On 13 September 1923, Primo de Rivera took power in Spain, establishing a dictatorship. Primo’s coup responded to a variety of stimuli that were common in many European states at the time: disaffection with liberal democracy and the idea of parliament, fear of socialist takeover after the Russian Revolution of 1917, and a general ‘crisis mindset’ (whether economic, cultural, political or even all of them) that permeated the minds of the conservative elites of the early decades of the twentieth century.Footnote 1 In particular, the issue of national regeneration, which in Spain had a long-lasting intellectual tradition under the banner of regeneracionismo, functioned as a common point of departure for multiple right-wing movements across the continent.Footnote 2
In this context, the first takeover of a fledgling liberal state by a far-right movement was the establishment of the fascist regime in Italy following the March on Rome (28 October 1922). Historiography has long debated the role of fascism as a transnational or international force, able to project its influence across Europe.Footnote 3 Recent interpretations stress its ability to turn into a ‘political commodity’,Footnote 4 able to provide space for hybridisations or borrowing by local actors, thanks to the fact that it was an amalgamation of different (and often contradictory) ideas,Footnote 5 which could be decoupled, borrowed, reinterpreted, modified and applied to other national contexts. The expansion of comparative studies beyond the ‘mechanical juxtaposition’ of fascist and para-fascist regimes,Footnote 6 as well as the enlargement of the field of analysis to global circuits of ideological sharing,Footnote 7 has proved fruitful, demonstrating an intense process of borrowing from Italian fascism by other inter-war authoritarian dictatorships and the constant process of re-imagination and co-production of fascist ideas and policies in local contexts, which went well beyond passive imitation.Footnote 8 The study of the import of the ‘fascist model’ by local conservative and right-wing authoritarians has shown how this process gradually blurred the lines between the right and fascism,Footnote 9 their common point of origin in the ‘crisis mindset’ notwithstanding, and how it marked a departure from a more ‘traditional’ type of conservatism (focused primarily on the preservation of existing social structures and hierarchies) to something new, a solution to the perceived problems of the time, a new blueprint for the future.Footnote 10
Like many other inter-war regimes, Primo de Rivera’s has also been the object of scrutiny, albeit with some lateness.Footnote 11 Recent historiography has dispelled the long-lasting interpretation that saw it as an ‘interregnum’ in preparation for the republic and the civil war,Footnote 12 underlying its attempt to impose a ‘fascism from above’ and its role as the first regime to selectively borrow aspects of Italian fascism, even if it operated in a radically different context and went on to achieve (or not achieve) similarly different results.Footnote 13
Two focal points in the historiography of fascism from a transnational perspective will serve as the starting point for this article: corporatism and the role of intellectuals as mediators, importers and reinventors of fascist ideas and policies. The former constitutes the most apparently self-evident point of contact between Italian fascism and Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, especially considering the timing of its implementation in the two countries in 1926. In April, the Italian corporations and fascist trade union were established, followed in November by the Spanish labour reform, which, in the mind of its principal creator, the minister Eduardo Aunós Pérez, was supposed to be the first step in transforming the country into a corporatist state with the establishment of the National Corporatist Organisation (Organización Corporativa Nacional; OCN). Initially limited to the industrial sector, in 1928 Aunós attempted to finalise the reform by including agricultural workers. However, the reform had already found a difficult application during the previous years and faced the resolute opposition of Catholic trade unions as well as agrarian landowners, who functionally stonewalled it until the regime itself crashed under the pressure of the economic crisis and political unrest at the beginning of 1930, bringing the Spanish monarchy with it.Footnote 14
While unsuccessful in its realisation in Spain, corporatism has been interpreted by recent historiography as part of the fascist arsenal of ‘political commodities’, a passe-partout that, while masquerading as an apolitical, technical topic, was part of a convergent authoritarian solution to the issues conservatives viewed in society.Footnote 15 At the same time, as mentioned, reception was not merely passive, and in this process, intellectuals (and/or technocrats) played a pivotal role as mediators.Footnote 16 As ideas spread, diffusion was influenced by the receivers, who modified them in a process that accounted for both distortion due to incomplete or faulty knowledge of the subject and the need to adapt them to a different social, political and economic context.Footnote 17
This article thus aims to investigate not so much Aunós’s transnational (or international) connections as his Spanish ones and how they operated as a networkFootnote 18 to disseminate corporatist ideas in Spain. The group gathered around the Ministry of Labour appears to present the characteristics of the homini novi, as described by Charles Maier. Unhappy with their current situation, they tried to build a new state project in the wake of the First World War. They were ‘collective actors who possess[ed] different sources of power and public influence and [sought] to maximise their historical roles’ by mobilising the population,Footnote 19 in this case replacing the citizen with the producer. Many of them felt clearly that they were at a crossroads in history, a point at which they could alter its course.Footnote 20 Similarly, as they all shared to some degree the ‘crisis mindset’, they constituted a cultural milieu where hybridisations with fascism were possible, because of the aforementioned ability of fascism to present itself as a new, radical and forward-moving response to the anxieties of European ruling classes. This led to a gradual ‘fascistisation’, defined by Aristotle Kallis as ‘the process of importing fascism (as ideology and/or political élite) into the rationale of an authoritarian transformation of the political system masterminded by certain sectors of disunited élites in inter-war European countries’, which entailed experimentation with various aspects of fascism, adapted to the various national contexts.Footnote 21 This group of intellectuals, however, while sharing their overall outlook on the Spanish situation, needed an ‘accelerant’ to coalesce, and found such a reagent precisely in Aunós, who, through Primo’s dictatorship, endeavoured to bring together previously dispersed intellectuals under the umbrella of the Ministry of Labour, which acted as the centre for a network of previously disjointed scholars and publicists.
