At first glance, as they came to power in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. Nixon administration and the British Heath government seemed likely to enjoy cooperative relations. Against a backdrop of the U.S.-British “special relationship,” each governed from the center-right, each was led by individuals possessing pride in their working class backgrounds, and each faced common challenges as traditional notions of “great power politics” yielded to more turbulent concerns for trade, monetary, and regional conflicts.

Nevertheless, as Catherine Hynes shows in what is likely to be considered the definitive study of U.S.-British relations during the early 1970s, the “special relationship” would receive its severest postwar test, as Edward Heath prioritized British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) over relations with the United States. Indeed, Hynes argues that Heath—having secured entry into the EEC—arguably overcompensated in seeking to demonstrate Britain's credibility as a truly “European” state. Heath would redefine the “special” relationship as a “natural” one, rebuff Nixon administration overtures for bilateral meetings, and stress the need for the United States to deal with Britain in a multilateral, European context.

Top Nixon administration officials—most importantly, Henry Kissinger—found this approach highly frustrating. By the conventions of realpolitik, the British had always held themselves somewhat aloof from Europe and enjoyed a unique status in their alliance relations with the United States. Given this structural position, as Kissinger put it, “I think Ted Heath was wrong … he threw away an asset without gaining anything corresponding, especially when all the Europeans were very eager to establish a preferential relationship in the United States” (quoted, 237). One can sense the befuddlement on the part of Kissinger, the scholar of Metternich and Bismarck, as he faced a British government that risked alienating the United States for no certain benefit.

In this light, Kissinger would seek to overcome mounting tensions in the western alliance by designating 1973 as a “Year of Europe.” Speaking to the founding ideals of the North Atlantic community, Kissinger argued in a widely publicized April 1973 speech that “the Atlantic nations must join in a fresh act of creation equal to that undertaken by the postwar generation of leaders of Europe and America.” Yet, this initiative was seen by the Europeans as ill-conceived at best, and condescending at worst. French President Georges Pompidou remarked that “for Europeans, every year is the year of Europe.” Heath himself would look back twenty years later and recall that Kissinger “created the ‘Year of Europe,’ which never of course came about. He just declared he was going to have a ‘Year of Europe.’ Well, we didn’t want a ‘Year of Europe’” (quoted, ix).

Hynes expertly frames the sources of these trans-Atlantic tensions, highlighting the combination of apparent relative decline on the part of the United States and the economic imperatives pushing the British toward a closer relationship with the EEC. Moreover, in her most important contribution, Hynes stresses the uniquely psychological and emotional context of U.S.-British relations. Indeed, her account is suffused with the language of emotion, hurt, and mutual resentment, as she shows that policy makers do not simply respond to the dictates of the balance of power, or even act with respect to strategic doctrines. Instead, emotional states often prefigure their strategic calculations and ideological commitments. Hynes's account is accordingly filled with references on all sides to “resentment” (ix), policy makers who feel “aggrieved” (46), appeals to demonstrate “‘emotional’ commitments to the transatlantic Alliance” (118), references to attitudes that resemble those of a “jilted lover” (179), and descriptions of “cathartic” speeches in which policy makers vent frustrations (215). Hynes stresses, in particular, the ways in which such feelings pervaded four crises over the early 1970s, as the Nixon administration and Heath governments clashed over perceived failures to consult each other or to provide adequate rhetorical support. These events encompassed the July 1971 Nixon announcement of his upcoming visit to China, the August 1971 announcement of the Nixon administration's closing of the “gold window” and imposition of a ten percent import surcharge, the October 1971 Nixon announcement of his planned visit to Moscow to conclude the SALT negotiations, and the October 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In addressing the final collapse of the “Year of Europe,” Hynes describes the further impact of domestic politics. Where each leader had once seemed so secure in his standing at home, Heath and Nixon would ultimately be brought down by domestic political developments. Heath would fall in March 1974 in the midst of economic crises encompassing recurring strikes, a shortened workweek, and tensions over wage and price controls. Nixon would resign in August 1974, having been personally and politically undone by the Watergate scandal. However, Heath's fall is particularly important in Hynes's account, as he was succeeded by governments determined to restore the special relationship and Britain's role as an intermediary in relations between the United States and Europe.

Indeed, if there is a criticism to be made of Hynes's account, it is that she overstates her conclusion, which reduces Heath's efforts to downgrade the special relationship to that of a “curious anomaly in post-war history” (241). It might be better, however, to view the Nixon-Heath divide as an instance of a recurring type of social conflict between the two allies. Consider the current 2009–10 context of lukewarm relations between the Obama administration and the Brown government, which speaks to the merit of Hynes's analysis of tensions that can divide even the most long-standing allies.

In sum, Hynes's account is essential reading for anyone interested in postwar Anglo-American relations, offering a meticulously researched, tightly focused, and persistently engaging analysis of the interplay of power and personality in postwar U.S.-British relations.