Two recent books challenge the conclusion that Locke is a modern political philosopher. Philip Vogt's John Locke and the Rhetoric of Modernity argues that Leibniz's view that Locke believed the nascent mind was a blank slate, human psychology operated in accord with the principles of mechanics, and the soul was not eternal has obscured the true Locke and therewith the true character of modernity (1–2). Vogt, an associate professor of history at Lawrence Technological University, intends to uncover the real Locke by analyzing his rhetorical structures, his analogies, tropes, and topoi.
Alexander S. Rosenthal's Crown Under Law: Richard Hooker, John Locke, and the Ascent of Modern Constitutionalism rejects the distinction of the ancients and moderns and the subsequent classification that Locke is thoroughly modern. Rosenthal, a lecturer in political theory at Johns Hopkins University, claims Leo Strauss's view of Locke, along with its antihistoricism and esotericism, has imputed motives and intentions to Locke “that cannot be found by a straightforward reading of either the text itself or the circumstances from which it arose” (xxiii). Rosenthal intends to return to the historical origins of Locke's thought, the political theology of Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, which is “the matrix from which Lockean thought arose, with its broad influence on the Anglo-American world” (xiv).
Rosenthal's book addresses the question, “What is the historical and theoretical origin of modern constitutionalism?” (xiii). The central figures in the rise of modern constitutionalism and the idea that “law must limit the sovereign's power,” are Hooker and Locke, with Hooker the progenitor of Locke's constitutionalism (90). Rosenthal intends to restore Hooker as a political thinker in his own right and not as a Lockean “polemical ploy to solicit a respected and traditional authority on behalf of a more radical and modernist agenda” (xxi).
Hooker's constitutionalism, Rosenthal argues, is inseparable from the theological disputes of the English Reformation in which Hooker defended the Elizabethan settlement that attempted to formalize the separation of the ecclesiastical affairs of England from papal jurisdiction and establish the crown as supreme governor of the Church. English Calvinists rejected the settlement as unlawful because it was not grounded in Scripture. Indeed, Calvinists argued that there is only one true law that compelled obedience: the divine law of Scripture. Hooker understood that the political ramifications of Calvinist theology went beyond Church practice, attacking the legitimacy of the civil authority and the English legal system (16, 19–20).
The Calvinists' insistence on the divine law was related to their postlapsarian anthropology, which considered the will as thoroughly corrupted by Original Sin, leaving man with no other guide for his salvation than Scripture. Calvinists viewed natural law with skepticism and implied that human beings were subject to a double predestination: some were preordained for salvation while others were to be condemned (47ff.). In response, Hooker adapted the Thomistic teaching on the hierarchy of law. Hooker argued predestination was incompatible with divine goodness and justice, portraying God as willful and not bound by law. Following Aquinas, Hooker concluded that God was indeed bound by the eternal law, His own purposes, which must be good (37). “Founded on this eternal law, there is, on the one hand, the revealed law disclosed in Scripture and, on the other hand, there is the natural law discernable by natural reason, which orders all things to their proper end” (73). Positive law is necessary because the “natural law by itself prescribes no penalties, and without sanctions the majority of persons in the fallen state would be unable to keep the law” (72).
Hooker's defense of civil government, Rosenthal believes, is the progenitor of Locke's constitutionalism. Government is necessary to restrain sin, and when established, it ought to be limited by the rule of law and directed toward the common good. Legitimate government is limited from above, by the natural law grounded in the eternal law, and from below, by the limits of sovereignty derived from the consent of the community as a whole (108). For Hooker, Rosenthal argues, there are two stages in the origins of political society. “In the first stage, the community exists in the natural condition of self-dominion with no one in authority” (117). This prepolitical state is social, but not yet political, and resembles Locke's state of nature, governed by the law of nature. For political society to emerge, then, the community must consent for some to rule over the whole. Accordingly, the community delegates power to the sovereign, whether one, few, or many, but this power is limited by the existence of the social compact and the nature of law. The crucial difference, according to Rosenthal, between Hooker and Locke is that Hooker believed that government ought to be concerned with ecclesiastical matters, as they were part of the common good. He did not explicitly develop a teaching on revolution. Rosenthal notes the differences are due to differences in the historical context of the thinkers (234ff.).