Building a Network
Aunós was born into a petite bourgeoisie family in the town of Lleida on 8 September 1894. As a youngster, he developed an interest in music, which he pursued for the rest of his life, although with limited results.Footnote 22 After graduating in law in Madrid, he joined the Liga Regionalista, the main right-wing Catalan party at the time, and was elected to the Catalan Cortés in 1918, when he was only twenty-four.Footnote 23 Eventually, for reasons still unknown, he left the Liga in 1923 and shifted towards Spanish nationalism. When Primo de Rivera took power in September of the same year, he was appointed subsecretary to the Ministry of Labour. Once in his new position, Aunós wasted no time, launching a frenetic campaign of reform that would last throughout the 1924–5 biennium. He focused on three areas: the centralisation of the Ministry of Labour and its activities, an increased role of the state in workers’ education and the enhancement of Spain’s economic image (both domestically and abroad) through trade fairs and exhibitions.
These activities resulted in a greater concentration of power in the hands of the young minister, as well as in the creation of an informal network of supposed technocrats, more or less explicitly linked to the Ministry of Labour, which would prove invaluable for the dissemination of Aunós’s agenda. As noted by scholars of fascism, the idea that politics and technical knowledge could be divorced in public servants allowed many to maintain their position in fascist Italy as well, whether because they underestimated their contribution to the cultural and ideological project of the regime or because they exploited this idea to support fascism from a ‘scientific’ position.Footnote 24
In particular, two moves cemented the minister’s position as the linchpin of a network of supposed technocrats gathered around the Ministry. Firstly, in July 1924, Aunós established and became the first president of the Superior Council of Labour, Commerce and Industry (Consejo Superior de Trabajo, Comercio e Industria; CSTCI), which he defined as ‘a link between the works of different departments and services of the Ministry, a guide for them and an institution that permanently collects projects of great national importance’.Footnote 25 A few weeks later, his reform of the Ministry of Labour was approved, bringing a decidedly verticist turn to the organisation. Notably, the reform also recognised the newly formed CSTCI as a central advisory body to the Ministry,Footnote 26 in turn bringing the technocrats of the dissolved Institute of Social Reforms (Instituto de reformas sociales; IRS, replaced and absorbed by the CSTCI only weeks before) into the Ministry’s orbit.Footnote 27 This reorganisation was, naturally, enthusiastically endorsed by the press.Footnote 28
Secondly, during the summer of 1925, Aunós was busy (re)organising the Social Sciences School (Escuela Social). The press debated the issue during August, especially the Catholic one, which lamented the poor state of social sciences education in the country.Footnote 29 The minister took the time to deliver a radio speech in mid-September on Unión Radio to detail his plan to the public.Footnote 30 In the speech, heavily influenced by organicism and Catholic doctrines regarding the organisation of the world, he defined the Social Sciences School as ‘a new path of national ascension [. . .] a need felt by the elevated spirits of our country, by those who spent the best years of their lives to improve the fate of the humble’.Footnote 31 It was, truly, the final step in the workers’ education, where they would learn about:
the moral bonds that unite men with each other, thus constituting that great cosmos that is the human community in perennial spiritual ascension, a gigantic organism in which all elements are rationally linked in a community of goals and mutual assistance, forming an infinite chain of wills directed towards an ideal of perfection.Footnote 32
The Escuela Social was supposed to be the pinnacle of technical education in Spain, part of a larger project by the regime to reorganise vocational education for the Spanish working class.Footnote 33 It offered both conferences and short courses in social studies aimed at the general public and functionaries, as well as specialised education for employees of the administration and those who wanted to dedicate their activities to the organisation of unions, cooperatives and so on. Courses were organised into a three-year programme of studies and responded to Aunós’s need to educate a new class of functionaries for his future arbitration committees.Footnote 34
The school was formally opened in grand style on 10 November 1925 at the Ministry of Labour, before an audience of workers and employees of the Ministry.Footnote 35 Aunós naturally gave a speech that was widely reported by the press, openly linking education with national indoctrination.Footnote 36 La Nación, the unofficial paper of the dictatorship, also pointed out how the school had brought together professors of different political positions, such as the reformists Leopoldo Palacios Morini (who became the director) and Práxedes Zancada y Ruata.Footnote 37 It is worth noting that both came from the dissolved IRS,Footnote 38 denoting the progressive repositioning of supposed technocrats within the frame of the dictatorship.
