The target article by Coall & Hertwig (C&H) makes a strong case for the need to integrate different perspectives on grandparental investment, as well as for the difficulty of harboring all perspectives under a single convenient tent.
An additional argument against the sufficiency of theories that rely heavily on genetic relatedness comes from reports of inter-species adoptions. For example, Izar et al. (Reference Izar, Verderane, Visalberghi, Ottoni, De Oliveira, Shirley and Fragaszy2006) reported on the case of adoption of an infant marmoset by a group of wild capuchin monkeys. Cross-species fostering is observed more commonly in domestic animals; for example, Hersher et al. (Reference Hersher, Richmond and Moore1963) studied parameters that facilitated cross-species adoption between sheep and goats. Psychologists might point out that such behavior represents generalization from behaviors appropriate for the (adoptive) species toward conspecifics. Kuo (Reference Kuo1930; 1938) reported that when single kittens were raised with single rats, they appeared to be attached to one another; when groups of kittens and rats were raised together, the cats and rats appeared indifferent to each other. A further argument is an extension of C&H's point that the proximate cause for grandparental care of their children and grandchildren lies in the grandparents' capacity for empathy, a point stressed by Hrdy (Reference Hrdy2009) and also by Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino (Reference Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino2002) in a Behavioral and Brain Sciences commentary on Rachlin's target article “Altruism and Selfishness.” In any event, the mechanism of empathy certainly need not be restricted to kin. In Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino (Reference Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino2002), we address the classic problem of a woman rushing into a burning building to save an unknown crying baby. We pointed out that negative reinforcement could provide an account of altruism here: The altruist avoids the indelible future memory of having done nothing to save the baby if she does not rush to help. In addition, we point out an array of reinforcement principles that can account for instances of altruistic behavior. Our experiences surely help to shape our propensity to be altruistic or not. For example, grandparents may well be excellent at caring for their grandchildren, having learned how to do so when caring for their children (and having modeled some of their own parenting behaviors upon those of their parents). Thus, a pattern of care-giving behavior has been acquired.
Of course, not all grandparents behave caringly towards their grandchildren, nor do humans and nonhumans regularly behave altruistically. In our laboratory, using one measure of altruism, the Sharing Game (an economic activity related to the Dictator Game; Fantino & Kennelly Reference Fantino and Kennelly2009; Kennelly & Fantino Reference Kennelly and Fantino2007), 20% of participants typically select altruistically, forsaking a payoff entirely in order to enrich an unknown other participant – whom they will never meet – when given a choice such as the following:
Player One receives $10 and Player Two receives $10
Player One receives $0 and Player Two receives $100
In this choice, it was clear that real money was involved and that the two players would never meet and would remain anonymous. We have in fact now done an approximation to this study three times conducted by three different experimenters; each time approximately 20% of participants (college students) chose altruistically, being willing to distribute a substantial sum to the anonymous second participant while taking nothing for themselves. Male participants were far more likely to select the altruistic option; this gender difference may reflect our published finding that female participants prefer to make egalitarian selections in the Sharing Game.
Not all instances of altruistic behavior may be accounted for by obvious instances of reinforcement, nor with consideration of genetics, relatedness, or individual experiences. A broader perspective might involve an expanded view of the self, and even the idea that individuals' behavior has important effects on their milieu, such that “what goes around comes around.” For example, C&H discuss studies of altruistic punishment (e.g., Fehr & Gachter 2002; see also, Zizzo & Oswald Reference Zizzo and Oswald2001). A type of altruistic punishment ripped from the headlines involves the punishment of those who talk loudly on their cell-phones in public places (as reported by Douglas Quenqua in an article in the New York Times; Quenqua Reference Quenqua2009). The punisher may gain no benefit for himself but may improve the environment in which we all reside. The more the cell-phone abusers who are silenced, the quieter the environment for all of us. Also, it is widely believed that an environment filled with litter tends to attract more littering. Thus, if we punish littering, we may improve the environment for us all. In both of these examples, however, the relationship between the altruistic act and the benefits to the individual are extremely indirect and even tenuous. The problem is similar to one raised by C&H concerning how we might “bridge the gap between altruistic acts now and ultimate reproductive success benefits in the future” (sect. 4.3, p. 6). In addition to an account in terms of empathy (with which we concur), the problem may be at least partially solved in two ways. First, it is not enough to think in terms of a “self” restricted to the boundaries of the individual body. We live in an environment that has largely nurtured us (though for some for whom this has not been the case, the propensity for altruism may be low indeed). When we act in a way that benefits that physical and social environment, we can feel that we are benefiting ourselves. The benefit need not be immediate. For most of us, strict reciprocal altruism is not required. We have an expanded view of cause and effect. Thus, most of us believe in what might be thought of as “what goes around, comes around”: Good that is done ultimately comes back to us. To assess this, we asked more than 300 undergraduates here at UCSD to what extent they agreed with the statement, “What goes around, comes around.” Eighty-six percent of students were in agreement (only 8% disagreed; the others were neutral). Thus, the gap between altruism and its payoff may simply reside in the belief that good deeds are ultimately rewarded. This type of belief may help buttress the other causes that are so eloquently brought to bear by C&H to account for grandparental investment and altruism.
