as well as thought with, and often only selectively embraced, understanding him is vital for understanding much English Republican thinking. Both this contribution, and the opening delineation, on which it depends, of the kind of republican Machiavelli is make the book a seminal contribution.
