I. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the arguments advanced by major utilitarian thinkers in the late eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century in support of the institution of private property. One looks in vain for deep utilitarian work on private property rights. The utilitarian canon provides no detailed analytical/historical rationale for this central market institution. Instead we find what can at best be described as a thin defense—a short chapter here, a chapter or two there. Virtually no serious historical analysis of the institution is presented by a major utilitarian. Empirical support for the defense is never collected. Instead the general defense of private property is thin, and largely rhetorical in character. The question addressed in this paper is: Why? Why did the utilitarian defense of the institution of private property typically take such a rhetorical form?
Rhetorical arguments, at least for our purposes here, are those which are not meant to convince, but rather to act as signs or symbols. Rhetorical arguments, lacking serious bolstering, show where a writer or school is “coming from.” They provide a shorthand statement easily identified by the reader. “Rhetorical” in this context has a mildly negative connotation and corresponds closely to the everyday use of the word. This common use of “rhetorical” can be distinguished from the broader meaning that refers less judgmentally to methods of persuasion as discussed by Deirdre McCloskey in The Rhetoric of Economics (1998). The common definition adopted here can also be distinguished from the much more pejorative meaning of “rhetorical” suggested by Albert Hirschman in his The Rhetoric of Reaction, where “rhetorical” arguments are those “that are in effect contraptions specifically designed to make dialogue and deliberation impossible” (1991, p. 170).
Rhetorical arguments are almost by definition thin. But it is difficult to specify what type of defense would qualify as appropriately substantial. It is beyond the scope of this paper to lay out full guidelines for utilitarian argumentation. But the general consequentialist position of utilitarians would seem to demand that a defense of property rights start from a well-reasoned theoretical argument deducing the likely outcomes of alternative institutional structures. Where possible, it would be bolstered with careful historical/anthropological/empirical exhibits demonstrating the soundness of the theoretical exercise. Both theory and empirics would aim at providing a measure of the aggregate welfare generated by the institutional forms considered.
Admittedly a defense of this quality might prove a daunting task. But the utilitarians featured here, when well motivated, could demonstrate an impressive ability to put together such consequential arguments. For example John Stuart Mill’s discussion of peasant proprietors and alternative systems of tenancy (1848, Book II, Chs. 6-10) displays a mastery of theory linked to a rich empirical effort. In that canvas, Mill combines positive economics with a strong normative argument in favor of independent proprietorships. This is institutional analysis of the highest order.
Against this background, we can proceed to ask why the early utilitarian defense of the institution of private property typically took such a rhetorical form. Why did the early utilitarians—William Paley, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill—not mount between them a serious defense of the institution?Footnote 1 More specifically we consider four hypotheses: irrelevance (the interests of utilitarians did not particularly depend on a defense), triviality (the defense at the time was considered a closed book), impossibility (the subject at least in utilitarian terms was simply too complex for any serious analysis), and ambivalence (utilitarians were painfully uncertain about the relation of the institution to their own stated goals).
II. IRRELEVANCE?
We begin by first asking whether we should even expect a serious argument from the utilitarians on the institution of private property. Was there any reason utilitarians, given their general approach, should have been worried about property rights? Was the question perceived by them as important at the time?
Jeremy Bentham and the philosophical radicals brought a new energy to a social-materialist view of rights. Bentham in particular took exception to the liberalism of John Locke with its metaphysical talk of natural rights. Rights made sense for the utilitarian only to the extent they served to advance the greatest good of the greatest number. This radical precept put virtually all the civil institutions of society in question. John Stuart Mill called Bentham “the great subversive … the great critical thinker of his age and country” (Mill Reference John Stuart and Ryan1867, p. 134). In principle, the philosophical radicals held up all rights and social institutions to serious questioning. Given such a starting point it would be difficult to imagine that the utilitarians would avoid subjecting the institution and character of property rights to careful scrutiny.
Apart from their general commitment to a radical reappraisal of society, utilitarians had more particular reasons to explore carefully the consequences of different systems of property. Virtually all utilitarians make a commitment to equality. As explicitly stated in the works of Jeremy Bentham, the utilitarians asserted the universality of diminishing marginal utility. For a pie of any given size, equal slices would generate the highest total utility. Similar commitments had prompted any number of agrarians, most notably the Levellers and Diggers of the Cromwellian revolution, to advocate substantial redistribution of property. Given the utilitarians’ strong endorsement of equality, it would seem that they must either accept the agrarian conclusions or develop an explicit and serious defense of private property.
In large part, the utilitarian commitment to equality was built on a conviction that the greatest proportion of people were fairly similar in their ability to produce and their capacity to enjoy. Utilitarians advanced this double-fold egalitarian proposition largely as a matter of faith.Footnote 2 These notions were characteristic of the enlightenment philosophers on whom the utilitarians relied, most specifically Claude Adrien Helvetius, David Hume, and Adam Smith.Footnote 3
A number of scholars have previously noted the deep tension in utilitarian thought between the philosophical radicals’ endorsement of equality and their announced commitment to the institution of private property.Footnote 4 More importantly, the utilitarians, themselves, were well aware of this tension and explicitly acknowledged its existence. Canonical figures such as William Paley, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill made much of the problem, although they offered little more than rhetoric by way of resolution.
