White House Statement, July 6, 2009Footnote 1
Joint Statement by President of the United States of America Barack Obama and President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev Concerning Afghanistan
Expressing concern over the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and noting the importance of stepping up the international community's efforts to help stabilize that country and promote the democratic process and economic growth there, we reaffirm our commitment to the goals of the common fight against the threats of terrorism, armed extremism, and illegal drug trafficking in Afghanistan. We shall continue and develop our cooperation in the interest of enhancing the capabilities of the Government of Afghanistan to accomplish key socioeconomic objectives, to raise living standards, and to ensure the security of its people.
We reaffirm our strong determination and capacity for expanding cooperation within the framework of the Russian-U.S. Counter-Terrorism Working Group and intend to make effective use of this mechanism to coordinate practical joint work in all aspects related to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.
We are prepared to increase the assistance provided to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in strengthening and developing the capabilities of the Afghan National Army and police, and in training counternarcotics personnel. In this regard, we are intent on further implementation of the counternarcotics project under the auspices of the Russia-NATO Council, using the International Interagency Center in Domodedovo, and on taking part in carrying out the Afghanistan-related projects of the OSCE pursuant to Decision No. 4/07 adopted in Madrid by the foreign ministers of that organization's participating states. In implementing UN Security Council Resolution No. 1386 and other resolutions that supplement it, we intend to make active use of the transit route through the territory of the Russian Federation for deliveries of property and equipment for the needs of the international forces operating in Afghanistan and strongly welcome and support the participation of other nations in stabilizing Afghanistan.
We consider it important to step up the fight against drug trafficking both within and outside of Afghanistan, including through the development of alternative livelihoods for farmers and interdiction of narcotics traffickers, and including prevention of shipments of precursors to that country pursuant to UNSC Resolution No. 1817.
To strengthen the capabilities of the Government of Afghanistan in the fight against drug trafficking, corruption, and other types of crime and threats, including those that are cross-boundary, we consider it important to encourage and support that country's efforts to implement the UN Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
To further support our countries' shared counterterrorism, anticrime and counternarcotics objectives in Afghanistan, the United States and the Russian Federation have decided to develop a bilateral initiative to increase significantly the use of financial intelligence and law enforcement tools to stop the illicit financial flows related to heroin trafficking in Afghanistan, including that by the Taliban and organized crime. The initiative will include an operational component to target the trafficking and the illicit networks that support it.
We express our willingness to explore issues related to Russian-U.S. interaction and cooperation in restoring the transportation, energy, and industrial infrastructure of Afghanistan.
We believe it important to ensure the necessary security conditions for holding nationwide presidential and provincial elections in Afghanistan that would be credible and transparent to the people and that should become an important stage in the development of that country as a self-sufficient democratic state and demonstrate the viability of its political system. In this regard, we welcome the increased international support for the Afghan elections and call for additional assistance to Afghanistan after the elections.
We are in favor of strengthening regional approaches to issues related to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, with the UN playing a major coordinating role. In this regard, both countries will closely cooperate within the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly and “Paris Pact” process. We note the particular importance of the Special Conference on Afghanistan held on March 27, 2009, under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Moscow, and the Hague International Conference on Afghanistan on March 31, 2009, as well as the meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers in Trieste in regard to Afghanistan.
We think it essential to intensify and strengthen interaction between Afghanistan and Pakistan in repelling the common threats of terrorism, extremism, and drug trafficking. We are prepared to help increase the effectiveness of such interaction, including through organizing Afghani-Pakistani summit meetings under our auspices, as happened in Ekaterinburg and Washington. We are committed to implementing the sanctions imposed by UNSC Resolution No. 1267 (Al Qaida/Taliban) and to bolstering the existing sanctions regime in order to isolate those who pose a threat to international peace and security.
We support the conditions set by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for reintegration efforts. These include recognition of the Constitution of Afghanistan, disarmament, and breaking any terrorist ties with Al-Qaida and other organizations connected with it.
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates, July 16, 2009Footnote 2
Secretary Robert Gates delivered these remarks in Chicago, IL
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Secretary Daley, for that kind introduction.
It's an honor to be at the Economic Club of Chicago. I certainly appreciate the special arrangements you made to have me here this afternoon.
I thank all the distinguished citizens of this great city who came here today. I am mindful I am speaking in the adopted hometown of my boss. President Obama sends his greetings, as do Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod and the rest of the Chicago crew. They are no doubt discovering that Washington is the true “Windy City.”
The issue that brings me here today is central to the security of all Americans: the future of the United States military: How it should be organized, equipped—and funded—in the years ahead, to win the wars we are in while being prepared for threats on or beyond the horizon. Earlier this year, I recommended to President Obama—and he enthusiastically agreed— that we needed to fundamentally reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment and reform the way the Pentagon does business—in particular, the weapons we buy, and how we buy them. Above all, to prepare to wage future wars, rather than continuing the habit of rearming for previous ones.
I am here on relatively short notice to speak publicly about these matters because the Congress is, as we speak, debating the president's defense budget request for the next fiscal year, a budget request that implements many needed reforms and changes. Most of the proposals—especially those that increase support for the troops, their families, and the war effort—have been widely embraced. However, some of the crucial reforms that deal with major weapons programs have met with a less than enthusiastic reaction in the Congress, among defense contractors, and within some quarters of the Pentagon itself. And so I thought it appropriate to address some of these controversial issues here—in a place that is, appropriately enough not only the adopted home of our Commander-in-Chief, but also a symbol of America's industrial base and economic power.
