INTRODUCTION
In recent years, much of the scholarly interest in state feminism in the industrialized West has been directed toward understanding various aspects of the significant challenges confronted by women's policy agencies in many jurisdictions in this region (Haussman and Sauer Reference Haussman and Sauer2007; Outshoorn and Kantola Reference Outshoorn, Kantola, Outshoorn and Kantola2007; Squires Reference Squires2007b).Footnote 1 Several studies have revealed that the adoption of policy directions informed by neoliberal orientations and new public management principles has often led to the transfer of dedicated women's units to peripheral locations within the public service, cuts in their funding and staff, or their outright elimination (Chappell Reference Chappell2002; Sawer Reference Sawer, Outshoorn and Kantola2007; Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2003). Scholars contributing to this literature have focused primarily on Europe, North America, and Australia, paying little attention to developments in countries like Aotearoa/New Zealand (although see Curtin and Sawer Reference Curtin, Sawer, Castles, Gerritsen and Vowles1996; Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2004, Reference Teghtsoonian2005). This is an unfortunate omission because in the context of an emerging antipathy to women's policy agencies among many contemporary governments, the example of the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MWA) in Aotearoa/New Zealand stands as an interesting puzzle.
Established in 1986, the ministry survived significant economic and state sector restructuring under the fourth Labour government (1984–90), weathered the extension of neoliberal orientations into the reform of social policy by National-led governments (1990–99), and continued with its work in challenging circumstances under the fifth Labour-led government (1999–2008). Its institutional persistence over such an extended period of time, and under a variety of different governments, suggests that downsizing and marginalization may not constitute an inevitable fate for women's policy agencies, even when faced with the election of a right-wing government and the demise of a vigorous, visible women's movement.
At the same time, it is unclear what sort of meaning we should make of the institutional persistence of Women's Affairs as a free-standing ministry. There is evidence from many jurisdictions in the West that the institutional instability fostered by neoliberal downsizing undermines the effectiveness of women's policy agencies by disrupting working relationships, erasing institutional memory, and reducing the resources available to do the work (Malloy Reference Malloy1999, 270; Sawer Reference Sawer and Hancock1999; Squires and Wickham-Jones Reference Squires and Wickham-Jones2002). On the face of it, then, it would seem plausible to suggest that Women's Affairs' longevity has contributed in important ways to the ability of its staff to work effectively on behalf of the interests of diverse groups of women. This assessment would appear to be particularly warranted in light of the fact that Women's Affairs has been structured as a full-fledged government ministry. A number of scholars and feminist bureaucrats have argued that a central location within government with access to venues within which key policy decisions are made—such as that afforded Women's Affairs by virtue of its structure—will significantly enhance the capacity of a women's policy agency to articulate and promote the interests of diverse groups of women (see, e.g., Sawer Reference Sawer and Hancock1999; Stephen Reference Stephen, Beveridge, Nott and Stephen2000).
There are those, however, who caution that there is a significant tension between feminists' proximity to power and their capacity to advocate effectively on behalf of women. Suzanne Franzway and her coauthors, for example, warned long ago that “if femocrats could achieve a more central location, their capacity to advocate clear feminist policy might be blunted by close involvement in the state directorate's own strategies” (Franzway, Court, and Connell Reference Franzway, Court and Connell1989, 139–40). A growing number of scholars have echoed this concern, suggesting that when women's policy agencies are located within governments that adopt neoliberal policy orientations and management practices, their work may become implicated in the pursuit of these goals and serve to legitimize them (see, e.g., Teghtsoonian and Chappell Reference Teghtsoonian and Chappell2008). And, as community-based activists have worried, the institutionalized arm of social movements may lose its critical edge through the processes of adapting to a mainstream organizational environment—such as the public sector—and seeking to become effective on its terms. Long-term survival at the heart of a government bureaucracy may thus undermine, rather than enhance, the ability of a women's policy agency to promote the interests of diverse communities of women.
These analyses lead us to the question of “institutional persistence for what?” and suggest that we ought to consider whether—and, if so, how—the central location of the Ministry of Women's Affairs within government may have constrained in important ways what its staff and leadership have been able to achieve on behalf of women. Scholars, women's policy agency staff, and community activists both within Aotearoa/New Zealand and elsewhere share an interest in understanding better how various factors have influenced the ministry's effectiveness in securing positive policy outcomes for women. In this article, we explore these questions through an examination of the ministry and its work over the past 25 years, identifying both the policy “wins” for women to which it has contributed and the challenges and roadblocks that it has confronted. We argue that three key features of the Ministry of Women's Affairs—its political context, particularly the ideological commitments of the party in power, its political and bureaucratic leadership, and its institutional design and working practices—have been important in shaping both its successes on behalf of women and the constraints on what it has been able to achieve.
SITUATING AN ANALYSIS OF THE MINISTRY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS
Our focus on the Ministry of Women's Affairs in Aotearoa/New Zealand is well suited to an exploration of whether longevity and a central location within government, proximate to power, constitute valuable resources or dangerous traps for women's policy agencies. Several features of this women's policy agency have remained relatively unchanged over the more than two decades of its existence, even as the reins of government were handed from the Labour Party to National—the main party of the Right—and back again. It has never been subsumed within a larger unit, although this possibility has been raised and discussed at various points in time, and the human and financial resources available to it have not fluctuated significantly. For example, the number of staff employed by the ministry has been fairly consistent (35 in 1990, 35 in 1999, and 37 in 2008), while the budget remained unchanged between 1990 and 1999 (at NZ $3.5 million), rising to NZ $4.5 million by 2007–8 (MWA 1990, 1999, 2007).Footnote 2 It has never held responsibility for the delivery of services and has provided only small grants to community-based women's groups on an irregular basis.Footnote 3 These continuities in institutional structure, mandate, and resources, combined with its status as a free-standing government ministry, mark Women's Affairs as relatively well positioned in terms of both stability and proximity to power when compared with women's policy agencies elsewhere in the industrialized West.