For example Paley goes so far as to make this tension the defining starting point for his explorations of utilitarian ideas. He begins with his now famous “flock of pigeons in a field of corn.” How peculiar it would be if we “should see ninety-nine of them gathering all they got into a heap; reserving nothing for themselves, but the chaff and the refuse; keeping this heap for one, and that the weakest, perhaps the worst, pigeon of the flock; sitting round and looking on, all the winter, whilst this one was devouring, throwing about, and wasting it. …” Should we see this we see “nothing more than what is every day practiced and established among men. Among men, you see the ninety-and-nine toiling and scraping together a heap of superfluities for one (and this one too, oftentimes the feeblest, and worst of the whole set, a child, a woman, a madman, or a fool); getting nothing for themselves all the while, but a little of the corsest of the provision, which their own industry produces … ” (Paley Reference Paley and Mahieu1785, p. 63). Paley’s sympathy for equality is clear. Against this background Paley explicitly acknowledges that private property as an institution requires a utilitarian defense. “There must be some very important advantages to account for an institution, which, in the view of it above given [the pigeon analogy], is so paradoxical and unnatural” (Paley Reference Paley and Mahieu1785, p. 64).
It would seem that Paley has set the stage for an extended defense of private property. Paley himself is explicitly aware of the need. But what does he offer? Of course as a committed utilitarian Paley can’t fall back on a Lockean rights-based defense. Private property must serve the good. What are the social goods associated with the institution? Paley offers us little more than platitudes, less than ten pages of unsubstantiated cliches. The institution of private property “increases the produce of the earth,” “preserves [that] produce to maturity,” “prevents contests,” and “improves the conveniency of living,” through the facilitation of a division of labor. Paley concludes with the fundamental claim: “even the poorest and the worst provided, in countries where property and the consequences of property prevail, are in a better situation, with respect to food, raiment, houses, and what are called the necessaries of life, than any are in places where most things remain in common” (pp. 65–66). Paley asserts that the distributions simply don’t overlap.
Paley’s invocation of the pigeon flock powerfully draws the question which he fully accepts. But his answer is surely thin, indeed so thin, that we are left considerably more impressed with the implicit attack on private property than the defense. The “context” hardly accomplishes Paley’s intended purpose. We can reasonably ask why a stronger defense wasn’t forthcoming.
As suggested above, Paley is far from unique in his awareness of the tension between equality and property. Jeremy Bentham presents much the same argument. Jeremy Bentham is utilitarianism. More than any other moral philosopher his writings are identified as the very essence of utilitarian thought. Society should seek the greatest happiness of its members. Even more explicitly than Paley, Bentham asserted the goal of equality. Hence, like Paley he too acknowledged the need to defend private property on utilitarian grounds. All institutions must be measured against the utilitarian standard.
In his most complete discussion of the question in Principles of the Civil Code, Bentham begins from the proposition that the state can influence the greatest good for the greatest number through four channels or sources. “It may be shown, that all the functions of the law may be referred to these four heads: to provide for subsistence; to secure abundance; to befriend equality; to maintain security” (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1843a; p. 302). In discussing these goals Bentham argues that abundance is ultimately the condition for subsistence. Equality must not be allowed to push on security. Indeed, according to Bentham, security is the fundamental source of the greatest good. It is fundamental because unlike the other three security determines expectations and hence activity in general. Bentham argues, “Among these objects of the law, security is the only one which necessarily embraces the future: subsistence, abundance, equality, may be regarded for a moment only; but security implies extension in point of time, with respect to all the benefits to which it is applied. Security is therefore the principal object.” From this observation it is but a short step to the potential disasters facing those eager to expand equality. Bentham states the predicament, “Equality may be fostered, both by protecting it where it exists, and by seeking to produce it where it does not exist. But here lies the danger: a single error may overturn the whole social order” (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1843a, p. 302). More specifically, the threat is a return to a state of nature. “But if property should be overturned with the direct intention of establishing an equality of possessions, the evil would be irreparable. No more security, no more industry, no more abundance! Society would return to the savage state whence it emerged …” (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1843a, p. 312).
Bentham has acknowledged that as an institution private property must mount a defense. He, like Paley, makes large claims in its behalf. But these claims are for the most part rhetorical assertions. Despite the admittedly critical need for a defense, Bentham offers only the sketch of an argument. We have only a rhetorical evocation of a state of nature and a highly intuitionist anthropology. In that primitive state, savages “without law and property … strive incessantly against famine; which sometimes cuts off entire tribes. Rivalry for subsistence produces among them the most cruel wars; and, like beasts of prey, men pursue men, as a means of sustenance” (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1843a, p. 307).
Finally, turn to John Stuart Mill. Mill like Paley is painfully aware that a utilitarian defense of private property cannot be erected on the actual histories of transactions in the past. He clearly sees such history as an embarrassment, or at best a testament to the gradual progress of the species. Thus Mill in his famous, but relatively short, two chapters “Of Property” attempts to separate his defense from the actual history of property. He sets out to consider the usefulness of the institution not in the midst of the horrendous inequalities of the industrial revolution, but rather in an egalitarian colonial Eden, “a community unhampered by any previous possession; a body of colonists, occupying for the first time an uninhabited country; bringing nothing with them but what belonged to them in common …” (Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 201). And in this Eden, Mill works mightily to reconcile property and equality. He seeks to consider a private property:
… accompanied by none of the initial inequalities and injustices which obstruct the beneficial operation of the principle in old societies. Every full grown man or woman, we must suppose, would be secured in the unfettered use and disposal of his or her bodily and mental faculties; and the instruments of production, the land and tools, would be divided fairly among them, so that all might start, in respect to outward appliances, on equal terms, accompanied by none of the initial inequalities and injustices which obstruct the beneficial operation of the principle in old societies
(Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 205).He even goes so far as to provide an original “compensation … for the injuries of nature.”