First, some context on how we got to this point. President Obama's budget proposal is, I believe, the nation's first truly 21st century defense budget. It explicitly recognizes that over the last two decades the nature of conflict has fundamentally changed—and that much of America's defense establishment has yet to fully adapt to the security realities of the post-Cold War era and this complex and dangerous new century.
During the 1990s, the United States celebrated the demise of the Soviet Union and the so-called “end of history” by making deep cuts in the funding for, and above all, the size of the U.S. military, including a 40 percent drop in the size of the Active Army. This took place even as a post-Cold War world grew less stable, less predictable, and more turbulent. The U.S. military, with some advances in areas such as precision weaponry, essentially became a smaller version of the force that held off the Soviets in Germany for decades and expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. There was little appetite for, or interest in, preparing for what we call “irregular warfare”—campaigns against insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other non-state groups. This was the bipartisan reality both in the White House and in Congress.
Of course, after September 11th, some things did change. The base defense budget—not counting spending for the wars—increased by some 70 percent over the next eight years. During this period there were important changes in the way U.S. forces were organized, based and deployed, and investments were made in new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles. However, when all was said and done, the way the Pentagon selected, evaluated, developed, and paid for major new weapons systems and equipment did not fundamentally change—even after September 11th.
Indeed, the kinds of equipment, programs, and capabilities needed to protect our troops and defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not the highest priority of much of the Defense Department, even after several years of war.
I learned about this lack of bureaucratic priority for the wars we are in the hard way—during my first few months on the job as the Iraq surge was getting underway. The challenges I faced in getting what our troops needed in the field stood in stark contrast to the support provided conventional modernization programs— weapons designed to fight other modern armies, navies, and air forces—that had been in the pipeline for many years and had acquired a loyal and enthusiastic following in the Pentagon, in the Congress, and in industry. The most pressing needs of today's warfighter—on the battlefield, in the hospital, or at home—simply lacked place and power at the table when priorities were being set and long-term budget decisions were being made.
So the most important shift in President Obama's first defense budget was to increase and institutionalize funding for programs that directly support those fighting America's wars and their families. Those initiatives included more helicopter support, air lift, armored vehicles, personnel protection equipment, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, we also increased funding for programs that provide long-term support to military families and treatment for the signature wounds of this conflict—such as traumatic brain injury and post traumatic stress.
But, while the world of terrorists and other violent extremists—of insurgents and IEDs—is with us for the long haul, we also recognize that another world has emerged. Growing numbers of countries and groups are employing the latest and increasingly accessible technologies to put the United States at risk in disruptive and unpredictable ways.
Other large nations—known in Pentagon lingo as “near-peers”—are modernizing their militaries in ways that could, over time, pose a challenge to the United States. In some cases, their programs take the form of traditional weapons systems such as more advanced fighter aircraft, missiles, and submarines.
But other nations have learned from the experience of Saddam Hussein's military in the first and second Gulf wars—that it is ill-advised, if not suicidal, to fight a conventional war head-to-head against the United States: fighter-to-fighter, ship-to-ship, tank-to-tank. They also learned from a bankrupted Soviet Union not to try to outspend us or match our overall capabilities. Instead, they are developing asymmetric means that take advantage of new technologies—and our vulnerabilities—to disrupt our lines of communication and our freedom of movement, to deny us access, and to narrow our military options and strategic choices.
At the same time, insurgents or militias are acquiring or seeking precision weapons, sophisticated communications, cyber capabilities, and even weapons of mass destruction. The Lebanese extremist group Hezbollah currently has more rockets and high-end munitions—many quite sophisticated and accurate—than all but a handful of countries.
In sum, the security challenges we now face, and will in the future, have changed, and our thinking must likewise change. The old paradigm of looking at potential conflict as either regular or irregular war, conventional or unconventional, high end or low—is no longer relevant. And as a result, the Defense Department needs to think about and prepare for war in a profoundly different way than what we have been accustomed to throughout the better part of the last century.
What is needed is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. As a result, we must change the way we think and the way we plan—and fundamentally reform—the way the Pentagon does business and buys weapons. It simply will not do to base our strategy solely on continuing to design and buy— as we have for the last 60 years—only the most technologically advanced versions of weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of another superpower adversary—especially one that imploded nearly a generation ago.
To get there we must break the old habit of adding layer upon layer of cost, complexity, and delay to systems that are so expensive and so elaborate that only a small number can be built, and that are then usable only in a narrow range of low-probability scenarios.
We must also get control of what is called “requirements creep”—where more features and capabilities are added to a given piece of equipment, often to the point of absurdity. The most flamboyant example of this phenomenon is the new presidential helicopter—what President Obama referred to as defense procurement “run amok.” Once the analysis and requirements were done, we ended up with a helicopter that cost nearly half a billion dollars each and enabled the president to, among other things, cook dinner while in flight under nuclear attack.
We also had to take a hard look at a number of weapons programs that were grotesquely over budget, were having major performance problems, were reliant on unproven technology, or were becoming increasingly detached from real world scenarios—as if September 11th and the wars that followed had never happened.
Those of you with experience in the technology or manufacturing sectors have at some point probably faced some combination of these challenges in your own businesses. But in the defense arena, we faced an additional, usually insurmountable obstacle to bring rationality to budget and acquisition decisions. Major weapons programs, irrespective of their problems or performance, have a habit of continuing long after they are wanted or needed, recalling Ronald Reagan's old joke that a government program represents the closest thing we'll ever see to eternal life on this earth.
First, there is the Congress, which is understandably concerned, especially in these tough economic times, about protecting jobs in certain states and congressional districts. There is the defense and aerospace industry, which has an obvious financial stake in the survival and growth of these programs.
And there is the institutional military itself—within the Pentagon, and as expressed through an influential network of retired generals and admirals, some of whom are paid consultants to the defense industry, and some who often are quoted as experts in the news media.
