But if faith were emptied [of its meaning], what righteousness would remain for a human being, since “the righteous lives by faith” (Rom. 1:17; Hab. 2:4)?Footnote 1
Faith and Justification in Augustine and His Legacy
Written in 416, epistula (Letter) 177 reflects the late maturation of Augustine’s theology of justification by faith, a mystery of grace which had occupied his attention for over twenty years. It expresses his growing realization that it is not enough to ground human righteousness in faith, or to quote that “the righteous lives by faith.” Rather, the grace of justification is preserved only if faith is not “emptied.” But what is the meaning of faith, which must not be “emptied”? Why is it that, of all the virtues which could be highlighted by Augustine or Scripture, the righteous lives by faith?
Augustine stands behind Western Christianity’s centuries of debate over justification in numerous instances by name and countless more implicitly. He appears in Martin Luther’s famous recounting of his discovery of the justifying righteousness of God, just after the apostle Paul.Footnote 2 Centuries before Luther, extracts from Augustine on faith and justification predominate in medieval Latin Christianity’s foremost biblical commentary – the Glossa Ordinaria – and its foremost theological resource – Peter Lombard’s Sentences – as well as in the works of major theologians,Footnote 3 such as Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae.Footnote 4 And in the centuries which followed, Augustine’s teaching on justification assumes a central position (and is a central point of debate) in John Calvin’s InstitutesFootnote 5 and in the works of other Reformers,Footnote 6 at the Regensburg Colloquy’s (1541) attempt at reconciliation,Footnote 7 in the Council of Trent,Footnote 8 in John Henry Newman’s Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification,Footnote 9 in Karl Barth,Footnote 10 and others.Footnote 11 He is the only individual named in the body of the 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church’s section on justification, which names him as the inspiration for elevating justification as “the most excellent work of God’s love made manifest in Christ Jesus and granted by the Holy Spirit.”Footnote 12 Alister McGrath’s Iustitia Dei, the only modern study of the whole Western history of the doctrine of justification, has been tremendously successful in drawing attention to Augustine’s theology of justification. McGrath simply designates Augustine “the fountainhead.”Footnote 13 McGrath offers two reasons: that Augustine is the first Christian author to offer an integrated, coherent account of justification within “a grander theological vision” and that Augustine was uniquely forced to clarify the doctrine of justification by the theological controversies of his day, especially with Pelagianism.Footnote 14
Despite the importance of Augustine’s influence on the history of justification in Western Christianity, relatively few modern studies have been written on justification or faith in Augustine, and none of them are comprehensively dedicated to the topic.Footnote 15 By comparison, Augustine’s doctrine of grace continues to receive ample focus. Augustine’s thought on justification was largely ignored in nineteenth-century scholarship, likely due to both the legacy of disputes about justification between Catholics and Protestants and disputes about grace within Catholicism, especially in the shadow of Jansenism.Footnote 16 A few shorter works in roughly the first half of the twentieth century addressed faithFootnote 17 or justification,Footnote 18 usually in a specific context.Footnote 19 In the second half of the twentieth century, Alister McGrath’s Iustitia Dei (1st ed. 1986; 4th ed. 2020) has been the most influential treatment, sparking numerous short responses,Footnote 20 though it reflects the earlier, shorter interpretations of John Burnaby,Footnote 21 Georges Bavaud,Footnote 22 and Peter Riga.Footnote 23
The consensus among these treatments, including those who ultimately disagree with Augustine, has been that justification for Augustine is essentially a matter of charity, not faith. Bavaud says, “The love of man for God is the cause of justification,” and “in the eyes of Augustine, it is charity which justifies the sinner.”Footnote 24 Caroline Hammond Bammel contrasts Augustine and Origen’s approaches to justification as a process of renewal in charity for Augustine vs. a forensic moment in faith for Origen.Footnote 25 Robert Dodaro largely agrees: “justification is an active process by which God restores human beings to justice, that is, to a proper relationship of obedience to God,” where justice is the right “order of love.”Footnote 26 McGrath himself put the contrast most strongly in his 3rd edition (2005) of Iustitia Dei:
[For Augustine,] faith alone is merely assent to revealed truth, itself inadequate to justify. It is for this reason that it is unacceptable to summarize Augustine’s doctrine of justification as sola fide iustificamur – if any such summary is acceptable, it is sola caritate iustificamur. For Augustine, it is love, rather than faith, which is the power which brings about the conversion of people…. The personal union of individuals with the Godhead, which forms the basis of their justification, is brought about by love, not by faith.Footnote 27
Several responses to McGrath since the original publication of Iustitia Dei in 1989 have criticized this summary,Footnote 28 perhaps leading to its absence in the 4th edition (2020), though the 4th edition does not provide an explanation or replacement.Footnote 29 The sola caritate (by charity alone), therefore, remains a common reading of Augustine with no clear alternative on offer.Footnote 30 On the basis of the existing scholarship, why should it be otherwise?
