Yitzhak Nakash's Reaching for Power: The Shiʿa in the Modern Arab World extends the analysis of his highly acclaimed The Shiʿis of Iraq to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Lebanon, while adding material on modern Iraq. The result is the first comparative study of Shiʿi communities in the Arab world.
Reaching for Power begins with an overview of the oppression and duplicity that the Shiʿa have endured in much of the Arab world. Perhaps nowhere were they treated worse than in the Qatif and Hasa regions of the northern Arabian Peninsula, which were first subjugated by the Al Saʿud in 1795, and made part of the modern Saudi state in 1913. As Professor Nakash documents, Wahhabi Islam extended no tolerance to the Shiʿi populations of Qatif and Hasa. Despite promises of being treated well if they did not resist the Al Saʿud in 1913, once the Saudis controlled the region, Shiʿi institutions were closed and the Shiʿi community went into decline. When oil was discovered in the area in 1938, the Saudi monarchy prevented its Shiʿi population from enjoying its economic benefits. To appease the Wahhabis, tombs of Shiʿi clerics in Mecca were desecrated.
Saudi repression of the Shiʿa was replicated in Bahrain after the island was conquered by the Al Khalifa in 1783. As with the Al Saʿud, the Al Khalifa sought to discredit Shiʿi national and religious credentials. Whereas the Saudi monarchy claimed that their conquest of Qatif and Hasa unified Islam, the Al Khalifa narrative was one of having liberated Bahrain and brought Arabism to the island. Actually, the author shows that the Shiʿa had a long and distinguished tradition both in Bahrain and in Qatif and Hasa, seen in a large waqf system, a well-developed agriculture, and trading networks throughout the Gulf. Shiʿi counternarratives emphasized their community's status as an ancient and settled culture that was subjugated by Sunni nomads.
In Lebanon, the Shiʿa were historically the most suppressed of the seventeen confessional groups that comprise the modern state. Geographically separated in the Bekaʿ Valley and Jabil ʿAmil, Lebanon's Shiʿa were unable to exercise effective political power, especially under a hostile Ottoman rule. However, by 1975 the Shiʿa had become Beirut's largest ethnic group, the Amal movement was challenging Israeli control of the south, and the charismatic Imam Musa Sadr had taken over leadership of the community. During the late 1980s, Hizbullah emerged as a powerful force within the Lebanese political system.
Professor Nakash's discussion of the Shiʿi mobilization in Bahrain and Lebanon to challenge their inferior status makes for compelling reading. His analysis transcends a narrow cultural focus to highlight the economic and political problems that have faced Arab Shiʿi communities. The forging of alliances among Shiʿa and Sunni Arabs in Bahrain, and among Shiʿa and other confessional groups in Lebanon, provides a hopeful sign for the future.
The author is less convincing when analyzing Iraq. First, many of Iraq's Shiʿa have been strongly secular throughout the modern period, especially the educated middle classes and workers. This was already evident prior to World War I when Sunni and Shiʿi notables sought to establish a national secular Arabic education system, and in the many multiethnic labor unions that were formed during the 1920s and after. However, secular voices receive little attention, such as those of prominent rice merchant, and National Party leader, Jaʿfar Abu Timman; educational reformer Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali; the dean of Iraqi historians, ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Hasani; Baʿth Party leaders Fuءad al-Rikabi and ʿAli Salih al-Saʿdi; and the poets and leftist reformers Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri and ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayyati. This omission raises an important conceptual issue: are Shiʿa, who are politically active but secular, to be excluded from a model that focuses on Shiʿi efforts to gain political power in Arab society? Or are only those Shiʿa who self-consciously identify themselves in religious terms, and act through Shiʿi religious institutions and organizations, to be included in such a model?
Second, the discussion of Iraq focuses more on sectarian divisions than on politically integrative processes. For example, Professor Nakash emphasizes the Sunni dominated state's denigration of the Shiʿi role in a central event of modern Iraqi history, the 1920 revolution. For the author, the uprising's historiography, especially in works published during the 1990s, during the height of Saddam Hussein's promotion of sectarianism to prop up his rule, is an indicator not only of Shiʿi political marginalization, but also of the strength of sectarian cleavages in Iraq.
However, an alternative historiography of the revolution, which emphasizes its ecumenical nature and cross-ethnic nature, is not discussed. This latter historiography is evident in works such as Muhammad Mahdi al-Basir's History of the Iraqi Question, ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Hasani's The Great Iraqi Revolution, and ʿAbd al-Husayn al-Mubarak's The 1920 Revolution in Iraqi Poetry. The most authoritative study of the uprising, Wamidh Omar Nazmi's The Political, Intellectual and Social Roots of the Iraqi Independence Movement, 1920, a Durham University doctoral dissertation published in Arabic in 1984, views the uprising in nationalist terms. Shiʿi and Sunni celebrations of their respective religious festivals, praying in their respective mosques, and their encouraging of Jews and Christians to join nationalist demonstrations because they were also full Iraqi citizens, are cited by Iraqis as indicators of the revolt's Iraqi, rather than sectarian nature. In this historiography, the emphasis is not on a Sunni state seeking to repress the memory of a Shiʿi uprising, but rather on Shiʿi and Sunni Iraqis (and other ethnic groups) joining together in a nationalist enterprise in 1920 to fight against an exclusionary state and its British overlords.
From 1920 until its suppression by the first Baʿthist regime in 1963, the majority wing of the Iraqi nationalist movement emphasized cross-ethnic cooperation and antisectarianism. The 1920 revolution was often invoked as a model for nationalist activities, whether the general strike of 1931, the wathba of 1948, or the intifadas of 1952 and 1956. For Iraqis seeking to use the past to promote political pluralism, cultural tolerance, and democracy, the history of Sunni–Shiʿi relations is not just an academic issue, but one that has important political implications for post-Baʿthist Iraq.
As its title suggests, Reaching for Power looks to the future. The key question is whether Shiʿa in Arab countries will seek power as a unified ethnic group, under religious leadership, or whether they will follow a strategy of cross-ethnic and largely secular political alliances such as the author details in Bahrain (and which I would argue has characterized much of modern Iraqi politics as well). Many Iraqis argue that Saddam Hussein and the Baʿth Party were unable to destroy the Hawza, the main religious institution of Iraq's Shiʿa, because of its revered status and its independent sources of income from devout Shiʿa as well as from foreign pilgrims visiting Shiʿi holy sites in Iraq. These Iraqis argue that, once Iraq's Shiʿa feel more comfortable exercising political power, they will rely less on the clerics and will turn as much to the secular organizations that have been slowly reorganizing since 2003.
The struggles of the Arab world's Shiʿa have been admirably documented and analyzed by Yitzhak Nakash. Nevertheless, the Shiʿa still have a long road to travel before finding political and social equality in the Arab world. Whether they will pursue this equality in more narrowly defined confessional terms, or within broader cross-ethnic alliances, still requires much additional research.