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The target article by Coall & Hertwig (C&H) makes a strong case for the need to integrate different perspectives on grandparental investment, as well as for the difficulty of harboring all perspectives under a single convenient tent.
An additional argument against the sufficiency of theories that rely heavily on genetic relatedness comes from reports of inter-species adoptions. For example, Izar et al. (Reference Izar, Verderane, Visalberghi, Ottoni, De Oliveira, Shirley and Fragaszy2006) reported on the case of adoption of an infant marmoset by a group of wild capuchin monkeys. Cross-species fostering is observed more commonly in domestic animals; for example, Hersher et al. (Reference Hersher, Richmond and Moore1963) studied parameters that facilitated cross-species adoption between sheep and goats. Psychologists might point out that such behavior represents generalization from behaviors appropriate for the (adoptive) species toward conspecifics. Kuo (Reference Kuo1930; 1938) reported that when single kittens were raised with single rats, they appeared to be attached to one another; when groups of kittens and rats were raised together, the cats and rats appeared indifferent to each other. A further argument is an extension of C&H's point that the proximate cause for grandparental care of their children and grandchildren lies in the grandparents' capacity for empathy, a point stressed by Hrdy (Reference Hrdy2009) and also by Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino (Reference Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino2002) in a Behavioral and Brain Sciences commentary on Rachlin's target article “Altruism and Selfishness.” In any event, the mechanism of empathy certainly need not be restricted to kin. In Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino (Reference Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino2002), we address the classic problem of a woman rushing into a burning building to save an unknown crying baby. We pointed out that negative reinforcement could provide an account of altruism here: The altruist avoids the indelible future memory of having done nothing to save the baby if she does not rush to help. In addition, we point out an array of reinforcement principles that can account for instances of altruistic behavior. Our experiences surely help to shape our propensity to be altruistic or not. For example, grandparents may well be excellent at caring for their grandchildren, having learned how to do so when caring for their children (and having modeled some of their own parenting behaviors upon those of their parents). Thus, a pattern of care-giving behavior has been acquired.
Of course, not all grandparents behave caringly towards their grandchildren, nor do humans and nonhumans regularly behave altruistically. In our laboratory, using one measure of altruism, the Sharing Game (an economic activity related to the Dictator Game; Fantino & Kennelly Reference Fantino and Kennelly2009; Kennelly & Fantino Reference Kennelly and Fantino2007), 20% of participants typically select altruistically, forsaking a payoff entirely in order to enrich an unknown other participant – whom they will never meet – when given a choice such as the following:
Player One receives $10 and Player Two receives $10
OR
Player One receives $0 and Player Two receives $100
In this choice, it was clear that real money was involved and that the two players would never meet and would remain anonymous. We have in fact now done an approximation to this study three times conducted by three different experimenters; each time approximately 20% of participants (college students) chose altruistically, being willing to distribute a substantial sum to the anonymous second participant while taking nothing for themselves. Male participants were far more likely to select the altruistic option; this gender difference may reflect our published finding that female participants prefer to make egalitarian selections in the Sharing Game.
Not all instances of altruistic behavior may be accounted for by obvious instances of reinforcement, nor with consideration of genetics, relatedness, or individual experiences. A broader perspective might involve an expanded view of the self, and even the idea that individuals' behavior has important effects on their milieu, such that “what goes around comes around.” For example, C&H discuss studies of altruistic punishment (e.g., Fehr & Gachter 2002; see also, Zizzo & Oswald Reference Zizzo and Oswald2001). A type of altruistic punishment ripped from the headlines involves the punishment of those who talk loudly on their cell-phones in public places (as reported by Douglas Quenqua in an article in the New York Times; Quenqua Reference Quenqua2009). The punisher may gain no benefit for himself but may improve the environment in which we all reside. The more the cell-phone abusers who are silenced, the quieter the environment for all of us. Also, it is widely believed that an environment filled with litter tends to attract more littering. Thus, if we punish littering, we may improve the environment for us all. In both of these examples, however, the relationship between the altruistic act and the benefits to the individual are extremely indirect and even tenuous. The problem is similar to one raised by C&H concerning how we might “bridge the gap between altruistic acts now and ultimate reproductive success benefits in the future” (sect. 4.3, p. 6). In addition to an account in terms of empathy (with which we concur), the problem may be at least partially solved in two ways. First, it is not enough to think in terms of a “self” restricted to the boundaries of the individual body. We live in an environment that has largely nurtured us (though for some for whom this has not been the case, the propensity for altruism may be low indeed). When we act in a way that benefits that physical and social environment, we can feel that we are benefiting ourselves. The benefit need not be immediate. For most of us, strict reciprocal altruism is not required. We have an expanded view of cause and effect. Thus, most of us believe in what might be thought of as “what goes around, comes around”: Good that is done ultimately comes back to us. To assess this, we asked more than 300 undergraduates here at UCSD to what extent they agreed with the statement, “What goes around, comes around.” Eighty-six percent of students were in agreement (only 8% disagreed; the others were neutral). Thus, the gap between altruism and its payoff may simply reside in the belief that good deeds are ultimately rewarded. This type of belief may help buttress the other causes that are so eloquently brought to bear by C&H to account for grandparental investment and altruism.