Mill is clearly aware of the tension. He as much as admits the injustice of property rights in the here and now. Mill’s defense of property is not a defense of the institution as it had historically evolved, but a defense of what it might become, hardly a defense at all. And against this highly abstracted background, Mill goes on to conclude with what must appear something of a platitude:
There has never been imagined any mode of distributing the produce of industry, so well adapted to the requirements of human nature on the whole, as that of letting the share of each individual (not in a state of bodily or mental incapacity) depend in the main on that individual’s own energies and exertions, and on such furtherance as may be obtained from the voluntary good offices of others
(Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 982).Footnote 5Clearly Paley, Bentham, and Mill acknowledge that if utilitarians are to endorse the institution of private property, they must first defend it against the claims of equality. They leave no doubt that such a defense is central to their project. But still what they produce is remarkably thin. Perhaps they simply felt that the defense was trivial and needed little if any elaboration. We turn now to this second of our possibilities: triviality.
III. TRIVIALITY?
To the extent that utilitarians viewed the defense of private property as trivial they presumably based their conclusion on the scholarly understanding of the day. Where in that scholarly mix had the defense already been established? Three related strains of thought suggest themselves: seventeenth-century political philosophy, eighteenth-century history, and eighteenth-century moral philosophy.
Antecedents in seventeenth-century political philosophy
Bentham’s argument about security would hardly have been novel for his readers. He has simply restated (not even repackaged) the Hobbesian description of the state of nature.Footnote 6 Hobbes’s position was well known to Bentham’s contemporaries. As read today, Hobbes is far from a utilitarian (Tuck Reference Tuck, Tuck and Hobbes1996). Yet in the most famous passage from the Leviathan Hobbes comes quite close:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, an removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”
(Hobbes Reference Hobbes and Tuck.1660, p. 89).Hobbes never would endorse the utilitarian greatest good, but he is not above suggesting that his “state of nature” lacks virtually all the useful material and cultural achievements that contribute to the attractiveness of civilized life. Given Hobbes’s central place in British political philosophy, it is understandable that Bentham and other utilitarians, where convenient, drew on the Hobbesian description of the state of nature. But in doing so, did the utilitarians draw on a richness of argument that rendered unnecessary their further defense of their position? Put somewhat differently, was the Hobbesian case so well developed, that no further elaboration was really required of the utilitarians like Bentham? I think the answer is no.
Hobbes’s argument in the Leviathan is itself quite thin; little more than a speculation. In a short paragraph Hobbes acknowledged that his “warre of every one against every one” never generally existed “over all the world.” But he goes on to suggest two empirical examples. (1) “(For) the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner” (Hobbes Reference Hobbes and Tuck.1660, p. 89). And (2) “Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to feare; but the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre” (Hobbes Reference Hobbes and Tuck.1660, pp. 89–90). A bit later Hobbes refers to the “miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge” (Hobbes Reference Hobbes and Tuck.1660, p. 128).
From this base Hobbes goes on to justify the state and in particular the institution of private property. For in very utilitarian fashion, Hobbes justifies the property rights established by the power of the state in terms of their consequential value: “For before constitiution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily caseth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of that Power, in order to the publicque peace.” These are the “Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum)” (Hobbes Reference Hobbes and Tuck.1660, p. 125). The establishment of property rights is the critical action of the sovereign. Before, all is state of nature and insecurity; after, all is industry.
That is it for Hobbesian anthropology, empirics, and historicism. The entire evidentiary structure of Hobbes’ argument rests on a brief allusion to American Indians and a reminder of the miseries of the English Civil War. For Hobbes, the Leviathan is justified as virtually self-evident. Property rights come with the state.
Bentham and other utilitarians certainly echoed Hobbesian notions about the state of nature. But neither Bentham nor Paley emphasized a debt to Hobbes. Mill, on the other hand, invoked Hobbes explicitly and regularly.Footnote 7 But where Hobbes was under no responsibility to demonstrate that the property rights that exist meet the full utilitarian challenge, i.e. the greatest good of the greatest number, the utilitarians were. Simply echoing Hobbes, Paley, Bentham, and Mill hardly settled the matter.
Of course between Hobbes and the utilitarians, the traditional argument in favor of private property had undergone its own history. Most importantly, John Locke had attempted to anchor private property as a natural human right, not a civil right. Locke, like Hobbes, is not a committed utilitarian so he, too, is under less pressure than Bentham and his followers. Locke had based the claims of property in the rights of labor. Protection of this preexisting right impels each person to early seek out a contract for government.
[T]he enjoyment of the property he has in this [primitive] state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit this Condition, which however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: And ’tis not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to joyn in Society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property”
(Locke Reference Locke and Laslett.1690, p. 350).While Locke’s theory is very different from that of Hobbes, his historical-anthropology is virtually the same. “[I]n the beginning all the World was America” (p. 301). And that was just about it. Whatever the persuasiveness of Locke’s argument, one could hardly consider it empirical or historical in nature. And precisely for this reason utilitarians found it a frail defense of property. While the rising commercial classes might find Locke’s talk of pre-existing right to private property attractive, his argument could hardly appeal to serious utilitarians. Most obviously, the line of connection between ancient labors and modern wealth was just too obviously impure.
