1. Introduction
In November 2025, the European Commission published its proposal for a Digital Omnibus as part of a comprehensive Digital Package on Simplification.Footnote 1 Framed under the political mandate for a “simpler and faster Europe,”Footnote 2 its overarching aim is to boost EU competitiveness by cutting administrative compliance costs, rationalising the application of the digital rulebook, and providing regulatory relief, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Echoing the Draghi and Letta Reports’ calls to alleviate the disproportionate regulatory burdens stifling European competitiveness,Footnote 3 and following the launch of the Competitiveness Compass,Footnote 4 the Digital Omnibus outlines a broad set of amendments whose stated ambition is to simplify, clarify, and improve the digital regulatory framework.
The Digital Package on Simplification is the seventh initiative in a broader series of cross-sectoral Omnibus packages introduced by the European Commission since 2025.Footnote 5 These measures are officially intended to alleviate regulatory burdens on industries, to bolster EU competitiveness, and “to make business easier and faster and ensure Europe’s prosperity.”Footnote 6 However, the substantive extent of their intervention remains fiercely contested. Scholars caution that, in a considerable number of cases, these legislative initiatives transcend mere technical streamlining. Under the guise of “cutting red tape,” they effect major policy reversals and drive a comprehensive deregulatory agenda, dismantling established social and environmental standards across multiple domains, while bypassing public consultation and impact assessment requirements. In a similar vein, forceful criticisms have been levelled against the Digital Omnibus. Civil society organisations and commentators contend that, beneath its ostensible pursuit of administrative streamlining and SME empowerment, the Proposal effects far-reaching, substantive deregulation. According to these critiques, the measure goes well beyond merely consolidating technical adjustments and resolving regulatory overlaps and redundancies, substantively altering the EU digital acquis. Critically, the Proposal has been faulted for privileging private-sector expertise and corporate freedom over public oversight, aligning with the policy positions of dominant, predominantly non-European technology firms that actively leverage widespread European concerns over economic decline and global market dynamics to demand systemic deregulation.Footnote 7
Although institutional and academic attention has been predominantly captured by the targeted yet profound amendments to central pillars of the EU digital corpus – namely the GDPR and the data legislation, along with the Artificial Intelligence ActFootnote 8 – the substantive extent of the Proposal’s deregulatory impact becomes most evident in an otherwise overlooked dimension: the wholesale repeal of the Platform-to-Business (P2B) Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 (P2BR).Footnote 9 Against this backdrop, this article critically examines the legal consequences of the Digital Omnibus stemming from the repeal of the P2BR. The subsequent analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 contextualises the P2BR by outlining its policy background and key provisions and introducing the rationale advanced in the Digital Omnibus for its repeal. Section 3 explores in detail the effects of the envisioned abrogation, deploying a granular gap analysis to assess whether the Digital Omnibus merely eliminates overlaps and multiple layers of regulation, or engenders more profound and far-reaching consequences. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Digital Omnibus and the P2B Regulation
2.1. The P2B general framework
The P2BR is the first horizontal framework adopted in the EU governing providers of online intermediation services and online search engines. It was enacted against a market environment where digital platforms had consolidated their position as gateways for undertakings seeking to reach their end-user base.Footnote 10 The growing intermediation of online transactions through these dominant intermediaries, driven by strong, data-driven indirect network effects,Footnote 11 significantly heightened the economic dependence of business users – particularly micro, small and medium-sized enterprises – on platform infrastructure.Footnote 12 The resulting bargaining power asymmetry enjoyed by these intermediaries enabled them to engage in unilateral, potentially unfair trading practicesFootnote 13 and to leverage their positions to extract rents and squeeze commercial margins.Footnote 14 The structural vulnerability of business users was further exacerbated by a pervasive enforcement deficit, which left them without effective legal redress and exposed to arbitrary platform conduct.Footnote 15 This, in turn, severely restricted cross-border commercial activities and distorted the proper functioning of the Internal Market, generating a significant adverse aggregate impact on the European economy.Footnote 16