While the ministry has experienced stability in these terms, one thing that has shifted is the partisan composition of the governments of which it has been a part, and it is these transitions that mark the boundaries of the three time periods around which we have organized our analysis. Many feminist scholars and activists have suggested that governments formed by parties of the left have generally been supportive of the establishment of women's policy agencies and their equity-oriented agendas. These scholars have also noted that governments formed by parties of the Right are likely to undermine this work, or dismantle the agency altogether (see, e.g., Chappell Reference Chappell2002; Ortbals Reference Ortbals2008). However, recent research has complicated this picture by demonstrating that these relationships have sometimes been turned on their head: governments formed by parties of the “left”—for example, those identified as “Third Way” administrations—have not always been friendly to women's policy agencies or the feminist policy directions they have sought to pursue. And, perhaps even more surprisingly, parties of the Right have sometimes adopted relatively benign or even supportive orientations while in government, despite expectations to the contrary (Mazur Reference Mazur2009; Teghtsoonian and Chappell Reference Teghtsoonian and Chappell2008). These developments suggest that the question of whether proximity to power enables or constrains the work of women's policy agencies may be an even more complex issue than hitherto thought. These realities invite us to consider whether the effectiveness of this type of structure might be limited in various ways even as a government—of the left or the right—retains its institutional form.
In addition to affording an opportunity to contribute to debates among scholars, practitioners, and activists about the relationship among the partisan composition of government, the ideological commitments of the party in power, and the effectiveness of women's policy agencies, our analysis of the work of the ministry over three different political periods has allowed us to identify two other factors that have played a significant role in shaping what Women's Affairs has been able to achieve. These are 1) the ministry's political and bureaucratic leadership and 2) its institutional design, including its relationship with community-based women's organizations and feminist organizational practices. Comparative research focused on women's policy agencies has identified these as factors, among many others, that may influence their ability to advance the interests of diverse groups of women (see, e.g., Mazur Reference Mazur2009; Outshoorn and Kantola Reference Outshoorn, Kantola, Outshoorn and Kantola2007; Squires Reference Squires2007b), while more detailed case studies have provided evidence of the particular processes and mechanisms through which they play out. Thus, the cross-national project pursued by the Research Network on Gender, Politics and the State (RNGS) has identified the political and bureaucratic leadership of women's policy agencies as a variable of interest, and case study research has been able to provide accounts of some of the particular ways in which the profile of such leadership has made a difference. Sandra Burt and Sonya Lynn Hardman (Reference Burt, Hardman and Pal2001), for example, have suggested that the capacity of Status of Women Canada to work effectively on behalf of women within the Canadian federal government was enhanced when it was led by a minister who also held other important responsibilities within the Cabinet, while other scholars have shown the impact that feminist leadership of women's policy agencies—or the lack thereof—can have on what they are able to achieve (see, e.g., Chappell Reference Chappell2002; Curtin Reference Curtin2008; Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2000). Similarly, a wide array of research has pointed to women's community-based activism as a significant influence on the effectiveness of the work of women's policy agencies (see, e.g., Grey and Sawer Reference Grey and Sawer2008; Weldon Reference Weldon2002). Scholars have also noted that the downsizing of women's policy agencies has frequently occurred alongside claims, rooted in public choice theory, about the purported need to prevent bureaucratic capture by “special interests” (Maddison Reference Maddison2006; Sawer Reference Sawer2002; Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2003). Such arguments have undermined the role of consultations with community groups and their interaction with policymakers and have challenged the legitimacy of units within government associated with particular groups, including women.
Our analysis of the Ministry of Women's Affairs contributes to these literatures by offering insights into how these factors—the partisan composition of government, an agency's political and bureaucratic leadership, and its institutional design—have operated together in a particular political and institutional context. We have developed our analysis through a recursive process that has involved both considering our empirical materials in light of the claims developed in the literature and choosing to focus on particular aspects of women's policy agencies in light of the relationships and patterns that we observed on the ground in Aotearoa/New Zealand.
Our arguments are informed by data collected as part of three different research projects, the first completed during the early 1990s, the second conducted during the late 1990s and early 2000s and the third in the mid-2000s.Footnote 4 The data include 37 interviews with people appointed in various capacities to the ministry (including ministers, chief executives, policy managers and policy analysts), as well as with 10 other people who either held elected office or belonged to a nongovernmental organization at the time of the interview; a detailed review of an extensive range of documentary sources, including ministry documents (Annual Reports and Briefings to the Incoming Government Footnote 5 produced by the ministry since its inception; Pānui, the ministry's newsletter; and various internal documents); government press releases; newspaper coverage of the ministry and its activities for the period 1984–2007; Broadsheet (a key publication of the women's movement in New Zealand 1983–97); and a selective range of public documents generated by other government ministries.
THE MINISTRY IN THE 1980S: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ADAPTATION
In contrast to the Australian femocrat model of a women's coordinating agency within a central department, Labour women in Aotearoa/New Zealand believed that the only way forward on women's policy was through the creation of an independent government ministry for women. They were successful in securing a commitment to establish such a ministry as a non-negotiable feature of the fourth Labour government's (1984–90) policy program, and the process of creating the Ministry of Women's Affairs was initiated soon after the 1984 election. Just as the Australian model of state feminismFootnote 6 was considered pathbreaking in the 1970s, there are three features of the New Zealand model that allow a similar claim to be made about the MWA in the 1980s and that provide a benchmark of sorts for assessing subsequent developments.