Paley, for example, explicitly rejects Locke’s position. Even if the earliest titles to property were won by hard labor, it was simply improbable that “a regular regard had been paid to justice, in every successive transmission of them since; for if one link in the chain fail, every title posterior to it falls to the ground” (Paley Reference Paley and Mahieu1785, p. 70). The utilitarians were good enough historians to appreciate this simple fact. As Paley put it, a property right is not
the less, nor ought it to be impeached, because the estate was taken possession of at first by a family of aboriginal Britons, who happened to be stronger than their neighbours; nor because the British possessor was turned out by a Roman, or the Roman by a Saxon invader; nor because it was seized, without colour of right or reason, by a follower of the Norman adventurer; from whom, after many interruptions of fraud and violence it has at length devolved to me (Paley 1885, p. 71).
Bentham, like Paley, rejects Locke’s natural rights. He explicitly and famously argued, “… there is no natural property” (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1843a, p. 308). For Bentham property is created by the law and to be judged on utilitarian principles. Property can’t be defended by recourse to some natural Lockean right. Indeed, Bentham repeatedly makes fun of such efforts and the man who posits “an eternal and immutable Rule of Right” which “dictates so and so: and then begins giving you his sentiments upon any thing that comes uppermost” (Bentham Reference Bentham and Ryan1780, p. 79). Bentham can’t fall back on Locke. But he was not completely convinced (as Paley seems to have been) that the quality of title is irrelevant to the utility of the institution of private property. In particular, he expressed second thoughts when it came to the acceptance of hoary fraud. Thus he stated, “The age of Nestor ought not to be sufficient to secure to an usurper the wages and the price of his iniquity. For why should there be a period when the malefactor should become tranquil? Why should he enjoy the fruits of his crimes under the protection of the laws which he has violated?” (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1843a, Part II, Ch. 1) Such misgivings suggest that Bentham’s endorsement of property rights required a considerably more elaborate defense than he himself provided. Echoes of Lockean notions of justice didn’t make the utilitarian argument easier, but more difficult.
Of the three utilitarians considered here, only John Stuart Mill flirted seriously with the Lockean position on property rights. His chapter “Of Property” includes the following: “Private property, in every defence made of it, is supposed to mean the guarantee to individuals of the fruits of their own labour and abstinence” (Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 208). In principle, Mill seems to endorse both a utilitarian and Lockean position.Footnote 8 But while Mill struggled to reconcile the two, he feared that a serious interpretation of the latter tended to undermine the former. Thus after acknowledging that “there are excellent reasons of general utility” why a bad title should become a good one over time, he observed:
It is not at all conformable to intuitive morality that a wrong should cease to be a wrong because of what is really an aggravation, its durable character; that because crime has been successful for a certain limited period, society for its own convenience should guarantee its success for all time to come (Mill 1869, p. 654).
Utilitarians recognized that history could not plausibly be used to establish legitimate Lockean titles in property. But they might have reasonably asked whether it could be used to establish more clearly the value of the institution of private property, along the lines of Hobbes’s proto-utilitarian defense. Could utilitarians, in say 1800, point to a developed historical record that had established the proposition beyond question? Put somewhat differently, were they justified in taking such a record more or less for granted?
Antecedents in the work of eighteenth-century historians
Utilitarians, as Leslie Stephen observed long ago, claimed to base their reforms on empirical evidence, but had only the crudest appreciation of history (Stephen Reference Stephen1900, p. 298).Footnote 9 Bentham especially was fond of shortcuts. For him “a rough sketch of a science is the same thing as its definite constitution.” Even John Stuart Mill criticized Bentham for his attitude toward history. As Stephen suggested, history for the utilitarians was only a “record of crimes and follies and of little else” (p. 297). Hence when the utilitarians offered historical examples in defense of private property, it would be surprising if they brought forth more than a few sketches.
But the eighteenth century had witnessed a flowering of historical researches. Edward Gibbon had produced his striking history of the Roman Empire. In Scotland, David Hume had undertaken a massive history of England. And his friend William Robertson had written a number of histories, the most relevant to the current discussion being one of America. To what extent had this outpouring of historical scholarship established the defense of private property?
The works of none of these prominent historians are directly cited by our utilitarians in support of their (admittedly short) defenses.Footnote 10 The history they do draw on amounts to little more than commonplaces. Paley restricts his history of property largely to some thoughts on Bible stories. Bentham makes an off-handed reference to the lack of economic development in lands ruled despotically by the Ottomans (Benthem 1843a, Part I, Ch. 10). Mill also mentions the despotism of the Turk.Footnote 11
Our finding that the early utilitarians made little use of the new historical scholarship of the late eighteenth century is perhaps not surprising. Quite simply, the historians offered the utilitarians relatively little “data” on property rights. The following (admittedly cursory) overview of what the major historians had to say about property rights supports this conclusion.
Gibbon: Gibbon’s famous work had little to say about the importance of private property to Roman successes and failures. Early in the Decline and Fall, Gibbon shows respect for the genius of the Antonine emperors in providing an inclusive and stable religious, political, and legal system to the empire. He contrasts their inclusive approach with the dualism of the mid-eastern empires, characterized by central despotism and loose control in the rebellious periphery. But he offers no specifics here.