These approaches do correctly understand that righteousness consists in charity for Augustine, but they strangely miss the essential rootedness of justification in faith. The reduction of justification to charity would seem to entail precisely what Augustine had warned against in epistula 177: the emptying of faith and therefore the obscuring of justification. Although Augustine does often link charity and righteousness,Footnote 31 he speaks just as frequently, if not more, of the identification of faith and righteousness: “your righteousness is your faith;”Footnote 32 “this will be your righteousness, to believe in me [Christ] as mediator;”Footnote 33 “our righteousness is from faith…. This is the righteousness of faith, to believe what you do not see and by the merit of your faith attain to vision.”Footnote 34 He often describes faith as essential for the proper working of all the other virtues, as if it fundamentally orders, shapes, or arranges them.Footnote 35 “Faith in Augustine,” concludes Magnus Löhrer, “stands at the core of a religious life.”Footnote 36 While the expression iustitia caritatis (the righteousness of charity) never appears in his writing, Augustine uses the Pauline expression iustitia fidei (the righteousness of faith)Footnote 37 roughly fifty times in his corpus.Footnote 38 More recent scholars have noticed this imbalance in the traditional treatment of Augustine’s theology of justification,Footnote 39 but none so far have offered a sustained analysis of how and why Augustine attributes human justification to faith. Understanding the meaning of faith in Augustine can therefore be traced back to a fundamental and deeply exegetical question: what is the iustitia fidei?
The affirmation that righteousness for Augustine consists in charity must be matched by the reality that it subsists in faith. Fundamentally, in Augustine, faith justifies because faith reconciles one to God by receiving the life of Christ and the Holy Spirit. This is evident psychologically in the intellectual, volitional, and fiducial character of faith in Augustine’s thought, with faith serving to define human ends, desires, and relationships in reference to their highest good, God. Faith is the indispensable matrix for properly theological desire. The iustitia fidei is also evident in Augustine’s correlation of his theology of justification by faith with ecclesial practices, especially baptism. Faith’s epistemological character as trust (fides) rather than sight corresponds precisely with the sacramental nature of the incarnation and the human need for an ecstatic reliance on God for grace. But most of all, it is evident in the central thesis of this book: that Augustine eventually develops not one but three distinct ways of interpreting faith, each of which yields a different approach to the righteousness of faith.
Since faith is always both intellectual and affective, these three ways can be distinguished by three paradigmatic motivations for believing: fear, hope, and love. Fearful faith is exemplified by schismatics and lax catechumens (who are afraid of the cost of Christian commitment), hopeful faith by baptismal candidates (competentes) and penitents who are driven by trust in God’s future help, and loving faith by the baptized, persevering faithful (fideles). No one faith holds exclusive right to the term fides (faith). Fides is therefore polyvalent. If by fides one means faith paralyzed by fear, this faith is idle assent, what Augustine calls sola fides (faith alone) without works, which is insufficient for righteousness, or fides daemonum (the faith of demons) – since “the demons believe, but tremble” with fear (James 2:19). Though this bare faith in need of charity is often the interpretation of justification ascribed to Augustine, it represents only one reading of fides.Footnote 40
When motivated by hope, however, fides means trust, which turns to, pursues, and then obtains the grace of the Holy Spirit. Unlike fear, hope motivates faith to accept the sacrifices of pursuing God’s offer of grace, especially in baptism. In this way, the righteousness of faith is the righteousness obtained and enabled by faith; it takes its name from faith’s striving for grace, its conditioning of the mind to enable good works, and its anticipation of receiving charity. This represents a second interpretation of the iustitia fidei.
But fides motivated by love clings to God with the whole heart and mind, thereby reordering the whole soul justly, and participates in Christ’s righteousness. Augustine identifies such christoform faith with the scriptural expression to “believe in Christ” (credere in Christum), in contrast to the mere propositional belief that Jesus is the Christ (credere Christum), which even the demons admit. The in with the accusative construction emphasizes that faith sets one in motion in a definitive direction toward a clear end: “to go to him by believing,”Footnote 41 as Augustine says. The righteousness of believing in Christ is not an anticipation, as with hope, but a synecdoche for the whole of human righteousness. It implies not just what one believes or whom one trusts but, fundamentally, what one is about.Footnote 42 Believing in Christ is righteousness.Footnote 43
This distinction between the three senses of iustitia fidei is a gradual development in Augustine’s thinking and never receives systematic deployment. Augustine generally distinguishes the meaning of iustitia fidei in paired contrasts – between loving and fearful faith, or between hope and love, or between fear and hope – and not in the full triad. In particular, while love and faith are conceptually quite distinct, Augustine does not offer a clear definition of hope, which blends elements of both. On the one hand, Augustine implies that hope is simply the belief that one has a future good, in which case it seems to be just a kind of faith.Footnote 44 But, on the other hand, when he writes that “hope cannot exist without love,” hope seems to mean love of a future good, in which case it is just a kind of love.Footnote 45 How then is hope distinguishable from love, or hopeful faith from loving faith? The difference is between a desire enkindled by an absent good and a desire enkindled by one present. Hope is the longing for an expected good, while love is the enjoyment of one possessed. When love is broadly defined as “to desire something for its own sake,” hope is a love;Footnote 46 but when love is defined more narrowly as union and enjoyment, as “a movement of the mind to enjoying God for his own sake”Footnote 47 or as “willing to be present in order to enjoy [something],”Footnote 48 hope is a foretaste of love. While this distinction is not one that Augustine explicitly makes, this book will argue that it reflects numerous other distinctions, prevents contradictions within his theology of justification, and unlocks its overall intelligibility. The distinct righteousness of hopeful faith and of loving faith is one of the most important legacies of Augustine’s theology of justification.
