In The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War, Avi Raz focuses primarily on the negotiations between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians that began immediately after the June 1967 war. The period covered is relatively short, spanning the initial days of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula until October 1968, near the time of Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's death. The book's title refers to Eshkol's oft-quoted comment that although Israel was delighted with the dowry it had acquired, i.e. the territorial conquests, it remained somewhat perplexed regarding the bride: the 1.5 million Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the eyes of Israeli policymakers, the war yielded a crucial geopolitical prize yet also introduced a critical demographic threat.
Raz's research is based on a meticulous and extensive examination of documents in Hebrew, English, and Arabic, including minutes of Israeli cabinet meetings, reports on the atmosphere in the Palestinian street that were prepared by the Israeli military and security services, dispatches from Washington to Tel Aviv and Amman, articles and opinion columns from Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian newspapers, and a series of in-depth interviews with leading policymakers who took part in the events described in the book. Yet despite the sheer magnitude of the data collected, their complexities and multifaceted nature, Raz threads a clear and concise argument throughout the book: earnest attempts by Jordan's King Husayn and the Palestinian political leadership to broker a fair deal with Israel were met by dishonest Israeli policymakers who chose deceit and deviousness as preferred tactics and indeterminacy as their main strategy.
Raz investigates the negotiations between Israel and Husayn, whose offer of full diplomatic relations in exchange for returned control over the West Bank to Jordan was met with empty rhetorical gestures from leading Israeli figures, including Eshkol, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, and Foreign Minister Abba Eban. Raz also explores the role played by the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank, explaining how political power oscillated between two forces that laid claim to this title: the “notables,” or the traditionally dominant heads of familial clans allied with the urban commercial elite who had held informal social and political authority throughout the Ottoman, British, and Jordanian periods of rule, and the young cadre of political activists who sought to peel away from the Jordanian crown in order to fashion a new and independent Palestinian polity.
The various propositions of these two groups ranged from formal annexation by Israel or Jordan, to a cantonization of the Palestinian territories and inclusion of these units within a federative structure, to the creation of an independent state. Yet as Israel remained focused on curtailing—rather than fostering—the political freedom of the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, its sincerity in negotiations with the Palestinian leadership came into question. None of the Palestinian proposals conformed to Israeli designs and Palestinian attempts at forging political autonomy were met with repression, including the banning of public gatherings, threats of deportation, and the cutting of revenues.
Raz pays particular attention to the part played by Israeli advisors, appointed by Dayan or Eshkol, who came from various positions within the security services and served as the eyes, ears, and mouth of the occupation regime. These individuals were mostly concerned with the creation of some type of puppet administration in the West Bank that would be subordinate to Israel. Their accounts of their dealings with Palestinians were frequently misleading, and fortified by the now-familiar claim of having “no partner.” From time to time, when they felt their desired outcomes might not be achieved, they even recommended deporting the figures with whom they negotiated—another strategy that would become familiar in later years. According to Raz, Israeli hypocrisy, which also included unilateral moves on the ground—such as the annexation of East Jerusalem and blocking the return of more than 200,000 Palestinian refugees who had either fled or been expelled to Jordan during the war—was the principal obstacle to a viable peace agreement.
Raz's well-written book illuminates aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that have thus far received little attention, and lucidly depicts the advantageous situation in which Israel found itself immediately after the war. The country faced a moderate Palestinian leadership, keen to achieve peaceful compromise, and an amiable monarch and trusted ally of the West in Jordan. Chapter 4, which deals with the forced Palestinian exodus both during and after the war, is mandatory reading for any scholar who endeavors to understand demographic engineering in general and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular. The book is an important contribution to the historiography of the June 1967 war and its aftermath, a body of literature that includes Tom Segev's work on the same period (which Raz deems superficial) and later studies by Gershom Gorenberg, Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, and Neve Gordon that explore Israeli colonization schemes in the post-1967 decades. Interestingly, almost all of these, the current work included, were authored or coauthored by Israeli journalists. As such, all of them—and Raz's in particular—have a compelling narrative style. However, this background might also relate to some of the book's weaker points, which I will now address.
While the book deals with a relatively short period, it is densely packed with events, dates, figures, and characters, sometimes at the expense of a more analytical discussion. The insufficient analytical depth is notable in regards to the attention allocated to the intricate details of Israel's offer made on 19 June 1967 to cede most of the territories it had occupied. Likewise, Raz makes short shrift of American involvement, which included consistently reprimanding Israel for its recalcitrance while refraining from pressing it to engage seriously in peacemaking. Along similar lines, Husayn's myopia regarding Israeli designs on the West Bank is treated without serious contemplation of the underlying dynamics and motives that fostered the political interactions. The reader is left puzzled as to why no serious leadership emerged from Gaza to take part in the negotiations, which were overwhelmingly dominated by a West Bank elite. When referring to the involvement of the Israeli security services in attempts to nurture a cooperative Palestinian leadership, Raz comments that “old habits die hard” (p. 81), invoking the military regime Israel had imposed on its own Palestinian citizens between 1948 and 1966, yet he offers no exploration of how or why such practices reemerged after 1967. In light of the contemporary corpus concerning the various means and methods employed by Israel to govern Palestinian lives, his treatment of these subjects is somewhat thin.
Especially lacking here is any attempt to understand the Israeli viewpoint, which remains couched in an almost clichéd Orientalism and condescension throughout the book. In a notable example, the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban receives special attention as an almost sinister politician who resorted time and again to “dossier diplomacy” in order to produce a sense of continuing dialogue through various manipulations, masquerades, and bald-faced lies. Raz emphasizes “Takhsisanut,” a Hebrew term attributed frequently to Eban, translated here as “deviousness” (p. 183). Yet it could also be argued that Eban's Machiavellian (or “Kissingeresque”) behavior could be explained as the application of a healthy dose of realpolitik when confronted by the complexities of diplomacy. The same could be said of the Israeli refusal to expose its opening position in any of the negotiations, something Raz reads as proof of duplicity. On a similar note, Raz takes for granted that Israel had an expansionist mentality, amounting here to a boundless messianic fervor, hubris, and existential anxiety. Again, Raz may be right, but due investigation is not evident.
Finally, Raz claims that his chosen historical framework “constitutes the critical and formative phase of the forty-five-year-long Israeli occupation” (p. 3). Yet without further elaboration, his defense of this argument is unconvincing. We are left with a thorough examination of a vital historical moment in the consolidation of the occupation, which is fascinating but becomes at a point somewhat repetitive. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the book is an extremely important contribution to the literature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and provides a clear depiction of how Israel's various manipulations, from the very first stage of the 1967 occupation, eventually turned into a self-defeating strategy that led to the precarious state of current affairs in Israel and Palestine.