Later in his discussion of Roman law and its reforms under Justinian, Gibbon offers a brief consideration of Roman property rights. Gibbon starts philosophically with a Lockean argument, but quickly acknowledges “the common rights, the equal inheritance of mankind are engrossed by the bold and crafty; each field and forest is circumscribed by the landmarks of a jealous master. …” His position becomes explicitly utilitarian:
In the progress from primitive equity to final injustice, the steps are silent, the shades are almost imperceptible, and the absolute monopoly is guarded by positive laws and artificial reason. The active, insatiate principle of self-love can alone supply the arts of life and the wages of industry; and as soon as civil government and exclusive property have been introduced, they become necessary to the existence of the human race”
(Gibbon Reference Gibbon and Bury1776, Ch. XLV, p. 357).But there is little of history here. Gibbon goes on to defend the institution of property in land as consistent with “the wisest legislators” who with the “singular” exception of the Spartans had “disapproved an agrarian law as a false and dangerous innovation.” In this vein he sees the wisdom of the Roman rejection of egalitarian folk traditions:
Among the Romans, the enormous disproportion of wealth surmounted the ideal restraints of a doubtful tradition, and an obsolete statute; a tradition that the poorest follower of Romulus had been endowed with the perpetual inheritance of two jugera; a statute which confined the richest citizen to the measure of five hundred jugera, or three hundred and twelve acres of land
(Gibbon Reference Gibbon and Bury1776, Ch. XLV, p. 357).Overall, it is hard to see much historical justification for the broad opinions Gibbon offers. Indeed, his material is largely a restatement of the views of philosophers. One suspects that in Gibbon’s discussion of private property history followed moral philosophy and not visa versa.Footnote 12
Hume: Hume of course was a historian as well as a philosopher. And his history of England clearly stated the theme that commerce and industry were dependent on the security of private property. For example, in discussing the lack of commerce in England after the Norman invasion, Hume wrote “[T]he improvements of agriculture were also much checked, by the immense possessions of the nobility, by the disorders of the times, and by the precarious state of feudal property; it appears, that industry of no kind could then have place in the kingdom” (Hume Reference Hume1778, v. 1, p. 484). Hume also commented on the bad “police” of the country that left private property insecure (Hume Reference Hume1778, v. 2, p. 69). The history of the country was one of an improvement of security such that by the time of the Tudors, Hume suggested “that the instances of a high exerted prerogative were not so frequent as to render property sensibly insecure, or reduce the people to a total servitude …” (Hume Reference Hume1778, v. 4, p. 200). Hume is by and large concerned with the threat of tyranny and or chaos to property. The lesson of English history is that commerce and industry require safety from arbitrary tyrants and marauding robber bands.
But the historical subject matter Hume has to work with offers little else in way of lessons. In particular, he has virtually no material that allows a comparison among alternative property arrangements. The only real challenge to traditional views of private property in the period he covers was raised by the Levelers. Hume dismisses their radicalism in a cursory fashion. In doing so, he offers opinion, not history.
Robertson: William Robertson’s history of America, written in very much a Humean spirit, opened a serious investigation of the favorite example of a state of nature, the American Indian tribes. Presumably, when Paley and Bentham made the claim that no one in a society with common property lived as well as the lowest in developed commercial societies, they had the Indian tribes in mind.
Robertson sets the stage in a conventional enough manner:
In America, man appears under the rudest form in which we can conceive him to subsist. … The greater part of its inhabitants were strangers to industry and labour, ignorant of arts, imperfectly acquainted with the nature of property, and enjoying almost without restriction or controul the blessings which flowed spontaneously from the bounty of nature
(Robertson Reference Robertson1777, p. 90).But he is surprisingly careful not to over-generalize his conclusions with respect to property or for that matter utility. He is acutely aware of the range of exceptions to the standard characterizations. While critical of Rousseau’s glorification of the savage state, Robertson is far from dismissive of Indian virtues. He also is appreciative of the effectiveness of tribal loyalty in stimulating contributions to common production.Footnote 13
Rather than a greedy war of all against all, Robertson sees the savage state as supportive of equality and hostile to privilege at least within the tribe. The lack of property rights doesn’t explain the low level of economic development of most Indian tribes; instead, their low level of development explains the lack of property rights. Robertson simply observes “nations which depend upon hunting are, in a great measure, strangers to the idea of property” (Robertson Reference Robertson1777, p. 108). This was especially the case in the temperate zones of North America.
Robertson’s general view suggested that where agriculture and settled life dominated, simple property rights were likely to be established and following those rights an elaboration of government and control. Robertson in particular discusses the Natchez and the people of Bogota in this light:
Among people in this state, avarice and ambition have acquired objects, and have begun to exert their power; views of interest allure the selfish; the desire of preeminence excites the enterprising; dominion is courted by both; and passions unknown to man in his savage state, prompt the interested and ambitious to encroach on the rights of their fellow-citizens
(Robertson Reference Robertson1777, p. 111).Reinforcing the influence of agriculture, Robertson also invokes a climatic determinism in his discussion of native American governments. “[I]f we proceed from north to south along the continent of America, we shall find the power of those vested with authority gradually increasing, and the spirit of the people becoming more tame and passive. In Florida, the authority of the sachems, caziques, or chiefs, was not only permanent, but hereditary” (Robertson Reference Robertson1777, p. 110).
And everywhere the suppression of independence is intricately linked to the manipulation of superstition. “Even among nations of this state, the spirit of subjects could not have been rendered so obsequious, or the power of rulers so unbounded, without the intervention of superstition. By its fatal influence, the human mind, in every state of its progress, is depressed, and its native vigour and independence subdued” (Robertson Reference Robertson1777, p. 111).
Robertson’s nuanced discussion of the historical varieties of American cultures did little to justify the traditional Hobbesian uses of the state of nature in the defense of property rights and the Leviathan. Robertson never suggests that the lack of a well-defined system of private property was responsible for the low level of economic development in much of the Americas. Just the opposite: he sees property emerging where the level of development makes it useful. He has virtually nothing to say about experiments in alternative systems of property rights.
