Why do strong judiciaries occasionally emerge out of adverse political contexts, while in other states, with seemingly similar or better conditions, courts show little ability to say ‘no’ to the executive – or, if they do, to make it stick? In Pathways to Judicial Power in Transitional States Rachel Ellett investigates this puzzle. And she does it well. The book, which is developed from her PhD dissertation, is a theoretically sophisticated, empirically rich and well-reasoned comparative analysis of judicial developments in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda. And her approach and insights are useful for scholars well beyond the immediate empirical context.

Engaging with the literature on judicial independence and judicial power, Ellett challenges and complements the regime-focused, rational choice-based explanations of why judicial power is strengthened in transitional states as they move away from authoritarian rule. At the core of these explanations, which have dominated the field, is an ‘insurance’ logic: elites will allow or encourage more independent and powerful judiciaries when they face a more unpredictable political context – typically with the introduction of multiparty election – as a strategy to protect their interest should they lose power. Ellett shows that these dynamics have limited explanatory force in the hybrid regimes that are the focus of her study: in neo-patrimonial states ‘where democratic institutions are often a form of window dressing, designed to obscure the real constellations of elite power formed through client-patron relations’ (p. 201), elite insecurity more often leads to attempts by the regime to reign in judicial power. To understand why this is the case, and, more importantly, to explain why we see different trajectories of judicial power among countries that share a lot in terms of their political context, Ellett complements regime explanations with historical institutionalism. She analyses the development of judicial power in the three countries at five critical junctures: (1) the conception of the judicial institution under colonial rule; (2) the transition to independence; (3) the consolidation of the post-colonial authoritarian regime; (4) the transition to multipartyism; and (5) the second multiparty election.

Drawing on a wealth of sources, including a rich interview material and a broad set of court judgments Ellett plots the distinct pathways to judicial empowerment in each country:

• • Uganda has seen the most dramatic clashes between the executive and the judiciary under shifting regimes, including under the long reign of the current president, but also the most vivid examples of judicial independence. Despite setbacks and threats, the country has seen a significant strengthening of judicial power in the Museveni era, with the judiciary using a range of techniques to build strategic alliances and a judicial culture that has enabled the passing of some quite remarkable decisions running against regime interests.

• • In Malawi, where the judiciary was marginalised by Hasting Banda's post-independence authoritarian state – and thus relatively untainted – the judiciary was able to actively use the transition to establish its position and power. And although it has at times been challenged, weakened and erratic in its decision-making, the judiciary has managed to remain central to Malawi's political life.

• • The Tanzanian judiciary on the other hand, has, throughout its history, seen less overt and heavy-handed regime interference. However, the enduring dominant-party state has engaged in a pattern of low-intensity manipulation and institutional weakening – including through appointment practices and regulations restricting jurisdiction and access – that has resulted in low demands for adjudication and muted judicial assertiveness.

In her analysis, Ellett shows how the divergent pathways to judicial power can be understood as an ever-evolving interplay between particular judicial actors and the political and institutional context in which they make their choices. By separating long-term institutional factors from short-term regime dynamics she is able to demonstrate how different neopatrimonial modes of governance have emerged in the three countries, and how relatively small differences in the social and political context have created different opportunity structures for judicial actors. She shows how the choices made at one point in time shaped the institutional context for later decisions – but also how fragile the judicial institutionalisation processes are, with the possibility of setbacks always present.

Ellett's book skilfully demonstrates how, paradoxically, ‘high levels of interference do not necessarily correlate with judicial weakness’ (p. 208) and her conclusion that we need ‘to look beyond democratic and autocratic dichotomies, and dig deeper to uncover the nuanced impact of various aspects of hybrid regimes on judicial empowerment’ (p. 202) is valid far beyond the three countries that constitute her empirical focus, to the growing number of hybrid or electoral authoritarian regimes in Africa – and in other parts of the world.

For those who are not particularly concerned with the emergence of judicial power, Ellett's book provides an insightful, engaging and elegantly written history of modern politics and power in East Africa. Highly recommended.