The main goal of Kurt Weyland’s Making Waves is to explore why the more intense and more rapidly spreading democratic contentions of the nineteenth century were ultimately less successful than movements of the twentieth century that evolved at a slower pace. For his analysis, Weyland selects three historical events of intense diffusion of democratic protests: the 1848 Spring of the People, the years 1917–19, and those of the 1970s/1980s. Weyland observes that over these time periods, the modes of democratic contention changed from the spontaneous, rapidly spreading protests that were unguided by leaders to preplanned, precalculated democratic contentions led by experienced leaders of broad-based, strong organizations. Emergence of organizations and their strong leadership slowed down the speed of contentions but guaranteed their successful outcomes as politically mobilized insurgents became increasingly organized and developed sophisticated methods of calculation and learning.
The uprisings of 1848 were characterized by hastily spreading, almost impulsive imitation of protests from one country to another by energized but unorganized protestors that Weyland refers to as “irrational masses.” This bottom-up strategy of contentions was sparked by, and was a reaction to, a successful overthrow of the autocratic regime in France. Emulating the actions and strategies that were introduced in France, protestors undertook quick overturns of their own autocratic regimes. Contentions developed into “tsunami”-like, leaderless protests spreading across Europe. Unfortunately, in view of the absence of organizational leadership, the inexperienced participants of these contentions had to follow their own limited knowledge, and their decisions were based on assumptions about the outcomes of contentions and not on facts, a process of inference Weyland calls “inferential shortcuts.” Thus, weak or absent organizations, combined with the limited individual knowledge of protestors, resulted in an overpositive estimation of outcomes that led to what he refers to as “inchoate polities” and, in turn, high velocity but low success contentions as in 1848.
In contrast, the political contentions that arose from 1917 to 1919 across many European countries, including Germany, Britain and Sweden, were organized by leaders of organizations and thus were slower developing but more successful. Accordingly, by the early twentieth century, many European countries had developed strong, broadly based political organizations and political parties that were led by powerful leaders. Leaders observed and rationally assessed costs versus benefits of democratic contentions occurring elsewhere before making decisions about whether to emulate actions that proved to be successful or to contain the potential protestors and prevent the unorganized mimicry Weyland calls “reactive response.” With the development of organizations (among them the powerful Social Democratic Party of Germany), the decision to partake in democratic contentions shifted from the micro-level decisions of individual protestors to a leader-guided mode of participation in which individual decisions were molded and modulated by parties and interest groups. In short, the development of organizations shaped the bounds of inference and rationality of individual protestors and reshaped the mode of contentions from protest actions guided from the bottom up to actions guided from the top down.
The so-called third wave of democratization that swept across Latin America and southern Europe in the 1970s/1980s was, as Weyland argues, unlike the spontaneous bottom-up crowd contentions initiated by external stimuli in the inchoate polities of 1848, and also unlike the dynamics of the contentions of 1917–19 that were guided by rational leaders of organizations. By the 1970s/1980s, political contention had further evolved into largely top-down changes in which organizational leaders negotiated reforms with the consensus and approval of represented constituencies, and avoiding clashes with existing regimes. Proficient leaders guided complex and ideologically diverse organizations, promoted trust in these constituencies, and, at the same time, tamed radical political sects. Under this dynamic, democratic transitions were negotiated, not fought for, leading to development of so-called packet transitions characterized by slow and gradual but very successful democratic changes.
Weyland’s focus on the role of organizations and organizational leadership provides a vital contribution to scholarly investigations on democratic contentions and warrants strong recognition in the field of democracy study. Weyland demonstrates that the progressive development of organizations and organizational leadership affects modes of democratic contention and, in turn, contention’s outcomes. These processes determine the inverse correlation between the pace and outcomes of democratic contentions. His analysis does, however, raise questions about the nature and predictive weight of the many variables that might comprise and/or accompany the impact of organizational complexity on success of democratization. In this sense, inclusion of multivariate determinants of democratization may help to more fully explain the contribution of organizations to democratic development. Several examples support this conclusion.
First, studies by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011, 2014) demonstrate that protests organized in a bottom-up fashion by civil society greatly increase the success of pro-democratic contentions if they are nonviolent. Thus, in this case, the significance of organization may be less important as a top-down structure of influence than as a manifestation of a developed, organized civil society. That is, the existence of organizations may be more important, in general, than the top-down or bottom-up organizational structures.