As a result, many past attempts by my predecessors to end failing or unnecessary programs went by the wayside. Nonetheless I determined in a triumph of hope over experience, and the president agreed, that given the urgency of the wars we are in, the daunting global security environment we will inhabit for decades to come, and our country's economic problems, we simply cannot afford to move ahead with business as usual.
To this end, the president's budget request cut, curtailed, or ended a number of conventional modernization programs—satellites, ground vehicles, helicopters, fighters—that were either performing poorly or in excess to real-world needs. Conversely, future-oriented programs where the U.S. was relatively underinvested were accelerated or received more funding.
For example, we must sustain and continually improve our specialized strategic deterrent to ensure that our—and our allies'—security is always protected against nuclear-armed adversaries. In an initiative little noticed, the President's program includes money to begin a new generation of ballistic missile submarines and nearly $700 million in additional funds to secure and assure America's nuclear deterrent.
Some of our proposed reforms are meeting real resistance. They are called risky. Or not meeting a certain military requirement. Or lacking in study and analysis. Those three words—requirements, risk, and, analysis—are commonly invoked in defense matters. If applied correctly, they help us make sound decisions. I've found, however, that more often they have become the holy trinity of the status quo or business as usual.
In truth, preparing for conflict in the 21st century means investing in truly new concepts and new technologies. It means taking into account all the assets and capabilities we can bring to the fight. It means measuring those capabilities against the real threats posed by real world adversaries with real limitations, not threats conjured up from enemies with unlimited time, unlimited resources, and unlimited technological acumen.
Air superiority and missile defense— two areas where the budget has attracted the most criticism—provide case studies. Let me start with the controversy over the F-22 fighter jet. We had to consider, when preparing for a future potential conventional state-on-state conflict, what is the right mix of the most advanced fighter aircraft and other weapons to deal with the known and projected threats to U.S. air supremacy? For example, we now have unmanned aerial vehicles that can simultaneously perform intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions as well as deliver precision-guided bombs and missiles. The president's budget request would buy 48 of the most advanced UAVs—aircraft that have a greater range than some of our manned fighters, in addition to the ability to loiter for hours over a target. And we will buy many more in the future.
We also took into consideration the capabilities of the newest manned combat aircraft program, the stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 is 10 to 15 years newer than the F-22, carries a much larger suite of weapons, and is superior in a number of areas—most importantly, air-to-ground missions such as destroying sophisticated enemy air defenses. It is a versatile aircraft, less than half the total cost of the F-22, and can be produced in quantity with all the advantages produced by economies of scale—some 500 will be bought over the next five years, more than 2,400 over the life of the program. And we already have eight foreign development partners. It has had development problems to be sure, as has every advanced military aircraft ever fielded. But if properly supported, the F-35 will be the backbone of America's tactical aviation fleet for decades to come if—and it is a big if—money is not drained away to spend on other aircraft that our military leadership considers of lower priority or excess to our needs.
Having said that, the F-22 is clearly a capability we do need—a niche, silver-bullet solution for one or two potential scenarios—specifically the defeat of a highly advanced enemy fighter fleet. The F-22, to be blunt, does not make much sense anyplace else in the spectrum of conflict. Nonetheless, supporters of the F-22 lately have promoted its use for an ever expanding list of potential missions. These range from protecting the homeland from seaborne cruise missiles to, as one retired general recommended on TV, using F-22s to go after Somali pirates who in many cases are teenagers with AK-47s—a job we already know is better done at much less cost by three Navy SEALs. These are examples of how far-fetched some of the arguments have become for a program that has cost $65 billion—and counting—to produce 187 aircraft, not to mention the thousands of uniformed Air Force positions that were sacrificed to help pay for it.
In light of all these factors, and with the support of the Air Force leadership, I concluded that 183—the program of record since 2005, plus four more added in the FY 09 supplemental—was a sufficient number of F-22s and recommended as such to the president.
The reaction from parts of Washington has been predictable for many of the reasons I described before. The most substantive criticism is that completing the F-22 program means we are risking the future of U.S. air supremacy. To assess this risk, it is worth looking at real-world potential threat and assessing the capabilities that other countries have now or in the pipeline.
Consider that by 2020, the United States is projected to have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. Of those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese. Nonetheless, some portray this scenario as a dire threat to America's national security.
Correspondingly, the recent tests of a possible nuclear device and ballistic missiles by North Korea brought scrutiny to the changes in this budget that relate to missile defense. The risk to national security has again been invoked, mainly because the total missile defense budget was reduced from last year.
In fact, where the threat is real or growing—from rogue states or from short-to-medium range missiles that can hit our deployed troops or our allies and friends—this budget sustains or increases funding. Most of the cuts in this area come from two programs that are designed to shoot down enemy missiles immediately after launch. This was a great idea, but the aspiration was overwhelmed by the escalating costs, operational problems, and technological challenges.
Consider the example of one of those programs—the Airborne Laser. This was supposed to put high-powered lasers on a fleet of 747s. After more than a decade of research and development, we have yet to achieve a laser with enough power to knock down a missile in boost phase more than 50 miles from the launch pad—thus requiring these huge planes to loiter deep in enemy air space to have a feasible chance at a direct hit. Moreover, the 10 to 20 aircraft needed would cost about $1.5 billion each plus tens of millions of dollars each year for maintenance and operating costs. The program and operating concept were fatally flawed and it was time to face reality. So we curtailed the existing program while keeping the prototype aircraft for research and development.
