Economic sociologist Sean Ó Riain’s excellent book offers an explanation of Ireland’s remarkable economic roller coaster over the past several decades, and in particular how its fate relates to liberalism. Few countries have ever ridden as steep a curve as Ireland’s since the 1990s. From a gross national income per capita that was 59% of Germany’s in 1990, it climbed to 124% of the German number in 2007, then plummeted to 82% by 2012. Widely agreed is that this is a tale of an economy that opened to Europe and the world, including a policy of mercenary tax competition, and then floated away on underregulated property and financial bubbles that eventually popped. For Ó Riain, however, the Irish story is not just about the virtues and vulnerabilities of a liberal-market economy. To the contrary, a closer look at Ireland suggests that even liberal-looking economies are never purely liberal, and we cannot attribute their outcomes simply to naturalistic market conditions. Markets are always embedded in variegated social institutions that profoundly shape their successes and failures. The Rise and Fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger turns the Irish case into a powerful argument for a more general commitment to theoretical views in the tradition of Karl Polanyi, which political scientists know mostly under the name of “sociological institutionalism.”
The common narratives that form Ó Riain’s foils either credit or blame liberalism for the whole Irish story. From relatively orthodox economic points of view, Irish growth took off because it finally removed obstacles to a market-led economy—opening itself to Europe, stabilizing government spending, keeping inflation low, welcoming foreign investment—and it collapsed because it strayed from the optimal liberal path, failing to maintain adequate liberal rules of prudential regulation in the early 2000s. From a more critical point of view, Ireland’s growth and collapse display the inequities and perils of liberal economies. The economic and political elites of this peripheral country made a deal with international capital, not unlike the “triple alliance” that Peter Evans described long ago in Brazil, which brought in a wave of money and sharp inequality. Inevitably, this thinly rooted, externally dependent growth brought a major crisis.
Ó Riain suggests that neither kind of account can adequately explain the dramatic shifts in Ireland’s fate, and more concretely that neither maps well onto what actually happened on the ground. Rooting his version in a Polanyian understanding of markets as social institutions, Ó Riain highlights that complex political agendas and ties underlaid both boom and bust in Irish markets. He grants that openness and rather classical macroeconomic management helped set up the boom, but shows that the Irish state was considerably more active in generating the boom than a simple liberal account would expect. Rather than getting out of the way of the market, the government courted foreign investors, steered venture capital, and brokered crucial neocorporatist wage deals between labor and business. Then, however, this proto-developmental state was unable to manage and stabilize the massive wave of capital that began to wash over the Emerald Isle in the late 1990s (and, in fact, became a major booster of it).
Much of the process of “financialization” occurred for extra-Irish reasons, as British, French, and German banks eagerly lent the Irish unprecedented amounts of money, with encouragement from the new background structure of the euro. On the domestic side, these transnational processes proved seductive for the “growth machine” model of political-economic elite interactions centralized in the Fianna Fáil party, and the Irish government became a cheerleader for the financial sector and its property bubble. The combination of these international and domestic conditions, working proximately through domestic banks and property developers, “misallocated capital in Ireland on a grand scale” (p. 70). Overall, Ó Riain’s story is that “developmental and corporatist institutions were critical in promoting growth in the 1990s, but were derailed by the property bubble of the 2000s fueled by market liberalism and state boosterism” (p. 9).
The theoretical discussion that sets up this story is sophisticated and lucidly positioned vis-à-vis work on the nature of liberalism and markets, neoclassical economics, varieties of capitalism, developmental states, small states, welfare states, Marxism, corporatism, and European integration. At the core of Ó Riain’s account is a Polanyian semicritique of Polanyi, through which he summarizes the main gist of contemporary economic sociology very well (pp. 18–19). Polanyi suggested that markets are sociopolitical constructs, but then wrote of markets being progressively “disembedded” from society in the nineteenth century. An even more Polanyian perspective, arguably—one that treats markets as still more profoundly social—holds that even runaway liberalism and markets are socially embedded phenomena, and will be enduringly riddled with nonobvious social features and complexities. Remarking that liberal economies have generally been less completely theorized than others, much as “whiteness” long received little attention in studies of race (p. 11), Ó Riain argues that even liberal economies like Ireland’s remain embedded in local particularities.
Empirically, the book offers many different cuts into the Irish story, often based in clever uses of data. For example, Ó Riain directs our attention to evolutions in employment across industries to show that the 1990s boom had broad bases that were then eroded by misallocations to real estate and finance in the 2000s; to the size and destinations of private and publicly steered capital to show how the state encouraged the growing bubble; and to spatial contrasts between vacancy rates and new housing stock to show that construction became increasingly divorced from any measure of demand. In the most qualitative section, he investigates bank documents to show how unprecedented lending was rationalized (both internationally to Irish banks and from Irish banks to their customers).
Ó Riain’s ambition to trace a more complex and concrete account of the Irish political economy is empirically demanding, however, and ultimately, the book falls somewhat short of showing us the kinds of action evoked by its rich theoretical apparatus. The social underpinnings of liberalism consist of nuanced institutions and practices that we can see most directly in the ways that people act and talk, but The Rise and Fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger mostly remains at the level of broader discussions and data. In particular, the treatments of European-level developments and changing political coalitions feel like somewhat glossy summaries. Ó Riain thus offers a magisterial conceptualization of Irish growth and collapse and many interesting and relevant slices of data to buttress it, but stops a bit short of showing his argument unfolding in action. Nonetheless, this book should be required reading for anyone interested in Ireland, Europe, or the industrialized world’s political economy more broadly, and especially for those who seek to understand both the sources and limits of the dominance of liberalism in the twenty-first century.