At the end of the 1924–5 biennium, Aunós had consolidated his position at the centre of a network of publicists, technocrats and academics. This was made apparent as the minister received a deluge of praise from his colleagues and other members of the Spanish ruling class. The director of the Cheap Houses Federation Cooperative, Juan José Pou de Barros, called him ‘young, intelligent, active, of great initiative and enthusiasm and, above all, gifted with an energetic and joust personality’.Footnote 39 Criado Díaz, president of the Spanish Owners Confederation, similarly praised Aunós’s ‘patriotism, talent and youth’, of which ‘we [the members of the Confederation] are so proud’.Footnote 40 In the press, he was praised for ‘the sharpness’ of his ‘well-known’ analytic skills,Footnote 41 his youth and intelligence,Footnote 42 as well as for his ‘zeal’ in his work.Footnote 43 A street in the ‘garden city’ in Madrid (a project Aunós personally sponsored) was named after him.Footnote 44 Other appreciations were rougher in quality but no less direct. El Mundo published on its first page a hagiographic poem dedicated to Aunós, praising his tireless work and the frequent trips he took from city to city in Spain and abroad:
and this is how
the life goes by
without rest and without shortcuts
and so busy
of the worthy undersecretary
of Labour’.Footnote 45
These references testify to how Aunós had reached a significant presence in the public space in just a few months, thanks to the incorporation of technocrats and functionaries into his team at the Ministry. Some of these figures accrued considerable power inside the Ministry, a position reliant on Aunós. Such was the case, for example, of José Marvá y Mayer, who became chief labour inspector in 1924 and, very rapidly, was appointed vice-president of the CSTCI.Footnote 46 Some of them were hybrid figures who worked under Aunós in some capacity but were also prominent publicists, contributing to the elevation of the minister’s figure in the public’s eye. Such was the case of Fernando Soldevilla, who was part of the CSTCI while singing the praises of the minister in his Año Político.Footnote 47 But his network also included minor figures, such as José Casais y Santaló, who, while chief negotiator of the Labour Ministry, magnified Aunós’s work on the pages of technical publications like El Constructor.Footnote 48 This was the period, therefore, when he cemented his informal yet highly effective network of colleagues and supporters, which would reach considerable scale and play a pivotal role in legitimating and disseminating his ideas across the country.Footnote 49
At the beginning of December 1925, considering his position sufficiently secure, Primo de Rivera decided to turn his Directorio Militar into a Directorio Civil, reshuffling his cabinet.Footnote 50 Aunós, who had proven to be an active and loyal servant of the dictatorship,Footnote 51 was among the personalities consulted by the dictator before this decision and was promoted to minister of labour.Footnote 52 A year later, in November 1926, Aunós’s most ambitious reform was approved: the establishment of the OCN. The system envisioned by Aunós was based on a series of joint committees (comités paritarios) that grouped workers and employers belonging to the same trade. Each committee was composed of equal numbers of workers’ and employers’ representatives, plus one president appointed by the Ministry (representing the government and national interests).Footnote 53 Where Aunós got the idea for his reform is still somewhat unclear, but it is certain that he drew at least some inspiration from the comités paritarios that had been established in Barcelona during the social upheaval following the First World War in an attempt to provide some form of conciliation between the social classes of the city,Footnote 54 but also from similar experiences that were taking place across Europe, from Belgium to Germany and, in particular, fascist Italy.Footnote 55
At the Core
Like many other conservative and Catholic thinkers of his time, Aunós’s ideology was steeped in paternalistic principles based on a hierarchical view of society, the rehabilitation of the corporatist system and democracy as a government for the people (not of the people). Society was conceptualised as an organism in which each individual had a part to play.Footnote 56 Economically, this translated into a rejection of the French Revolution and its ideals. According to Aunós, most of mankind’s woes could be traced to the laissez-faire policy that gained prominence during the nineteenth century, as it atomised society and gave birth to what he called ‘the absent state’. In opposition to this, according to him, corporatism emerged as the result of two needs, closely intertwined: the return of an interventionist state and the reorganisation of the country’s economic life.Footnote 57 Thanks to corporations, labour and capital were elevated in their social function, since, in the corporatist state: ‘the relations between workers and employers should be the same as those between the shareholders of a company. Everyone is a producer.’Footnote 58 In this way, trade unions would be reconciled with their adversaries (the owner class) under the tutelage of the state and absorbed into the joint committees, making them functionally obsolete as class struggle would cease to be a necessity.Footnote 59 The joint committees thus appeared as not so much a means to resolve social unrest but rather a way to prevent it altogether.