Many of these decisions—like the one I just described—were more clear-cut than others. But all of them, insofar as they involved hundreds of billions of dollars and the security of the American people, were treated with the utmost seriousness by the senior civilian and military leadership of the Pentagon. An enormous amount of thought, study, assessment, and analysis underpins these budget recommendations—including the National Defense Strategy I issued last summer.
Some have called for yet more analysis before making any of the decisions in this budget. But when dealing with programs that were clearly out of control, performing poorly, and excess to the military's real requirements, we did not need more study, more debate, or more delay—in effect, paralysis through analysis. What was needed were three things—common sense, political will, and tough decisions. Qualities too often in short supply in Washington, D.C.
All of these decisions involved considering trade-offs, balancing risks, and setting priorities—separating nice-to-haves from have-to-haves, requirements from appetites. We cannot expect to eliminate risk and danger by simply spending more—especially if we're spending on the wrong things. But more to the point, we all—the military, the Congress, and industry—have to face some iron fiscal realities.
The last defense budget submitted by President George W. Bush for Fiscal Year 2009 was $515 billion. In that budget the Bush administration proposed—at my recommendation—a Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget of $524 billion. The budget just submitted by President Obama for FY 2010 was $534 billion. Even after factoring inflation, and some of the war costs that were moved from supplemental appropriations, President Obama's defense request represents a modest but real increase over the last Bush budget. I know. I submitted them both. In total, by one estimate, our budget adds up to about what the entire rest of the world combined spends on defense. Only in the parallel universe that is Washington, D.C., would that be considered “gutting” defense.
The fact is that if the defense budget had been even higher, my recommendations to the president with respect to troubled programs would have been the same—for all the reasons I described earlier. There is a more fundamental point: If the Department of Defense can't figure out a way to defend the United States on a budget of more than half a trillion dollars a year, then our problems are much bigger than anything that can be cured by buying a few more ships and planes.
What is important is to have a budget baseline with a steady, sustainable, and predictable rate of growth that avoids extreme peaks and valleys that are enormously harmful to sound budgeting. From the very first defense budget I submitted for President Bush in January 2007, I have warned against doing what America has done multiple times over the last 90 years by slashing defense spending after a major conflict. The war in Iraq is winding down, and one day so too will the conflict in Afghanistan. When that day comes, the nation will again face pressure to cut back on defense spending, as we always have. It is simply the nature of the beast. And the higher our base budget is now, the harder it will be to sustain these necessary programs, and the more drastic and dangerous the drop-off will be later.
So where do we go from here? Authorization for more F-22s is in both versions of the defense bill working its way through the Congress. The president has indicated that he has real red lines in this budget, including the F-22. Some might ask: Why threaten a veto and risk a confrontation over a couple billion dollars for a dozen or so planes?
The grim reality is that with regard to the budget we have entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar diverted to fund excess or unneeded capacity— whether for more F-22s or anything else—is a dollar that will be unavailable to take care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I cannot accept and I will not take.
And, with regard to something like the F-22, irrespective of whether the number of aircraft at issue is 12 planes or 200, if we can't bring ourselves to make this tough but straightforward decision— reflecting the judgment of two very different presidents, two different secretaries of defense, two chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff, and the current Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff, where do we draw the line? And if not now, when? If we can't get this right—what on earth can we get right? It is time to draw the line on doing Defense business as usual. The President has drawn that line. And that red line is a veto. And it is real.
On a personal note, I joined CIA more than 40 years ago to help protect my country. For just about my entire professional career in government I have generally been known as a hawk on national security. One criticism of me when I was at CIA was that I overestimated threats to the security of our country.
Well, I haven't changed. I did not molt from a hawk into a dove on January 20, 2009. I continue to believe, as I always have, that the world is, and always will be, a dangerous and hostile place for my country with many who would do America harm and who hate everything we are and stand for. But, the nature of the threats to us has changed. And so too should the way our military is organized and equipped to meet them.
I believe—along with the senior military leadership of this nation—that the defense budget we proposed to President Obama and that he sent to Congress is the best we could design to protect the United States now and in the future. The best we could do to protect our men and women in uniform, to give them the tools they need to deter our enemies, and to win our wars today and tomorrow. We stand by this reform budget, and we are prepared to fight for it.
A final thought. I arrived in Washington 43 years ago this summer. Of all people, I am well aware of the realities of Washington and know that things do not change overnight. After all, the influence of politics and parochial interests in defense matters is as old as the Republic itself. Henry Knox, the first secretary of war, was charged with building the first American fleet. To get the support of Congress, Knox eventually ended up with six frigates being built in six different shipyards in six different states.
But the stakes today are very high— with the nation at war, and a security landscape steadily growing more dangerous and unpredictable. I am deeply concerned about the long-term challenges facing our defense establishment—and just as concerned that the political state of play does not reflect the reality that major reforms are needed, or that tough choices and real discipline are necessary.
We stand at a crossroads. We simply cannot risk continuing down the same path—where our spending and program priorities are increasingly divorced from the very real threats of today and the growing ones of tomorrow. These threats demand that all of our nation's leaders rise above the politics and parochialism that have too often plagued considerations of our nation's defense—from industry to interest groups, from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. The time has come to draw a line and take a stand against the business-as-usual approach to national defense. We must all fulfill our obligation to the American people to ensure that our country remains safe and strong. Just as our men and women in uniform are doing their duty to this end, we in Washington must now do ours.
Department of Homeland Security Press Release, July 24, 2009Footnote 3
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano and members of the Bipartisan Policy Center's (BPC) National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG) met today to discuss the Department's progress in implementing the recommendations outlined in the 9/11 Commission Final Report released five years ago this week.
“The 9/11 Commission provided DHS a roadmap to create a safer and more secure America, and the Department is answering that challenge,” said Secretary Napolitano. “Today's meeting marked the next step in continuing this critical dialogue and expanding our capabilities to protect our country.”
