Richard S. Kay's book, The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of the Law, examines the immediate aftermath of William of Orange's arrival in England in November 1688. In this wide-ranging book, Kay investigates the legal issues that ultimately resolved the Glorious Revolution. The central thesis is that the Glorious Revolution rests on a paradox: the overthrow of James II in 1688 came about as a way to save the constitution (14). The Glorious Revolution, in other words, began not when William landed at Torbay but rather when the Convention Parliament met and lawyers worked out the revolutionary settlement. The revolution in Kay's view was inherently conservative: lawyers “crammed irregular decisions into regular forms; they described illegal actions with legal terminology. In short, they faked it” (17). This book is a survey of the working out of that paradox, “focusing on how its makers viewed the importance of adherence to law at the very moment they were breaching a governing system's most fundamental norms” (ix). In order to resolve that paradox, Kay relies mostly on printed primary sources: parliamentary debates, newspapers and parliamentary journals.
The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of the Law offers a meticulous examination of the issues and debates that dominated the Convention parliament. Kay's book consists of five chapters, bookended by an introduction and an afterward. Chapters 1 and 2 investigate the political origins of the Glorious Revolution and how lawyers and parliamentarians dealt with the contradictions created by the overthrow of James II and the coronation of William III and Mary. Chapter 3 investigates the lawyers' struggle to create legal order following the inherent illegality of the Revolution and chapter 4 examines the new legal order created after the revolution. The book ends with a short afterward examining how the revolutionary settlement played out in the decades immediately following the Glorious Revolution.
The concept of revolution is thus central to the book. Michael Foley's work on constitutional revolutions plays a key part. Foley investigates the “abeyances” in constitutional governments when institutional practice is out of synch with the ideology that underpins it. Provided that there is no focusing event or crisis, lawyers and bureaucrats were happy to live with contradictions and inconsistencies in the governing system. In the context of the Glorious Revolution, as Key points out, divine right and absolutist monarchy operating within a common law tradition produced wildly incongruent assumptions about politics and law. Provided that lawyers and politicians did not have to confront the logical conclusions of those assumptions, the system worked just fine. However, James II's incipient absolutism provoked just such a crisis. The resulting revolution was important not so much in its immediate effects, according to Kay, but rather the long-term effects of putting England down the path towards constitutional government and political stability.
There is a whiggish teleology to all of this. Kay writes this book not so much as an historian but as a legal scholar who has spent a career studying applied jurisprudence. Reading this book one gets the feeling that Kay is rehashing historiographical debates that were resolved a generation ago. Scholars of seventeenth-century England have intensely debated the revolutionary nature of the Glorious Revolution, its implications for religious toleration and the development of centralized government in England. Kay's bibliography shows roughly a dozen books published in the twenty-first century and none published since 2010. Only two recent books—Tim Harris' Revolution: Crisis of the British Monarchy (2006) and Steven Pincus' 1688: The First Modern Revolution (2009)—are seriously engaged with. This is odd because some of the best new research on the late Stuart period has centred on revolutionary ideology and behaviour—the same themes that Kay investigates in his book. Jonathan Scott's work for instance has reconceived the entire seventeenth century as a period of crisis, change, and revolution, rooted in concerns over the future of Protestantism and its existence on the continent. Tim Harris and others have investigated the causes and consequences of the Revolution in terms of the three kingdoms. A nuanced understanding of the relationship between political theory and legal behaviour is lightly touched upon. Recent debates on the relationship between historical thought and the common law are left relatively unmentioned. Historians looking for a new interpretation of the Glorious Revolution will be disappointed with this book.
Despite these criticisms, the Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of the Law ably addresses a lacuna in contemporary historiography on the inner legal workings of the Convention. Thanks to Kay, we now have a thorough analysis of the legal debates that dominated the Convention as well as a survey of the different legal options available to parliamentarians to justify the Glorious Revolution. That the revolution produced an unprecedented upheaval in English legal history is undisputed. Kay's afterward examines the revolution in historical perspective from the standpoint of the eighteenth century and beyond. The inherent ambiguity of the law and the desire of the lawyers to treat the revolution as a legal problem allowed them to argue that in fact no revolution had taken place at all. Continuity of the law was the ultimate achievement of the Glorious Revolution. The flexibility inherent in the legal system masked the revolutionary nature of 1688–1689 and allowed England's governing institutions to persist despite the upheavals within the system. In this sense, the Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of the Law will be of interest to legal historians and graduate students of seventeenth-century English political and legal history.