Accordingly, Aunós developed a narrative of historical progression, which illuminates several key aspects of his thinking. He argued that corporations had emerged during the Middle Ages in the form of guilds, primarily in Latin Europe (Italy, France and Spain) as a continuation of organisations that had existed in ancient times, in particular the Roman Collegia.Footnote 60 The Catholic Church played a pivotal role in this reorganisation. In Spain, after the Reconquista: ‘professional associations [were] fundamentally religious institutions’.Footnote 61 Furthermore, this relationship between guilds and Christianity was not exclusive to Spain, and ‘the guilds spread in all of Europe, given that they [were] inherently tied to the idea of Christianity’. However, stagnation eventually set in, and the guilds became closed organisations, imposing ‘capricious conditions’ on the admission of new members and enforcing the control of only a few families over the production of goods, thereby undermining their role in maintaining ‘social harmony’.Footnote 62 Ultimately, in response to this situation, the ‘individualist state’ emerged, advocating for the dissolution of guilds as a means of liberating individuals to pursue any profession in life.Footnote 63 However, in doing so, individualism ‘atomised’ the masses, dismantling the natural human relationships that had been established within society.Footnote 64 It was precisely this ‘age of individualism’ that brought forth all the social issues that plagued the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as labour was regarded merely as a commodity to be exchanged.Footnote 65 Following the rapid process of industrialisation, which brought about the ‘separation between capital and management’, workers’ unrest grew swiftly.Footnote 66 In this ‘atmosphere of unrest and despair [. . .] Socialism was born’ as ‘the abuses and outrages committed without interruption exacerbated the people’s anger, gave rise to hatred between the classes’.Footnote 67 On the other hand, ‘the first standard-bearers of the Catholic Social movement’ started organising as well, albeit later. Among them were the German Kettler, the Austrian Vogelsang and the French Tour du Pin, ‘whose organicist program is the basis of the current corporatist reaction’.Footnote 68
In Aunós’s chronology, the first decades of the twentieth century were pivotal in bringing about both the collapse of the ‘individualist state’ and the overzealous trade unions. As he argued, ‘starting in 1910, the anarchist movement [the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo; CNT] took on an organic character’, launching its bid for power. These attempts culminated in the mass strikes of 1916–17, which, although a failure, did not spell the end of the CNT or the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), as the government allowed them to continue to exist. Alarmed by socialist and anarchist agitation, ‘the Catholic workers’ group emerged with full vigour and enthusiasm, coalescing into the Consejo Nacional de las Corporaciones Católicas Obreras [National Council of Catholic Labour Corporations]’ in 1910.Footnote 69 The war finally brought an end to the old order and, with it, a renewed threat of socialist takeover. Therefore, it was necessary to establish a new order, and ‘its first glimmerings appeared on the horizon when the poet D’Annunzio, seizing control of the city of Fiume, [. . .] proclaimed the Regency of the Carnaro’. Its constitution served as the foundation for the political and social system of the future.Footnote 70
While entirely teleological and not particularly original,Footnote 71 Aunós’s historicisation of corporatism is important as it established a few points that his network would often repeat. First of all, Aunós’s vision was not regressive but progressive, in line with Primo de Rivera’s attempt at a profound transformation of the Spanish institutions.Footnote 72 His corporations were not a recreation of the medieval guilds but something else entirely: ‘we are not moving towards a medieval conception of corporations [. . .] but rather democratically constituted professions with all their social rights guaranteed by public authority’.Footnote 73 Secondly, while Aunós was clearly anti-socialist and opposed to trade unions, he recognised their historical role as essential in paving the way for corporatism. They were a necessary counterbalance to the employer’s power and the divisive nature of the ‘individualist state’.Footnote 74 In particular, they ‘served [. . .] to enable many men who lived in disorganisation, [. . .] to learn [. . .] to unite, to get to know each other, to find human and economic interests similar to their own and equally worthy of defence’.Footnote 75
A Decentralised but Unified Network
Through speeches at conferences and events and articles in publications sponsored by the Ministry, Aunós’s network significantly contributed to the strengthening of his position and the systematic dissemination of corporatist thought, often disguised as purely ‘technical’ considerations on society or the economy. Members of the network were active in several papers and journals, including, in particular, the Revista Social, established since 1926 in Barcelona, and the Revista de Política Social, established in Madrid in 1928 as the ‘Organ of the Spanish corporatist movement’.Footnote 76 Moreover, as mentioned, many members of Aunós’s network published in some capacity in other seemingly independent journals or on La Nación.
The first thematic area to which Aunós’s network contributed was the diffusion of ideas regarding the corporations’ functions and aims, namely reducing social conflict by absorbing the conflicting parties into the state’s organisation, in this reproducing almost verbatim the minister’s points. Zancada, for example, wrote a lengthy article at the beginning of 1927 on the decree-law establishing the OCN. He highlighted how conciliation had clear advantages, as it defused social tensions by ‘replacing hostility [in the relationship between employers and workers] with permanent dialogue, thereby creating an environment of harmony’. He also echoed Aunós’s points regarding the benefits for both workers and employers, claiming that workers could enjoy better conditions thanks to collective bargaining, while employers could be assured that workers would not walk away from their commitments.Footnote 77 At the same time, the state was an ‘impartial judge’ enforcing ‘social peace’.Footnote 78 Álvaro López Núñez, Marvà’s second-in-command at the Labour Inspectorate, followed Aunós’s schematisation of his reform in a speech delivered on 31 March 1928 at the Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación. Núñez, who was a fervent Catholic and a strenuous defender of the Christian-Democratic political position, argued that the joint committees had ‘a technical, legal, pedagogical and charitable [. . .] nature’. First, they regulated remuneration, working hours and other technical aspects of work. Secondly, the joint system, ‘through collective Labour contracts’, would eventually create a labour code, thereby embodying a legislative and legal function. Third, the committees held a pedagogical role through technical education, seeking ‘a beneficial social ascension not only for individuals but for the progress of society’. Finally, since the committees were also expected to operate as labour exchanges, they would