Nonetheless, even from his earliest works, there are clear hints and seeds of the overall development. In soliloquia (Soliloquies) (386–87), Augustine writes that the cleansing of the soul first depends on faith to know the real nature of health and to recognize its sickness. But since the soul is sick, it will “feel that these commands are harsh” – it will fear them – and thus “hope must be added.” And in order to actually desire and carry out its enlightenment, hope must come to charity.Footnote 49 This brief passage contains all three motivations – fear, hope, and love – as growing from and within faith. Thus, while these three ways of accounting for justifying faith do not come to the reader completely pre-assembled, they are more than merely a modern hermeneutical tool. The three paradigmatic motivations for believing follow Augustine’s own distinctions and his own insistence on the need to identify the range of meaning of fides for understanding justification. Once unpacked, distinguishing fearful, hopeful, and loving faith indispensably illuminates his theology of grace, conversion, sacramental initiation, and justification. Moreover, it shows how righteousness subsists in faith because faith is the crucible of divine desire.
Fundamentals: iustificare and iustitia
Augustine’s doctrine of justification held several constitutive features by the height of the Pelagian controversy, the period in which it is most well-known.Footnote 50 An early overview of these features, which are familiar to many already and attested throughout Augustine’s work, will provide a common basis for understanding the remainder of this project. Justification is the effective beginning of God’s salvation.Footnote 51 First and foremost, justification is a free gift of grace and a work of God,Footnote 52 not a human work or accomplishment:Footnote 53 “Christ justifies; man doesn’t justify.”Footnote 54 Although human nature was created good in Adam, it is now universally injured and in need of restoration and pardon;Footnote 55 human nature’s injury includes the inability to restore itself.Footnote 56 Augustine frequently quotes Paul to warn that, if humans could self-justify, then Christ died in vain.Footnote 57 Human cooperation is, nonetheless, essential in Augustine’s view,Footnote 58 since it is not the sleeping but the willing who are justified. Human free choiceFootnote 59 is held captive by sin (liberum arbitrium captivatum) and has not been annihilated by the fall.Footnote 60 In a sermon from around 416, Augustine explains Philippians 3:9, “not having a righteousness of my own:”
The whole thing is from God, not, however, as though we were asleep…. Indeed, there is no will except yours; there is no righteousness except God’s. The righteousness of God can exist without your will, but apart from your will it cannot exist in you…. God made you without you… [But] he who made you without you does not justify you without you…. Nevertheless, he himself justifies, so that it is not your righteousness.Footnote 61
This cooperation is in no way an independent contribution or an assent preceding God’s action. On the contrary, God justifies human beings “with” them precisely insofar as he makes the unwilling become willing.
Justification, then, names God’s healing work of making righteous those who are unrighteous.Footnote 62 It unites two elements: the forgiveness of sin and interior renewal. In his contra Iulianum opus imperfectum (Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian), a late work representing his mature thinking, Augustine defines justification as follows: “God, of course, justifies sinners, not only by forgiving the evil deeds they committed, but also by bestowing love so that they avoid evil and do good through the Holy Spirit.”Footnote 63 God’s justification of sinners entails their real rectification and restoration, but this renewal only suffices for righteousness with the erasure of sinners’ past guilt. Forgiveness means that the past act is not counted against the presently renewed person: “That which is forgiven is both covered and not imputed.”Footnote 64 Human righteousness always depends on God’s past and ongoing pardon; indeed, “our righteousness in this life consists in the forgiveness of sins rather than the perfection of virtues,”Footnote 65 since the virtues contribute to righteousness but never reach perfection. The unworthiness of all for the gift of renewal and forgiveness underscores the gratuity of justification.Footnote 66 Augustine is adamant that justification is not God’s recognition of who is already righteous but rather his gracious creation of a new reality.Footnote 67 By renewal and forgiveness, justification acquires a distinct beginning when it is “established.”Footnote 68 But whereas forgiveness is complete once given, renewal is always incomplete and growing:Footnote 69 “we have been justified, but this righteousness can grow.”Footnote 70 Nonetheless, Augustine is adamant that the imperfection of righteousness does not make it illusory or unreal.Footnote 71
In Augustine’s own idiom, the terms “Christian” (Christianus) and “believer” (credens) encompass all who profess the true faith, baptized or unbaptized, and are not synonymous with being saved or justified. Not all “believers” (credentes) but only the “faithful” (fideles) are justified,Footnote 72 that is, baptized believers, since justification requires both faith and baptism.Footnote 73 Baptism justifies because it effects the two elements of justification: its washing effects forgiveness, which Augustine links to “no condemnation” (Rom. 8:1), and its gift of the Holy Spirit provides the fulfillment of the “righteousness of the law” (Rom. 8:4).Footnote 74 Still, in this life, the justified – though truly made righteous – remain sinners because of lingering evil desires.Footnote 75 Their sins are comparatively slight (levia) and are pardonable (venialia) through prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. In this sense, these practices can also be called righteousnessFootnote 76 and contribute to Christian righteousness.Footnote 77 Grave (gravia) or damnable sins, however, such as “impurity [e.g., adultery], apostasy, and murder,”Footnote 78 are only forgiven through rigorous penance under the bishop’s supervision.Footnote 79 Without such repentance, these sins are incompatible with justification.Footnote 80
What is the life of the justified like? Justification is not a possession, making one self-sufficiently righteous. Even the justified are in constant need of grace, especially the grace to persevere in charity and resist grave sin to the end.Footnote 81 God has predestined who will be justified and who will persevere,Footnote 82 though he works within human wills, not against them.Footnote 83 Even then, no one knows if he is predestined and will persevere in grace (or not).Footnote 84 The justified must actively choose to work out their salvation, which is why free choice is a necessary gift of God.Footnote 85 Though good works are necessary for salvation,Footnote 86 Augustine never speaks of justification by works, since works are always consequent on justification.Footnote 87 Works do contribute to the reception of eternal life as a reward;Footnote 88 nonetheless, all merits are still the result of God’s help and initial gifts,Footnote 89 and so even the most meritorious good works of the justified are never less than “his own gifts.”Footnote 90