First, during the period when Women's Affairs was being established, there was significant consultation with women in the community on what they themselves wanted to see accomplished by a dedicated ministry. In late 1984, 21 hui (the Maori term for “meeting”) were held nationwide with 12,000 women participating in discussions. Such consultation was unprecedented as a strategy for informing the creation of a bureaucratic and policy mandate for a government ministry. The ministry was, in part, aiming to be a “transmission belt” between women in diverse communities and government. Its staff and leadership believed it was necessary for Women's Affairs to secure support and acceptance, not just from the women's movement and feminist groups but also from women who were not politically active.
The ministry's second distinctive feature was its internal organizational design, which was explicitly inspired by feminist thought and practice. With the support of Minister Ann Hercus, the MWA's first administrative head, Mary O'Regan, established working practices that challenged existing bureaucratic culture by minimizing hierarchy within the ministry. These practices included participatory and consultative approaches to decision making and the fostering of informality in relationships both within Women's Affairs and between the ministry and women in the community (O'Regan and Varnham Reference O'Regan, Varnham and Du Plessis1992). Many of O'Regan's innovations are now commonly accepted: “[W]hanau [family] support at interviews; acknowledgement of skills and competencies not reflected in formal qualifications and conventional working lives; and, innovative consultative processes [with communities]” have since become more widely adopted across the public sector (MWA 1996a, 8).
Third, from the outset, the ministry's terms of reference included a clear commitment to biculturalism, that is, to working practices and an organizational structure intended to reflect and be responsive to the culture and interests of Maori as well as those of European descent.Footnote 7 A Maori Women's Secretariat, Te Ohu Whakatupu, was established as an autonomous unit within the ministry and was responsible for ensuring that the specific needs of Maori women were included in all areas of its work. The decision to adopt this dual structure within the ministry emerged from the recommendations of a consultative group of Maori women who developed a submission outlining the views of Maori women concerning appropriate structure and ways of working for the new ministry when it was first being discussed in the mid-1980s (“Submission to the Minister of Women's Affairs” 1984). Although the implementation of their recommendations unfolded as a conflicted and incomplete process (McDowell Reference McDowell1985; Tamihana and Rosier Reference Tamihana and Rosier1989), Te Ohu Whakatupu nevertheless provided an important institutional base from which Maori women were able to engage with the policy process during the 1980s and 1990s (Tahi Reference Tahi, Wilson and Yeatman1995). Thus, while the Policy Unit within the ministry was assigned responsibility for attending to the interests of all women in Aotearoa/New Zealand, including Maori women, Te Ohu Whakatupu was charged with focussing in particular on the needs and interests of Maori women.
However, the wider policy context within which these organizational innovations were pursued soon became relatively unsupportive of feminist policy orientations and practices. The fourth Labour government pursued a radical public sector reform program, which included the privatization of state assets, deregulation of the financial and industrial sectors, and a significant restructuring of the public sector. The Ministry of Women's Affairs was not immune to the changes that were rapidly implemented. Mary O'Regan resigned as administrative head, largely in protest, and was replaced with Judith Aitken. Aitken had been actively involved in the women's movement and the Labour Party during the 1970s, but she was also well schooled in the rhetoric and practice of state sector reform (Campbell Reference Campbell1988). Within two months of her arrival at the ministry, Aitken had reorganized its structure and redefined its function. The administration and information sections were combined to form a “corporate services unit,” and Te Ohu Whakatupu's autonomy was eliminated through the requirement that, henceforth, all projects it wished to undertake had to be approved by the management team. The ministry's work became more focused on policy advice, performance indicators were developed to track what was being accomplished, and Aitken focused on the ministry's accountability to government through the minister, rather than also acknowledging the need to be accountable to women in the community, as had been the case earlier. The ministry's role as a “transmission belt” for women was thus significantly diminished (Curtin Reference Curtin1992).
While these institutional reforms were a significant departure from the feminist organizational culture that had initially characterized the ministry, this change needs to be considered in context. The public sector reform pursued by the Labour government was informed by a range of theoretical models, including public choice theory, agency theory, and new managerialism. Within these models, client-oriented agencies such as the Ministry of Women's Affairs are framed as “rent-seekers,” or as the problematic bureaucratic expressions of “special interests” (Boston et al. Reference Boston, Martin, Pallot and Walsh1996; Sawer Reference Sawer2002). It was thus arguably a strategic necessity that the ministry reorient its focus away from advocacy on behalf of women and onto the core business of policy advice based on consultation with women if it hoped to survive the radical public sector reforms of the 1980s. On this view, Aitken can be credited with helping to ensure that the ministry remained in place throughout Labour's term in office and with making it more acceptable to the incoming right-wing National government. On the other hand, the change of strategy was experienced as a significant loss by many feminists in the community (see, e.g., Rosier Reference Rosier1989) and could be understood as an illustration of the costs of proximity to power (Franzway, Court, and Connell Reference Franzway, Court and Connell1989).
The creation and retention of the Ministry of Women's Affairs was clearly a policy success in its own right, particularly since not all Labour Cabinet ministers were enthusiastic supporters, and the efforts within Cabinet by Ann Hercus in this regard should not be underestimated (Curtin Reference Curtin2008). Drawing on its wide consultation with women's groups, the ministry contributed to several other important policy successes during Hercus's tenure as minister (1984–87). Administrative reforms enabled part-time positions in government (and later in state schools) to be made permanent, rape law reform was completed, with additional funding provided to rape crisis centers and refuges, and work was undertaken in the areas of child protection and parental leave. A start was also made on measuring and valuing unpaid work through the inclusion of a specific question about it in the 1986 census (Curtin Reference Curtin2008).
