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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2004
For decades the U.S. courts of appeals were afflicted with the proverbial middle child syndrome. They were given less than deserved attention by legal scholars and political scientists, and their decisions commanded less media and popular attention than rulings by the Supreme Court and even decisions of federal district courts. To many observers, the appeals courts were relatively invisible. Circuit courts are convalescing from this affliction because increasingly political scientists are turning their analytical attention to these thirteen important stations of judicial power in American society.
Scholars have used a variety of techniques to analyze these courts. Some choose to examine the courts of appeals comparatively, by emphasizing differences in institutional structure, decision outcomes, and judicial personalities. Others perform a detailed and intuitive case study of only one. This latter technique may limit generalizability, but it gives political scientists and, especially, students of the judiciary a useful sense of the historicity and doctrinal contributions of individual courts. Christopher Banks has written an important book that falls within this second category.
Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit Court contributes to the broader judicial politics literature by providing a detailed historical account of the major political and jurisprudential developments in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after 1960. According to Banks, the post-1960 period was one of significant transformation for the D.C. Circuit. It emerged from relative obscurity to become a dominant political force not only in supervising local community courts and liberalizing the rights of criminal defendants in the Washington, D.C., area but also in superintending the policy decisions of federal administrative agencies and in serving as what is putatively the most fertile ground for the cultivation of prospective nominees for the Supreme Court.
The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 chronicles the D.C. Circuit's great authority in the judicial hierarchy. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the internal and external political forces that have shaped the current status of the D.C. Circuit. Chapter 4 discusses the significance of en banc reviews and the degree of scrutiny afforded by the Supreme Court over circuit decisions. Chapter 5 summarizes the main argument and speculates on the D.C. Circuit's future. From the outset Banks notes accurately that, with few exceptions, precious little has been written about this court, even though it occupies a central place in the federal judicial system.
Part of the difficulty is the lack of detailed data (beyond the descriptive material available from the Administrative Office of the Courts [AOC] that would permit rigorous empirical analysis. The recently completed court of appeals database compiled by Donald Songer (Principal Investigator) begins to address this difficulty. Indeed, analyses using AOC data are by necessity historical and descriptive rather than deductive and theoretical. Banks relies upon descriptive data from this federal agency in his coverage of the D.C. Circuit and all the numbered circuits, and these data enable him to emphasize the distinctive features of the D.C. Circuit. Yet, like many scholars who write about the courts of appeals, Banks could not obtain comparative data on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the only circuit court with limited subject-matter jurisdiction and the court most similar to the D.C. Circuit in jurisdiction and geographic location.
Banks does not explicate and test a new theory of judicial behavior. Instead, he seeks to write a descriptive book about an important circuit court, and he succeeds. Banks relies upon a critical evaluation of various theories of judicial behavior, especially the hierarchical model (chap. 4) proposed by Donald Songer, Jeffrey Segal, and Charles Cameron (“The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions,” American Journal of Political Science 38:3 [August 1994]: 673–96), to analyze events within the D.C. Circuit from 1960 to 1997.
The main argument is that, since the 1960s, the D.C. Circuit has had two distinct reputations in the legal community, and each influences the court's work. The first was developed during the 1960s, when the D.C. Circuit positioned itself as a progressive forum for adjudicating criminal disputes. Because of escalating crime in American society and the social upheaval of that period, the circuit was vilified for its progressive or lenient stance on the rights of criminal defendants. Congressional Republicans championed wholesale changes in the court's personnel and jurisdiction in an effort to fight crime and restore public order.
The second reputation is that of a quasi-specialized, de facto court for adjudicating administrative appeals, a direct result of the transformation of the court's personnel and jurisdiction. In chapter 3, Banks describes how political forces both inside and outside the D.C. Circuit influenced the court's decision making in administrative law, including differences in orientation among the judges, which led to the development of the popular “hard-look” doctrine that expanded the scope of judicial supervision of administrative agency decisions. In examining both reputations, Banks helps us understand how powerfully Washington politics permeates the judicial system.
Toward the end of the book, Banks addresses the politically controversial issue of subject-matter specialization in the courts. Political elites are sharply divided on the propriety of establishing specialized tribunals staffed with experts to adjudicate legal controversies in a specific policy area. Banks spells out the pros and cons in this debate. Although he seems tepid on this issue at first, his preference is clearly pronounced by the end. The D.C. Circuit is traditionally considered a generalist court, but since the 1970s the court has decided the greatest proportion of administrative agency appeals directly involving the federal government. Therefore, Banks advocates congressional reform to restrict its substantive jurisdiction to cases from administrative agencies because “the D.C. Circuit operates best as a specialized court” (p. 136). This would turn the D.C. Circuit into a specialized court of administrative law. But Banks is extremely cautious and calls repeatedly for more studies of the issue before any reforms are implemented. This caution undermines the force of his own evidence showing that the D.C. Circuit is the most active tribunal in deciding administrative appeals and that this makes it appropriate for the D.C. Circuit to be formalized as a specialized court.
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