Crucially, market self-correction proved inherently unviable due to market failures and an intrinsic misalignment of incentives.Footnote 17 Prior to the enactment of the P2BR, a critical regulatory gap thus persisted regarding transparency and procedural fairness in platform-to-business (P2B) relationships.Footnote 18 To remedy these structural deficiencies, the P2BR was designed to guarantee that business users – particularly SMEs with limited bargaining power – could operate within a predictable legal framework, shielded from arbitrary platform behaviour, unlocking their cross-border potential within the Internal Market.Footnote 19
Aimed at “promoting fairness and transparency for business users,” the P2BR addresses some of the most controversial contractual provisions and commercial practices adopted by digital platforms vis-à-vis business users: unilateral and/or retroactive changes to terms and conditions (T&Cs); differentiated treatment and self-preferencingFootnote 20 ; data access; Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clausesFootnote 21 ; and dispute resolution mechanisms. To remedy these market distortions and mitigate the structural disparity of bargaining power in P2B relationships, it introduces “a targeted set of mandatory rules,” ensuring that business users have “the necessary safeguards to prevent harm from unfair trading practices, a general lack of redress, and regulatory fragmentation across the EU.”Footnote 22 To mitigate the risks associated with the unilateral modification of contracts, and to provide business users with the necessary time to make technical or commercial adaptations, or to terminate the contract, the Regulation imposes temporal safeguards and requires platforms to provide advance notice.Footnote 23 Furthermore, since the termination of a platform service may deprive the business user of essential market access and data, resulting in severe economic loss, the Regulation obliges platforms to provide a statement of reasons at least thirty days in advance.Footnote 24 In addition, platforms are prohibited from imposing retroactive changes to their T&Cs.Footnote 25 Concerning differentiated treatment and MFN clauses – identified as among the most problematic and frequently encountered trading practices in the marketFootnote 26 – the P2BR mandates platforms to include a description of any differentiated treatment given to their own goods or services compared to those of third-party business users, clarifying the main economic, commercial or legal considerations justifying such treatment.Footnote 27 Similarly, providers are required to set out the grounds for adopting clauses that restrict the ability to offer goods or services under more favourable conditions through other means (MFN clauses), disclosing the main economic, commercial or legal considerations for such restrictions.Footnote 28 Moreover, to tackle the frequent lack of clarity over the conditions for data access and use,Footnote 29 the P2BR obliges platforms to provide a clear description of the scope, nature and conditions of their access to and use of certain categories of data.Footnote 30 Finally, to address the lack of effective redress,Footnote 31 the P2BR institutes a framework for dispute resolution, mandating providers to maintain an internal system for handling complaints and to identify two or more mediators with whom they are willing to engage to attempt to reach an out-of-court settlement.Footnote 32
2.2. The proposed repeal
The Commission justifies the proposed repeal of the P2BR by asserting that the Regulation merely holds “residual relevance” and that its material provisions have been “largely covered” or superseded by the Digital Services Act (DSA)Footnote 33 and the Digital Markets Act (DMA).Footnote 34 In addition, it grounds its initiative in the empirical findings of its 2023 Preliminary Report and Evaluation Study, which identify enforcement gaps and a limited awareness of the Regulation.Footnote 35 Consequently, it frames the repeal as a convenient simplification designed to eliminate regulatory duplication, minimise legal uncertainty, and reduce layered compliance costs.Footnote 36
These conclusions rest on flawed premises and contradict the Commission’s own findings. To be sure, the P2BR is not without structural shortcomings.Footnote 37 Furthermore, it manifestly shares regulatory overlaps with both the DSA and the DMA across several areas. Yet, the assumption that the DSA and the DMA can seamlessly absorb the P2BR without severe consequences for business users fails to withstand close legal scrutiny and is disproved by the Commission’s own earlier evaluations, which explicitly recognised the enduring function and the non-redundant role of the P2BR even alongside the DSA and the DMA.