Hercus was critical to these policy successes. In addition to Women's Affairs, she also held the portfolios of Social Welfare and Police. She used her dual role as Minister of Social Welfare and of Women's Affairs to advance significant changes in the area of child care that supported women's interests. She facilitated the transfer of responsibility for child care from the Department of Social Welfare to the Department of Education in 1986. This enabled arguments for new funding (a 125% increase between 1989 and 1994) to be made in terms of the educational needs of children, rather than in terms of women's needs or rights, all of which was more palatable to Treasury officials (Curtin Reference Curtin1992). In addition, the combination of the Women's Affairs and Police portfolios contributed to progress in the area of rape law reform.
Policy leadership across two portfolios was also evident during Margaret Shields's term as the second minister of Women's Affairs (1987–90). As associate minister of Education (1989–90), Shields was an important advocate for the advancement of early childhood services. She lobbied hard in Cabinet for the early childhood funding increases noted above and for changes to improve regulations and training in ways that supported growth in Kohanga Reo (Maori immersion preschool education). Policy wins were also achieved in the areas of superannuation and benefits to families.Footnote 8 In addition, from 1987 until 1990, Shields headed the Department of Statistics, reflecting her professional experience prior to entering parliament. From the mid-1970s to 1981, Shields worked as a statistician in the Department of Statistics and had taken an interest in time-use surveys. While she did not have the same seniority as Hercus within Cabinet, she was a committed feminist and believed passionately in the importance of recognizing women's unpaid work. The influence she exerted by holding both portfolios ensured that a pilot time-use survey was undertaken in 1990 (Curtin Reference Curtin1992), a policy initiative that remained a priority even after Labour's election loss in that year.
MAINTAINING A PRESENCE UNDER A GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT
The prospects for Women's Affairs initially appeared rather dim in the wake of the 1990 election that brought the right-wing National Party to power. During the 1980s, National had expressed an interest in abolishing the ministry or converting it to one for family affairs. Moreover, in the briefing papers that were prepared for the incoming government, ministry staff presented a critique of the economic rationalist policy directions pursued by the previous Labour government—a stance unlikely to be attractive to the incoming government (MWA 1990; Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2005). Nevertheless, not only did Women's Affairs retain its institutional form as a free-standing government ministry but the financial resources made available to it also remained relatively steady throughout the period that National was in office: as noted, the ministry's budget remained unchanged between 1990 and 1999 and it retained its staff complement over the same period (MWA 1996a; 2000).
In addition, Women's Affairs appeared to be generally well positioned in terms of its political leadership under National. Between 1990 and 1996, the ministry enjoyed strong leadership under Jenny Shipley, who held other portfolios with significant political clout (including Social Welfare and Health) alongside her responsibility for Women's Affairs. During much of this time, Women's Affairs was also supported by an associate minister outside Cabinet who was politically interested in women's equality. It is true that the ministry's profile was diminished somewhat following the 1996 election when, for the first time, the minister of Women's Affairs was excluded from Cabinet. And the fact that the new minister, Christine Fletcher, also held responsibility for Cultural Affairs and Local Government—neither of them particularly prestigious assignments—meant that her time and energy were drawn away from Women's Affairs without the compensation of holding a portfolio with real clout within government.
This demotion in the status of the minister of Women's Affairs constitutes an exception rather than the rule under National, however. Jenny Shipley returned to the leadership of Women's Affairs in September 1997 and retained the position for nearly a year after becoming prime minister in November 1997. Throughout the 1990s, Shipley served as an advocate for the ministry's continued existence, arguing that it made important contributions to government policy work and that its elimination—as called for by socially conservative segments of her own party—would constitute a significant loss both for women and for government. Her effectiveness in doing so reflects, in part, the fact that the “special interests” discourse that proved so powerful in legitimizing the undoing of women's policy agencies elsewhere was not strongly established within the National Party during this period (Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2005, 322–23).
How can we best understand these developments? Clearly, the realignment of the ministry's work and its relationship with community-based women under Judith Aitken played a key role in rendering the ministry more acceptable to its new political masters under National (Curtin Reference Curtin1992; Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2005). In addition, unlike some women's policy agencies in other jurisdictions, Women's Affairs in Aotearoa/New Zealand has never undertaken program-related responsibilities as part of its mandate and did not serve as a source of significant government funding for community-based women's groups. As Katherine Teghtsoonian (Reference Teghtsoonian2005) has argued, these features of the ministry's mandate meant that Women's Affairs did not become the target of government budget- and program-cutting initiatives as has been the case for women's policy agencies with these types of financial responsibilities in other jurisdictions. At the same time, this mandate has meant that there were fewer avenues through which relationships of mutual support and/or critical engagement between the ministry and women's groups could develop.
In the context of the challenges flowing from National's policy commitments, which are discussed further below, the ministry's institutional stability during the 1990s constituted an important support for key components of its work. One example of this is its Time Use Survey project, through which information was gathered about “the overall mix of time spent on personal care, paid work, education, unpaid work, and leisure” for various subgroups of the population (Pānui, September 2001, 4). In addition to generating information about activities that often remain invisible in policy discussions, the Time Use Survey was designed to ensure the availability of data that could be disaggregated by both gender and racialized identity in order to support policy analysis that took differences along these lines into account. The preliminary release of this data in 1999 marked the culmination of the project that had originated in the mid-1980s under Margaret Shields's leadership. The persistence of staff at Women's Affairs throughout the mid-1990s in seeking funding for this project during a period when government had other priorities paid off with a rich data set broken down along a number of dimensions, including gender, that could be used by policy analysts across government.