Many of these components of his mature teaching on justification only emerge clearly over time, though in several cases, Augustine explicitly changes his view. While scholars disagree on how much Augustine reversed or altered his own thinking, two points are widely accepted because Augustine himself named them in his retractationes (Revisions). First, prior to the 400s, Augustine takes the speaker in Romans 7:14–25 who says, “the law is spiritual, but I am fleshly” (7:14), to be someone in need of grace, not yet imbued by the Spirit, and thus not the apostle. After the 400s, he increasingly distances himself from this view, concluding that this passage describes the spiritual person under grace, who must constantly fight against concupiscence.Footnote 91 If not indicative of a particular change in doctrine, it does demonstrate a shift in emphasis related to justification: even the justified are never free from sin and continuously need grace. Faith’s role is not its one-time acceptance of Christ and the Spirit but the continual reliance of the justified on God. Thus, as we will see, Augustine’s changing reading of Romans 7 corresponds with his expanded ability to talk about justification by faith not only as a description of a past conversion from sin to righteousness but also as a description of the ongoing state of being caused by faith itself.
Second and most famously, in 396, while writing ad Simplicianum (To Simplician), Augustine becomes convinced that the initial choice to believe (the initium fidei) is not the basis of God’s election but a result of it; God chooses or elects who, precisely, will come to faith. Crucially, this means that faith cannot be attributed solely to our free choice but must be seen as the effect of God’s choice. Augustine admits that he had been “mistaken, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God is not a gift of God, but that we have it from ourselves…. I thought that it was our very own and something we had from ourselves that we assented to the gospel.”Footnote 92 We will return to both of these changes.
Iustificare
A remarkable point of clear continuity in Augustine’s theology of justification is his interpretation of iustificatio (justification) fundamentally as “making righteous.” For Augustine, justification makes the recipient righteous before God. The Latin term iustificare (to justify) has no classical precedents but arises in Latin Christian texts – first the Vetus Latina (Old Latin) used by Augustine and others, and then the Vulgate – to translate the Greek dikaioun.Footnote 93 Augustine consistently interprets iustificare as a compound of iustum (righteous) and facere (to make),Footnote 94 that is, “to make righteous,” just as vivificare means “to make (facere) alive (vivum)” and mortificare means “to make (facere) dead (mortuum).”Footnote 95 It is almost a tautology to call Augustine’s understanding of iustificare factitive given its root in facere. Augustine does at some points recognize that Scripture uses iustificare to mean “to count righteous,” such as when interpreting Romans 2:13 (“those who observe the law will be justified”), but even in these rare instances he explains the declaration by presupposing a prior transformation,Footnote 96 thereby reinforcing his factitive understanding of justification.Footnote 97 That Augustine is aware of but does not hold to a declarative sense of justification shows that he should not be thought of as blinded into his exegesis by a faulty Latin translation.Footnote 98 Augustine’s overall reading of justification in Paul as iustum facere is a considered theological position rather than a philological accident.
Augustine’s understanding of justification corresponds with his interpretation of the iustitia dei (the righteousness of God). The iustitia dei is not a property of God in the sense of God’s own righteousness but names an outpoured gift into the justified: “not that righteousness by which God is righteous but that righteousness with which he endows a person when he justifies him.”Footnote 99 In characterizing this endowed righteousness, Augustine does not use the distinction of inherent vs. imputed righteousness, the flashpoint of later disputes about the nature of justification.Footnote 100 On the one hand, Augustine clearly understands righteousness to be a property given to the justified, one “imparted (impertita) by God;”Footnote 101 on the other hand, Augustine affirms that righteousness “consists in forgiveness,”Footnote 102 which is the non-imputation of sins. Together, the imparting of righteousness and the forgiveness of sins point to the holistically restorative nature of justification in his thought, which one reader has nicely coined “ontological and sanative.”Footnote 103 Because Augustine understands human righteousness to be real and appropriate to this life,Footnote 104 albeit incomplete and consisting in forgiveness, there is no evidence of a duplex iustitia (double righteousness) in his thought.Footnote 105 In fact, that Augustine understands iustificare as synonymous with transformation and iustitia (righteousness) as an inward gift was well recognized (and critiqued) even among many sixteenth-century Protestant admirers of Augustine.Footnote 106
The recurrent efforts by some scholars to relativize Augustine’s universally factitive understanding of justification, or to introduce an imputation of Christ’s righteousness, simply misunderstand his texts and insert false dichotomies;Footnote 107 at the same time, these readers are right to note that Augustine’s account is not exclusively factitive (even if it is universally so).Footnote 108 Even if the word iustificare is understood factitively, the surrounding theology encompasses declarative elements. Many distinctions commonly treated as irreconcilable – process vs. event, declarative vs. transformational, participatory vs. inhering, forgiveness vs. renewal – can both be found in Augustine.Footnote 109 For him, justification is forgiveness of past sins as well as renewal in love, participation in Christ from whom one’s righteousness inheres, a declaration on the basis of a transformation, and an event which expands into a process. Rather than seeing Augustine as a partisan of transformation vs. declaration, infusion vs. non-imputation, perhaps the most fruitful way to receive Augustine is as a reconciler of these oft-sundered ideas and biblical texts.
