In 1948, the first publication of the Collège de ‘Pataphysique’, a ‘society committed to learned and inutilious research’ founded by major members of the surrealist movement in France, was, rather remarkably, an imaginary obituary. With this, the society had put into the limelight an important characteristic of science – sometimes ritual in academia can be as important as content, and these rituals offer an outstanding opportunity to lampoon some of the practices of institutionalized science. It is, however, clear that rituals always have an important social function to accomplish, even in science, which is supposedly the most rational of all human undertakings. The two studies under review here analyse two overlapping episodes in the development of academic identities in Germany. Anna Echterhölter focuses on a ritualistic aspect of science – obituaries of eminent scientists. She employs these obituaries as a means to elucidate the changing norms and standards that scholars and scientists submit themselves to. Denise Phillips throws her net wider – she investigates the social context in which Naturwissenschaft – natural science – became a distinct cultural category. Both studies are accounts of the development of the image that science and scientists have of their moral and social status, of how knowledge and knowledge practices are valued, and of the wide-reaching consequences these developments can have.
Echterhölter's study shows persuasively that obituaries could very well be a significant source for historians of science. In the first part of her study, Echterhölter places obituaries in the tradition of other literary or non-literary forms of remembering or eulogizing scholars. This part of the book offers a welcome but sometimes too meandering and too digressive historical account of the forms of remembrance that were used in early modern universities. In the second part Echterhölter offers detailed readings of the obituaries of four eminent scientists – Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu, Carl Friedrich Gauss and Johannes Müller. The author covers a period in which the scientific method more and more was judged according to its suitability as a form of life. While in the eighteenth century the social and family life of the scholars was recognized separately from their scientific achievements, in the obituary for Gauss the scientific method experiences an extension and moral valorization. Disinterestedness, self-sacrifice in the name of science and pure interest unencumbered by considerations of applicability are constructed as moral achievements that reflect upon the persona and the science. In Emil Dubois-Reymond's obituary for his teacher Johannes Müller, the pioneering physiologist even saved his own life by distancing himself during an existential crisis from Romantic natural philosophy and by devoting himself to the experimental method. These case studies demonstrate that obituaries serve as a means to secure status and to enshrine what it means to be ‘scientific’ and how to value scientific findings. These case studies are the most interesting part of the book; there remains, however, one significant lacuna. The author does not succeed in demonstrating that these obituaries in fact did play an important role in shaping the moral self-conception of scientists. The author's analysis demonstrates that these obituaries express changing norms, but it remains unclear how much this genre contributed to creating and maintaining them.
Denise Phillips adopts a wider perspective and analyses the emergence of Naturwissenschaft as a scientific category. The received picture emphasizes the state-supported rise of the research university, the strengthening of the role of professors, and the end of the socially diverse Enlightenment republic of letters, which did not need to respect not-yet-existing disciplinary boundaries. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Naturwissenschaft had metamorphosed from a flexible and inconsistently used category into an elitist, highly technical form of knowledge about nature – applied sciences such as agronomy, or dilettante collecting of minerals, plants or beetles, were excluded. Phillips directs her attention in particular to the supposed end of the republic of letters. She claims that there are many continuities from the eighteenth-century republic of letters to professionalized nineteenth-century science. To support her claim, she focuses on the Kingdom of Saxony to illuminate the prominent role diverse local and regional economic and scientific societies played in establishing disciplinary identities. Phillips shows how the early modern scholar was replaced by the educated citizen, the Bildungsbürger, and this in turn by the professional scientist. The study of nature escaped the small circle of scholars when pharmacists, medical doctors, progressive farmers and manufacturers began to collect specimens, carry out experiments and publish their results. This development was also the consequence of the training of these professional groups in new technical, medical or agricultural academies, which were not restricted to practical training but also instilled a theoretical perspective. These new actors thus could strive for the status of being a scholar – a scholar, however, who always, and foremost, kept applicability and utility in mind. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, these new actors and university professors worked harmoniously together in the numerous scientific and economic societies. Around 1840 it became, however, apparent that the status of the natural scientists began to suffer from this social and professional inclusiveness. Phillips documents how, as a consequence of this development, the scientific societies began to split up into theoretically and practically oriented versions. Science, deriving general laws, was generated by university professors and discussed in exclusive societies. The more utilitarian societies focused on the practical application of these general insights. Scientific results were still considered to be public goods, but these were created in elitist circles and then made available to the public. Phillips also shows how this development was accompanied by the rise of science popularization and the methodological and epistemological separation of science and humanities. But she also cautions against seeing the resulting divisions as too categorical – she shows how on a personal and family level the dividing line between university professor and chemical entrepreneur or between agronomist and classical philologist was less sharp than the official rhetoric leads us to believe.
Phillips convincingly shows that the epistemological foundations of science were debated not only in academic ivory towers, but also in local and regional contexts with participants from a wide range of professional and social backgrounds. The communal, socially inclusive exercise of curiosity and of the passion for nature remained alive and influential well beyond the early decades of the nineteenth century.