Another important aspect of Women's Affairs' continued existence during the 1990s was the institutional space, and the political and material resources, afforded by its status as a ministry Together, these assets contributed to a more significant profile for the gendered and racialized impacts of government policy directions than could otherwise have been achieved, and supported an organizational structure within which differences among women could be addressed more consistently than would otherwise have been the case. One of the principal strategies for achieving these goals was to continue work on a gender analysis mainstreaming initiative that the ministry had begun to develop while Labour was still in office. These efforts culminated in 1996 with the release of The Full Picture: Guidelines for Gender Analysis (MWA 1996c), a 40-page document that presented a rationale for including gender analysis as a routine part of policy work across government and a detailed account of how this could be accomplished.
Reflecting the ministry's commitment to taking a diversity-sensitive approach to “women” in its own work, The Full Picture emphasizes the importance of attending to differences among women in policy analysis. For example, the document's introductory discussion explaining what gender analysis involves takes as one of its central themes the fact that “women's lives are not all the same.” It stresses that “Māori women's life experiences, needs, issues and priorities are different from those of non-Māori women,” and that this is also the case for “Pacific women and other groups of women (dependent on age, ethnicity, disability, income levels, employment status, marital status, sexual orientation, and whether they have dependants)” (MWA 1996c, 7). In addition, a senior policy analyst was hired by the MWA to focus on the particular interests of women within the diverse Pacific communities in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The point was thus emphasized that gender analysis is not just about exploring the policy-relevant differences between women and men; it also, by definition, focuses on such differences among various groups of women as well. Although the initiative was not widely embraced elsewhere in government, and ministry staff struggled throughout the 1990s and subsequently to develop strategies for improving its uptake (Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2004), these efforts did afford a visibility to the gendered dimension of government policy that would otherwise have been ignored.
Another set of positive developments supported by the institutional persistence of the ministry flowed from the work that Te Ohu Whakatupu undertook during the 1990s. At the time, few references to the particular interests of Maori women appeared in the frameworks for policy development, service delivery, and consultation that were produced by individual government departments to outline strategies for responding to Maori interests and for meeting the Crown's Treaty obligations (see, e.g., Department of Internal Affairs 1996; Inland Revenue Department 1998). However, a number of documents produced by Te Puni Kokiri (TPK), the Ministry of Maori Development, did acknowledge gender as a potentially significant dimension of difference among Maori (TPK 1996, 1999; TPK and Ministry of Women's Affairs 1999). These developments within TPK were supported by innovative efforts to bring together disparate strands of diversity-oriented policy analysis that were unfolding within the Ministry of Women's Affairs. This work, steadily pursued during the 1990s, focused on the development by staff in Te Ohu Whakatupu of a separate policy analysis framework that would facilitate attention to the interests of Maori women, both as Maori (and therefore as Treaty partners with the Crown) and as women. By 2002, the ministry noted that this work had progressed sufficiently “to allow policy advice within the Ministry to be appropriately analysed from either a Māori-centred approach, using the gender analysis approach, or a combination of both, depending on the outcomes that are being sought” (MWA 2002b, 9). These developments provide just one example of what Te Ohu Whakatupu was able to accomplish during the 1990s as a distinct unit within the Ministry of Women's Affairs.
Women's Affairs also made important contributions to a number of positive policies initiated elsewhere in government. Examples of policy advances included new human rights legislation (1993), significant support for Maori women interested in establishing their own businesses, and the adoption of a new Domestic Violence Act in 1995 (MWA 1996b; Tahi Reference Tahi, Wilson and Yeatman1995). However, ministry staff were unable to deflect a number of other policies with problematic consequences for women to which National was committed. During the party's tenure in office, the neoliberal reforms that had been initiated by the fourth Labour government were broadened to address key social policy sectors, including health, education, and housing (Boston Reference Boston, Boston, Dalziel and St. John1999). National also undertook the repeal of employment equity legislation, significant deregulation of the labor market, and social welfare reforms, including the (ultimately unsuccessful) Code of Family and Social Responsibility. These policies, and many others adopted by National, had a negative impact on the interests of diverse groups of women, particularly Maori women, women in Pacific communities, and economically vulnerable women (Bunkle Reference Bunkle1995; Du Plessis Reference Du Plessis and Du Plessis1992).
In this context, it is interesting to note that although a minister of Women's Affairs holding dual portfolios had proved useful in advancing key policy initiatives during the fourth Labour government's term in office, these institutional arrangements had a mixed set of political effects under National. Between 1990 and 1996, while significant cuts to single parent and other benefits were being developed, Jenny Shipley served simultaneously as both minister of Social Welfare and minister of Women's Affairs. As Rosemary Du Plessis (Reference Du Plessis and Du Plessis1992, 217) has suggested, this dual-portfolio arrangement arguably minimized public conflict between these two mandates when, because of the particular policies being pursued by the Social Welfare Department, there were significant tensions that needed to be managed. Shipley retained her position as minister of Women's Affairs while also serving as prime minister during early 1998 when the Code of Family and Social Responsibility was introduced. Wendy Larner (Reference Larner2000, 249) notes that “the prime minister was strongly identified with the proposed code,” which suggests the possibility that strategic use was being made of the dual-portfolio arrangement to manage opposition to it from within Women's Affairs. Shipley's dual-portfolio role was arguably a contradictory one—contributing to the survival of the ministry but also containing its impact (see Benn Reference Benn and Coote2000 and Chappell Reference Chappell, Brennan and Chappell2006 for similar contradictions in the United Kingdom and Australia, respectively).