The National Security Preparedness Group is a bipartisan coalition of national security experts including former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge and co-chaired by former 9/11 Commission Chair Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton.
“The members of the BPC's National Security Preparedness Group look forward to working with Secretary Napolitano and DHS to ensure the continued implementation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations,” said Governor Kean. “Part of the success of the 9/11 Commission and the acceptance of its recommendations occurred as a result of our commitment to bipartisanship. We remain dedicated to the bipartisan mission of keeping the country safe and ensuring there are sufficient resources to do so.”
Secretary Napolitano and members of the NSPG discussed the progress report the Department released Wednesday, which outlined DHS' advances on a range of 9/11 Commission recommendations and reflected the agency's focus on enhanced science and technology, efficiency and fiscal responsibility and reinvigorated coordination with state, local, tribal and international partners.
The group also discussed new policies, initiatives and grant opportunities to bolster the Department's capacity to secure the nation from an ever-changing array of threats to homeland security, including cyber attacks and bioterrorism.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano, July 29, 2009Footnote 4
Secretary Janet Napolitano delivered these remarks in New York, NY
Introductory Remarks Omitted
Secretary Napolitano. [T]oday, I will speak candidly about the urgent need to refocus our counter-terror approach to make it a shared endeavor—to make it more layered, networked and resilient—to make it smarter and more adaptive and to make sure that as a country—as a nation—we are at the point where we are in a constant state of preparedness and not a state of fear.
The challenge is not just using federal power to protect the country, but also enlisting a much broader societal response to the threats that terrorism poses.
In the last four weeks alone, I have traveled nearly 30,000 miles, from Islamabad to Seattle, engaging partners in all of these levels. We have brokered international agreements, launched new partnerships and challenged our citizens to play their part in our collective security. We face a common threat; it requires a collective response. And we must face that threat and coordinate that response in an evolving and highly networked world.
So the networked world takes on many forms. The cyber-network that runs our power grids, fires our critical infrastructure and facilitates commerce is now a target and is itself vulnerable to attack. This networked climate forces us to rethink how best to protect our values and our security in a world where the tools for creating violence and chaos are as easy to find as the tools for buying music online or restocking an inventory.
We also live in a mobile world, with complex networks of people and information. We cannot forget that the 9/11 attackers conceived of their plans in the Philippines, planned in Malaysia and Germany, recruited from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and carried them out in the United States. So that's why our homeland security network must be built to leverage force multipliers: the cooperation of our international allies, the full powers of the United States federal government, the vigilance of the police on the beat and the untapped resources of millions of our own citizens.
So, what does the world we face look like today? First, while the terror threat is ever changing, it is critical to reiterate that the threat remains. The consensus view of the intelligence community, of which DHS is a member, is that the terror threat to the homeland is, quote, “persistent and evolving.”
In my daily briefings and as a member of the president's National and Homeland Security Councils, this is something I discuss with the president and the rest of the security team on a regular basis. And so we're constantly looking for ways to better share information up and down the response ladder I just described, from individuals and communities to local law enforcement, to the federal level and then at the international level.
The broader context here is that we've invested considerably in our border and port security and have substantially reorganized the federal government to focus better on the threat of terrorism.
Now, at the same time, there have been continued attacks against our allies and our interests. And make no mistake, Americans continue to be targeted in terror attacks. Just two weeks ago, American hotels were the target of bombings in Jakarta that killed eight people and injured six Americans. Six Americans were among the 164 people killed in the attacks in Mumbai in November of 2008. Three Americans were among the 54 killed in the attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September of 2008.
So if 9/11 happened in a Web 1.0 world, terrorists are certainly in a Web 2.0 world now. And many of the technological tools that expedite communication today were in their infancy or didn't even exist in 2001.
So therefore, more than just hardware, we need new thinking. When we add a prominent former computer hacker to our Homeland Security Advisory Council, as I just did, it helps us understand our own weaknesses that could be exploited by our adversaries.
And the threats we face are by their very nature asymmetrical. Terrorism more often has become privatized violence— does not rely on links, links to an army or to a sovereign state.
We often hear that this is what our globalized era looks like, but what is most salient about today's environment is that it is also networked. And in a networked world, information true and false moves everywhere all the time.
And in that networked world, everyone who is part of the network, meaning all of us, can enjoy the tremendous benefits, but also must be ready and willing to learn about and help address the vulnerabilities that come with these benefits. So the team we put on the field needs to be bigger, better networked and better trained.
What are the implications for this network world for the Department of Homeland Security? It means that we must continue to take an all-hazards approach to preparedness, meaning we prepare for natural disasters as well as terrorist attacks. We need to comprehend and anticipate an expanding range of threats.
The threat of a nuclear or radiological device is of grave concern, and reducing that threat is a key administration priority. But we must be equally prepared for biological or chemical threats, which are capacities al Qaeda has sought for years.
We've seen greater use of IED's and suicide bombers in terrorist attacks around the world. And given our responsibilities for enforcing our immigration laws and protecting our ports of entry, we are also keenly aware that illegal immigration is not only a matter of sovereignty but could pose a national security threat as well. The reality that potential terrorists could use a variety of ways to enter the country illegally—fake documents, visa overstays and even border tunnels—make this so.
Now DHS monitors and shares information about potential homegrown threats as well. These can be individuals, radicals— radicalized by events abroad, or lone-wolf attacks.
And last, but certainly not least, we're spending considerable time and attention on the cyber world. Under the Obama administration's new cyber plan, DHS retains the lead role protecting the government's civilian sites while working closely with the private sector as well.