combat unemployment and, consequently, eliminate poverty.Footnote 79 Tomas Elorrieta, an academic and president of the Comité Paritario of graphical arts, echoed several of Aunós’s talking points in an interview published by the Revista de Política Social in 1929. He highlighted how joint committees ensured fair wages for workers and protected employers from unfair competition that exploited lower salaries. Furthermore, these committees safeguarded workers from sudden dismissal while acting as a form of insurance for employers, as they prevented workers from leaving at will. Like Núñez, Elorrieta asserted that the committees would combat unemployment while also providing technical education for the workers. He also touched upon another idea that Aunós was keen to disseminate: that the joint committees were not intended so much as an arbitration body to resolve existing conflicts but rather as a means to prevent conflicts altogether. Elorrieta returned to these topics on the occasion of the third anniversary of Aunós’s reform, again reiterating the points about corporatism as a tool for social peace in a speech steeped in organicism.Footnote 80
Many other examples can be found in the articles published by the Revista Social and the Revista de Política Social. Gomez Gil (secretary of the Comisión mixta de Espectáculos públicos, member of the Ministry of Labour’s Secretaria Auxiliar and author of the book How to Create a Joint Committee) touted that: ‘the normal functioning of the committees, the basis of the Corporatist system, will make the word “struggle” disappear from [the] relations [between capital and labour] in the future’.Footnote 81 While Alejandro Gallart y Folch, a professor of administrative and procedural corporatist law at the Barcelona Escuela Social since 1929, remarked that state representatives were ‘not only impartial judges’ of issues brought to their attention but also ‘representatives of [. . .] the collective interests of the country’, which might even conflict with those of the workers and the employers.Footnote 82
However, perhaps the most evident aspect of Aunós’s narrative consistently echoed by his network was the historicisation of corporatism. Zancada, for example, highlighted the significance of social conflicts during the period 1919–23 in shaping the need for economic reorganisation.Footnote 83 This idea was also advocated by Elorrieta, who argued that corporatism represented the highest manifestation of rational economics.Footnote 84 In 1928, another author reproposed Aunós’s chronology of the medieval guilds, their decadence, the rise and fall of the ‘individualist state’ and, finally, the tumultuous period of the early twentieth century, during which the state faced two choices: either to ‘become a gigantic police agent’, or to ‘arbitrate disputes by issuing fair and equitable [laws]’. Thanks to Aunós, Spain opted for the latter choice.Footnote 85 Leopoldo Palacios, director of the Escuela Social, presenting his course on Principios de Derecho Corporativo, similarly stressed the stages that had led to Spanish corporatism, underlying in particular the importance of Fiume.Footnote 86 Núñez went even further, in his 1928 article, claiming that corporatist law had always existed, as ‘professional association is almost as natural to man as the family’. However, he promptly returned to the conventional narrative, linking various historical workers’ associations as if they were directly connected. He, too, suggested the idea of trade unions as ‘preparation’ for the new corporatist state.Footnote 87
In general, the connection between modern corporations and medieval guilds was a recurring theme, in accordance with the social-Catholic perspective that, by the late 1920s, had become entirely fused with nationalism in Spanish regeneracionismo. However, just like Aunós, his network members also underlined the novelty of modern corporations. Núñez, for example, stated that they were ‘a reminiscence of the ancient guilds, adapted to the conditions of modern life’.Footnote 88 His colleague Elorrieta described them as a way to modernise ‘the Middle Ages through the Treaty of Geneva’.Footnote 89 Others, like Bernaldo de Quirós, employed this historicisation to present Aunós’s reform as a natural progression in Spanish history, thereby justifying its application to all economic endeavours.Footnote 90
Once the characteristics and the historical position of Spanish corporatism were established, scholars and legislators involved with it moved to comparing it to other systems, often intertwining these comparisons with the historicisation of corporatism in Spain and other countries. The Revista de Politica Social, for instance, highlighted how Spain and Italy maintained, throughout the ages, ‘precedents of indestructible force in the corporatist organisation of Labour’.Footnote 91 However, the main goal of comparative studies on corporatism seems to have been the exaltation of Spanish superiority.Footnote 92 Between 1926 and 1930, although many countries, such as Belgium and Germany, had adopted some type of labour arbitration that could be linked to the modern corporatist movement, only fascist Italy had implemented an explicit corporatist policy.Footnote 93 Therefore, the bulk of comparative articles published by Aunós and others focus precisely on the relationship between the Spanish and Italian systems – even more so because some, including Aunós himself, although not consistently, painted the Spanish OCN as a derivation of the Italian model.Footnote 94 It is not a surprise, then, that authors adopted a clear antagonistic stance towards Italian corporatism. In his historical introduction, Núñez stated that his purpose was precisely to ‘dispel the error that some have made in supposing that this system [the Spanish one] is the result of the suggestion that the Italian corporatist organisation may have produced in [the Spanish government]’. Spain had no need ‘for outside encouragement to complete a reform that [. . .] had begun in our country years ago’, nurtured in the ‘laboratory’ of the IRS. He did not deny that ‘a stimulating gust of corporatist spirit is sweeping through the world today’ and that this wind had reached Spain. However, he contended that ‘we are not lagging behind in this restoration of corporate life, we are in the vanguard [. . .]. We did not need, therefore, the example of Italy, and we even believe that on the present occasion it would not be very useful to us.’ The Italian corporatist system was ‘extremely statist, and [. . .] this excessive intervention of the State in social relations largely sterilises the best impulses of social life’. In contrast, the Spanish model, founded on ‘trade union freedom with reasonable intervention by the State’, yielded better results and aligned more closely with the old Christian-Democratic motto: ‘free trade unions inside mandatory corporations’.Footnote 95