MOVING FORWARD UNDER THE FIFTH LABOUR GOVERNMENT?
At the 1999 election, National was replaced by a Labour-led government headed by Helen Clark. Seven women were given ministerial positions, constituting 35% of Clark's first Cabinet. There was some hope among feminists in the community that with so many (feminist) women in Cabinet from the left of the Labour Party and from their left-wing coalition partner, the Alliance, women's issues would be substantively and visibly represented. These prospects were undermined, however, by considerable organizational turbulence within the Ministry of Women's Affairs and by the politically pragmatic direction adopted by the government.
In 2000, Te Ohu Whakatupu and the Policy Unit were merged into a single entity led by two policy managers, one of whom was assigned specific responsibility for Maori staff and strategic outputs, in addition to other responsibilities. This departure from the foundational structure of the ministry met with significant criticism by Maori women in the community. In a report submitted to the monitoring committee of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Maori Women's Welfare League (MWWL 2002) noted the disappointment expressed by Maori women with these structural changes and their concern that the changes indicated a “lack of respect for Maori women's opinion and status.” The report argued that unless Te Ohu Whakatupu's former autonomy and status within the ministry were restored, the government ought to create a new and separate ministry of Maori women's affairs (2002, 7–8). Although neither of these options was pursued, a new position was subsequently created within the ministry—Treaty relationships manager—charged specifically with providing leadership on Treaty issues and on “improved outcomes for Māori women and their whānau, hapū and iwi” (MWA 2003, 9).
A number of other issues were raised in a highly critical review of the ministry's capabilities that was carried out by the State Services Commission (SSC) in 2003. The SSC's report suggested that the ministry was facing serious challenges with respect to its leadership, its policy development processes, and its capacity to retain staff. In addition, the report argued that “the internal culture [of the ministry] has been driven more by ideology/advocacy, than being evidence-based” (SSC 2003, 3), suggesting a concern with the possibility of “capture” by “special interests.” The report also canvassed several options for remedying this situation, including the absorption of the ministry into a larger department with some independence and an autonomous budget. However, it concluded that the best way forward was through the appointment of a new chief executive who would focus on improving the ministry's credibility and working relationships with departments elsewhere in government. A subsequent review carried out by the SSC in 2005 provided a more positive assessment of the ministry in terms of its contributions to cross-departmental policy work and its relationship with “external stakeholders” (MWA 2005b, 7).
These developments echo in interesting ways those that took place following the appointment of Judith Aitken as chief executive in the late 1980s. In both periods of a Labour-led government, the ministry has been able to survive by de-emphasizing or abandoning its advocacy role and by conforming as closely as possible to established public service norms regarding leadership and methods of engaging in policy work. Under the fifth Labour government, the ministry was quite explicit on this point, noting that “We do not act as advocates because we have found that simply advocating for issues is not an effective way for a policy agency to influence others to achieve outcomes for women. A persuasive case backed up by convincing evidence is a far more powerful tool and assists with prioritization” (MWA 2007, 4; emphasis in original). These shifts have also been reflected in the use of short-term contracts to engage policy experts, a practice that runs contrary to the collective approach to the ministry's work that was originally adopted by its staff. Thus, over time, the ministry has operated more and more as a mainstream agency, rather than as an agent of feminism within the state.
In its first term, the Clark government allocated the Ministry of Women's Affairs portfolio to a minister from the junior coalition partner, the Alliance. While the portfolio itself has never been highly ranked, the clout associated with it was potentially even less when assigned to a member of the smaller party in government—a development that did not bode well for Women's Affairs' ability to exert significant influence on policy developments. Yet in at least one policy area the Alliance minister of Women's Affairs, Laila Harré, was able to achieve important gains. While in opposition, she had drafted a private member's bill on paid parental leave, which was drawn from the ballot for select committee consideration (Curtin Reference Curtin1999). Although Labour had not fully supported Harré's bill, the principle of paid parental leave fitted with the broader agenda it brought to office of promoting the economic autonomy of women, and a bill providing for 12 weeks paid parental leave was passed in 2002. The Labour-led government subsequently extended the leave period to 13 weeks as of December 2004 and 14 weeks as of December 2005, and introduced shortened eligibility times (Dyson Reference Dyson2004)—developments that received considerable support from women in the trade union movement. In addition to Harré's leadership on this issue, the Ministry of Women's Affairs provided policy advice that contributed to the shape of the resulting legislation.
There was some limited progress in encouraging other departments to undertake gender analysis and in developing a distinct framework for Treaty analysis during this period. In November 2000, it became a formal requirement that a Gender Implication Statement (GIS) accompany all departmental advice given in Cabinet submissions to the (then) Cabinet Committee on Closing the Gaps (subsequently the Cabinet Committee on Social Equity), but the results were disappointing. The ministry continued to offer training and additional tools to assist departments with gender analysis in response to the fact that few were including a GIS in their submissions and those statements that were submitted were often of poor quality (MWA 2002a, 2002b). The ministry also made progress on developing a Mana Wähine Analysis Framework, building on the work undertaken during the 1990s, and worked with the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs in an effort to ensure that Pacific women's priorities were attended to (MWA 2002b)
Nevertheless, the fifth Labour government was criticized for a lack of substance in its policy commitments to gender equality (Hyman Reference Hyman2008). For example, the CEDAW committee reporting on New Zealand's progress since 1995 expressed “serious concern at the continuing wage differential between women and men” and “at the impact of the repeal of the Pay Equity Act for women's equal pay rights” (MWA 2002c, 15). Having done little to redress the pay equity issue during its first term, the Clark government created a Pay and Employment Equity Unit within the Department of Labour during its second term. However, compared with the fourth Labour government's legislative pay equity initiative in 1990, the policy instrument adopted in 2004 was much more voluntary in nature. The unit, in consultation with Women's Affairs, designed a tool that organizations could use to review and evaluate the degree of equity and gender neutrality in the workplace. It is not evident that this initiative had any impact on the gender pay gap before the unit was abolished by the National government elected in 2008 (Curtin and Devere Reference Curtin and Devere2006).