2.3. On the relevance and persistent validity of the P2BR
Although the Evaluation Study and the Report – adduced in support of the repeal of the P2BR – acknowledge the Regulation’s critical issues and limitations, they articulate starkly divergent conclusions. In those documents, the Commission confirms the enduring validity of the P2BR in addressing the persistent vulnerabilities of business users. It contends that the problems of the P2BR do not lie in its provisions, which are deemed highly relevant and appropriate. Rather, a “low level of awareness” and “insufficient enforcement by national authorities” are seen as the primary drivers of low alignment and limited compliance by online platforms. Accordingly, it calls for the structural reinforcement of the Regulation, contending that the P2B framework continues to represent “the appropriate solution for solving the problems still faced by business users.”Footnote 38 Under this perspective, the Regulation retains significant value and all its relevance, requiring only more rigorous enforcement and enhanced awareness. If it is “applied fully and correctly,” the P2BR remains “as relevant as ever,” offering effective solutions to mitigate these power imbalances.Footnote 39
Notably, the Commission recognises the persistent importance of the P2BR, even in light of the adoption of the DSA and the DMA. Specifically, it defines the relationship between the P2BR, the DSA and the DMA as “well delineated,”Footnote 40 conceptualising these new acts as “complements” to the P2BR.Footnote 41
Regarding the DMA, the Commission emphasises its limited scope of application, which is confined exclusively to designated “gatekeepers” and their core platform services.Footnote 42 It notes that the normative reach of the P2BR “goes beyond the DMA,” governing “all medium-sized and large providers of online intermediation services.”Footnote 43 As such, the P2BR ensures that “business users of online intermediation services have more legal certainty to build an online presence spanning both ‘gatekeeper’ core platform services under the DMA and other online intermediation services.”Footnote 44 Far from making the Regulation redundant, the DMA is deemed to enhance the P2BR, making it “more impactful.”Footnote 45 In a similar vein, the Commission frames the DSA as a complement that works in conjunction with the P2BR. It reaffirms that the importance of the P2BR’s contractual transparency is “only set to increase” as the EU implements the DSA.Footnote 46 In sum, the Commission maintains that the P2BR remains necessary alongside the DMA and the DSA, as it still serves as the proper mechanism to resolve the ongoing difficulties specifically encountered by business users.Footnote 47
These conclusions are mirrored in the strategy devised to relaunch and operationalise the P2BR. In those documents, the Commission asserts that “it is imperative to achieve the P2BR’s full potential,”Footnote 48 and outlines a dedicated strategy. To increase the effectiveness of the Regulation, it adopts a multi-faceted approach articulated along several core pillars: information campaigns to ensure that business users and associations are aware of their rights and obligations; incentives for the creation of specialised mediation bodies to facilitate out-of-court dispute settlements; targeted SME support; sector-specific codes of conduct; and closer cooperation with Member States and competent national authorities on implementation and enforcement.Footnote 49
2.4. The change of strategy. The Digital Omnibus
The Digital Omnibus represents a definitive departure from the trajectory outlined so far. While a transitory phase maintains cross-referenced articles, the overarching strategy pivots towards a complete repeal of the P2BR.Footnote 50
The rationale for this abrupt change rests on the premise that the P2BR retains only residual relevance and has become redundant. The Commission justifies this reorientation by arguing that the objectives and provisions of the P2BR are “largely covered” by the DSA and the DMA.Footnote 51 It contends that the P2BR’s most significant provisions have been successfully absorbed by these other instruments, and that the recent entry into application of the DMA and the DSA has rendered the European regulatory framework for online intermediary services significantly more robust and complete. This new legal framework is posited to have largely overtaken the P2BR, often providing stronger and more comprehensive protections for SMEs when dealing with larger digital actors. Accordingly, the Commission reframes the P2BR as being superseded by subsequent legislative developments, arguing that its retention would create a layered and complex regulatory environment that could ultimately hinder the Digital Single Market.Footnote 52
With the P2BR characterised as having only “residual value,” and its repeal framed as “necessary to eliminate the duplication of rules,”Footnote 53 the Proposal is presented as a pragmatic simplification designed to eliminate overlaps and multiple layers of redundant regulation. By removing these duplications, the Digital Omnibus purports to minimise legal uncertainty and reduce unnecessary compliance costs. In turn, this “simplification” is expected to foster greater business trust, encourage new market entrants, and contribute to a more coherent, robust, and targeted enforcement mechanism, thereby enabling regulators to allocate resources more efficiently.Footnote 54
To test these assumptions, section 3 evaluates whether the Digital Omnibus merely eliminates overlaps and multiple layers of regulation or, conversely, entails a substantive loss of protection for business users, ultimately marking a fundamental departure from the established digital acquis. To this end, it scrutinises the P2BR by drawing a comparison between its main provisions and their purported counterparts in the DSA and the DMA, thereby subjecting the assertions contained in the CSWD Digital Omnibus to textual appraisal.
3. Mapping the regulatory void. Why the DSA and DMA do not absorb the P2BR
Before examining the P2BR provisions in detail, one preliminary point must be stressed. The most fundamental distinction between the P2BR and the acts allegedly set to absorb its most significant safeguards, namely the DSA and the DMA, lies in their divergent scopes of application and underlying objectives.Footnote 55 This distinction is starkest in the case of the DMA. The P2BR regulates a vast array of digital business models ranging from global giants to regional players.Footnote 56 In contrast, the DMA applies exclusively to a very small number of dominant technology companies designated as “gatekeepers” and their “core platform services.”Footnote 57 As a result, most platforms operating in Europe fall completely outside its scope of application.
