No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 September 2005
This is an engaging book from an economist who has observed his country's economy from the inside as an official at Banque du Liban (Central Bank of Lebanon) and from the outside as an economist at—of all places, given his aversion to the Washington consensus—the International Monetary Fund. The book is not so much a political economy of Lebanon as a heterodox analysis of the Lebanese economy, especially during 1948–74. It is well grounded in theory and rests on an extensive, though sometimes tenuous, reading of the empirical evidence.
The book opens with a theoretical chapter that may seem superfluous to readers who are not interested or schooled in “capital controversies.” The chapter reviews the major schools of thought (although it skirts several). Gaspard stresses a post-Keynesian thesis that policy matters and that laissez-faire can be trusted neither to promote capitalism nor to deliver economic growth.
In his first four chapters, Gaspard aims to shatter common myths about Lebanon—that it was an oasis of prosperity, the “Switzerland of the Middle East.” In conveying his thesis, Gaspard sometimes adopts hard interpretations and relies on incomplete arguments. He notes that Lebanon missed several historic opportunities to industrialize. The first, in the second half of the 19th century, proved too fragile, based as it was singularly and inflexibly on the silk industry. The second missed opportunity, between 1926 and 1944 and driven by infrastructure developments (by the French), tariff protection, and expenditures by the Allied forces, was more viable. However, it did not prove long lasting because by 1948 Lebanon's political class had opted for laissez-faire and what Carolyn Gates called “merchant republic.” Unfortunately, Gaspard fails to address political-economy arguments behind decisions to make Lebanon a center of commerce and finance.
If industrialization as an engine of growth was not given the needed priority, how did the country fare without it? Gaspard belittles the 3.3 percent growth in per capita income during 1948–74 and its consequences for development. But this is a decent rate, especially given Lebanon's high starting income. It is hard to believe that such growth kept illiteracy rates stubbornly at 30 percent, and it is hard not to believe that poverty rates were reduced, given that the ratio of average to subsistence wages increased from 75 to 115 percent. It is true that income distribution remained unequal, but market economies do not redistribute income. However, the author is surely right when he says that certain groups and regions remained outside the development chain, and a more activist policy should have provided better opportunities to the “neglected”—something that no doubt would have improved social peace in the country.
Gaspard correctly identifies early spurts of growth with industrialization and capitalism as the system to facilitate this process. In this respect, he argues that the country was neither industrialist nor capitalist. But having lost as an interest group to banks and the merchant class, industrialists had to operate against considerable odds—at least, at the policy level. It is a mark of relative achievement that industry increased its share of output and employment from 9 to 17 percent, and its efficiency (or total factor productivity) improved annually from 0.3 percent to more than 1 percent. More interesting is that industry's rate of profit averaged 33 percent against a national average of 22 percent, yet its rate of accumulation was a modest 30 percent. As for capitalism, Lebanon had a mixed record on the two requirements that would foster its growth: prevalence of waged labor and accumulation on an extended scale. Waged labor did increase from 43 to 55 percent during the period, but the national rate of accumulation stood at 30 percent; close to 70 percent of profits were in dividends and free capital. This surely does not square well with the presumed fame of Lebanese entrepreneurship. Answers to questions regarding the Lebanese system of ownership of capital and the incentives to use it would have enriched the analysis in the book considerably.
The penultimate chapter, “From Crisis to Reconstruction” (it might have been titled “From Crisis to Crisis”), contains a fascinating account of the disutility of the Lebanese banking system. The system contributed to the country's development but lived opulently off its misery. Banks financed less than a third of investment, started the monetary crisis in 1987 by speculating heavily against the Lebanese pound, and collected more than $9 billion in excessive interest on the public debt between 1993 and 2002. The last figure is more than half the $16 billion in corrupt expenditures that the government spent during the period—expenditures that, not surprisingly, equal the country's current external debt. This sadly represents the triumph of rentierism and finance capital during the reconstruction period, and it could also explain the retreat in growth (at 3.1%) and the reversal in the contribution of industry to output (at 13%). It no doubt represents a third missed opportunity.
In the end, any book on Lebanon's political economy has to wrestle with issues of governance and the institutional capability of the state. Lebanon is an extremely difficult country to govern, and badly governed countries rarely produce sound economies. Its segmented politics, largely a product of the confessional system, is a recipe for corruption and, ultimately, government failure. The only bright spot in the sad history of attempts to establish a semblance of government accountability was during the presidency of Fuad Chehab (1958–64). But this attempt fizzled, undermined by internal fissures and regional pressures that still preclude a strong central state. Perhaps prophetically, the architects of the republic in the late 1940s knew that and deferred instead to the market as the agency for economic and social organization. But markets also fail, and they tend to reproduce any initial distribution of resources and not to guarantee structural transformation—to the dismay of those who are left out and their prospects for a better economy. As a result, Lebanon remains between a rock and a hard place, between government failure and market failure.