When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics by Nathan J. Brown is an extremely important and timely contribution to our understanding of Islamic movements and the political conditions under which they have operated. Compelling and well written, the book provides a clear conceptual framework and a convincing argument backed by case studies. Brown seeks to explain how Islamic movements operate in politics and how politics, in turn, shape those movements. By focusing on questions of “how,” Brown provides insights that are crucial for understanding Islamists in power today.
But the focus is not on Islamists who are in power but what they will do when they get into power. Rather, the book examines how opposition Islamist movements respond to changes in political opportunities under authoritarianism. Brown examines four cases of Islamist movements (in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Palestine) operating in conditions “when victory is not an option,” that is, when authoritarian regimes were committed to preventing them from obtaining power. Brown argues that Islamist movements confronting state suppression will seize political opportunities and invest resources in politics, a process he calls “politicization,” but will refrain from going too far. For example, Islamist movements will form political parties but not allow them much autonomy. Islamist movements will also provide broad statements about their program and ideology and not provide detailed answers to controversial issues (i.e., gender, political pluralism, etc.). The logic behind this political ambiguity is that leaving room for retreat on ideological issues provides the movements with flexibility. It allows them to remain close to their core principles but at the same time affords necessary wiggle room for maneuvering within a changing political space. This vagueness and flexibility enables movements to attract supporters outside their core constituency and at the same time reduces the opportunities for a regime to repress them.
The fact that victory is not an option for Islamic movements in semiauthoritarian states creates the odd condition in which Islamic movements actually “run to lose” (Chap. 2). This phenomenon occurs when leaders of Islamist movements know they cannot actually win the overall election but decide to participate anyhow, investing pragmatically in certain elections and issues and guided by the motto “participation not domination.” However, when state repression pushes them away from electoral competition, they move to other areas of social and political activism outside of the electoral sphere.
The cases presented in the book provide the empirical support for Brown's arguments. He examines Islamist movements in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Palestine to show how these movements’ ideologies and organizational structures were shaped by the shifting political context: the move from authoritarian to semiauthoritarian state governance, or more specifically the point at which authoritarian regimes enabled a limited form of political liberalization to occur. These Islamic movements all share a common ideological foundation, the Muslim Brotherhood, but each case study reflects a variation on this foundation, and the movements reviewed operate within a diversity of regime types.
The case studies, which Brown covers in Chapters 4 and 5, speak for themselves. Egypt's move from full authoritarianism to semiauthoritarian rule in the 1970s allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to re-emerge in various spheres over the next few decades, and encouraged a new generation of leaders to take advantage of political opportunities. This new generation sharpened its political focus to make the movement the regime's primary opposition and, as a result, the primary target of the regime's repression. This led to the movement's more cautious political behavior (p. 86). In Jordan, where the Muslim Brotherhood was able to operate more openly, the movement did not invest heavily in state politics before the emergence of semiauthoritarianism during the late 1980s, and instead focused its activities on nonpolitical arenas, such as health care and social activities. By the time the regime implemented reforms aimed at political liberalization, the Muslim Brotherhood had already established a foothold in society through its associations and founded a political party, the Islamic Action Front. The Islamic Action Front's success in the 1989 elections provoked the Jordanian regime to crack down (albeit not as harshly as in Egypt) and exacerbated internal divisions in the movement over how to proceed. The Kuwaiti case parallels the dynamics and timing of the Jordanian case, as the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood focused on nonpolitical activities until the political openings of the 1980s allowed them to compete and do well in elections. In Palestine, the case of Hamas reflects a similar evolutionary course as the other Islamist movements discussed in this book, and shows how the opening of political space has encouraged Hamas to depart from some of its proclamations while at the same time leaving it room for ideological retreat. Brown briefly applies his argument to other cases, such as Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Tunisia, and Turkey, and also discusses different types of Islamism by discussing Salafi movements (Chap. 9).
Two other strengths of this book are worth mentioning. First, it clearly defines a number of important terms and, in doing so, engages a literature that will surely undergo considerable change in the coming years. Namely, instead of using terms such as “moderation” and “inclusion,” Brown employs “politicization.” This avoids the heavy normative baggage associated with “moderation” and more accurately describes the process of what he is really investigating—the movements’ investment of resources in electoral political participation. Second, Brown uses witty and effective metaphors to illustrate political dynamics. For example, he presents a tube of toothpaste as a way to understand how Islamists react to constraints and opportunities, and employs a cat and mouse metaphor to depict the relationship between semiauthoritarian regimes and Islamic movements. These are effectual tools for readers to get a sense of the ebb and flow of authoritarian politics.
This book's conceptual contributions, rich empirical case studies, and compelling argument will provide readers with much food for thought. It is an extremely accessible and critical read for serious scholars of Islamic movements, students of Middle East politics, and those in the policy community interested in gaining a better understanding of factors that will shape politics in the Arab world for years to come.