As Rosenthal looks to historical context to emphasize Locke's debt to Hooker, Vogt looks to Locke's rhetoric. Vogt's book is concerned “with figuration, with topoi and tropes, which is to say that it is concerned with the rhetorical structure of Locke's thought” (2). Vogt argues the same rhetorical structures that allow us to speak allow us also to think. Language according to Vogt is “limited for describing the experience of the world” and cannot convey anything more than “the mind's own predispositions.” All language is, therefore, figurative and cannot present a literal representation of the world. The utility of such representations, and not their accuracy, matters (4–5).
Vogt considers Locke's “An Examination of Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God,” which Vogt believes was intended to complete Locke's teaching on analogy in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (10). Malebranche's theory of perception and cognition taught that human ideas spring from the mind of God. These pure ideas are perfectly reliable until they are distorted by the passions or the senses. Locke rejects this teaching on the grounds that it is an abuse of the trope that God is mind, because it treats the human mind and the mind of God as corresponding, and the physical and the spiritual realms as equivalent (12).
Vogt observes that Locke began the Essay with “his own version of an analogical equation of the eye and the mind, a counterpoint to Malebranche's Vision of God, to the effect that the mind's ability to measure its own capacities is as limited as the eye's ability to see itself” (14). As Vogt explains, Locke's distinction between the primary and secondary (sensible) qualities of objects supports the understanding that the mind and sense experience are limited because it is impossible to conceive how God could link the qualities or “annex such Ideas to such Motions” (15). If it cannot be known how the primary qualities of an object produce the secondary qualities, “it cannot be known that one person's perceptions of either primary or secondary qualities are the same as someone else's.” The truth or falsehood of our ideas, for Locke, therefore, depends upon relational judgments, probabilities, and contingency. Further, “truth … cannot reside in the accurate correspondence of words to things, but in adherence to the sanctioned employment of words” (17). Language, in order to be useful in conveying understanding, must be strictly used or at least used in a way that corresponds to the experience of our limitations and society's usage.
Locke rejects Malebranche's theory because it cannot be reconciled with the normal experience that we cannot know for certain that our ideas are implanted in the mind of God. Vogt points out that due to the limitations of human understanding we are forced to rely on analogy and figuration to describe our experiences. But it must be recognized that these ideas do not necessarily reveal the true makeup of the universe. At best, our explanations of the world are artificial, only probable, and never certain.
The analogy that Locke uses to describe the human mind in the Essay, Vogt argues, is not Leibniz's blank slate, which implies that the mind is passive, something acted upon by the external world. Instead, Locke draws from the seventeenth-century practice in art and philosophy, the analogy of the mind as a ship, because it represents the searching character of the mind and its capacity and inclination to structure the data of experience (101). The analogy also captures the limits and the adequacy of the human mind to navigate a world that in the end remains largely enigmatic. The analogy of the ship “calls on us to navigate between the Scylla of radical skepticism and the Charybdis of dogmatism and enthusiasm” (102).
Vogt notes that postmodernism recognizes that man's linguistic constructions are conventional and artificial, but it dogmatically asserts there is no need to believe that there is anything behind the constructions (178–79). Vogt's Locke answers that still there is more to our constructions. While we navigate the world, we recognize we cannot plumb the depths of the oceans. Nevertheless, we can adequately navigate our course.
Rosenthal and Vogt's books are well researched and thought provoking. They both promise to uncover the real Locke, but one wonders if they make good on their promise. Rosenthal makes his intention known: he intends to ground Locke's political thought in Hooker's constitutionalism by emphasizing the continuity between late-Scholasticism and Locke (234, 268). His heuristic method, in the manner of Pocock and Skinner, seems to be designed to deny that Locke could break out of his historical context, which is tantamount to denying that either Locke was a philosopher or that philosophy is possible. Vogt provides a rhetorical reading of Locke's Essay, and he is clearly interested in certain tropes, analogies, and topoi that he believes will reveal the true Locke. Vogt treats Locke as if he is bound to the tropes of his day to convey his thought. Neither Rosenthal nor Vogt follows Locke's suggestion in the Reasonableness of Christianity on how to read his works. One might well ask whether, in the end, the approaches of Rosenthal and Vogt close us off from the real Locke.
