Volume 34.1 of JRA includes a review of my 2019 book, Escape from Rome: The Failure of Empire and the Road to Prosperity, by the archaeologist Richard Hodges (hereafter H.).Footnote 1
The first thematic section, “Escapism,” does not give a sense of my book's structure and contents. The core parts of the book (Parts IV and V, which make up 54% of the main text) fail to receive even a single sentence that might explain what they are about. Only Part II, on the factors that sustained Rome's expansion, and the short epilogue at the end of the book attract any attention.Footnote 2 Instead, H. criticizes my alleged lack of caution in employing demographic information. This impression, however, derives from a striking misreading of a single graph (Fig. E.1 on my p. 525), which – as a whole series of equivalent graphs in Part I also do – refers to the proportion of the population of Europe that was claimed by the most populous polity at a given point in time and not, as H. avers, to “’actual’ population peaks in the later 6th c. to 9th c.” (411).
In the next section, H. states that my book “deploys hypotheses based upon historical data. Archaeological evidence to provide some quantifiable bases for the thrust of his history is absent” (413). Yet we cannot in good faith distinguish between “historical data” and “archaeological evidence” unless the former are thought to be limited to textual data: archaeological evidence is historical evidence. H. complains that I rely too heavily on “historical” (that is, textual) evidence in constructing my argument, neglecting archaeological material, and that I introduce “very little raw or original data” (409). This betrays a profound misunderstanding of the nature of my project and the genre to which it belongs. My study is a work of synthesis that develops an extended argument about chains of causality and path dependence over the long run of history by covering several thousand years of political, military, social, economic and cultural history across much of Afroeurasia. In conception and execution, any such exercise must inevitably embrace parsimony and reduction. Immediate engagement with primary sources, whether textual or material, becomes virtually impossible; dependence on secondary scholarship is a must. For these reasons, my book, just like any other work in this vein, relies on the best efforts of what one might call intermediate synthesizers, including those (such as Chris Wickham) who digest large amounts of archaeological evidence.
Even more crucially, in this case, it does not actually matter whether some of the intermediate synthesizers I rely on prioritize textual over archaeological evidence. My study is propelled by a series of overarching questions: in terms of the scale of political organization, how (much) and why did post-Roman Europe differ from other parts of the Old World that had witnessed the rise of large land-based empire? How robust was the absence of large land-based empire from post-Roman Europe west of Russia? What would it have taken for this form of organization to return? How did the persistent absence of large, land-based empire from most of post-Roman Europe affect later political, economic, cultural and scientific developments that a very large number of scholars in different disciplines have sought to connect to the so-called “Great Divergence” – the appearance and acceleration of sustained transformative development in parts of Europe?
Everything I cover in my book is subordinated to these questions. In assessing the evidentiary base of my account, the most salient question is whether a rebalancing of different types of evidence would materially challenge or undermine my argument. As far as I can tell, the answer is no. The overall patterns of empire formation in different parts of the Old World are so well established that no amount of new evidence, archaeological or otherwise, could call them into question. Nor is archaeological evidence particularly germane to my counterfactual scenarios of imperial restoration in post-Roman Europe. And for the single most important (and, to my mind, most interesting) question I address in my book – the relationship between post-Roman socio-political fragmentation and the Great Divergence – the contribution of ancient and medieval archaeology invoked by H. is of little if any conceivable relevance.
This is emblematic of a more serious problem. Throughout the same section, H. does not provide a single example of how archaeology's “huge new dataset that might challenge” existing paradigms (413) actually has any impact as far as my book is concerned. This is particularly unfortunate because there can be no doubt that the relationship between archaeological research and social-science-inflected big history is very much worth debating. This is a missed opportunity.
A similar misunderstanding of my methods and objectives mars H.'s final section, in which he takes exception to my neglect of Jack Goody's work and the critiques of Eurocentric scholarship it is thought to represent. Since this touches on complex issues that may not be of immediate interest to an archaeological audience, all I can do here is note that once again my approach is determined by the very specific, pivotal question of that part of my book: how are different explanations of the Great Divergence commencing in parts of Europe rather than elsewhere connected to and predicated on the enduring inter-state and intra-state polycentrism of the post-Roman era? My discussion in Parts IV and V, which ranges across much of the Old World, is consistently transcontinental and comparative rather than “Eurocentric,” as H. claims (415).
Finally, at least in my mind, H.'s tone in the colorful opening page and a half speaks for itself. Suffice it to say that I find it disconcerting to see an established scholar express so openly his disdain for scholarship that seeks to reach both fellow academics and a broader audience. At a time when the Humanities are under growing pressure, isn't that an ambition worth embracing?
