Historians of Yemen in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries tend to portray British colonial rule in the Yemeni South and the imamate of the Hamid al-Din dynasty in the North as stages in a supposedly “natural” historical trajectory culminating in the creation of modern nation-states, be it the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen or, after the 1990 unification, the Republic of Yemen. Moreover, with few exceptions, scholars have examined Yemeni history during this period in isolation from the larger trends of empire, capitalism, Islamic reform, and anti-colonial resistance.
John Willis's book is innovative and unique in that it examines the history of the imamate in the North and British colonialism in the South within the larger regional contexts of South Asia and the Ottoman Empire. Willis argues that the production of the Yemeni North and South as political spaces cannot be understood in terms of a teleology that “naturally” led toward the nation-state. Rather, drawing on Paul Carter's spatial history approach, he demonstrates that this process was highly contingent, fraught with contestation and failure, and shaped by encounters between local actors on one side and specific intersecting trans-local trends on the other.
The first three chapters look at the creation of the Aden Protectorate after the British occupation of Aden in 1839. Chapter 1 examines the elevation of the “nine tribes” of the Aden hinterland to the status of “native chiefs” and their incorporation “into the Indian system of semi-independent princely states” (14). Here, Willis adds significantly to the work of Thomas Metcalf and James Onley by showing that this process went beyond administrative organization and included state rituals such as the Delhi durbars of 1903 and 1911 and the “production of historical, ethnographic, and cartographic knowledge” (14).
In Chapters 2 and 3, Willis looks at the sabayha in the western portion of the protectorate and the amir of Dali on its northern edge, arguing that their political practices called into question the central category of knowledge informing the “nine tribes” Protectorate system, namely the concept of the shaykh, who exercised sovereign rule over the members of his tribe. Yet the work of the Anglo–Ottoman boundary commission in 1902–05 and the short-lived Dali Agency (1902–07) suggested that the amir was not a sovereign ruler at all but a primus-inter-pares figure at the center of very specific, constantly changing local alliances. The British were both unable and unwilling to adjust their style of governance to these realities.
Chapters 4 and 5 trace the formation of a state space under the rule of Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Hamid al-Din in the Yemeni North from 1918 to the Saudi–Yemeni war of 1933–34. Against the view that the imamate of the inter-war years was isolated, Willis demonstrates convincingly that the imam drew heavily on Ottoman military and technical expertise to expand his power. The imamate combined a new notion of territoriality with an older ideology of rule that insisted on obedience to the imam and enforcement of shariʿa. Imam Yahya also participated in the larger inter-war movement of Islamic reform and anti-imperialist mobilization.
Yet, by adopting the title of king, seeking bilateral international agreements, waging war with the Saudis over Najran, and increasing pressure on taxpayers, the imam undermined his own claims to just rule and Muslim unity against European imperialism and laid bare the fragility of the state he had created. Willis concludes his analysis of the contingency of the political spaces created in the Yemeni North and South by exploring the decade between 1924 and 1934, when military forces of the imamate occupied the northern portion of the Aden Protectorate.
This is a superb study: clearly written, tightly argued, and based on extensive research in Yemen and the United Kingdom. It is noteworthy not just for its transregional scope but also for its effective engagement with the literature on political spatiality and comparative empires. That said, an expanded discussion of the extent to which Ottoman concepts and practices informed the politics of state building under the imamate post-1918 would have been helpful. For example, is the way in which Yemeni chroniclers of the 1920s and 1930s used the term islah (reform) simply “embedded in an Islamic discursive tradition” (141) or does it also draw on the post-Tanzimat Ottoman discourse of civilizational uplift studied by Selim Deringil or Maurus Reinkowski?
