There is no dearth of literature on US policy toward India and South Asia. A number of historians have dealt with specific epochs, former diplomats have written narrative accounts, and journalists have discussed ties during particular administrations. If the extant literature had a lacuna it was the absence of a sweeping history of American involvement in the subcontinent. That gap has now been effectively addressed with Srinath Raghavan's The Most Dangerous Place: A History of the United States in South Asia.
Despite minor matters about which one can cavil, this is an impressive book. Raghavan's work is based upon extensive use of archives in multiple countries, it encompasses over two hundred years of history, and it reveals a number of hitherto mostly unknown episodes in American policy toward the region. The book can genuinely be seen as a benchmark for any future scholarship on American foreign policy toward South Asia.
Three key themes undergird Raghavan's analysis: the pursuit of power (encompassing its political, economic, and military dimensions); the role of ideology; and the significance of culture. These issues are carefully woven into the examination and discussion of the long historical record.
Raghavan's account starts at a time when British colonialism had yet to formally establish a toehold on the subcontinent. Americans were drawn to the region for a variety of reasons. Foremost among these was the quest for profits—a quest that would manifest itself over a long span of time. Ideological considerations also propelled Americans toward South Asia. Specifically, the belief that the United States had a preordained role in spreading the blessings of liberty to the world played a critical role in driving American policy. Finally, as American travelers encountered the region, they took an avid interest in its cultural heritage. Their reactions, intriguingly enough, were bifurcated: most of them felt comfortable with the monotheistic features of Islam and were repelled by many elements of Hinduism. A coterie of American intellectuals, however, was drawn to Hinduism's metaphysical dimensions.
In his discussion of the early years of American involvement in the subcontinent, Raghavan demonstrates an extraordinary grasp of developments within the United States and how they shaped interactions with South Asia. For example, he dwells on the impact of the American Civil War on the fortunes of cotton production in India. Indeed, growing commercial ties with India during this period also contributed to the entry of a spate of American merchants into the area. Their initial reactions, Raghavan argues, based on contemporary accounts, were one of bafflement largely because of the country's extraordinary cultural and ethnic diversity. The encounter with the presence of widespread and abject poverty, in turn, also shaped their responses, producing a sense of palpable shock.
Later, deep-seated American attitudes and dogmas also influenced Americans’ perspectives on British rule in India. Raghavan argues that many leading Americans were firm believers in the significance of the Anglo-Saxon imperial enterprise. Not surprisingly, President Lincoln's secretary of state, William Henry Seward, after a visit to India concluded that it was undoubtedly an ancient civilization with much to recommend. Nevertheless, he held that its inhabitants lacked the intellectual wherewithal or suitable historical experience for self-government. Consequently, under the putatively benevolent tutelage of British colonialism, India could eventually make suitable progress in the arts of self-rule. Ulysses S. Grant came to a similar conclusion following his visit to India.
Raghavan also discusses the critical role of the missionary enterprise in US-South Asian relations. As early as the latter half of the nineteenth century, American missionaries had wended their way to the subcontinent. In considerable part they were driven by a desire to convert the locals to a specific version of Protestant Christianity. Their zeal, however, ran into various revivalist and reform movements that were underway at this time in India, leading to clashes between the local populace and prominent missionaries.
Even otherwise prominent, liberal American politicians, including President Franklin Roosevelt, displayed a curious ambivalence about terminating British colonialism in South Asia. Other historians have argued that his inconsistent views stemmed mostly from the exigencies of preserving the wartime alliance with Great Britain against the Axis powers. However, Raghavan argues that beyond this pragmatic consideration, Roosevelt's outlook stemmed from a prevailing sentiment that decolonization should be gradual and incremental, reflecting the belief that nonwhite peoples needed to be ushered into modernity and freedom only in stages.
Where did South Asia stand in the American postwar foreign policy calculus? As other scholars have argued, Raghavan affirms that it was of limited significance. It ranked below Western Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. Within this ranking, Pakistan assumed greater importance in part because of the pernicious British belief in the theory of “martial races.” The country was seen as a significant source of military manpower, while India was not. Not surprisingly, Pakistan, which sought to balance Indian preponderance, quickly turned to court the United States. Mohammed Ali Jinnah deftly contended that Pakistan was “the pivot of the world,” helpfully reminding his American interlocutors that Russia was “not far away.” Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, on the other hand, made few efforts to woo the United States. Pakistan's courtship of the United States ultimately led to the US-Pakistan alliance of 1954, with vast and abiding ramifications for regional security in South Asia.
Raghavan's later chapters, which deal with the more recent decades in US-South Asia relations, are for the most part, equally compelling. He ably covers a number of controversial periods, including the aid policies of the Johnson administration toward India, US nonproliferation policy toward India and Pakistan with its myriad contradictions and abrupt shifts, and the concerted attempts to dislodge the Soviets following their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.
The overall quality of The Most Dangerous Place is excellent. It is nevertheless possible to highlight a few small objections. Toward the end of this sprawling volume, Raghavan makes a few judgments that lack nuance. For example, he asserts that in their pursuit of the “war on terror” George W. Bush and Barack Obama both evinced scant regard for international law. This is clearly a questionable claim and shows a lack of appreciation of the stark differences that characterized the policies of the two administrations in this particular policy arena. Among other matters, the Obama administration unequivocally eschewed any willingness to use torture to extract information from captured foreign combatants. Also, his assertion that the Bush administration was responsible for initiating the “de-hyphenation” policy separating India from Pakistan is certainly incorrect. Instead, it was a strategy that had been launched under Ambassador Frank Wisner during the second Bill Clinton administration.
In a volume this size, these quibbles must be considered minor and do little to detract from the general quality of the work. Indeed, both scholars and practitioners who have the patience to peruse this substantial work will find themselves amply rewarded.