If righteousness is imparted into humans in justification, how does Augustine interpret the reckoning or imputation of righteousness in Scripture, as in Romans 4:5: “his faith is counted (Aug. deputatur;Footnote 110 Vulg. reputatur; Gk. logizetai) as righteousness”?Footnote 111 While Augustine reads iustificare as synthetic – creating what is not previously there – he interprets deputare (to count) as analytic – God’s analysis of the reality of what he has created.Footnote 112 Faith reckoned (deputatur) as righteousness is God’s reasoned assessment (existimare) of what he has already created in justification. Commenting on Psalm 119:119, Augustine equates these terms: “‘I have counted (deputavi) or considered (putavi) or judged (existimavi) all sinners on earth as violators of the law.’ Our translators have had recourse to various words to represent the one Greek verb elogisamēn.”Footnote 113 In justification, God creates the conditions of righteousness which are simultaneously the grounds for his judgment or analysis.
For Augustine, to reckon a sinner to be righteous by sheer force of declaration alone – to count someone righteous who is not – does not describe a divine act but an all too human one. Such false reckonings call to Augustine’s mind precisely what the person does who wishes to “justify himself” (Luke 10:29),Footnote 114 asserting that one is righteous despite the opposite reality. Counterfactual declarations describe the tendency of human judgments to declare some to be just or sinners who are really the opposite in the sight of God, as when ignorant or corrupt human beings acquit the guilty or condemn the innocent. God’s “reckoning” is often contrary to human estimations, but it is never contrary to the reality; in the case of justification the reality “reckoned” is the very one God has re-created: “‘believing in him who justifies the impious’ (Rom. 4:5), that is, who makes (facit) the pious from the impious with the result that ‘faith is counted (deputetur) as righteousness’ (Rom. 4:5).”Footnote 115 God makes the unrighteous righteous and then rightly “counts (deputatur)” them among the righteous.
Iustitia
As a lifelong admirer of Cicero, it is not surprising to see that as early as the 380s, Augustine adopted Cicero’s famous definition of iustitia (the one Latin term translated by both “righteousness” and “justice”): to render to each their due.Footnote 116 In this sense, iustitia is justice, one of the classical four cardinal virtues. Frequently, however, Augustine reinterprets iustitia as the right orderingFootnote 117 of all things in love, delight, or charity (by his own insistence, there is no difference in meaning between these terms).Footnote 118 According to Augustine, love is not an emotion but a stable disposition to have specific desires or impulses toward actions; this disposition depends on beliefs about the relative value of goods.Footnote 119 In this order of loves, he follows Cyprian, Lactantius, and Ambrose,Footnote 120 though Augustine also harmonizes this approach with Cicero’s by noting that love expresses the true “due” which anyone is owed.Footnote 121
In this way, the Latin iustitia suggests not only justice but also righteousness, or right relationship between the human person and God and all others through God.Footnote 122 Justification, then, means the right reordering of human beings in relation to God and each other,Footnote 123 and righteousness is love because love disposes one to relate to every good exactly as much as its goodness deserves. Love is the reason for every movement of the soul, and thus the root of every action. And yet, although Augustine often equates righteousness and love,Footnote 124 he also does the same with faith;Footnote 125 thus, iustitia as the ordo amoris (order of love) does not lead to a reduction of iustitia to love alone but invites a deeper analysis of the relationship between faith, love, and justification.
Is the righteousness of the justified a righteousness created in them, or does it exist only by participation in God, or even only in the divine judgment? Augustine makes it clear that in justification, God both makes human beings participants in his righteousness and renews them through a created righteousness within them; indeed, created righteousness is the effect and form of their participation, without which they could not be said to be participants. One of Augustine’s clearest articulations of the real distinction between the divine righteousness and the righteousness created in human beings in their justification arises in confessiones (Confessions) 12 as part of his interpretation of Sirach [Ecclesiasticus] 1:4, “wisdom was created before everything.” There Augustine uses justification to provide an analogy for the difference between divine wisdom and created wisdom. Passages such as this speaking of created wisdom, as with Proverbs 8, were a commonplace in fourth-to-fifth-century Christological debates insofar as they suggested the Arian view that the wisdom incarnate in Christ was the first of God’s creation – incomparably exalted, but nonetheless a creature, and thus ontologically distinct and subordinate to God.Footnote 126 For defenders of Nicaea, the metaphysical distinction between the created and the uncreated was essential for responding to Arianism. Augustine denies that Sirach 1:4 speaks of Christ because such an interpretation rests on a failure to distinguish the created wisdom from its uncreated cause, which is “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24).
In response, Augustine adopts a common Nicene interpretation: the wisdom named in Sirach 1:4 is not God’s own, proper wisdom – which must be co-eternal with God lest we admit that God was for a time without wisdom – but a created wisdom within the world, “an intellectual nature which is light from contemplation of light.”Footnote 127 He then explains that the difference between God’s own wisdom and created wisdom is the “difference between light which illuminates and that which is illuminated.”Footnote 128 In this analogy, the former light is God’s own divine light as illuminating (illuminat), while the latter light is the creature’s received light as illuminated (illuminatur). The former is God, and the latter is created.