This sketch of eighteenth century historiography is obviously superficial. However, it hardly suggests that the historians had offered strong proofs on the central question raised by the utilitarians. The opinions of the ancients on the role of private property hardly could weigh in a utilitarian calculation. Nor was any defense of equality likely to advocate a return to medieval despotism. Just the opposite: a defense of equality would most probably be linked to the democratic political reforms strongly endorsed by most utilitarians. As such the history of tyrants was of little relevance. American history while interesting for pointing out the oversimplifications of common wisdom, hardly could establish the critical claim that egalitarianism would lead back to the state of nature. Rather it just suggested that the American “state of nature” was more complicated than most Europeans thought.
Antecedents in eighteenth-century moral philosophy
David Hume made the question of private property central to his theory of morals. His was surely the most sophisticated theory of property rights to emerge from eighteenth-century philosophy.
In his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), Hume begins with a quick historical review. He points out the “fanatical” quality of the levelers and somewhat more ambivalently the ancient examples of egalitarian legislation in Sparta’s constitution and Rome’s agrarian laws. But he leaves no doubt as to how obvious in the light of history he views the utility of private property. “But historians, and even common sense, may inform us, that, however specious these ideas of perfect equality may seem, they are really, at bottom, impracticable; and were they not so, would be extremely pernicious to human society. Render possessions ever so equal, men’s different degrees of art, care, and industry will immediately break that equality. Or if you check these virtues, you reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and instead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole community” (Hume Reference Hume1751, Ch. 3, Part II).
Hume had long been interested in the role of “selfishness” in human society. In his Treatise of Human Nature (1740), he had expounded at some length on how property rights cleverly set selfishness against itself. Our avidity for acquiring goods and possessions “is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society.” Moreover, “no affection of the human mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper direction to counter-balance the love of gain, and render men fit members of society, by making them abstain from the possessions of others. … There is no passion therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction” (Hume Reference Hume and Selby-Bigge.1740, p. 492). By providing protection for the bounty of selfish energy, property rights used a commitment to long-run selfish ambition to thwart the urge to steal in the short run.
Hume went on to build his entire theory of justice around the social psychological forces that he saw as stabilizing the notion of private property. Justice is not natural to the “mind of man.” Rather it derives its origin “from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants” (Hume Reference Hume and Selby-Bigge.1740, p. 495), Justice, like property, but unlike natural virtues, must be “full and perfect or none at all.” Society then more or less spontaneously establishes rights in private property based on “Occupation, Prescription, Accession and Succession.”
The philosophical argument is profound and utilitarian in spirit. But can it serve the purposes of a utilitarian defense? Does it reasonably trace the consequences of the institution? Throughout Hume’s discussion, as stated in the Treatise and the Enquiry, the social usefulness of private property rights is asserted as a trivial observation, without need of any substantial support. From a utilitarian perspective, Hume regarded the defense of private property as trivial. The “peace and order” of society makes “every individual person … a gainer, on balancing the account; since, without justice, society must immediately dissolve and every one must fall into that savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be suppos’d in society” (Hume Reference Hume and Selby-Bigge.1740, p. 497).
David Hume’s thought had a profound effect on the utilitarians. Paley, a devout churchman, restricted himself to criticizing the agnostic Mr. Hume, but is generally credited with legitimizing Hume’s utilitarianism. Bentham enthusiastically recognized Hume (along with Helvetius) as a major source of his own utilitarianism. And Mill of course had a very high opinion of Hume’s contributions. Still, Paley, Bentham, and Mill did not explicitly invoke Hume’s philosophical arguments on property.Footnote 14 While elegant, that theory could add little in the way of consequential support to the utilitarian defense of property rights. Many of the utilitarians undoubtedly noted Hume’s simple historical examples, but his deeper philosophical speculations provided little in the way of concrete evidence for their position.
IV. IMPOSSIBILITY?
Hume regarded the “historical proofs” against absolute equality as trivial. But did those “proofs” really justify claims for property rights? Utilitarians could hardly ignore in good conscience the wide range of alternative arrangements of property, taxation, redistribution, and public services that clamored for evaluation. Indeed, such an evaluation would seem to be exactly what Mill promised in the introduction to the second book of his Principles when he said, “The distribution of wealth … depends on the laws and customs of society. The rules by which it is determined are what the opinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the community make them, and are very different in different ages and countries; and might be still more different, if mankind so chose” (Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 200). And as suggested above, Mill in his chapters on tenancy does begin just such a discussion of that institution. But such efforts are difficult and painstaking. Far from trivial, the full utilitarian project of determining the specifics of that property system capable of producing the greatest happiness may seem to border on the impossible.
It may just be beyond us (and the early utilitarians) to imagine the full range of social organizations that might be substituted for “perfect” private property rights and then evaluate them from a utilitarian perspective. The utilitarian standard is just too difficult to meet. Yet, none of the early utilitarians seemed to admit the impossibility of what was required.
Put somewhat differently, the history of the utilitarian defense of property, starting with Paley, and building through Bentham, to Mill, seems to be a history of the excluded middle. By largely focusing on the extremes, utilitarians conveniently avoided the most difficult work. The utilitarians were convinced that efforts to achieve absolute equality were chimerical and destructive. The vast majority of their audience undoubtedly agreed. But what they certainly hadn’t proven was the case for a “perfect” property right, whatever that might be. They typically made security into an absolute. The result was embarrassingly Panglossian. Hume, famous for his dictum that “ought” can’t be extracted from “is,” had constructed a highly teleological explanation for property rights. Not satisfied with suggesting that the institution of private property served a range of useful functions, the utilitarians at their most aggressive pushed on to claiming a need for virtually unfettered property rights. All of this is somewhat odd, given the clear recognition by utilitarians that variations on the institution of private property were considerable across the countries of Europe and elsewhere.
