Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Liberia was a favorite example of an African ‘failed state’. Larger than life figures like Prince Johnson, General Peanut Butter, and most especially, Charles Taylor lent themselves to easy caricature in the global media. A post-Cold War conflict financed not by super-powers but by the trade in weapons, diamonds, timber, and rubber put the scholarly focus on commercial networks and profiteering. Liberia seemed to exemplify the triumph of a violent, poststate capitalism in Africa. The obvious importance of the economy made it difficult to understand the political in modern Liberia's political-economy, and a considerable (and still influential) literature grew out of efforts to make sense of the relationship between power and profit in this small West African nation.
Felix Gerdes enters this debate at a different moment. Mid-way through President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's second term, Liberia features prominently in the Africa Rising narrative. This is a moment that should not have happened, at least according to the way Gerdes reads the existing literature on the Liberian conflict. War was supposed to be too profitable to ever end in Liberia. The political dynamics of state formation had been superceded by violent private enterprise. Too few actors had an interest in making the state work and too many were making fortunes from the instability and violence brought about by the state's absence. Classic state theory had little of value to say about Liberia and its future.
Gerdes introduces his book as a corrective to that narrowly economistic, antistate reading of the Liberian conflict. The first and second Liberian wars, he argues, were in fact perfectly in keeping with conventional theory regarding how states emerge and how they endure. Statehood was always the real prize and the fortunes of the various players in Liberia's drama have waxed and waned largely based on how closely they hewed to well-understood principles of modern political power. Liberia's nearly two decades of violence were not evidence of state failure but an example of how ‘Young States’ solidify. Even at its most violent moments, ‘the dynamics of political competition during the wars inadvertently strengthen[ed] principles of statehood’ (p. 251). The war, in other words, was not evidence of Liberia as a failed state, but a period of protracted state formation.
Gerdes needlessly simplifies the literature he claims to be writing against, notably William Reno's work on warlord politics, in which Liberia figures heavily. With one or two exceptions, no serious observer ever claimed that greed alone explained the Liberian war. But Gerdes's book is nevertheless a welcome effort to view Liberia's violent recent history as a comprehensible political development. Drawing heavily on Weber and Charles Tilly for his theory, Gerdes argues that Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) won a classic political struggle in the first half of the 1990s. Taylor was a more charismatic leader and better organized than his opponents, his NPFL was seen as more legitimate than the alternatives, and he commanded the resources to win in the zero-sum game of African politics.
Taylor's political fortunes did change with the second Liberian war, primarily as a consequence of his failure to bureaucratize the state apparatus to which he laid claim. His successor, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, has so far managed the delicate balance between personalized patronage politics and the professionalization of the bureaucracy, a balance that Gerdes portrays as the obvious and perhaps inevitable consequence of the Taylor years. It, too, may ultimately be unsustainable, but moves Liberia further along the state-formation trajectory by strengthening the ‘statehood principle’ as a whole.
The just-so nature of Gerdes's conclusions are likely to be frustrating to anyone who has wrestled with the complexities of Liberia's recent history; the story told here is too neat and over-determined to be completely credible. Gerdes provides detailed accounts of the activities of the wars' major players and the book is valuable as an archive of the conflict. But because his project is to demonstrate how well Liberia fits with state theory, the particularities of the Liberia case are often lost. In comparison to Stephen Ellis's or Reno's work on the Liberian war, or the analyses by Mary Moran, Mats Utas, or Amos Sawyer, there is little effort here to understand Liberia on its own terms. For students of African Studies with an interest in Liberia, Civil War and State Formation might be most helpful when put into dialogue with these other histories. But ironically the book's emphasis on Liberia's predictable conformity to standard political-economy models is also its strength. Gerdes does the commendable, and unfortunately rare, work of presenting the Liberia war and its aftermath not as chaos but as logical political history.