Zancada shared similar views, expressing them in an interview published in September 1928. He asserted that the success of Aunós’s reform lay precisely in its foundation of freedom of association. The unfavourable comparison with the Italian system was evident, although it was never explicitly mentioned. Zancada claimed that a compulsory union would ‘place professional association above the freedom of individuals and above the freedom of work itself’.Footnote 96 Others, while not delving into details on the matter, were similarly trenchant in their evaluation. In 1929, for example, Jerónimo Mallo, a lawyer and prominent legal scholar, highlighted Spain’s primacy as ‘our labour legislation was [. . .] the first to define a new type of labour structure, creating an organic system’. He claimed that the joint committee as an institution ‘has precedents in foreign laws; however, the complete articulation of work life in joint organisations with hierarchical links had not been established until now, except in Spain’.Footnote 97 Elorrieta even claimed that Spain had primacy in the field of social legislation since the sixteenth century.Footnote 98
However, the most extensive examination of these issues in the journals belonging to Aunós’s network was conducted by the minister’s brother, Antonio Aunós,Footnote 99 in a series of articles for the Revista Social, published between 1928 and the end of 1930. Antonio introduced the comparison with Italy and the issue of state control in the first and second articles of the series before thoroughly exploring these matters in the eighth and final one. In his introduction, he underlined the mandatory nature of fascist unionism and the strict control of the state over the systemFootnote 100 before moving to a lengthy and technical analysis of the juridical recognition of trade unions and professional associations in Italy.Footnote 101 As mentioned, this served as the springboard for his comparison between the Spanish and Italian systems, which started with the assertion that: ‘the fundamental principle of fascist law is the almost absolute intervention of the State in the social problem’. The Italian system ‘converted the employers’ or workers’ unions into official bodies under constant control of the State’. This was possible because, in Italy, strong unions already existed and the legislator could ‘take advantage of the organised [unions] [. . .] to place them within the [new] official framework’. However, this meant that the unions, now an official organ of the state, had to be strictly watched by the state, leading to a system based on ‘a strong discipline emanating from the central power and at odds with democratic theories’. The undemocratic nature of the fascist state found its roots in the ‘socio-political situation of Italy before the advent of fascism, under the imminent danger of Communism that threatened to destroy social order. Fascism, to restore it, opened new juridical horizons, destroying the moulds of the old political organisation of the State.’ According to Antonio Aunós, this system was inferior to the Spanish joint committees, as the two opposing parties, workers and employers, only met at the top of the hierarchical structure (the corporations) rather than at the base of it (the Spanish Comités Paritarios). Moreover, the principle ‘of subordination of particular class interests to the general interests’ of the nation as well ‘must be consolidated in the corporation, rather than in the Trade Union’, as the latter ‘carried within itself a latent representation’ of the class struggle. However, he conceded that these issues were mitigated in Italy by two factors: first, the presence of consolidated and powerful trade unions and, second, the firm authority of the state, which prevented disruptive forces from imposing their needs over the nation’s needs.Footnote 102
Interestingly, this hostility, whether blatant or overt, towards the fascist model can also be inferred from the programmes of the courses taught by some of these authors at their respective institutions. Zancada, for instance, who taught Spanish corporatist law at the Escuela Social, published his curricula in the Revista de Politica Social in 1928, offering us precious insights into the subjects covered in the course. Notably, despite several introductory lessons on the history of guilds and corporations, as well as the emergence of the corporatist movement, there is no reference to Italy or Italian thinkers.Footnote 103 While it might be possible that he would touch upon them during class without specifying it in the course summary, it is worth noting that he also published, on the same issue, a Notas al programa de Derecho Corporativo Español, in which he essentially echoed Aunós’s chronology about corporations. However, here, too, he apparently did not consider including Italian contributions in the matter.Footnote 104
Another academic programme we have some hints of was the one taught by Leopoldo Palacios at the Escuela Social on ‘Principles of Corporatist Law’. The course curriculum closely mirrors that of Zancada in that it opens with a lengthy historical introduction. Likewise, it does not directly mention Italy, which seems somewhat odd, as the lessons’ titles include Germany, Austria, France and the United Kingdom. It is possible, even probable, that Palacios would indeed examine Italy in his lesson on ‘Legislation in the Main Countries [of the World]’ or on ‘The Corporatist State’, but the omission of Italy and Italian thinkers from the titles and lessons’ summaries is nonetheless somewhat jarring.Footnote 105 This is especially so as, during the event at which he was presenting his programme, chaired by Aunós, he emphasised the importance of Fiume as a beacon for the resurgence of corporatism (while still avoiding the mention of any fascist thinkers).Footnote 106
Finally, the last common topic that emerges in publications authored by Aunós’s affiliates concerns international bodies, particularly the International Labour Organisation (ILO). According to Spanish thinkers, the corporatist movement’s internationalist dimension was to be found in the spread of corporatist principles through the League of Nations. Aunós and others often made passing references to the League and the importance of the ILO during the late 1920s, as well as to the Treaty of Versailles, which was described as the origin point for a new international interest in labour matters.Footnote 107 These references were likely part of the legitimisation process that Aunós and his group pursued, which should be framed within a wider international ‘offensive’ conducted by the dictatorship. Spanish politicians, especially after 1927, engaged in a campaign of spurious amicability with the League of Nations, viewed as a tool to ‘re-enter’ Europe and an opportunity to move beyond their country’s provincialism.Footnote 108 Furthermore, Aunós and the corporatists, in particular, regarded the ILO as a key instrument for disseminating their ideas internationally. On the other hand, this cordiality was often reciprocated by the ILO, especially in the figure of its president, Albert Thomas, who openly praised Aunós multiple times and was always a well-regarded guest of the Spanish government during his visits.Footnote 109