So what this range of threats shows is that while the shock and pain and images of 9/11 stay with us, the terror threat is even more decentralized, networked and adapted than on 9/11. The terrorists in Mumbai, for example, made use of GPS devices, satellite phones, mapping websites, like Google Earth, and even live cable TV.
Now we cannot hermetically seal off this country, the United States, from the rest of the world. So for DHS to be the best in the world at what we do, we have to multiply the effect of our forces and at the same time promote a global environment that is inhospitable to violent extremism.
Beginning at his Inauguration and continuing most recently at his historic speech in Cairo, President Obama has begun a different kind of dialogue with the Muslim and Arab worlds, recognized there is far, far more that unites than divides us. At our department, our Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) is building stronger relationships with Arab and Muslim Americans, as well as South Asian communities across the country, so we can share information with community leaders in a timely manner and also become more culturally attuned to issues that members from these communities often face.
So what is the right response, and what are we doing? As I mentioned earlier, there are four layers, and the place we start is the work of engaging the American people in our collective effort. I'm often asked if complacency is a threat in the United States, and I believe the short answer is yes. But I think a better question is this: Has the United States government done everything it can to educate and engage the American people? The answer there is no. For too long we've treated the public as a liability to be protected rather than an asset in our nation's collective security. And this approach, unfortunately, has allowed confusion, anxiety and fear to linger.
Let me stress—this is no small matter.
This is a first-order issue for us. The consequences of living in a state of fear rather than a state of preparedness are enormous. We may be better prepared as a nation than we were on 9/11, but we are nowhere near as prepared as we need to be. There are, of course, aspects of countering the terror threat that are inherently governmental, but the smart government is one that knows what it does best and which helps others do their best as well.
So here's how we're looking at this. First, with respect to individuals and the private sector, we're taking a much closer look at how we can support and inform our greatest asset, individual citizens, and with them the private sector. You are the ones who know if something is not right in your communities, such as a suspicious package or unusual activity.
Three years ago, it was an attentive store clerk who told authorities about men trying to duplicate extremist DVDs. This led federal agents to eventually round up a plot to kill American soldiers at the Fort Dix army base here in New Jersey—in New Jersey.
Just last month, a—just last month, a passenger saw two employees exchange a bag at the Philadelphia airport that had not been properly screened. That passenger's vigilance ultimately stopped a gun from getting onto the plane.
So there's no doubt that building a culture of preparedness in our communities will require a long-term commitment from all aspects of our society. But there are, as I said, simple ways for you as individuals and community and business leaders to engage right now. With basic training, every one of us can become better first preventers as well as first responders.
You can use ready.gov to make an emergency plan for your family. You can volunteer by contacting your local CitizenCorps or AmeriCorps councils. You can get free training on basic disaster response by joining a local CERT, or Community Emergency Response Team.
Second, we need to find new ways to work with the private sector to become more resilient to disasters of all kinds. And a key piece of this is securing our nation's critical infrastructure. This might sound just like a challenge for the government, but the fact of the matter is, 85 percent of our critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. And these are critical. These are commercial facilities, chemical plants, emergency services— much of it owned, as I said, in private hands. We must therefore be more effective at defining our critical assets and providing our private sector and their leaders with the knowledge and technical assistance to help them secure these assets.
Since the year 2003, DHS has issued more than $28 billion in grants to help secure critical infrastructure at the state and local level, but it has to be more than dollars. It has to be the active engagement of employers who work with us, who work with the federal government and DHS to identify resources and plan for ways to secure them.
I recently appointed a task force to review our existing color-coded threat system. That was the system originally designed to inform the public, and different economic sectors within the public, about impending threats. That review is under way, and I mention it only to say that if a better, more effective system can be found, that will be used instead of the current color-coded one, just to see how —the federal government and DHS rethinking what it needs to provide active information to individuals, to businesses, to employers.
The second layer is local law enforcement. And if you go out one ring from individuals and the private sector, you have 780,000 law enforcement officials across 18,000 state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. Let me just say those numbers again: 780,000 across 18,000 departments. These men and women play an absolutely critical role, because they are the ones that can act on information they receive from individuals in the community, from their own observations, or from the intelligence community itself. But the ability of state and local officials, as well as the private sector, to prepare for threats and to respond to a disaster is only as good as their ability to receive useful information, understand what it means and act upon it effectively.
As Arizona governor, I took a lead role in creating our state's first law enforcement fusion center. Now, in a typical fusion center, an FBI agent might be sitting next to a state highway patrol officer; who might be sitting next to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, agent; who might be next to an agent from the DEA or from the tribal police. They don't merely share space. They share databases and techniques. They share ideas and experiences. They break down barriers and build networks.
This ensures that local law enforcement has better information necessary to protect our people, our neighborhoods, our infrastructure. Fusion centers are and will be a critical part of our nation's homeland security capabilities. I intend to make them a top priority for this department to support them, build them, improve them and work with them.
We've now moved three dozen intelligence analysts out to the field. In other words, as we build the fusion centers, we need to move analytic capacity from the Beltway to the country. So let's—how this is used. And I'll take it out of the terrorism context for just a moment. That if a law enforcement agency reports an increase in drug seizures of a particular type, that is a data point. That's a piece of intelligence. But a whole range of agencies working together in a particular fusion center can analyze that trend to understand what it means, how it will affect particular neighborhoods, and whether it foretells something even larger on the horizon.
In addition to the 70 current fusion center sites, the department will be collaborating with the Department of Justice and the FBI in more than 100 joint terrorism task forces across the country as well. So you see how we're creating the network— individuals, private sector, now among fusion centers and the law enforcement community.