We might reasonably ask what type of social science the utilitarians actually imagined capable of deciding among and evaluating these various alternative sets of rules. Paley gave us few hints in this regard and never formalized a social science that could be used to make fundamental decisions about institutions such as property rights. While he spoke of a “science of politics,” he did so in an off-handed and highly informal manner. Thus in discussing hereditary monarchies and elective monarchies, he cited “the confession of every writer on the subject of civil government, the experience of ages, the example of Poland, and of the papal dominions” as establishing the superiority of the former to the latter. But Paley didn’t seem to expect much from such researches, since he placed this conclusion “amongst the few indubitable maxims which the science of politics admits of” (Paley Reference Paley and Mahieu1785, p. 319).
Bentham clearly had a more elaborate vision of social sciences in general and political economy in particular. He saw the “science” of political economy as informing the “art” of governing. And he felt that Smith had made major gains in advancing that science (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1843b, Chs. 1–2). Bentham attempted then to reconcile his own greatest happiness principle with Smith’s political economy. This promising project led to a number of acute observations including the endorsement of a proto-benefit-cost analysis. However, so much was assumed from the start, that the resulting opus could hardly have provided a serious foundation for a defense of private property. The “general rule” for government was simply “Be quiet.” Bentham concluded, “The art, therefore, is reduced within a small compass: security and freedom are all that industry requires.” In effect, Bentham’s rhetorical commitment to laissez-faire and private property preceded his social science. It would have been virtually impossible to use that social science to broadly and seriously test the normative merits of alternative approaches to private property.
Like Bentham, John Stuart Mill made clear the utilitarian challenge to the social sciences. Like his father James Mill, he understood that the goal of achieving the greatest good of the greatest number opened “a wide and difficult field, and that the whole science of human nature must be explored to lay a foundation for the science of government” (James Mill Reference Mill1820). But except for his discussion of tenancy, J. S. Mill avoids the difficult task. As Leslie Stephen observed, utilitarian emphasis on experience never produced the broad social science it would seem to require.
V. AMBIVALENCE?
It is not hard to appreciate the sources of ambivalence in the utilitarian defense of property. Istvan Hont speaks of the “paradox of commercial society”: “The economic efficacy of inequality was a paradox because it drove a wedge between the traditional egalitarian intuitions of Western moral thought and the guiding assumptions of modern political economy” (Hont Reference Hont2005, p. 92). Hence the almost compulsive need to conclude that all was in fact for the better. Hont suggests that Hume (and Smith) had constructed “an argument that resembled in structure and purpose the Christian defense of “evil” in the world by a theodicy, that is a reconciliation of the existence of evil with the benevolence of God” (Hont Reference Hont2005, p. 91). But such constructs inevitably allow the underlying ambivalence to show through. The more careful the attempt, the more likely such ambivalences appear. Under the circumstances, saying less avoids embarrassment.
We have already seen how Paley’s famous discourse on a flock of pigeons suggested considerable ambivalence toward the institution of private property. As D. L. Le Mahieu has commented, “Wrenched from context, the analogy was perhaps the most radical declaration against property in the Enlightenment” (Paley Reference Paley and Mahieu1785, p. xviii). Paley’s passionate statement belies his thin resolution and suggests considerable ambivalence. And even more than Paley, Jeremy Bentham, over his long career, evinced conflicting judgments of the institution of private property. In his most extensive, but still relatively short, defense of private property in Principles of the Civil Code, Bentham reiterates the standard Humean arguments. Recognizing the pull of equality, he argues that security and the ability to plan into the future are fundamental to the advance of the economy. But as Bentham grew older and politically more radical, his prescriptions for the economy verged on redistributional. He advocated for public education, inheritance laws, and welfare. And for all this Bentham has been attacked by more than one libertarian including von Mises and Rothbard. But what the libertarians see as apostasy is more reasonably viewed as a growing ambivalence—a growing ambivalence about the basic defense of private property.
If Paley and Bentham showed considerable ambivalence, they were not the most conflicted utilitarians. Surely that title belongs to John Stuart Mill. Mill eventually endorsed an entire range of redistributional measures. These can easily be seen as conflicting with his support of individualism and laissez-faire. Leslie Stephen put it this way:
If his views had been actually adopted; if the state educated, nationalized land, supported the poor, restrained marriage, regulated labour where individual competition failed, and used its power to equalize wealth, it would very soon adopt state Socialism, and lose sight of Mill’s reservations
(Stephen Reference Stephen1900, v. III, p. 236).Such inconsistencies don’t necessarily reflect any lack of analytical understanding on Mill’s part, but more likely evidence his considerable and growing ambivalence over the classical arguments for private property and laissez-faire.
In the Principles, Mill included two relatively short chapters on property. Here he begins by arguing that the history of the institution of private property is largely irrelevant to measuring its consequences. This surely is somewhat odd, given that utilitarians mean to base their recommendations on experience. And it is odd in that Mill will repeatedly insert historical observations in the discussion. But according to Mill, “Private property as an institution, did not owe its origin to any of those considerations of utility, which plead for the maintenance of it when established” (Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 201).
In place of a strongly historical argument Mill offers a thought experiment for a colony considering a system of private property or collective ownership. The question is what consequences flow from each system. But, both alternatives are to be fully purged of any imperfections. Private property is initially distributed in the fairest possible manner. Collective ownership is governed by democratically elected magistrates. He intends to compare “communism at its best, with the regime of individual property, not as it is, but as it might be made” (Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 208).