In 1929, the notion of employing the ILO to spread corporativism found fresh ground in the Revista de Politica Social, coinciding with the XII International Labour Conference held in Geneva that same year. Aunós himself attended the conference, and the Spanish delegate, José Jorro, presided over the work of the Committee on the protection of workers against accidents employed in loading or unloading ships.Footnote 110 Jorro, Count of Altea, had been the Spanish representative to the ILO since 1920 and, by 1929, was fully integrated into Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship as the organiser of the Unión Patriótica branch of the Alicante province.Footnote 111 According to him, Spanish corporatism was well regarded by the ILO. In Genevra, the widespread opinion was that corporativism must depend on ‘the affirmation of trade union freedom, and since the Spanish organisation has had the good sense to respond to the principle of freedom of association, its international success has been indisputable and unquestionable’.Footnote 112 Another article, this time by Mallo, explored how Spanish corporatism, due to its organisational structure, was particularly well suited for dissemination by the ILO. According to him, Spanish corporativism had three distinct characteristics: firstly, ‘equal bilateral representation’ of workers and employers; secondly, ‘direct suffrage for the appointment of representatives’; and finally, ‘the intervention of neutral elements’ appointed by the government (the president). Mallo then isolated the episode of the XI International Labour Conference in Geneva (1928) to assert that the Spanish model was already the dominant one, as all other European countries, whether knowingly or not, shared the same basic principles as those implemented by Aunós. In particular, he focused on the issue of minimum wage and the appointment of a commission to discuss it. During the conference, three questions were debated: whether the commission should consist of equal numbers of representatives from both workers and employers, whether it should include a neutral or ‘independent’ member or members and how these individuals should be appointed. In all instances, according to Mallo, from Germany to Denmark to Italy to Ireland, the responses indicated a clear trend: the conference voted in favour of equal representation, the free election of the committees’ members and the inclusion of an independent member. This agreement ‘conforms to the essential characteristics [equal representation, free elections, independent member(s)] of the Spanish Joint Committee. [. . .] All this indicates that a structural corporate movement is likely to commence soon in several countries, driven by the principles of our decree-law of 26 November 1926.’Footnote 113
Conclusions
Examining the network that coalesced around the Ministry of Labour between 1926 and 1930, it is notable how quickly it formed and its remarkable degree of internal cohesion, given that the core points (the innovativeness of the Spanish system, its historicisation and its democratic nature) were consistently echoed by all of its members. This was due in part to Aunós’s moves, the creation of the CSTCI and the Escuela Social, which brought previously dispersed technocrats under his umbrella. But it was also the product of long-lasting trends in Spanish politics, which arguably began at the end of the nineteenth century, with regeneracionismo and a consistent push for technocrats to enter the administration. All of this occurred in the general European context of the inter-war years, which saw much greater involvement of technocrats in policy-making processes as a result of the experience of planning and state intervention during the First World War, while the same technocrats became increasingly fascinated by authoritarian solutions.Footnote 114 The Spanish case testifies to the strength of this process, as the country did not participate in the war but was nonetheless caught in its shockwaves. Spanish technocrats and intellectuals from conservative backgrounds distrusted parliament, which they saw as a gathering of oligarchs. At the same time, they stressed the necessity of a ‘therapeutic’ dictatorship to fix Spain, seen as an ‘infirm body’,Footnote 115 especially after the example of Italy and the March on Rome in 1922.Footnote 116 In this sense, Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship at large could be considered the culmination of these processes and marked the definitive entrance into the political stage of new elites.Footnote 117 Aunós’s role can be viewed very much in the same way, as the minister provided institutional channels and a more centralised framework through which a previously disparate group of people could access influential roles in both the administration and the press to pursue their shared agenda. Aunós, therefore, constituted the ‘operational’ centre for his network, rather than being a force for innovation in a strictly ideological way. Moreover, as direct contacts between the different members of the network do not appear to have been significant, it is also clear how important pre-existing convictions were in building and maintaining this informal network through the channels provided by the Ministry of Labour.
Another important characteristic was the crucial role of journalists and publicists in the network, as they autonomously but coherently disseminated their ideology through the press, making good use of their ‘different sources of power and public influence’ to return to Maier’s framework.Footnote 118 Aunós himself was quite active in this respect, but, as examined, virtually all members of the group gathered around the young minister were involved with publications in some capacity. This aspect was crucial, as it merged with their supposed neutrality as technocrats, allowing them to present a highly political ideology, such as corporatism, as a purely technical matter to be discussed by academics and scholars, thereby avoiding ideological implications.
In this sense, it is evident that the network played a crucial role in ‘smuggling’ authoritarian, anti-socialist and anti-parliamentarian talking points into the Spanish mainstream political discourse, contributing to the more radical tendencies of regeneracionismo that would later be translated into Franco’s Falange.
In this context, the interpretation of corporatism as an ideological passe-partout appears reinforced. At its basis, it was connected to the perceived crisis of the liberal state, unable to control the social tensions of the time.Footnote 119 Corporatism, instead, promised to incorporate into the state those external actors (namely the trade unions) that had been at odds with it, restoring social peace and harmony.Footnote 120 While it is now clear that Aunós’s reform was indeed different from the Italian version of corporatism, it nonetheless signals the importance of focusing on general trajectories, rather than static models, when examining the exchange of ideas across national boundaries.Footnote 121 Aunós’s corporatism, in fact, marked a significant departure from its ‘traditional’ counterpart while converging towards a fascist model already in its 1920s iteration. It was strongly anti-democratic and, moreover, it placed the whole system under the strict control of the state, in the form of the president of the joint committees (appointed by the Ministry), which exercised an authority wholly incompatible with the tenets of earlier Catholic corporatism. As analysed here, the Spanish model of the 1920s appears as an example of an authoritarian solution practised by the Spanish right, which was not a copy of the Italian model nor entirely disentangled by it (as it shared the aim to forcibly eliminate social strife by imposing the state’s authority over the issue), but was rather a form of convergence, based on the same premises (the ‘crisis mindset’) and with the same aims (the need to recompose society and stop social conflict).Footnote 122 It was a new, radical alternative that allowed conservative elites to experiment with authoritarian solutions.
