Sungmoon Kim’s Confucian Democracy in East Asia is an important contribution to the recent scholarship that examines the political relevance of Confucius to contemporary political thought and practice. The book is divided into three parts, with Part I providing a comprehensive and critical overview of the recent scholarship, Part II elaborating Kim’s theoretical contribution, a Confucian democracy, and Part III devoted to a detailed review of Confucian democracy in South Korea.
In Part I, “Toward Confucian Democratic Theory,” Kim distinguishes between what he calls the Confucian Communitarians, who turn to Confucian rituals and offices and the “democratic values” sustained by Confucian “role ethics” to counter what they see as the maladies of modern liberal rights-based individualism (Chapter 2), and the Confucian elitists who think Confucian meritocracy provides a salutary counter to modern mass democracy (Chapter 3). Kim generally favours the Confucian communitarians (p. 70). Yet he thinks their endorsement of a Confucian social self is an “aestheticism that prefers a prepolitical, non-dialogic, ritualistically orchestrated ‘tacit’ consensus” that seems to preclude individual moral agency (pp. 39–43), or favours conservatism because it leaves little room for what Kim calls incivility (as opposed to uncivility) (pp. 63ff). The Confucian elitists, who claim that liberal democracy is not plausible in Confucian democracies because they have a long tradition of meritocratically choosing political elites (p. 72), are rejected by Kim on the theoretical grounds that Confucian virtue politics, benevolent government, and moral statesmanship is qualitatively different from meritocratic elitism. This elitism Kim traces to Han Fai or the Legalist tradition of thought, “concerned more with the security and stability of the state than with the welfare (particularly the moral well-being) of the people” (p. 74).
The overview of the Confucian scholarship in Part I provides the basis for Kim’s own contribution in Parts II and III of the book. His central thesis is that “in East Asian societies democracy would be most politically effective and culturally relevant if it were rooted in and operates on the ‘Confucian habits and mores’ with which East Asian are still deeply saturated, sometimes without their awareness—in other words, if democracy were a Confucian democracy” (p. 4). Part II, “Confucian Democracy in Theory—A Pluralist Reconstruction,” explores important themes, such as value pluralism (Chapter 4), familialism and public reasoning (Chapter 5), welfarism (Chapter 6) and meritocracy (Chapter 7). Each chapter is in a sense a “reinvention” of both Confucianism and democracy, because “for Confucian democracy to be socially meaningful and politically practicable in increasingly pluralizing East Asian societies, both Confucianism and democracy must undergo dialectical transformations and constrain each other, thus creating the social condition favourable for it” (p. 128).
In Part III, “Confucian Democracy in Practice—The Korean Case” we get a better sense of what Confucian Democracy means in practice. The core argument developed in Chapter 8, “Motivating and Legitimating Confucian Democracy: The Politics of Chŏng,” outlines the way Chŏng, a form of “affectionate rationality,” sustains the “uri (‘we’)-responsibility” civic virtue that is essential for maintaining and empowering Korean citizenship and democracy (pp. 205–226). Chŏng has also a legitimating effect in social discourses and practices according to Kim, which he demonstrates in the subsequent three chapters focusing on questions of human rights (Chapter 9), liberty (Chapter 10), and multiculturalism (Chapter 11).
Kim advises that the book can be read by moving from Part I directly to Part III, which suggests that there are in a sense two books here, a more theoretical and general work for ‘East Asia’ (Parts I and II) and a more specific “Confucian Democracy in South Korea” (Parts I and III) (pp. 19 fn 50). It is in this second, “Korean” book that we see why a Confucian democracy is needed. “In a sense” according to Kim, “Korean democracy is undergoing a crisis; as its civil society is rapidly being pluralized and multiculturalized, it is spending down the bonding social capital that it used to be able to draw on for sustenance” (p. 268). The dilemma seems to be a choice between Korean Confucian civility and the democracy it sustains (or can be made to accommodate), and the challenge of liberalism that threatens Korean civility. Kim’s intention is therefore to negotiate this dilemma by “reconstructing” both Confucianism and democracy to meet this challenge. In essence, the book is Monstesquieuian in spirit, counselling future legislators on the need to reconcile free government with the general spirit of a nation, which is shaped by climate, religion, laws, customs, and manners. The work as a whole therefore displays the Montesquieuian virtue of moderation in formulating arguments, repudiating critics, and importantly, in showing the need for judgment or prudence in negotiating competing demands of customs and mores, and liberal rights.
The more theoretical “East Asia” version of the book also displays such virtues. The overview and engagement with contemporary Confucian scholarship is comprehensive, detailed, and fair. The reconstruction of Confucianism is nuanced and thoughtful, drawing upon classical Chinese scholarship as well as contemporary democratic theory. But this discussion, unmoored from distinctive traditions, reveals the limits of such an approach. There is little on what constitutes “East Asia” and the “habits of the heart” in each country (p. 247). What constitutes the “Confucian” tradition is also not clear. It is not surprising that Kim often turns to Mencius to reconstruct his Confucian democracy (pp. 65, 95, 137, 165, 173, 192), but if the focus is lived tradition, is it not appropriate to include, rather than repudiate the Legalists as “not Confucian,” not to mention Daoism, Buddhism, and in contemporary terms, Christianity? Importantly, if Confucianism need not have such theoretical complexity and practically means “familialism”—respect for one’s elders, family, and the common good (p. 90)—is there anything distinctively Confucian about these virtues that arguably obtain in all societies?
In a similar vein, there is insufficient theoretical examination in Part II of the precise nature of the threat to Confucian civility. Passing remarks suggest the danger is atomistic individualism and neoliberal consumerism (pp. 4, 37, 39, 70, 113). The question is taken up directly in Part III, but in the specific context of Korea’s adoption of Kantian “universal personhood.” Thus the “internal tension between the universalism of liberalism and the particularism of democracy” is to be solved, according to Kim, not by imposing liberal democracy but by developing it locally (p. 235). This is because “Confucian habits of the heart” mean liberalism cannot simply be implanted in Korea (p. 242). Leaving aside the question of whether this claim is descriptive (liberalism cannot be implanted) or normative (it should not), this theoretical discussion of individual rights does not attend sufficiently to political practice shaped by liberal institutions. Korean democracy is constitutionally committed to core liberal democratic principles such as “respect of human rights, political liberty, and the autonomy of civil society” (p. 279). The book therefore could have usefully explored whether and to what extent its endorsement of “Confucian” democracy, founded on the “state as family-state (gukka) and society as extended family” (p. 243) or the view that “in Korea the political is familial” (p. 266), can ever be consistent with liberal constitutionalism—that is, the rule of law, separation of powers, and an independent judiciary (cf pp. 114–116; 281). Confucianism may be made democratic, but whether it can be recast as liberal is the important question that shadows this thoughtful book.