Augustine then adds an analogy to iustitia, saying that there is also an equivalent difference “between wisdom which creates (creat) and wisdom which is created (creata est), just as between the righteousness which justifies (iustitiam iustificantem) and the righteousness made in justification (iustitiam quae iustificatione facta est). For even we are said to be your righteousness (2 Cor. 5:21).”Footnote 129 The former righteousness – justifying righteousness – is the proper righteousness of God by which he justifies, just as he has a wisdom by which he makes wise and a light by which he illumines. The latter righteousness – the righteousness made by God in justification – is the created impress of God’s righteousness, just as God’s own wisdom makes its recipients wise with a created wisdom and God’s own light makes its recipients illumined with a created illumination. The created impress is the correlate of the efficacy of the divine form itself. God’s wisdom is the source of all human wisdom, just as God’s righteousness is the source of all human righteousness. This passage not only demonstrates but explains why the righteousness of the justified is not identical with God’s own righteousness but is, instead, something created by him.Footnote 130
To collapse the two iustitiae – the divine and human – by proposing that justification entails only a human entrance into the divine righteousness or only a reckoning of divine righteousness is to fall into the same metaphysical confusion of the uncreated and the created which plagues Arianism. The righteousness of the justified is not God’s uncreated righteousness indwelling. It is a created righteousness made by the uncreated iustitia iustificans (righteousness which justifies). But there is nonetheless an analogous metaphysical continuity between the righteousness of God justifying and the righteousness of the human being justified, just as there is an analogous relationship between the wisdom of God illuminans (illuminating) and the human being illuminatus (illuminated) with created light. They are not identical, but the latter is an effect and reflection of the former. Augustine can speak of “my righteousness,” but also “not as properly mine or given to me by myself,” since it comes from God.Footnote 131 Moreover, just as with light and wisdom, all created righteousness possesses its distinct reality by participation in God’s righteousness, and the more one participates, the more righteous one becomes;Footnote 132 the created always depends on the creator.
Augustine’s understanding of created righteousness undergirds the fundamental realism of his whole theology of justificationFootnote 133 and, as this passage from confessiones shows, stands in basic continuity with his fundamental understanding of the relationship between God and the world, grace, and nature. As a testimony to this realism, Augustine says near the end of his life that “those human beings who are reborn in Christ are made righteous by the same grace by which Christ was born a righteous man.”Footnote 134 The Christian’s righteousness is as real as Christ’s, since it shares the same source and nature as Christ’s. In short, this passage from confessiones provides an unusual level of clarity that Augustine understands the righteousness of the justified human being to be a created righteousness, not the uncreated righteousness of Christ, even though this created righteousness exists only by continuous participation in the uncreated.Footnote 135
Why Justification?
In the twentieth century, numerous concerns have been expressed about the enduring relevance or fittingness of a doctrine of justification – by implication, this includes the enduring relevance of Augustine’s doctrine of justification. Biblical scholar Michael Gorman wrote in 2009, “The doctrine of justification is in crisis, or at least in flux.”Footnote 136 Since at least the early twentieth century there has been a growing sense that justification as a theological locus has lost its relevanceFootnote 137 or ought to be abandoned,Footnote 138 while the rise of the New Perspective on Paul has challenged many of the assumptions surrounding traditional Pauline theology stretching back to Augustine about the meaning of justification, works, or pistis Christou.Footnote 139 Past approaches to justification have often retreated into well-worn polemical ruts. Concerns about their narrow focus on the status of the individual before God have often spurred more Christological or ecclesiological approaches to Christian salvation, because the theology of justification seems locked on the individual’s binary relationship to God, rather than the corporate dimension of the Church or the cosmic scope of Christ. The Augustinian doctrine of justification by faith also seems to necessitate a soteriological exclusivism, relying as it does on the anthropological premise that it is impossible for any will to be converted to love without the intellect’s conversion to right faith. Is it not the case that this undermines the will’s transcendental orientation to the good? Lastly, even if there is a historical value to justification among Western Christians due to the post-Reformation divides between Catholics and Protestants, the landmark Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification might suggest that these issues are no longer in need of further historical investigation. All of these causes have left justification seeming exhausted and exhausting.
