To my knowledge, this is the first work that attempts a systematic analysis of a heretofore relatively neglected genre of Muslim legal writing: takhrīj al-furūʿ ʿalā al-uṣūl. The stated purpose of this genre of legal writing was to provide a coherent account of the relationship of substantive legal rules (i.e., the “furūʿ”) to the theoretical principles (i.e., the “uṣūl”) from which those rules were derived or could reasonably be justified. Ahmad wisely disclaims any attempt to provide a unified account of the varied writings that make up this genre. Instead, he provides readers with a well-written introduction to this genre by exploring six works written over the span of some 600 years: Taʾsis al-Nazar of al-Dabbusi (Hanafi, d. 1036), Takhrij al-Furuʿ ʿala al-Usul of al-Zanjani (Shafiʿi, d. 1258), Miftah al-Wusul ila Binaʾ al-Furuʿ ʿala al-Usul of al-Tilmisani (Maliki, d. 1369), Al-Tamhid fi Takhrij al-Furuʿ ʿala al-Usul of al-Isnawi (Shafiʿi, d. 1370), Al-Qawaʿid wa-l-Fawaʾid al-Usuliyya wa Ma Yataʿallaq biha min al-Ahkam al-Sharʿiyya of Ibn al-Lahham (Hanbali, d. 1402), and Al-Wusul ila Qawaʿid al-Usul of al-Timurtashi (Hanafi, d. after 1599).
Ahmad's principal thesis is that the juxtaposition of theoretical principles and substantive law “stimulated advanced juristic minds to consider the need for constant adjustment of both the theoretical and practical aspects of the law” (p. xxii). A critical tool in this dialectic between legal theory and legal rules was the hypothetical case that, far from being evidence of a legal intellect that was unconcerned with reality, was the primary tool by which the coherence of tentative solutions to problems presented by substantive doctrine was tested (p. xxii). Although I am not certain that Ahmad has fully succeeding in demonstrating his hypothesis—at least with respect to those rules of Islamic law that deal with human affairs (muʿāmalāt)—there is little question that his work provides a useful introduction to the question of how medieval Muslim jurists approached the issue of the relationship of their substantive rules to more abstract theoretical principles. In so doing, he helps illuminate a period in Islamic legal history and a genre of legal writing that have been relatively ignored. Students and researchers in Islamic legal history, accordingly, will find this work a useful starting point for any future research in this area.
An additional strength of this book is its attention to theory: in various places throughout the book, the author makes judicious comparisons to comparable principles in Anglo American jurisprudence. It is unfortunate that assumptions regarding the “otherness” of Islamic law continue to have surprisingly robust and negative real-world consequences in cases in which secular courts in Western jurisdictions are called on to construe principles of Islamic law. Another important contribution of the book is the author's attempt to place his work in the context of different approaches to the study of Islamic law in Western and Muslim institutions. Although the former seem to have an almost obsessive concern with questions regarding the origins of Islamic law at the expense of the history of later periods for which data is plentiful, the latter have little interest in actual legal history, focusing instead on the uses to which Islamic law might be put in the radically altered context of modernity. These theoretical issues are set forth principally in the book's first two chapters, which together represent approximately a quarter of the book's length.
The author explores the relationship of theoretical principles to substantive legal rules in five chapters covering some 150 pages. Some readers with detailed knowledge of uṣūl al-fiqh will no doubt find some of the material (e.g., the semantic status assigned to verbs in the imperative mood) to duplicate previous scholarship. Nevertheless, Ahmad explores these issues in a different context, where the challenge is to explain how a legal theorist's understanding of this question affects substantive legal outcomes. Otherwise, Chapter 4 deals with some technical legal questions arising out of Islamic remedial law (aḥkām waḍʿiyya), such as the difference among the various legal schools between whether contracts with elements of invalidity are simply null or whether they may nevertheless, despite elements of invalidity, result in certain legal consequences. Here, the author shows how practice (i.e., a jurist's consideration of substantive legal doctrine) had an impact in forcing Shafiʿis and Hanbalis to revise their view—even if only in part—that contracts were simply either valid or invalid.
Chapters 5 and 6 cover topics such as hermeneutics and extratextual sources that are generally familiar to students of uṣūl al-fiqh. Perhaps the most interesting from a theoretical perspective, Chapter 7 addresses theoretical principles that lack any revelatory provenance and amount to legal principles in the purest sense; they are principles developed and justified entirely by reference to the view of a jurist. An important example of this phenomenon is the various assumptions regarding the nature of Islamic law's jurisdiction (i.e., is it territorial or universal?)—how the answer to this question of principle determines the answers to many important questions in substantive law.
The relationship of substantive Islamic law to Islam's theological premises is obviously not only a matter of historical concern but also one with pressing practical importance in today's world for those jurisdictions in which Islamic law still makes up a part of the state's legal system. From that perspective, it is critical that more work along the lines of Ahmad's be conducted.
Along those lines, it is important to ask whether jurists engaged in Islamic law should care about Islamic legal history. To the extent that these jurists believe that theoretical principles of the sort described in Ahmad's Chapter 7 have been the fundamental driver of the development of Islamic substantive law—at least with respect to those areas of Islamic law that correspond to secular notions of legality—then legal history ought to have a privileged position in the teaching and research agendas of contemporary Muslim legal academies.
Conversely, to the extent that Islamic substantive law is deemed principally to be an interpretive project, the task of which is to construe theologically determined infallible sources of meaning, then the job of legal history is simply to describe how the “right” way to read these privileged sources of meaning was discovered. The relatively low priority that modern Muslim legal academies assign to legal history suggests that they have adopted what Ibn Khaldun called the theologians' approach to legal theory. They might find that what Ibn Khaldun called the jurists' method might be a more valuable route to legal reform, in which case one could expect a renaissance in the study of legal history in the Muslim world. This reviewer, for one, certainly hopes that Muslim academies will turn away from the theological method in favor of the jurists' method.