Then we move on to the federal role. Since 2001, the United States government has invested considerably in reorganizing itself to counter the threat of terrorism. Now, DHS obviously plays the critical role here because we were given the explicit mission to secure our country against attack. So we, therefore, have an obligation to be clear about that mission.
We are not the FBI and we are not the CIA, but we need to work in close coordination with them and with all agencies who have part of the counterterrorism portfolio. And the way we are doing that is taking information shared amongst the Beltway and improving the sharing of information up and down the ladder— state, local, tribal communities—to the private sector. So the addition of the ability to share intel is the value-added that the Department of Homeland security provides.
And we also provide protection at our ports. CBP —Customs and Border Protection —is handling now security at 327 ports of entry.
The Coast Guard is patrolling 95,000 miles of American coastline.
But their roles all depend, and their effectiveness all depends, on the smooth flow of information and intelligence so that their actions are pivoted from data, from actual information. So as we improve intelligence-sharing among federal agencies, and that, in turn, with our own department components, we also improve intelligence-sharing with, as I said, state and local tribal partners.
Next, our international partners. At the widest level, we have the many players and partnerships that exist internationally, as well as more that need to be created. I mentioned earlier traveling 30,000 miles in the last few weeks. But here's what that's really about. DHS, together with the Department of Justice, State and others, is brokering agreements with our allies in Europe and around the world to share information on air travelers in advance of their travel, to gather critical biometric information so we know who is in our country, to scan baggage and cargo effectively while still facilitating legal trade and commerce.
The idea here—to paraphrase former Secretary Ridge—is that our physical United States border should be our last line of defense, not our first. So together with the Department of Justice, we have now forged agreements to prevent and combat serious crime with 13 international partners. There's more to do on this front.
Now, I want to give you a window into how important these partnerships are. Let me show you one example of our new approach and new thinking. Our growing relationship with Mexico is, of course, part of a broader effort, and it is designed to interdict not only the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, bulk cash and people at the United States-Mexico border but also designed to recognize our strong national, our homeland interests in the United States and Mexico and its relationship, and the whole national interest we have in making sure that Mexico and the crime there and the large cartels there are broken up.
This direct, interactive approach with our international partners is a new approach which we think is critical to dealing with things like cartel violence and also helps us ensure that that violence does not spill across our border or weaken Mexico's ability to be a strong partner with the United States.
So we're going well beyond what we've done in the past; for example, by inspecting southbound train cargo, cars and trucks, and in fact, helping Mexico create an effective customs operation on our common southwest border that previously did not exist.
Let me close by going back to something I said earlier about people, because in the end, what we really do is about people. We are a nation of more than 300 million. More than that, we're a nation of families, communities, organizations, of cities, suburbs, tribes, all of their local governments and organizations. And within these groupings lies an extraordinary pool of talent, ingenuity and strength.
We face a networked enemy. We must meet it with a networked response. The job of securing our nation against the threat of terrorism is a large one, and it may never be totally completed, but we have a much larger chance at success if we strengthen our own networks by enlisting the talents and energies of Americans.
Countering the terrorist threat is not just the effort of one agency; it is one—or one element of society. Nor is countering terrorism the consequence of one tactic. Rather, it requires a holistic, unrelenting approach at all levels, with all tactics and all elements of society.
We need to be the very best at what we do, and that means engaging and empowering our citizens to be part of our collective effort, an effort aimed at effective prevention and of resilient response. So when I hear the phrase “Department of Homeland Security,” I think of us as a hub, but the hub of a very large wheel that involves every single person in our country.
Mr. Steiger. I want to give the members as much of an opportunity to have at you, but I can't resist asking you a couple of questions myself.
Aretha Franklin was one of many to note that every chain has got a weak link.
And when you—
Secretary Napolitano. I thought she sang about respect.
Mr. Steiger. Well, that too.
But as you seek to create this network of not just officials but individuals, how do you bring the less adept or less committed into the network, so that we've got across the country a—the kind of powerful, involved citizenry and officialdom that you're talking about?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think, one of the things we need to do is communicate that unfortunately the terrorist threat is not just focused on New York City or Washington, D.C., or a few other urban areas. Indeed if you look at the last couple of weeks, arrests have been made in places like Minneapolis and North Carolina.
So I think better education, about the breadth of the threat and how it can be carried out, is important. But even as we educate, we prepare. And again a lot of this preparation that I'm talking about has multiple uses, particularly in terms of response.
If you know or have planned with your family what you would do if an attack were to occur, that planning obviously has uses, should you have a tornado or a hurricane or other natural disasters. So education broadly but connected with also preparation and tools on, okay, well, how do you respond? Individual, family and then working with communities.
Mr. Steiger. You also alluded to the undeniable fact that terrorism can emanate from all kinds of places around the world and that intelligence is very important. The number of possible threats is infinite. So how do you zero in on the most important ones?
And yet the resistance of people, let's say, at the CIA—to share with the FBI and vice versa—is legendary. How are you doing, getting them to share with you, when they have a tough time sharing with each other?
Secretary Napolitano. Let's talk about that, because there has been a legacy of nonsharing in some respects, which is a luxury we can no longer afford.
And that is why we have a director of National Intelligence. In fact, our group, the principals—which means the head of the FBI, the head of CIA, myself, Admiral Blair—we will be meeting tomorrow. We regularly have luncheons, just ourselves, no staff, to make sure that we are effectively communicating the sharing of information.
I think the fact that I as the secretary of Homeland receive a daily intel brief—not just from members of the Department of Homeland Security, but also, for example, from a CIA briefer—helps make sure or ensure that critical intelligence is being shared. And in this administration we're very intent on exercising how we handle intel and how we respond. Indeed, right now there's a national-level exercise under way that will test some of this sharing capacity, whether things are being shared and whether responses are being correctly calibrated.