Although less evident, the divergence is no less critical when examining the DSA. The P2BR applies to the relationship between any provider of “online intermediation services” and its “business users.”Footnote 58 It is expressly designed to address the phenomenon whereby business users, particularly SMEs, become highly dependent on platforms to reach customers; such structural reliance generates a severe imbalance in bargaining power that enables platforms to behave unilaterally in a manner that grossly deviates from fair commercial conduct.Footnote 59 Conversely, the DSA establishes a much broader framework that applies to all “recipients of the service,” which encompasses everyday consumers, individual users, and businesses alike.Footnote 60 Its primary goal is to ensure a safe, predictable and trusted online environment by combatting the dissemination of illegal content and mitigating broader societal risks.Footnote 61 It approaches terms and conditions from a horizontal perspective of transparency, content moderation and fundamental rightsFootnote 62 ; and its procedural safeguards are expressly triggered when a recipient provides illegal content or information that violates the platform’s terms and conditions.Footnote 63 These differences are mirrored in all the provisions under scrutiny. As the subsequent analysis elucidates, a legal framework primarily designed to establish a safe online environment by regulating content moderation rests on an entirely distinct rationale compared to a regime aimed specifically at protecting business users vis-à-vis digital intermediaries.
3.1. Transparency and fairness of terms and conditions
The first relevant provision to examine concerns the transparency and fairness of terms and conditions. In this respect, the CSWD Digital Omnibus posits that “Transparency and fairness of terms and conditions by providers of online intermediation services (Articles 3 and 8 P2B Regulation) is granted now by the eponymous Article 14 of the DSA, covering also conditions for restrictions on the use of their service.”Footnote 64
This claim is textually disproved by a close reading of the DSA, which does not replicate the tailored commercial safeguards established under the P2BR. The P2BR imposes a minimum fifteen-day advance notice period before any amendments to T&Cs can be implemented, mandating even longer periods if the modifications require technical or commercial adaptations. Business users are granted the right to terminate the contract before the changes take effect.Footnote 65 Furthermore, the P2BR prescribes targeted commercial disclosures tailored to the specific needs of business users, such as those concerning intellectual property and distribution channels.Footnote 66 Any changes non-compliant with these procedural notice requirements or basic transparency rules are automatically rendered null and void.Footnote 67 In addition, providers are prohibited from imposing retroactive changes to terms and conditions, except in narrow cases where such changes are required to respect a legal or regulatory obligation or when they are strictly beneficial to the business users.Footnote 68
Far from replicating these mechanisms, the DSA requires providers of intermediary services merely to “inform the recipients of the service of any significant change to the terms and conditions” (Article 14(2)). However, it lacks the granular disclosure regime and the mandatory fifteen-day prior notice period of the P2BR. Moreover, it omits the “null and void” sanction for non-compliance, remaining silent on the legal consequences within contractual relationships if its terms and conditions rules are violated.Footnote 69 Finally, it does not prohibit retroactive changes to terms and conditions.
Even when dealing with designated “gatekeepers” and their core platform services, business users lose this specific contractual shield. The DMA mandates the application of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) general conditions of access and prohibits disproportionate termination conditions.Footnote 70 However, it neither imposes the fifteen-day advance notice requirement for T&C modifications nor contains any provision prohibiting gatekeepers from imposing retroactive changes to their terms and conditions. In the absence of explicit statutory provisions, such obligations might, at best, be arguably inferred by way of interpretation, introducing a high degree of uncertainty into the rights enjoyed by business users, even where a platform qualifies as a gatekeeper.
3.2. Restriction, suspension and termination of services
The CSWD Digital Omnibus argues that “obligations on intermediation service providers as regards restriction, suspension and termination (Article 4 P2B Regulation) are largely covered by the obligation on hosting service providers to provide a statement of reasons for restrictions (Article 17 DSA) and, to some extent, conditions for measures and protection against misuse (Article 23 DSA).”Footnote 71 This premise suffers from a severe analytical flaw, and the language adopted – insofar as it postulates that the P2BR’s rules are “largely” or “to some extent” covered by this new framework – obscures a structural dilution of the existing regulatory safeguards.
