This is a useful collection of thirteen original essays by accomplished philosophers on a subject of great importance: the problem of international ethical duties, especially the duties of people in well-off countries to improve the well-being of people in poor nations. Deen Chatterjee, the editor, describes the book's focus by asking two questions: ‘If we have duties and obligations toward each other in everyday moral contexts, should these be extended to the distant needy? If so, what should be the nature and role of institutions implementing such duties beyond our own borders of special ties and communities?’ (p. 1).
Since current philosophical discussion of these issues originated with Peter Singer's 1972 essay, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, the book begins with an essay by Singer and three essays that continue the debate in the terms with which Singer framed it. Later sections, however, deal with other approaches and other ways of framing the issues. While significant differences exist between the various authors, all agree that there are duties of assistance to the distant needy. Their positions range from extreme global egalitarianism to various kinds of extended nationalism and limited globalism. Readers will find no extreme nationalists, political realists or libertarian opponents of international aid in this volume.
The book contains four parts. Part I begins with a restatement by Singer of his demanding, impartialist ethic and three analyses of aspects of his original view. Richard Arneson considers several attempts to show that partiality for ourselves is morally justified, but he finds these attempts weak and defends Singer's impartialism. Frances Kamm explores the relevance of distance between potential assisters and assistees and defends the view that distance sometimes makes a moral difference. Judith Lichtenberg tries to explain why, even when people find Singer's view plausible, they lack the motivation to live in accord with his strict ethical demands.
The original debate about Singer's views seems to turn on the status of impartialism. If impartialism is correct, then there are extremely strong duties to assist the distant needy while if partiality is permissible, duties to the distant needy are either weak or non-existent. In Singer's contribution, he backs away slightly from this view and provides impartialist grounds for partiality toward friends, families, and benefactors. He rejects partiality toward racial and national groups. The three commentators remain focused on the clash between partialism and impartialism.
The second part consists of essays by Richard Miller and by David Miller, who share both a last name and somewhat similar views on these issues. Both Millers defend national partiality, but neither sees this as inconsistent with duties to people in other nations. Friends of the distant needy should, I think, hope that their approach is right. It will certainly be less of a challenge to defend duties of assistance if they are compatible with the kind of partiality that seems so natural to virtually everyone. If duties of assistance can only be defended by appeal to the radical idea that we have no sound basis for acting on behalf of ourselves, people we love and care about, and our own countries, then duties of assistance will remain difficult to defend. A less radical starting point may make such duties more palatable, though it remains to be seen whether less radical views can generate a sufficiently demanding ethic of assistance.
Part III contains three essays that take John Rawls's Law of Peoples as their starting point. (Singer briefly criticizes this work in his opening contribution.) Martha Nussbaum criticizes Rawls for being too accommodating to non-liberal cultures that do not recognize the rights of women, but she also argues that recognition of these rights does not imply duties to intervene and change the society's practices. By contrast, Charles Beitz argues that when we make judgements about what rights exist, we need to consider what rights can feasibly be implemented. There is no point, he argues, in making strong claims about rights if there is no feasible way to implement respect for them. Erin Kelly defends Rawls's strategy of focusing on a narrow range of especially fundamental rights and not requiring that so-called decent societies accept the full range of liberal rights. All three agree that there are duties to those who are not our fellow citizens, but they go well beyond the ‘assistance’ issue to talk about other rights and the relevance of means to promoting them.
Part IV also focuses on implementation. Henry Shue considers the recurrent charge that rights talk is empty and formalistic and that genuine moral discourse must be thick, local and contextualized. Shue, wanting to defend the language of human rights, argues that once we start to consider how to implement rights, the alleged thinness of impartial, cosmopolitan views disappears. The implementation of rights in particular contexts gives rights talk the kind of content that localists have insisted on. Onora O'Neill urges attention to the institutions that are supposed to implement rights and argues that we should be careful not to attach duties of implementation to institutions that are incapable of playing this role. At the same time, she urges that NGOs and multinational corporations are often in a better position to do some implementing than particular national governments or the United Nations. The final essay by Thomas Pogge passionately sets forth a challenging thesis: namely that the poor, so-called developing nations are often the victims of the current wealthy nations and that there is no way that they can successfully ‘catch up’ on their own. Because the wealthy nations are responsible for many of the ills of the poor nations, they have a strong duty to narrow the gap. This duty, Pogge claims, should not be seen on the model of the benevolent bystander but rather should be understood as a duty to make up for harms that have been done.
The fact that all the authors accept the idea of duties of assistance suggests that attitudes have changed since Singer's 1972 paper. But Singer also demanded a very high level of assistance and sacrifice. Most people think he demanded too much, but there is little discussion here of how much is enough.
Singer's own view is clear. As a global egalitarian, he wants to see resources distributed so as to maximize utility for all; borders and national groups have no moral standing. In this volume, he criticizes Rawls for failing to defend a global version of the difference principle in the Law of Peoples. Singer is, I believe, unfair in charging that Rawls ‘does not disturb conventional moral views’ (p. 24) and ‘leaves untouched the plight of individuals who are dying from starvation, malnutrition, or easily preventable diseases’ (p. 26). Rawls (as quoted by Pogge) asserts ‘a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime’. Presumably, these unfavourable conditions include starvation and disease. Like Singer, Pogge thinks that Rawls demands ‘less than is needed’ (p. 260). Still, Rawls's view is considerably more demanding than conventional moral views and, if implemented, would make a huge difference in the world. Perhaps that is a good reason not to criticize it.
The claim that the Rawlsian conception of duties of assistance is too weak brings to center stage the issue of how we can tell what level of assistance would be adequate. If there is now a consensus that duties of assistance exist, attention must turn to how strong these duties are. Are they essentially unlimited, as Singer argues? Or is there a cut-off, as Rawls suggests? This volume may pave the way for this next phase of the discussion.
