In a book of wide-ranging historical and archival erudition, Rhodri Lewis ably tells the story of efforts in seventeenth-century England to produce an “artificial language.” This movement was inspired by Francis Bacon, culminated in John Wilkins's Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language, and was eventually pronounced a failure by John Locke. An “artificial language” project—or, since Lewis admits at the outset that this is an anachronistic expression (xii), what is better called natural or strictly philosophical language—is the attempt to represent the natural articulation of thought, and hence of being or things as such (12), through simple symbols or characters that would be universally communicable. This book is written in an engaging and occasionally poetic manner, to the point that one would rue the prospect of a rigorously systematic artificial language.
Lewis shows, by example and argument, that there are good grounds for the recent revival of interest (by the likes of Borges, Foucault, and Eco) in the ambitious, if flawed, pursuit of an algebraically exact character system. The issue of artificial-language planning raises perennial questions about mind, nature, and God, the importance of which perhaps even the author himself does not emphasize sufficiently. Indeed, his theme is relevant not only because of modern computer languages, symbolic logic, or Esperanto, but more fundamentally because the language planners' project lives on through the hopes that modern human beings place in scientific method and precision.
Bacon, the somewhat unwitting founder of the language planners' movement (10), proposed to remedy the deficiencies and abuses of language—”the idols of the marketplace”—with two goals in mind: to ensure that “the mind could accurately mirror … and transform the natural world to human advantage” (21, emphasis added; cf. 228). One might suspect that the failure of the project is foretold in this original intent if the goals of mirroring and transforming nature are in tension (cf. 20). To be sure, one could mirror what is natural and leverage this representation in the service of transformation. And perhaps there is nothing odd about wishing to grasp nature as it is and to improve human life at the same time. But once what is given has been transformed by the actions of the conqueror of nature, would he not find himself in a funhouse of distorting mirrors?
Another fundamental problem, which Lewis does not, at least not explicitly, identify as a difficulty, appears to have affected the most prominent figure of the movement. Bacon's follower, John Wilkins, understood the project as a millenarian or apocalyptic one. There is a question, however, whether the basis of the Baconian project is, in its original intent, theological or strictly philosophical. It would be theological inasmuch as it is grounded in a belief in a divine knower of essences, or in an Adam who properly named and classified all things. It would be philosophical, on the other hand, inasmuch as it relies on the human mind to grasp the simple intelligibles and construct a corresponding representational schema. Lewis sidesteps this difficulty in claiming that Bacon holds to a harmonious duality of philosophical and theological truths (19). To be sure, Lewis shows, in chapter 4 (“Discursus: Artificial Languages, Religion and the Occult”), that the key language planners were not fundamentally affected by language mysticism or “philosophic Biblicism.” But Lewis also makes it amply clear that Wilkins's fundamental presupposition was religious. He was inspired in his trusting search for a perfect language by the thought that his success would show that there is a rationally knowing God who has granted universal intelligence to humans and universal intelligibility to nature (179, 185), not to mention the charitable intention of forefending religiously inspired civil wars (175–76; cf. 229). As Lewis puts it, “Religion, or the habit of reverence towards a Christian God, structured the entirety of Wilkins' thought” (173). The importance of this issue might have justified putting “God” in this book's title, but both God and Wilkins are absent from it or the subtitle. In fact, in pursuing the philosophical issues raised by Lewis's work, it might have been helpful to consider whether certain of the theological inclinations and presuppositions of some of the language planners may have led them to be too hopeful in their search for a strict correspondence between words and things (5). In that respect, Locke's “nominalism”— according to which there is a necessary arbitrariness in the relation of language to reality—is usefully sobering. Lewis, however, as a dispassionate chronicler, does not take sides (cf. 128) and certainly does not fault the theological suppositions of the language-planning movement.
As Lewis indicates (21, 133), Bacon himself was not as fervent a religionist as were Wilkins and other eager would-be Baconians. Lewis's account tends to over-theologize Bacon's thought, which anticipated and fostered an eclectic civil religion with a hard political core and a flabby theological periphery. Nevertheless, Lewis's story enables us to see that it was only some, not all, of Bacon's woolly-headed purported followers who, out of zeal, pursued an impossible picture of linguistic perfection. Indeed, it is telling that Bacon's amanuensis Hobbes was, in decisive respects, an enemy of the language planners (139). Bacon, much like Hobbes, may have thought his language scheme promising precisely because of its conventional, man-made, antitheological character. He vexes and tortures nature and does not revere its presumed author (cf. 19 and 229). Indeed, on the issue of whether there are true universals, kinds, or species (and hence on the possibility of labeling those consistently), Bacon stands close to the coroner of the language-planning movement, Locke (The Advancement of Learning, book 2, 7.7).
At the end of his formidable work, Lewis writes that ”the ideal of a Christian God survived the philosophical problems which beset the language planners” (229). This is certainly true within the framework of the story told by Lewis. But, from a different perspective, the opposite of Lewis's conclusion might be said to have obtained. In Locke, Bacon found his true successor, and the movement initiated by the Lord Chancellor found its nontheological peak.