The P2BR protects the economic viability and legal certainty of dependent businesses against unilateral platform behavior,Footnote 72 imposing strict temporal safeguards and requiring platforms to provide advance notice. When a platform restricts or suspends a business user’s account, it is bound to issue a statement of reasons.Footnote 73 In the event of a complete termination of services, the platform is mandated to supply this statement of reasons at least thirty days in advance, allowing the dependent business time to adapt or seek alternative channels.Footnote 74 The advance notice is intended to give the business user time to make technical or commercial adaptations and to address the significant impact resulting from a potential loss of essential information.Footnote 75 Furthermore, the platform must grant the business user the opportunity to clarify the facts through an internal complaint-handling system and is required to reinstate them without undue delay if the decision is revoked.Footnote 76
By contrast, the DSA requires hosting providers to issue a more detailed statement of reasons when restricting visibility, suspending monetary payments or terminating an account,Footnote 77 thus improving on the P2BR with respect to the content of the notification. Crucially, however, as to its timing, this statement of reasons must only be provided “at the latest from the date that the restriction is imposed.”Footnote 78 By failing to replicate the thirty-day advance commercial notice period,Footnote 79 the DSA prevents business users from contesting the decision before it takes effect. Nor does the second safeguard invoked by the Commission afford effective protection. The suspension regime for misuse mentioned in the CSWD Digital Omnibus applies solely to recipients who frequently provide “manifestly illegal content” or submit “manifestly unfounded” notices or complaints,Footnote 80 thereby failing to capture the broader terms of service violations regulated by the P2BR.Footnote 81
3.3. Differentiated treatment, ranking and self-preferencing
As for transparency in differentiated treatment, ranking and self-preferencing, the Digital Omnibus posits the existence of “clear rules,” specifically referencing the transparency and risk assessment obligations enshrined in Articles 27 and 34(2) of the DSA, as well as the gatekeeper prohibitions laid down in Article 6(5) of the DMA.Footnote 82
This reasoning reflects the content of the DMA, which establishes a strict prohibition, forbidding gatekeepers from treating their own services and products more favourably in ranking, indexing and crawling than similar third-party servicesFootnote 83 – a safeguard which, as noted, is strictly limited to designated entities. Conversely, as regards the DSA, such an argument conflates two structurally distinct disclosure regimes, overlooking their fundamental functional mismatch.
Despite apparent similarities, the P2BR and the DSA are fundamentally divergent in their functional objectives and regulatory architecture – a distinction directly reflected in the scope and nature of the obligations set out under each framework.Footnote 84 Designed to address the risks of differentiated treatment for business users, and especially to protect them from unfair competition when they directly compete with the platforms,Footnote 85 the P2BR imposes a direct and specific obligation on providers to describe any preferential treatment they give to their own goods or services compared to those offered by third-party business users, and to detail the “main economic, commercial or legal considerations” justifying this unequal treatment.Footnote 86 If direct or indirect remuneration can influence main ranking parameters, providers must describe these possibilities and their effect on rankings.Footnote 87 In addition, the P2BR imposes a specific legal duty to keep such descriptions continuously updatedFootnote 88 and to ensure that business users can adequately understand how ranking mechanisms account for the characteristics and relevance of their specific goods and services.Footnote 89
By contrast, the DSA focuses generally on the transparency of recommender systems and applies broadly to all “recipients of the service.”Footnote 90 It only requires online platforms to disclose the main parameters of their recommender systems, and to explain the criteria and relative importance determining why certain information is suggested or prioritised for the recipient of the service.Footnote 91 However, it lacks any direct mandate to disclose commercial self-preferencing or differentiated treatment, and still less does it require platforms to detail the economic, commercial or legal considerations behind this practice. In sum, it falls short of the granularity and the substantive reach of the P2BR, which mandates transparency and accountability regarding the commercial aspects of contractual relationships.
The Commission’s stated intention to retain the Guidelines on ranking transparency (2020) as a “reference”Footnote 92 does not mitigate this structural divergence. The Guidelines address differentiated treatment as a possible “main parameter” that influences how search results or offers are ordered,Footnote 93 but they do not compel platforms to justify it. More fundamentally, they are non-binding instrumentsFootnote 94 – mere “interpretative guidelines” whose original purpose was simply to clarify the application of the P2BR.Footnote 95 Consequently, depriving these instruments of the act that they were designed to clarify and that provides their legal basis introduces significant uncertainty regarding their normative value.
Even more importantly, there is a crucial difference in the scope of the provisions under scrutiny. The transparency duties established by the P2BR extend far beyond ranking. Under the P2BR, platforms must disclose any differentiated treatment in access to data, remuneration charged to businesses, and access to specific technical interfaces or functionalities.Footnote 96 If a platform favours its own products – whether by manipulating algorithms, altering fees or granting exclusive data access – it must communicate this to its business users and justify the underlying economic or legal reasons for doing so. By contrast, being strictly confined to ranking, the DSA’s recommender system transparency fails to capture these broader commercial and technical dimensions.
A further gap emerges regarding online search engines. Whereas the P2BR subjects all search engines to transparency duties for both ranking and differentiated treatment,Footnote 97 the DSA is strictly limited to “online platforms.”Footnote 98 Consequently, unless specifically designated as Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) and thus captured by Article 38 DSA, other online search engines fall entirely outside the DSA’s recommender system transparency mandate.