In this sense, the adamant claim by Aunós’s network of the complete originality of Spanish corporatism should be placed into a wider frame. It reflects, first of all, a general unwillingness on the part of all inter-war authoritarian regimes to acknowledge their Italian ‘inspirations’ and instead to claim their uniqueness.Footnote 123 This process was connected to not only ideological reasons tied to the nationalistic nature of these regimes but also a genuine process of selective adoption of fascist ideas and practices, reimagined and readapted to specific national contexts.Footnote 124 In Spain, this translated into a distaste for a too close association between fascism and the Spanish regime that went all the way up to Primo de Rivera himself, who took great care to underline, for example, the radical difference between the fascist Milizia and the Spanish Somatén.Footnote 125 In particular, it was often highlighted how copying from Italy was useless, as Spain possessed its own, older and better-structured form of conservatism: national Catholicism.Footnote 126 Nonetheless, as recent historiography on transnational fascism has shown, even when those claims were advanced, influences and convergences still took place.Footnote 127 Fascism should, in this sense, be regarded as a ‘liberating precedent’, or a ‘discursive reference’, rather than a well-defined political model for those who borrowed from it.Footnote 128 The recurring reference to Fiume in Spanish publications is well placed in this interpretation, as the short-lived Regency of the Carnaro provided more of an incomplete precedent from which to borrow, rather than a precise doctrine to follow.Footnote 129
Moreover, inter-war dictatorships recontextualised some fascist elements while opposing others, not least because they had different complexions as a result of the larger or smaller presence of fascists in them in proportion to ‘classic’ conservatives.Footnote 130 In this sense, Primo’s dictatorship represents an interesting case. As it was established only a few months after the fascist takeover of Italy, Spanish conservative elements did not have to seek the support of, or contend their authority with, a large local fascist organisation.Footnote 131 They, in other words, found their ‘solution’ to the crisis inside the traditional toolbox of conservative authoritarianism,Footnote 132 while being able, in this way, to have almost total control over the elements they borrowed from the Italian experiment.
As noted, the process of borrowing was also a process of co-production by the borrower, as the diffusion of ideas and norms thanks to transnational agents was articulated in three steps: exposure, selection and application. During the latter step, norms were ‘localised’ by either framing them as a solution to a wider (national or international) problem or grafting them onto existing local traditions or norms, thus giving life to a creative process far different from simple imitation.Footnote 133 It appears that in their confused historicisation and description of the role of corporations, Aunós and his network were doing both at the same time, presenting corporatism as a general solution to a global problem and also grafting it onto Spanish national history, thus reclaiming the originality of their work vis-à-vis the Italian variant. The former operation, moreover, found its space in the international scenario as well, as the Spanish regime attempted to exploit the ILO to further its ideological agenda, exposing in this another path of convergence with Italian fascism, which was attempting the same using corporatism as well.Footnote 134
It is also important to note that this process was not static but rather a continuous recalibration. As time passed, Aunós moved closer and closer to fascism, especially after the fall of Primo’s regime in 1930, adopting a more pronounced state-centric, authoritarian version of corporatism that was much closer to the Italian model, in contrast to the initial social-Catholic tendencies of many of the authors examined.Footnote 135 As he returned to government after the Spanish civil war, he contributed to the implementation of Franco’s corporatist state, whose characteristics were much more authoritarian and fascistic.Footnote 136
This long-standing connection of Aunós to power highlights another point about the network examined, opening the door to further research paths: its extreme resilience to external pressure. Thanks to its purported technocratic nature, it largely survived without much fuss after the fall of Primo de Rivera and the establishment of the Republic. Aunós and a few prominent members of the dictatorship were forced into exile, but most of the technocrats of the CSTCI and other institutions were able to retain their positions undisturbed, biding their time until they could return to power with Franco a few years later and finally transform the Spanish state.Footnote 137 Ellorieta, Gallart y Folch, Morini, Zancada and Núñez, to name a few, all remained in the republican administration, and while the latter two were killed at the beginning of the civil war, the former three continued their career under Franco.
Aunós and his network, therefore, should be framed as a case of ‘fascistisation’. The minister of labour, his network and his labour reform constituted a vital step in the acceleration towards fascism of Spanish politicsFootnote 138 as a coherent – albeit failed in the short-term – project of reconstruction of the state around a new paradigm, which was based on the continuous re-imagining of ideas along the blurred border between corporatism, conservatism and fascism and operated by an informal, decentralised, but highly cohesive and active, network of technocrats, journalists and academics.
Acknowledgements
I want to thank Professor Giulia Albanese for her guidance throughout this research project and for the valuable feedback she provided on this article. Similarly, I would like to thank Dr Andrea Martini, who read the first draft and provided many valuable suggestions. Finally, I want to thank CEH’s anonymous reviewers, whose insights were instrumental in improving the article.