Such was not the case for Augustine, who thought a doctrine of justification was necessary and perennially important. For Augustine, the absence of a theology of justification by grace is a distinguishing feature of Pelagianism. In 418, at the height of the Pelagian controversy and after several years of writing in response to the theology of Caelestius and Pelagius, Augustine concludes in de gratia Christi et de peccato originali (The Grace of Christ and Original Sin):
In all the writings of Pelagius and of Caelestius that I have been able to read, I have never found that they confessed, as one should confess, this grace by which we are justified, that is, by which ‘the love of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us’ (Rom. 5:5).Footnote 140
At its most basic level, then, Augustine concludes that a theology of justification is a necessary implication (and safeguard) of the real efficacy of divine grace. Conversely, the absence of a theology of gratuitous justification is a telltale sign of Pelagianism. Indeed, Julian of Eclanum will later deny that God’s righteousness is anything other than his perfectly just rewarding of evil and punishment of good.Footnote 141 While Pelagius acknowledged multiple effects of grace – including the gift of free choice, the teaching of the law, the example of Christ, and the forgiveness of sins – Augustine insists that these alone are insufficient apart from the grace of God converting the unrighteous through the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Unsurprisingly, what emerge as the two core Pelagian errors – neglecting the effect of original sin on human nature and the necessity of divine help for the free return to GodFootnote 142 – correspond with the twofold effect of justification: forgiveness and renewal. Justification assumes its importance in Augustine’s thought in order to defend the reality of grace, and, as Pierre-Marie Hombert has persuasively argued, a primary reason for defending grace is to defend the necessary conditions for cultivating gratitude and humility in the Christian life.Footnote 143 Augustine’s doctrine of justification makes his understanding of grace concretely applicable. As such, it also makes concrete humanity’s humble thanksgiving to God. Hence, even Christ, says Augustine, “again and again praises this righteousness of faith when he speaks of the Holy Spirit.”Footnote 144
Augustine’s analysis of the Pelagian controversy also shows why analyzing Augustine’s thinking on justification provides crucial insight into ongoing scholarly debates about the development of Augustine’s theology of operative grace, especially the status of his early thought. Peter Brown’s Augustine of Hippo (1967) famously judged the early Augustine to be “on paper, more Pelagian than Pelagius.”Footnote 145 In his The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace (1980), Patout Burns argued that Augustine in ad Simplicianum (396) understood the operation of God’s vocation as “mov[ing] the will by giving knowledge,” as opposed to a grace “internal to the will.”Footnote 146 Many scholars have taken Burns to be arguing for the same conclusion, that the early Augustine held a Pelagian reduction of grace to the gifts of knowledge, free choice, and moral exemplarity. Carol Harrison has especially worried that Burns leaves us with a “Pelagian [early] Augustine, one who defended the role of knowledge, the law, and the intellect, as sufficient to motivate the free will of human beings.”Footnote 147 Some, such as Brian DobellFootnote 148 and Phillip Cary,Footnote 149 have expressed some sympathy for the hypothesis that the early Augustine articulated a Pelagian understanding of the work and necessity of grace for salvation.
A stronger response to the hypothesis of a Pelagian early Augustine is located in Augustine’s theology of justification. According to the mature Augustine, the distinguishing failure of Pelagius’s theology of grace is not that it counts knowledge, nature, free choice, or moral examples as graces. Instead, by Augustine’s own analysis in 418, the distinguishing failure of Pelagius’s theology of grace is the absence of a grace of justification.Footnote 150 By this metric, it is impossible to count the early Augustine as a Pelagian since an account of this grace is fully present in Augustine even before ad Simplicianum: it is the grace of charity poured out by the Holy Spirit in baptism.Footnote 151 This is the necessary, transformative grace of justification, which is received by faith, a grace which Augustine’s earliest anti-Pelagian works consistently find Pelagius avoiding.Footnote 152 Pelagius, by contrast, “wants the charity whereby we live good and holy lives to come not from God to us but from ourselves.”Footnote 153 Hence, even if the early Augustine does not hold his mature account of predestination as found in the late 420s, this does not make him a Pelagian. And yet, the reason for this is best seen in terms of his theology of the Spirit’s gift of justification, since this is what Augustine himself identifies as Pelagius’s root error. While it is true that the mature Augustine increasingly expands and specifies when the Spirit’s operation of love is needed to move the will, including the will to believe, even Augustine’s early view is fully in keeping with his contention in the 410s that Pelagius’s failure is a failure to account for the transformative grace of justification.
This study of Augustine’s theology of justification will reveal, moreover, that while Augustine’s famous letter ad Simplicianum in 396 does evince a change in his understanding of God’s election, it leaves the ordering and mechanics of justification unchanged. Augustine’s new conviction that election precedes any human merit does not undermine his earlier account of faith as obtaining the grace of justification. In fact, even the very late Augustine will still offer a way of defending the Ambrosian understanding that faith leads to, even merits, justification.Footnote 154 Nonetheless, as Augustine’s thought continues to develop, he gives increasing attention to how grace elicits assent and transforms the desires of faith from fear to hope to love in Christ. This analysis leads to a more precise reading of the development of Augustine’s theology of grace.
Despite Augustine’s insight into justification in the Pelagian controversy, it would be a mistake to think that the effect of grace was an abstract, polemical matter for Augustine. Rather, for Augustine, a doctrine of justification is the explanatory theological correlate of the phenomenon of Christian conversion. Its absence in Pelagius’s thought is detrimental to a truly theological account of Christian experience. Without a theology of justification, Christian conversion is just a human phenomenon that loses its divine origin, orientation, and narrative. It instead appears as a sociological change of religious identity, as a psychological experience, or as a moral reform. With a doctrine of justification, Christian conversion is illuminated theologically as a work of God. For Augustine, with the recognition of such a uniquely divine work comes the correspondingly singular public glorification of God: “What work is more magnificent than to justify a sinner?”Footnote 155
More specifically, Augustine’s theology of justification is meant to provide a properly theological account of Christian experiences and sacramental practice within the life of the Church. As subsequent chapters will uncover, Augustine’s theology of justification by faith – that faith justifies because it seeks and receives the grace of charity – is best understood as a theological commentary on the catechumenate. Who is the one Scripture is describing “who does not work but believes in him who justifies the ungodly” (Rom. 4:5)? It is the catechumen who brings nothing to the sacrament of baptism except his sins and confidence that God promises to justify those incorporated into Christ by bestowing the Holy Spirit. That catechumen’s baptism provides a singular image encapsulating justification by faith. For Augustine, these visible, ecclesial practices cannot be seen in a merely human way but must be recognized as what they most deeply are: signs of God’s inward work of justification. Thus, at least taken positively, Augustine’s theology of justification provides an interpretive lens for uniting Pauline exegesis and sacramental theology.