The CSWD Digital Omnibus also mentions Article 34(2) of the DSA, which requires very large online platforms (VLOPs) and VLOSEs to assess their algorithmic designs within a mandatory annual risk assessment. Applicable solely to these entities, this risk assessment is aimed at identifying, analysing and assessing systemic societal risks – primarily, the dissemination of illegal content, negative effects on fundamental rights, and threats to public security. As such, it does not tackle commercial fairness unless a systemic societal risk is identified.Footnote 99
3.4. Price restrictions and the MFN/parity clause
On further examination of the Commission’s claims, a comparison of the relevant provisions concerning the “most favoured nation clauses” (MFN) or “parity clauses”Footnote 100 also reveals fundamental divergences. In this regard, the P2BR establishes a highly specific commercial transparency obligation. Whenever providers of online intermediation services restrict the ability of business users to offer the same goods and services to consumers under more favourable conditions through alternative channels, they must outline the main economic, commercial or legal grounds for such restrictions within their terms and conditions.Footnote 101
In this respect, the CSWD Digital Omnibus only cites the prohibition of MFN clauses under the DMA,Footnote 102 wholly omitting any reference to the DSA’s total lack of equivalent or comparable provisions.Footnote 103 Consequently, with the DMA only applying to designated gatekeepers and the DSA failing to replicate the P2BR’s transparency mandate for MFN clauses, non-gatekeeper platforms are no longer legally bound to disclose the main economic, commercial or legal grounds for such crucial restrictions. As a result, the repeal of the P2BR leaves business users without equivalent protection vis-à-vis non-gatekeepers.
3.5. Access to data
The P2BR establishes strict transparency requirements in data access. It requires all providers of online intermediation services to include in their terms and conditions a clear description of the technical and contractual access, or the absence thereof, to any personal or non-personal data provided by users or generated through the service. Providers must detail whether they have access to the data, whether the business user has access to it, and whether such data is shared with third parties, including the purpose of the sharing and the availability of opt-out mechanisms for business users.Footnote 104 Such requirements aim to enable business users to thoroughly understand their data access rights and determine whether they can leverage such data to enhance their value creation.Footnote 105
In this regard too, the Commission does not mention the DSA, pointing exclusively to the provisions of the DMA, which obliges gatekeepers to provide end users with effective and free-of-charge data portability rights, and grant business users free, high-quality and real-time access to data resulting from their use of the platform services.Footnote 106
This line of reasoning obscures a twofold regulatory divergence. As in other cases, the CSWD Digital Omnibus remains entirely silent on the DSA’s lack of any equivalent disclosure obligation regarding data access, overlooking that, insofar as its provisions on data access are specifically enforcement- and research-oriented,Footnote 107 the DSA fails to absorb the data access safeguards established by the P2BR.Footnote 108 Furthermore, the CSWD Digital Omnibus hastily equates the DMA’s competition-oriented regime with the P2BR’s general requirement of contractual disclosure.
The DMA requires gatekeepers to provide effective, free-of-charge data portability rights for end users and establishes data access entitlements for business users.Footnote 109 However, it lacks a broader obligation mandating platforms to disclose their general data access policies or clarify how user or consumer data are shared with third parties – a fundamental safeguard established by the P2BR. This divergence reflects the essentially distinct rationales of the two acts. While the P2BR aims to establish contractual predictability and to enable value creation,Footnote 110 the DMA focuses on ensuring market contestability and on preventing gatekeepers from extracting unfair competitive advantages.Footnote 111 Consequently, it primarily addresses the risks inherent in a gatekeeper’s “dual role”Footnote 112 – where a platform operates simultaneously as an infrastructure provider and a direct competitor – by restricting how gatekeepers can leverage data access to unfairly compete against business users. As such, it falls short of replicating the comprehensive contractual transparency mandated by the P2BR.
While not cited in this specific context, the Data Act is potentially relevant, since it protects data access and portability rights of business users and introduces specific protection against unilaterally imposed unfair contractual terms.Footnote 113 However, it does not impose any comprehensive obligation to share the wider pool of personal or other data generated by consumers through the use of those services. Its scope is restricted to “product data” and “related service data,” excluding “content” and “inferred information.”Footnote 114 Furthermore, in B2B relationships, contractual limits can be imposed on the further use or downstream sharing of such data.Footnote 115
3.6. Complaint-handling and out-of-court dispute settlement
The CSWD Digital Omnibus posits that obligations for online platforms on complaint-handling, mediation and specialised mediators under the P2BR “largely overlap” with the DSA’s provisions on internal complaints systems, out-of-court dispute settlement, and transparency and reporting obligations.Footnote 116 Likewise, in this instance, it advances an unwarranted narrative of equivalence – a claim refuted by a comparative assessment between the DSA and the P2BR that exposes critical regulatory gaps.