So, personal interaction, de facto interaction on a daily basis, and then exercising, I think, are the three major techniques to improve that intelligence-sharing environment.
Q. Secretary, I was very admiring of your comments. But as I sat there, I heard you speak several times about what our citizens need to—how we need to implicate our citizens in more efforts. Are you suggesting we need train our people from school days on to be more alert and watch more carefully their school people, their schoolmates, their workers, their family, their neighbors, and then to more effectively report what they see to some authority?
Secretary Napolitano. You know, I think there's actually an important role that we can play in educating even our very young about watching for and knowing what to do if—if you're in an airport and you see a package left with no one around; you know, that sort of thing. I also think we could do a much better job at educating young people about how to— how to prepare how to handle themselves so that they can protect themselves also if something untoward were to happen.
So do we have a plan in that—in that way, or have we actually worked that angle of this? Not yet. But I think you're getting the gist of what I'm saying, which is to say we need a culture of collective responsibility, a culture where every individual understands his or her role; which goes along with my saying that the more we prepare, not only the stronger we are, but the more preparation you have, the less fear that you possess.
Q. Kenneth Bialkin with Skadden, Arps. My question bears on the same delicate civil liberties issues that you've already delved into, and I know it's hard.
Every profile that the press reports on terrorists, domestic terrorists, suggests that they made their contacts and had their activities in their mosques, that it is in the mosques where the— where they meet and plan and work. And obviously surveillance and education has to bear on what might be done in terms of educating those societies and alerting those people to the risks that their communities and others face.
Is that responsibility one which resides in your department? Is it shared? And what can you say about that particular focus, when we know that so much happens in such a restricted area?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, a couple of things. The direct answer to your question is that sort of activity is primarily the domain of the FBI.
But I think we have to be very careful about profiling a religious institution just as we have to be careful about profiling individuals. And that's why how you develop intelligence that's actionable needs to be very carefully done and not restricted or done in that religious environment.
Where we can help in our approach is to work with leaders in a variety of faith-based communities not just on education but really to have good community outreach, so if they perceive that there is something going on that is aimed at violent extremism or an extremist attack, they feel comfortable working with law enforcement in advance of that attack occurring. But I think we have to be very, very careful about interfering with the free exercise of religion or profiling in that sense.
Q. Bal Das from Kailix Advisors. Madame Secretary, in the network response, you identified a key component, which is greater international cooperation. And at the beginning also you laid that out as being one of the framework of an effective response, since your borders—since our borders are the last, rather than the first, response.
How closely do you work with the State Department, in terms of the projection of American soft power as compared to hard power being at the nub of winning of the hearts and mind, which goes a great distance in making sure that the inspector in Karachi is not just obligated by a bilateral shared security treaty but genuinely feels that he needs to ferret out more information and share with a nation whose value system he or she empathizes with, whether it's Karachi or New Delhi? So I wonder how—I would appreciate your thought on how closely you work with the State Department and in the projection of American soft power as—about your strategic thinking. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. We work, obviously, very closely with the State Department in the international environment. Indeed, when I travel internationally, I immediately link up with whatever embassy or consulate is where I'm going, so that we attend and go to things together. So when I met with, for example, the president of Pakistan a couple of weeks ago, the ambassador was with me. Why? Because we want to show that we are linked together and have a common message and in—to use that as an example as an area where we can assist in helping create a civilian law-enforcement presence that would take the place of a military presence, particularly in certain parts of the country.
Perhaps a more direct example is Mexico, where Congress actually appropriated—it's called the Merida Initiative—to be used in conjunction with the federal government of Mexico to buy equipment and, importantly, to train civilian law enforcement.
And I want to just pause a moment on this. Our ability as a nation to work with other countries on having a—not just a law enforcement but justice systems that are civilian in nature as opposed to military, I think, is very, very important.
And that's one of the things that we have expertise in within the Department of Homeland Security, particularly when you're talking, for example, about how do you set up a port of entry, you know? How do you run it? What does it look like? What kinds of technology should be employed? What works? What have we found that doesn't work? What kind of training needs to be—needs do you need to have? What kind of supervision do you need to have? How do you prevent corruption from occurring or from infiltrating the ranks?
How do you create public trust that the people who are running ports are not simply on the dole and you can just pay them off and any kind of contraband can go through? So that transition from military to civilian, I believe, is where our department can play a key role.
White House Statement, August 17, 2009Footnote 5
On the August 17th explosion in Nazran, Ingushetiya
I am deeply troubled about reports of a suicide bombing today in Nazran, Ingushetiya that has resulted in the tragic loss of at least 20 lives and 138 injured. There can be no justification for such an act of terrorism. This latest attack highlights the concerning increase in violence in the region affecting officials and civilians alike. Our condolences go out to the Government of Russia and the families of victims.
White House Press Release, September 1, 20097
On attack on Saudi Assistant Minister
The U.S. Government strongly condemns the cowardly attack late last week against Saudi Arabia's Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Muhammad Bin Nayif. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula has claimed responsibility for the attack, which was unsuccessful. Prince Muhammad has been a courageous leader of Saudi Arabia's fight against al-Qa'ida, and we are very thankful that Prince Muhammad escaped this attack with only minor injuries. The President has extended his best wishes for a full recovery to Prince Muhammad. The attempt on the life of Prince Muhammad underscores the continued threat posed by al-Qa'ida and the importance of strong counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and our regional partners. The President has discussed security cooperation in all of his interactions with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, as they both share a firm commitment to dismantle the al-Qa'ida organization and to prevent it from carrying out its murderous agenda.