By analogy, just as fourth-to-fifth-century bishops such as Ambrose and Cyril of Jerusalem engaged in mystagogical catechesis for the recently baptized by discoursing on the mysteries of the creed, baptism, anointing, and the Eucharist,Footnote 156 Augustine sees justification as part of the Church’s mystagogy. An account of justification reveals the mystery and efficacy of grace in the process of initiation, from the initial assent of the catechumen to Christian doctrine to the final outpouring of grace in baptism. As Augustine’s theology of grace grows and develops, his intention is never less than to provide a richer, fuller account of the role of grace in every aspect of the Church’s life and Christian experience. Augustine’s various distinctions – congruous vocation and interior infusion, conception in grace and in birth, aid and indwelling, sub lege (under the law) and sub gratia (under grace), operative grace and cooperative grace – are never polemical abstractions. They serve to reveal more and more of the real presence of divine grace in ecclesial activities.
It is for these reasons that we cannot accept the view that Augustine did not have a doctrine of justification, and it is incorrect that he devoted no letters, sermons, or treatises to the topic, as is occasionally asserted.Footnote 157 On the contrary, Augustine wrote numerous letters where justification is a central issue, preached frequently on the topic, and named it a central focus, declared it the greatest of God’s works in his sermons, and titled a whole treatise after it: de perfectione iustitiae hominis (The Perfection of Human Righteousness).Footnote 158 But most fundamentally, Augustine makes the absence of a doctrine of Christian justification the defining lacuna in Pelagianism, which would entail the ironic conclusion that, if Augustine did lack a doctrine of justification, he was simultaneously by his own standard a Pelagian.
As this chapter’s opening quotation of epistula 177 stresses, however, what gives life and interpretive purchase to Augustine’s theology of justification can only be understood through its grounding in the expansive, polyvalent mystery of faith. Faith provides the consistent root for the ecclesial context of justification, connects justification with the whole of Scripture rather than a few over-emphasized Pauline passages, and unfolds the psychological and Christological depth of justification. Attending to Augustine’s theology of justification under the more profound heading of his theology of faith places Augustine’s legacy in fresh perspective and conveys how and why he found theological vitality in justification.
Development and Meaning
My argument proposes that Augustine’s full theology of justification by faith requires a chronological analysis, since this chronological analysis is what exposes both his undifferentiated and his differentiated uses of fides and thus the pluripotency inherent in speaking of justification by faith. At the same time, the approach of this project is not strictly chronological. It seeks instead the overarching movements of Augustine’s development and its major themes. Works that cannot be reliably dated are still mentioned if they highlight or accentuate a particular theme.
A developmental approach spans Augustine’s theological career while attending to how his thought expanded, deepened, and responded to conceptual challenges. Following Johann Sebastian Drey (1777–1853) and John Henry Newman (1801–1890), I use the term development to refer to a natural feature of all ideas in proportion to their intrinsic intellectual fecundity.Footnote 159 Development signifies something more specific than intellectual change and distinct from self-correction. Ideas, as mental images, can be mentally examined under a great number of aspects; a living idea is one which “is of a nature to arrest and possess the mind” and thus is under continuous examination.Footnote 160 The development of Augustine’s account of justification by faith, then, can be viewed as a natural consequence of his continuous mental examination of the idea of the iustitia fidei. The development of multiple ways of accounting for justification by faith is not a result of indecision or inconsistency but a sign of the diverse aspects under which the single, capacious idea of the iustitia fidei can be viewed.
This expansive, polyvalent understanding of Augustine’s reading of the iustitia fidei does not deny that there is a baseline meaning to credere (believing). Rather, it posits that the baseline meaning is inflected by the motivating affection of faith, thereby acquiring a unique connotation and meaning, and that this inflection is significant enough to produce a distinct idiom for each state of believing, such as credere Christum vs. credere in Christum. The idea that faith can be polysemic is reflected in Augustine’s exegetical theory, which defends the possibility of multiple meanings to Scripture and does not require that each biblical author use the same word with the same meaning or connotation.Footnote 161 In fact, it is precisely through exegesis that Augustine finds that Scripture demands a polysemic account of faith.
Development can include adjustment and reexamination, but its use does not signify decay, rejection, or reversal. On this use of the term, Augustine’s already noted change of view on election and the initium fidei (the beginning of faith) in 396 is best described as a correction or reversal, not a development, insofar as it is judged to be inconsistent with the idea itself. This reversal certainly affects his future theology of grace; still, his later thinking on grace can be read as a further development of that insight into the gratuity of the initium fidei. There are certainly instances of discontinuity and self-correction in Augustine’s thought, but development as used here is fundamentally a kind of expansive newness in continuity. It reflects the distinction Augustine makes between instances in which he denies his earlier views and instances in which he “made progress” (profectus)Footnote 162 in the long course of his writing. In some cases, he makes revisions or reversals; but in other cases, he says explicitly what he had earlier held implicitly,Footnote 163 or he learns to say what he had neither previously denied nor imagined.Footnote 164 These are developments. As he says, “I think that, as I wrote, I made progress by the mercy of God, but not that I started off with perfection.”Footnote 165