Moreover, while the government insisted that it was cognizant of the need to distance itself from the previous Labour government, it did not completely abandon neoliberal principles of individualism, marketized relationships and participation in paid employment as a key responsibility of all citizens. The Working for Families policy package arguably stands as an expression of these normative commitments. It was designed to reward participation in paid employment but failed to address the ongoing social and economic challenges facing those—many of them women parenting alone—whose family responsibilities (among other things) prevent them from pursuing paid employment (see O'Brien Reference O'Brien2005).
It was in this context that the Ministry of Women's Affairs launched its central initiative under the Labour-led government: the Action Plan for New Zealand Women (MWA 2004). Developed following an extensive consultation process with women in communities around the country, the Action Plan focused on three priority areas: economic sustainability, work/life balance and women's well-being, and also included sections devoted to Maori and diversity. The Action Plan guided the ministry's core business for the remainder of the Labour government's term in office. Its vision was to create an “equitable, inclusive and sustainable society where all women can achieve their aspirations and, in addition, Māori women, as Tangata Whenua, can progress the aspirations of their Whānau, Hapū and Iwi” (MWA 2004, 3). This discourse of “aspiration” resonates with a “Third Way” privileging of the individual (although the notion of the collective is retained for Maori) and has permeated the policy statements of both Labour and National in recent years.
The strong emphasis in the Action Plan on increased labor force participation as a way forward for women is linked to arguments for a number of policy directions understood to be supportive of this particular life choice, including early childhood services, out-of-school child care, retirement savings reform, and paid parental leave. As Ella Kahu and Mandy Morgan (Reference Kahu and Morgan2007) have argued, this set of policies supports only a narrow range of choices for women: those involving participation in paid employment. Moreover, it represents a very liberal version of feminism. At the time the Action Plan was released, the minister of Women's Affairs was also the associate minister for Labour, which suggests again the relevance of a dual-portfolio assignment in furthering the government's overall agenda.
In addition to the organizational challenges facing the ministry and the limited clout of its political leadership under Labour, a significant factor contributing to what appears to be a reduced political commitment from Labour to a broader range of feminist policy positions may well be the lack of an active and visible women's movement in New Zealand. Sandra Grey (Reference Grey, Grey and Sawer2008) has argued that the women's movement in New Zealand is in abeyance, and that there has been little obvious pressure on the government from the outside around women's issues. Although the Maori Women's Welfare League has been active in lobbying for a broader-based partnership relationship between the ministry and Maori women, this work has been done through informal policy networks, rather than through a vocal, visible, grassroots women's movement.
Another political influence was the emergence within the opposition National Party of a discourse of “special interests.” Following his election as leader of the National Party in 2003, Don Brash indicated that he did not see the need for a Ministry of Women's Affairs and decided not to appoint a spokesperson for the portfolio (Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2005). And in an early 2004 speech, he argued the need for New Zealanders to work together as “one people” and to avoid what he characterized as divisive attention to the Treaty and the interests of Maori (Maddison Reference Maddison2006). In this context, it is interesting to note that in the Ministry's 2005 Briefing to the Incoming Government, no explicit mention was made of Gender Impact Statements or gender analysis. And although some reference was made to particular social and economic aspects of Maori and Pacific women's lives in this document, there was no dedicated section for these groups as had been the case with the 2002 Briefing, nor is there any reference to the Mana Wähine Framework. Instead, a more generic reference is made to the role of the ministry in supporting “capability building in the public sector to ensure [that] consideration of gender issues is embedded” (MWA 2005a, 38).
CONCLUSION
The institutional persistence of Women's Affairs as a free-standing ministry has accorded a continuous visibility to the interests of diverse groups of women and to the gendered and racialized dimensions of policy that would otherwise have been difficult to achieve. It also has ensured an opportunity for sustained work on a number of policy issues with significant implications for women in Aotearoa/New Zealand over an extended period of time. And arguably, its continued existence as a government ministry has given Women's Affairs a greater capacity to advocate on behalf of women in the face of problematic policy initiatives than that available to women's policy agencies that are without strong representation at the heart of government or that have been downsized, relegated to the margins, or eliminated altogether in other jurisdictions.