The DSA mechanisms do not fully absorb the broader B2B commercial scope of the P2BR. Triggered exclusively to contest a closed list of restrictive decisions mostly related to content moderation, taken on the grounds that the information provided by the user is illegal or incompatible with the provider’s terms and conditions,Footnote 117 neither the internal complaint-handling system nor out-of-court dispute settlement provided by the DSA offer effective redress mechanisms for commercial disputes.
Moreover, under the DSA, providers are mandated to ensure access to the internal complaint-handling system for a period of “at least six months” following the contested decision.Footnote 118 By contrast, the P2BR imposes no such expiration date, reflecting the continuous and evolving nature of B2B commercial relationships.Footnote 119 Another relevant divergence concerns the language required for dispute settlement bodies. The P2BR stipulates that mediators operate in the language of the terms and conditions governing the specific contractual relationship.Footnote 120 Quite differently, the DSA merely obliges out-of-court bodies to be capable of settling disputes in “at least one” official language of the Union.Footnote 121 This asymmetry potentially lowers the standard of protection, exposing business users to the risk of having to seek redress in a foreign language not used in their contract.
Shifting the focus to collective redress, the CSWD Digital Omnibus outlines the rationale for the repeal of the P2BR. Specifically, it claims that “the right for representative action for organisations and associations of business users (Article 14) is mirrored in the DSA (Articles 86 and 90) and importantly now covered by Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers.”Footnote 122
This assertion represents a manifest error in the CSWD, which invokes a strictly consumer-focused instrument to construct a non-existent collective redress framework for business users. Article 90 DSA does add the DSA to Annex I of Directive (EU) 2020/1828. However, the material scope of that Directive is strictly limited to infringements that “harm or may harm the collective interests of consumers,”Footnote 123 explicitly excluding harms suffered by persons qualifying as traders.Footnote 124 Consequently, professional recipients of intermediary services are precluded from relying on this procedural mechanism. As the DSA framework solely guarantees representative actions for the protection of consumers, the repeal of the P2BR strips businesses of their harmonised right to collective redress.Footnote 125
More generally, the proposed repeal severely impairs the enforcement framework originally established under the P2BR, which requires each Member State to ensure adequate and effective enforcement of the Regulation.Footnote 126 Neither the DMA – which designates the European Commission as the sole authority empowered to apply its provisions to gatekeepersFootnote 127 – nor the DSA – which allocates exclusive powers to the Member State of main establishmentFootnote 128 – allows for autonomous decentralised national oversight. In this respect, repealing the P2BR replaces a decentralised framework with the application of the centralised model of the DMA or the country-of-origin principle enshrined in the DSA. Consequently, business users cannot directly rely on the intervention of their national enforcement bodies, resulting in a substantial dilution of their protection.
3.7. Codes of conduct
The CSWD Digital Omnibus also claims that “the possibility for developing codes of conduct under the P2B Regulation (Article 17) is largely covered by Article 45 of the DSA, allowing for the drawing up of codes of conduct to be developed to contribute to the application of the DSA.”Footnote 129 The assertion rests on a profound analytical flaw regarding the material scope and underlying regulatory architectures of the two legal frameworks.
The P2BR mandates that codes of conduct must account for the “specific features of the various sectors in which online intermediation services are provided, as well as of the specific characteristics of SMEs.”Footnote 130 Conversely, the DSA’s co-regulatory framework is designed to mitigate macro-societal risks – such as illegal content and disinformation – and it is primarily tailored towards VLOPs.Footnote 131 The drafting of voluntary codes of conduct under the DSA is expressly intended to facilitate the proper application of the Regulation, with a primary focus on addressing “systemic risks” and the specific challenges of tackling “illegal content.”Footnote 132 Admittedly, the DSA adopts a very broad definition of “illegal content,” covering any information or activity that breaches Union or national law, regardless of its precise subject matter.Footnote 133 Nevertheless, a general standard of illegality of content is entirely different from contractual unfairness; and replacing a targeted, commercial fairness tool with a generalised, risk-based framework centred on content illegality deprives business users of the specific contractual protections guaranteed by the P2BR.
