G.’s volume is a passionate defence of a metaphysical understanding of Plato’s ethics grounded on the Idea of the Good. It rejects interpretations that dilute the metaphysical centrality of the Good and, on the contrary, offers a strenuous alternative that appreciates the metaphysical depth of Plato’s dialogues. The volume provides a scholarly analysis and attentive reading of Plato’s dialogues along with a careful discussion of the debate, not restricted to ancient philosophy scholarship. In Chapter 1 G. discusses Plato’s ethics as moral realism and critically engages with prudentialism, deontology and consequentialism.
In the contemporary debate ‘moral realism’ contends that moral statements express objective truths independent of human beliefs, motivations and character. Much of the debate is about what makes those statements true. In G.’s interpretation Plato’s moral realism is grounded on the metaphysical Idea of the Good. Here lies the main contribution that Plato’s moral realism can bring to the contemporary debate, precisely because of its radical difference. The Idea of the Good is presented as the ‘unhypothetical first principle beyond essence’ in Chapter 2. The Idea of the Good is a superordinate, transcendent reality. It is a non-naturalist reality because it is not in space and time. The Idea of the Good establishes the goodness of every good thing, as notably presented in the Republic (6.505a2–4; 7.517c1–3).
In Chapter 3 G. explains why Plato’s ethics cannot be reduced to moral psychology, ethical reasoning and cultivation of virtues. For G. the core difference from prudentialism is that a virtue’s intrinsic value is grounded in the participation with the Good. Instead of focusing on moral psychology, G. stresses that genuine moral knowledge entails understanding the metaphysical structure of reality, which includes recognising the integrative unity of the soul in alignment with the Good. This gets prominence in Chapter 5, where G. dives deep into one of the key concepts of ethics, namely moral responsibility. He argues that moral responsibility presupposes an ordered, integrated soul aligned with the Good. For G. it is not possible to simply refer to prudential reasoning or moral blame to establish moral responsibility. The unhypothetical first principle is needed for a robust account of moral responsibility and the establishment of universal, exceptionless ethical claims. Although this is not the aim of this book, these chapters help clarify some key differences between Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethics and, so, are in contrast to contemporary readings that tend to equate ancient ethics with virtue ethics, which is generally thought, right or wrongly, to originate in Aristotle.
From a methodological point of view, G. highlights the coherence of Plato’s philosophical thought, countering fragmented interpretations detaching ethics from a metaphysical structure. Still, this systematic coherence can be questioned by pointing to the difference between Socratic ethics and Platonic ethics. It might be argued that, if moral realism is the view of Plato’s middle dialogues (the Republic in particular), it is not the case for the first Socratic dialogues. However, in Chapter 4, G. challenges the scholarly distinction between Socratic ethics (considered non-metaphysical) and Platonic ethics (explicitly metaphysical) and, instead, demonstrates continuity by showing that Socrates’ ethical arguments implicitly depend upon a metaphysical commitment.
This interpretation is not new, and it was common in antiquity. G. does not hide the dependency of his reading of Plato on Neoplatonic interpretations. It should be noted that the Neoplatonic dependence is not only about the method but also about how the Good is conceptualised. G. identifies Plato’s Idea of the Good closely with the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Good as the One. Still, in arguing for a systematic and unitarian view of Plato’s philosophy he is not simply repeating what the Neoplatonic philosophers already said. His interpretation is pretty radical and critical. This is because it fights against contemporary approaches that focus on the development of Plato’s thought and stress the differences among the dialogues and the variability, complexities and nuances of each of them, depending on the context and the interlocutors. Here lies my main concern about this excellent book. Plato’s dialogues have significant literary and rhetorical dimensions, often are intentionally open-ended. This is not just a matter of style but how philosophy – and ethical reasoning included – is understood by Plato, i.e. as dialogical inquiry. G.’s emphasis on system-building and integrative unity neglects this crucial aspect of Plato’s ethics. I see that in G.’s view these approaches risk reducing Plato’s ethics to relativism. But I think that his position is too strong. Appreciating the difference of contexts and interlocutors, for instance, does not imply embracing relativism. On the contrary, it can show how metaphysical unity can reply to different situations and different interlocutors by being instantiated in different manners. So, this can even support G.’s view. For situatedness does not fight against a holistic approach that aims to show that the parts are integrated within a system, both in a metaphysical and ethical sense. Or this might speak in favour of particularism (J. Dancy, Ethics without Principles [2004]). Particularism is a form of moral realism, but very different from G.’s: it emphasises the unique circumstances of each moral situation and still asserts that moral judgements are true or false because they reflect objective moral facts about the world without the need of general principles.
G. might say that his point is not about how the Good can manifest itself differently in different situations. His point is about how unity is manifested. In Chapter 6 G. explores the Philebus and the Statesman. These are key dialogues for stressing how the Good manifests itself in proportionality, symmetry and measure. These qualities of unity do not just matter for describing the structure of reality, they are essential qualities to achieving moral excellence. Here we can find the core of Plato’s moral realism as presented by G. Ethical excellence is understood as the harmonious integration of human capacities. So, these dialogues reinforce the role of metaphysics in ethics and the good life. Still, if this might work with these later dialogues, the first Socratic dialogues are often pedagogical and not metaphysical. They address practical ethical concerns. G.’s strong metaphysical reading risks neglecting how Socrates carefully addresses different interlocutors in replying to their different needs and how ethically important the disposition of the interlocutors is in moral development. Following G.’s reading, the pedagogical aspect would not express a Socratic ethics different from the Platonic one. Instead, it would be a key feature of Plato’s ethics. Can a metaphysically grounded morality remain practically relevant, addressing ethical dilemmas in everyday life and replying to the needs of different interlocutors? My intuition is that G. would reply with a strong yes and that this has to do with the establishment of order, symmetry and harmony in the soul. But if this is the case, the moral psychology dimension that has been set to one side by G. seems quite important. In response to that, G. might say that its value is only instrumental, but does not have any impact on moral realism that, on the contrary, is about a more fundamental order, symmetry and harmony of the structure of reality. This is a point for further discussion because I still think that moral psychology, if understood as care for the soul and not necessarily as prudentialism, can play a crucial and constitutive role in understanding the metaphysical structure of reality.
To conclude, this is a remarkable book that offers a scholarly rich and precise defence of Plato’s moral realism. Although I do not think that Plato’s ethics can be fully equated to moral realism because it does not saturate the richness of an inquiry-based ethics where the passionate knowledge of the philosopher and the care of the soul play a constitutive role (not just instrumental), this book has the immense value of signalling the need to focus more on the Idea of the Good in Plato’s philosophy. There might be disagreements about the role of the Idea of the Good and whether or not it is a matter of moral realism. The radical difference from contemporary moral realism might raise doubts about the identification of Plato’s ethics with moral realism. Still, this might point to some problematic assumptions of the contemporary metaethical debate and offer instead Plato’s moral realism as an alternative ancient approach.