Mill then proceeds to his defense, which may easily strike one as no defense at all. It is not the real world of private property he defends. That real world he roundly condemns, endorsing “communism” with all its potential faults over the then present system of private property which, according to Mill, rewarded people in almost inverse proportion to their work effort. Rather, Mill’s conditional defense is for a “principle of private property [which] has never yet had a fair trial in any country. …” (Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 208). Mill goes on:
The laws of property have never yet conformed to the principles on which the justification of private property rests. They have made property of things which never ought to be property, and absolute property where only a qualified property ought to exist. They have not held the balance fairly between human beings, but have heaped impediments upon some, to give advantage to others; they have purposely fostered inequalities, and prevented all from starting fair in the race. That all should indeed start on perfectly equal terms is inconsistent with any law of private property: but if as much pains as has been taken to aggravate the inequality of chances arising from the natural working of the principle, had been taken to temper that inequality by every means not subversive of the principle itself; if the tendency of legislation had been to favour the diffusion, instead of the concentration of wealth—to encourage the subdivision of the large masses, instead of striving to keep them together; the principle of individual property would have been found to have no necessary connexion with the physical and social evils which almost all Socialist writers assume to be inseparable from it
(Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 209).But even in this rarified world Mill hedges his endorsement, suggesting a range of social experiments with alternative systems so that their consequences can be tested by experience.
Mill’s ambivalence comes out strongly in his discussion of taxation. In the Principles he saw dire consequences in general taxation to subsidize the poor at the cost of the propertied rich:
… the surplus would in time be wholly absorbed; taxation for the support of the poor would engross the whole income of the country; the payers and the receivers would be melted down into one mass. The check to population either by death or prudence, could not then be staved off any longer, but must come into operation suddenly and at once; everything which places mankind above a nest of ants or a colony of beavers, having perished in the interval
(Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 358).This from the otherwise gentle Mill. But Mill elsewhere suggests that the economy of a developed country can prosper from a well-designed effort by the state to intervene. In such countries “experience has shown that a large proportion of the results of labour and abstinence may be taken away by fixed taxation, without impairing, and sometimes even with the effect of stimulating, the qualities from which a great production and an abundant capital take their rise. … The Government may carry off a part; but there must be assurance that it will not interfere, nor suffer any one to interfere, with the remainder” (Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 707).
For Mill, the most pressing purpose of taxation was the subsidization of public education. The poor had capacity, but needed considerable development. For all the emphasis on the system of perfect liberty, the poor needed support and guidance. The poor would get little benefit from an absolute equality of property. Rather, in recognition of the potential of the poor, a substantial public investment in education was to be undertaken.
From a classical vantage point such interference with markets ran the risk of all redistributions. But, at least for Mill, the danger was worth the likely reward. Education was one of the few forms of redistribution that could work to erase the very need that brought it forth.
Instruction, when it is really such, does not enervate, but strengthens as well as enlarges the active faculties: in whatever manner acquired, its effect on the mind is favourable to the spirit of independence: and when, unless had gratuitously, it would not be had at all, help in this form has the opposite tendency to that which in so many other cases makes it objectionable; it is help towards doing without help.
(Mill Reference John Stuart and Robson1848, p. 949).The point then is that education and training for production (and to some extent for consumption) represent substantial and critical social investments. Skills and talents cannot be redistributed after the fact. The redistribution of material output will not easily undo an unequal concentration of education and training. Mill firmly believed that nurture not nature is the source of the bulk of inequality. But, in effect, Mill and the utilitarians argued that like nature: Nutritura non facit saltum, nurture makes no leap.Footnote 15 What starts as a rhetorical, almost didactic, defense of private property ends with a call for a major long-term reordering of society.
It would be perverse to suggest that the utilitarians attempted to strategically mask their radicalism with a traditional defense of private property. There was undoubtedly real movement in Bentham’s thought from his Defense of Usury to his endorsement of public education and similarly the older J. S. Mill held a more nuanced view of property than the young. But given the extent of their ambivalence, it was easier and more politic from the start to endorse a widely accepted formula than to subject the institution of private property to an aggressive and extensive examination.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The early utilitarian world view saw people as fundamentally equal. This key assumption created a strong preference for equality. While never asserting absolute equality, the utilitarian perspective traced the bulk of differences in outcomes to nurture and not nature. Minus an education the philosopher ends as a street porter. Utilitarians were particularly aware of the ludicrous quality that clung to a strict interpretation of property rights. No better example could be offered than Paley’s odd flock of pigeons. Of course the resulting second guessing was greater for some, say John Stuart Mill, and less for others, say Paley himself.
The utilitarians walked a precarious path. On the one hand they advocated an extension of the franchise and a broad expansion of public education, on the other they held to a thin defense of the social usefulness of private property as an institution. The tension between these commitments generated a considerable energy. But it was not likely to generate a full scale reconsideration of the defense of private property.
First, that defense was accepted as trivial. Second, any full analysis against the utilitarian standard of the greatest happiness was far beyond the capacity of the political economy of the early nineteenth century (and probably beyond the capacity of economics today). Thirdly, as utilitarian ambivalence deepened the rhetoric of the defense became increasingly awkward.
For at least some later utilitarians the defense eventually was muted by increasingly expansive notions of social planning. From the perspective of modern libertarians these developments were a retreat from a penetrating insight toward an ineffective sentimentality. From the perspective of modern social democracy these changes represented a move from knee-jerk liberal overstatement to maturer reflection. Be that as it may, even the most radical of the early utilitarians, John Stuart Mill, who questioned both inheritance and private land ownership, never provided the full-scale, empirically based defense (or attack) on the central institution of the modern capitalist economy.