While these are important achievements, as are the various policy “wins” to which Women's Affairs has contributed in important ways over the past two and a half decades, the ministry has also clearly been constrained in its ability to move government policy in directions that are of benefit to women. Its capacity to work on behalf of women has been contained institutionally through a variety of mechanisms. One of the most significant of these has been the ethos and operation of the new public management reforms that have shaped how government business has been conducted since they were launched by the fourth Labour government. The abiding concern with “capture” within the public service reflected in these reforms has meant that ministry staff have modified significantly their relationship with women in the community and muted their advocacy role within government, focusing instead on conventional approaches to policy analysis and advice. Women's Affairs has continued to meet and work with women's groups, but this is now framed as “consultation” with “stakeholders”—terms and processes that sit less problematically alongside new public management discourse than the original “transmission belt” model and the commitment to advocacy that it reflected. And while the ministry's ability to adapt to the changes in the public service initiated under the fourth Labour government arguably ensured its survival, the price has been high: the abandonment of the innovative aspects of the ministry's approach to its work that were based on feminist principles.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Women's Affairs was led by ministers with strong political profiles who were willing to advocate for the ministry both within Cabinet and in the wider public arena in the face of criticism from government and party colleagues. Their efforts to do so were assisted by the relative absence of the discourse of special interests that elsewhere has served to undermine the legitimacy of women's policy agencies. And in the cases of Ann Hercus and Margaret Shields, it appears that having a seat in Cabinet and holding dual portfolios contributed to their clout and to their ability to advance the interests of women, particularly in the areas of child care and the valuing of unpaid work (Curtin Reference Curtin2008).
Although being led by a minister with other important Cabinet responsibilities has thus sometimes enhanced the effectiveness of Women's Affairs, and arguably contributed to its survival under National, it has also constrained the ministry's work in a variety of ways. Experiences under both National and the fifth Labour government suggest that a dual-portfolio minister may not necessarily constitute a significant asset for women seeking progressive policy change if the government of which the minister is a member is pursuing policies at odds with an equity-oriented agenda. Instead, as we have suggested, it can serve as a strategic arrangement that allows governments pursuing policies that are not particularly supportive of women's interests to manage opposition that might otherwise emerge from Women's Affairs.
As women's policy agencies have been downsized, marginalized, or eliminated, a scholarly literature has developed that demonstrates the challenges that these circumstances generate for staff in such agencies and for diverse groups of community-based women (Sawer Reference Sawer, Outshoorn and Kantola2007; Squires and Wickham-Jones Reference Squires and Wickham-Jones2002; Teghtsoonian Reference Teghtsoonian2003; Teghtsoonian and Chappell Reference Teghtsoonian and Chappell2008). The case of Aotearoa/New Zealand allows us to see the ways in which a very different set of institutional circumstances—relative stability and continuous proximity to power—exacts its own price: generating welcome opportunities to pursue much-needed policy changes, to be sure, but also significantly constraining what can be achieved on behalf of women. Our detailed examination of developments in this one jurisdiction over an extended period of time has also allowed us to unpack the mechanisms through which both opportunities and constraints have been materialized (importantly, the dual-portfolio minister) and to trace the effects of changes in the political context on the ministry's work.
Experiences in Aotearoa/New Zealand are also relevant to current discussions among scholars, policy staff, and activists regarding the political and institutional strategies through which a broad range of inequities, including those among women, could be productively addressed (Hankivsky Reference Hankivsky2005; Squires Reference Squires2007a, Reference Squires2007b; Woodward Reference Woodward2008). The variable fate of Te Ohu Whakatupu and its work, along with that of policy staff in other ministries, to ensure that government policies respond to the particular interests of Maori women—as Maori and as women—provides an example of how such initiatives can be developed given adequate time and resources. Many governments elsewhere have begun to consider how multiple dimensions of marginalization might be taken up in equity-informed policy development. The achievements and setbacks of policy staff in Women's Affairs in their efforts to develop and jointly mobilize both Treaty analysis and gender analysis frameworks points to an alternative that lies between approaches that privilege gender (for a critique, see Hankivsky Reference Hankivsky2005) and strategies that involve demoting gender to one among several aspects of “diversity” to be addressed (see Outshoorn and Kantola Reference Outshoorn, Kantola, Outshoorn and Kantola2007; Squires Reference Squires2007b).
While Women's Affairs has contributed in important ways to the improvement of women's lives in Aoteaora/New Zealand over the past two decades, we must also acknowledge the significant changes that have taken place in the Ministry and its work, many of which have involved notable departures from feminist practices and commitments. In its 2005 Briefing to the Incoming Government, the ministry describes itself as a “specialist policy advisor,” a “knowledge manager,” and a “monitor” overseeing progress on the Action Plan (2005a, 37–38). There is little discussion in contemporary ministry documents of equality in the way the term was used in the ministry's brief in 1984. And although there continues to be ongoing consultation with women in the community, this takes place primarily through policy networks established with identifiable “stakeholders,” rather than as part of a free-flowing dialogue between ministry staff and women in diverse communities. As the ministry itself acknowledges, this is no longer advocacy; rather, the views of community-based women now appear to constitute one of multiple sources of “evidence” on which the Ministry draws in framing its approach to policies on women. Overall, it is a very different—and decidedly less feminist—Ministry compared to what it was 25 years ago. Further analysis is needed to assess whether, and how, its profile and practices have changed during the tenure of the National-led government that was elected in November 2008.Footnote 9
The experiences of the Ministry of Women's Affairs over the past two decades provide no definitive closure to the debate about the balance of harms and benefits that arise when feminists' work is located close to the center of political power. This is partly because assessments of this balance sometimes require invoking a counterfactual: (for example, an argument that without a seat at central tables, even less would have been accomplished for women), and usually involve competing evaluations of the relative weight to be assigned to policy “wins” achieved and the compromises required to secure them that cannot be resolved by reference to “the facts.” Nevertheless, we would argue that it is important to establish that both costs and benefits do indeed flow from proximity to power, and to lay out the pathways through which they are actualized. While these will always be contextually situated, and hence our analysis of developments in Aotearoa/New Zealand will not necessarily apply directly to other jurisdictions, insights from a single case study such as this do suggest which elements of a political landscape may be relevant in evaluating whether particular strategies may offer a promising way forward and in considering where the potholes on the road may lie.