Second, Making Waves indicates that the networks between leaders of organizations may be important, which raises a question of the relative predictive weight of network structure, organizational structure (e.g., bottom-up vs. top-down), and organizational complexity irrespective of structure. As Weyland demonstrates, contacts between leaders contributed to the impact of organizations by providing external support, as well as information about strategies of successful democratic transitions. Few chapters illustrate frequent contacts between protest leaders of organizations and leaders of previously successful democratic transitions. Accordingly, in Latin America, “[t]hese legal experts, among them Patricio Aylwin, looked closely at Spain, which had dismantled its authoritarian institutions through a constituent assembly” (p. 205). Moreover, leaders of protests in Chile and Uruguay invited Adolfo Suarez, who was responsible for abolishing Franco’s regime in Spain, to learn from his experience, while Peru’s deputy who personally knew “the main architect of the Spanish charter” (p. 166) traveled to Spain and brought back material about Spanish negotiations and protest strategies. Plausibly, as suggested by Wejnert (Reference Wejnert2005, Reference Wejnert2014), shared information within networks could be important for protests to succeed, perhaps as important as, or more important than, organizational structure or complexity.
Third, Weyland concludes that with a slower pace and associated higher success of democratization, media has less impact than research would suggest. However, the impact of organizations could be enhanced by media; media could provide communication within and between organizations, as well as build organizational networks (Gunther and Mughan Reference Gunther and Mughan2000). As some would argue (Wejnert Reference Wejnert2014), the correlation of media with organizations and with networks could have as powerful an impact on success to democratic contentions as organizations per se.
Fourth, using Latin America in the 1970s/1980s as an example, Weyland suggests that the imposition of democratic ideology by Western countries is not effective, in spite of previous positions by others (e.g., Bollen Reference Bollen1983). Nonetheless, studies on African postcolonial democracies demonstrate a precedence of successful, though short-living, imposition of democracy in former British colonies (Bollen Reference Bollen1983; Kapstein and Converse, Reference Kapstein and Converse2008). Conceivably, the impact of imposition on democratization is modulated by organizations’ structures.
Fifth, in the 1970s/1980s “democratic wave” Weyland depicts an extension of the diffusion of democracy across geographical regions. In contrast, the spread of the 1848 and 1917–19 democratic protests was contained predominantly in Europe, often among countries that shared cultural and historical roots, eventually developing into single states, for example, Germany and Italy. These findings suggest that characteristics of organizational structures may influence democratization processes jointly, with an impact of characteristics of countries and characteristics of regions within which the countries reside. Perhaps regional indicators of the structural similarity of countries within former colonial networks account for the reason that Chile, Peru, and Uruguay modeled their democracies on Spain, their former colonial power, whereas neighboring Brazil, a former colony of Portugal, did not adopt the Spanish model (p. 171).
Sixth, Weyland makes an important contribution to research on democratization by introducing rationality to the analysis of democratic contentions, a concept that is rarely addressed in studies of democracy. Rationality of leaders who decide when and how to protest is complemented by Wejnert’s (Reference Wejnert2014) analyses of democracy. Unlike Weyland’s leaders’ heuristics applied in decision making on behalf of contentious crowds, in Wejnert’s study the cornerstone of rational decision making is derived from indicators of countries’ connectedness with other countries and their socioeconomic development that act as a gating function of success of democratic contentions (Lipset Reference Lipset1994). The determinants of countries’ characteristics, instead of leaders’ and masses’ heuristics, are viewed as the determinants of the threshold of diffusion of democracy (Wejnert Reference Wejnert2014). This diverse approach to rationality helps to explain the causes of democracy diffusion. On the one hand, diffusion originates from mimicking reactions of leaders rational decisions (Making Waves); on the other, following traditional studies of diffusion (e.g., Rogers 1995), mimicry or leaders decision constitutes the spark or triggering event that initiates the complex and lengthy process of diffusion, creating an S-shaped curve (Wejnert Reference Wejnert2002), while the socioeconomic characteristics and network connections modulate the curve (Wejnert Reference Wejnert2014).
In all, Weyland’s analyses, although a cornerstone of studies on democracy, could be extended by analysis of multivariate determination. In this sense, organizations may not serve as the single, major predictor of successful democratic contentions, but rather may interact with a host of other indicators, such as the level of countries’ development, countries’ networks, civil society, and media, as well as countries’ regional locations that serve as the proponents, initiators, and spreaders of democratic ideology. Multivariate and multilevel studies, which represent the interaction of country-level and regional-level determinants of successful “waves of democracy,” provide an opportunity to further extend Weyland’s study and enrich our understanding of democracy as a complex process (Dahl Reference Dahl1998), rather than as an event of transition from one regime to another. Multivariate analyses could also contribute to a broader understanding of democracy’s diffusion as a dynamic process, rather than mere imitation (Wejnert Reference Wejnert2002). In short, a focus on the contribution of any single complex factor, such as organizational complexity and leadership, to the outcome of highly multivariate processes like democratization or diffusion cannot enlighten the relative predictive weight of that one factor, among many, to these processes. Multivariate phenomena are probably best illuminated by multivariate analyses.