3.8. Legal certainty vs. policy preservation. The cross-referenced provisions
By way of derogation from the repeal of the P2BR, the Digital Omnibus provides that provisions cross-referenced in other legal acts remain in application until 31 December 2032 or until the referencing acts are amended.Footnote 134 Specifically, the Digital Omnibus temporarily maintains those provisions – most notably, the procedural safeguards against restriction, suspension and termination and the right to an internal complaint-handling system – with the stated objective of ensuring continuity and preventing a transitory legal void.Footnote 135
As established in the CSWD Digital Omnibus, the primary justification for maintaining these provisions is strictly related to legal certainty. Their temporary retention is framed solely as a way to prevent inconsistencies in EU law. When the relevant acts are eventually amended to remove these cross-references, the preservation of the underlying rights becomes entirely contingent on future legislative discretion. The CSWD Digital Omnibus concedes that this transitory phase preserves certain protections – such as those extended to self-employed platform workers under the Directive on Platform Work 2024.Footnote 136 However, it offers no guarantee of substantive legal continuity, leaving the protections designed for business users exposed to the risk of further erosion.
4. Conclusions. A deregulatory agenda overshadowed
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the Digital Omnibus extends far beyond mere administrative simplification, introducing fundamental policy changes that significantly alter the core objectives of the EU digital acquis and directly undermine the protective architecture established for business users under the P2BR.
The Commission invokes the rationale of streamlining regulatory compliance obligations for businesses, particularly SMEs. Yet, the Digital Omnibus yields the opposite effect. By formally repealing essential obligations imposed on digital platforms, it actively erodes crucial protections afforded to business users, exposing them to unfair commercial practices without adequate safeguards.
To be clear, simplification of the legislative framework, reduction of compliance costs, and streamlining of procedures are highly desirable goals, and the coexistence of different rules potentially applicable to the same service should be duly addressed to avoid overlapping regulation.Footnote 137 Nevertheless, the fundamental thesis advanced by the Commission – that the DSA and the DMA can seamlessly absorb the P2BR without severe consequences for business users – is demonstrably unfounded, as a granular analysis of the provisions under scrutiny reveals.
This flaw is clearly reflected in the language employed, which downplays the scale of the changes entailed by the repeal. The CSWD Digital Omnibus eschews a textual assessment of the specific protections sacrificed by the Proposal. In the absence of such a detailed analysis, it relies on open-ended claims, repeatedly asserting that the P2BR provisions are “largely” or “to some extent” covered by other acts, or that they “largely overlap” with other rules.
From this perspective, the choice to resort to the Omnibus is highly disputable. In sharp contrast with the procedure followed for the adoption of the P2BR,Footnote 138 the Commission has neither conducted a comprehensive impact assessment based on broad consultations, nor deployed a comparative analysis to explore regulatory alternatives to an outright repeal, nor undertaken any systematic investigation to address the implementation and awareness concerns highlighted in the Study and the Report. In the absence of empirical findings, an assessment of alternative options, and structured stakeholder consultations, the Digital Omnibus asserts that stakeholders “have not been vocal” about the impact of the P2BR, deducing from this purported silence that the rules are neither well-known nor effective and should therefore be repealed.Footnote 139 Crucially, this inferred lack of concern is directly refuted not only by civil society actors and commentators,Footnote 140 but also by Member States and by the critical stance expressed within the European Parliament.Footnote 141 These procedural shortcomings are starkly illustrated by the Call for Evidence, which closed just five weeks before the scheduled publication – a timeframe criticised as manifestly insufficient for any meaningful analysis of public input.Footnote 142 Here too, as with other recent Omnibus proposals,Footnote 143 the imperative for political expediency appears to take precedence over evidence-based policymaking, structured stakeholder engagement and participatory lawmaking.
In line with established principles of EU legislative drafting, the Omnibus technique is designed to consolidate technical amendments across related provisions, introduce purely technical updates, or enhance the clarity and coherence of existing legislation while preserving its underlying policy content.Footnote 144 In contrast, in the present case the Digital Omnibus goes well beyond resolving redundancies or streamlining procedures. It fundamentally shifts EU law from tailored commercial B2B safeguards toward a regime primarily centred on combatting the dissemination of illegal content and mitigating broader societal risks, alongside fairness obligations strictly confined to only a few designated gatekeepers.
Changes of this magnitude demand full compliance with the procedural safeguards designed to ensure evidence-based, proportionate and participatory lawmaking. Absent such scrutiny, exposing the adverse impacts of repealing the P2BR becomes imperative. The fundamental danger lies in misrepresenting a substantive policy shift as a technical simplification, thereby obscuring a major act of deregulation behind the narrative of administrative relief, and, most critically, depriving business users of essential protections without the benefit of transparent democratic debate.
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