During the “Asian values debate” which raged for many years, it was argued that the values, culture, and beliefs of Asian peoples are communitarian rather than individualistic, are duty oriented rather than rights based, and are such that Western understandings of human rights and liberal democracy are not acceptable to, and should not be imposed on, Asian peoples, societies, and states. With the democratization of Indonesia in the first decade of this century, the electoral gains achieved by opposition politicians in Malaysia and Singapore in the last few years, and the rapid change of the political climate in Myanmar most recently, the propositions that liberal democratic aspirations are not universally shared and that there exist peculiarly “Asian” values that are resistant to political liberalization and democratization become increasingly difficult to sustain. At the same time, whether China—the most populous nation-state in Asia and on planet Earth and the home of a two-millennia old Confucian civilization—will change in the direction of liberalization and democratization is still highly uncertain. The book under review is therefore a timely contribution to the study of culture, values, and political change in Asia.
Some of the claims or findings in the book may appear at first sight to be disappointing or discouraging for believers in liberal democracy. For example, the author suggests that “a powerful wave of liberal democratization is not likely to surge and sweep through the entire region of historically Confucian East Asia for many years to come” (15–16); “liberal democracy is not likely to become the only political game in Confucian East Asia in the near future” (323). Drawing a distinction between “liberal democracy” and “nonliberal democracy,” the author argues that “in the minds of people in Confucian East Asia … it is a nonliberal democratic system, not an authoritarian political system, which is most compatible with Confucianism” (323). “Confucian East Asia is likely to remain, in the assessment of Western liberal democrats, a region of disappointing democratic development for many years to come. To East Asians who remain deeply ingrained in the virtues of Confucianism, however, their country's resistance to the current wave of global democratization may appear as an exciting opportunity to avoid the deeply flawed liberal model of the Western democracy and to establish instead a new, innovative political system that combines the best of Confucian and democratic ideals of good government” (325).
The propositions quoted above should not, however, be taken at face value. They can only be understood in light of the conceptual and methodological features of the research project reported in this book. One basic presupposition is that there may be a causal relationship between the values, attitudes, and views of the people of a country and the political system or political change in that country, so that certain values or beliefs may operate as positive or negative forces with regard to democratization or the deepening and consolidation of democracy in the country concerned. The conceptual distinction developed by the author between liberal and nonliberal democracy (15, 271, 288) is such that those who support “liberal democracy” are those who support democracy both as a political regime (or “democracy-in-principle”) and as a process for political decision-making and implementation of policies (or “democracy-in-practice”); those who support democracy as a regime but are not committed to democracy as a process are defined as supporters of “nonliberal democracy,” or nonliberal democrats.
Methodologically speaking, this book is not a philosophical reflection on the relationship between Confucian thinking and democracy nor a study of the political dynamics and historical experience of democratization in Confucian East Asia. Instead, it is an empirical study of the relevant values, attitudes, and views held by people in Confucian East Asia—defined in this book to include mainland China (Hong Kong is not included in the study), Taiwan, Korea (though North Korea is not included in the study), Japan, and Singapore, comparing such values among different countries in this region, and comparing the values of people in this region with values of people in other regions of the world. This empirical study consists principally of a careful and in-depth analysis of respondents' answers to some of the questions administered by two sets of public-opinion surveys conducted in the first decade of this century, namely, the Asian Barometer Surveys in thirteen East Asian countries, and the World Values Surveys in fifty-seven countries around the world (9–10).
The author's analysis of the outcomes of these surveys has led to several interesting and significant findings. For example, even though the author's principal interest lies in the investigation of values which he labels “Confucian” (though the term “Confucian” has not appeared in the questions administered by the surveys), a comparison of relevant values held by people in “Confucian East Asia” and other parts of East Asia (and in certain cases other regions in the world other than the West) reveals that “Confucian” values are often as widely held by people in non-Confucian societies. The author himself admits that “none of the Confucian legacies analyzed in this study constitutes a unique set of cultural characteristics found only in historically Confucian East Asia,” referring to “the finding that these legacies are equally or more prevalent in other non-Western regions” (321). “It also suggests that some of the values long considered ‘Confucian’ might be better labeled as ‘non-Western traditional values’” (321). However, if this is the case, the very concept of “Confucian values” that has informed this book project becomes problematic.
The author has set out in this project “to offer a comprehensive account of the roles Confucianism plays in making democratic citizens by investigating its effects on the civic and political life of individual citizens” (9; emphasis supplied). The project finds that Confucian social and political ethics as “multivocal systems” (325) with “conflicting elements” (326) have both positive and negative effects on democracy (324, 331). Furthermore, people's experience of the practice of democracy in Confucian East Asia (in countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) has the effect of weakening in the society and culture concerned those political legacies of Confucianism (such as what the author calls “meritocracy” and “paternalism”) that the author finds to be antidemocratic or anti-liberal-democratic (13, 15). Thus “Confucian legacies and democratic political practices have a reciprocal and highly dynamic relationship, in which each influences the other” (326).
The devil is in the details; the force of the findings in this project depends ultimately on the exact text of the questions answered by respondents in the public-opinion surveys from which the findings are derived. For example, I have some doubt about the finding that attachment to the “Confucian political legacies” of “meritocracy” and “paternalism” inclines people against “liberal democracy” and toward “nonliberal democracy” (15, 17, 299, 300, 304, 305, 323), which leads the author to the conclusions that “Confucianism is incompatible with liberal democracy but compatible with nonliberal democracy” (304–305; emphasis in original) and that “Confucianism is one of the most powerful influences on the underdevelopment of democratic citizenship in Confucian Asia” (311). These findings should be assessed in light of the questions selected by the author from the surveys concerned to assess people's support for “nonliberal” democracy and their attachment to the “Confucian” values of meritocracy and paternalism.
The questions used to test whether respondents support nonliberal (as distinguished from liberal) democracy were four questions on (a) whether the government may disregard the law in a “difficult situation” (281); (b) whether a government which is “constantly checked by the legislature” “cannot possibly accomplish great things” (281); (c) whether judges in deciding “important cases” “should accept the views of the executive” (284); and (d) whether the government “should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society” (284). The questions may therefore be understood as addressing the values of the rule of law, separation of powers and checks and balances, judicial independence, and freedom of speech respectively. What the author refers to as support for nonliberal democracy actually means support for democracy without simultaneous support for these values.
The questions used to tap attachment to the “Confucian” value of meritocracy are whether the respondent agrees that “If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything” (120), and “If possible, I do not get involved in political matters” (121). The questions on the “Confucian” value of paternalism are whether the respondent agrees that “The relationship between the government and the people should be like that between parents and children” (124), and “Government leaders are like the head of a family: we should all follow their decisions” (125).
At least three issues arise from a close examination of these questions. First, it may be questioned whether the four questions on meritocracy and paternalism effectively tap people's commitment to “Confucian” values. As the author himself admits, a comparative study of the data from different countries reveals that “paternalistic meritocracy is more prevalent in non-Confucian East Asia than in Confucian East Asia” (319). Second, given the way in which the questions were framed, it is by no means surprising that those who are willing to let virtuous political leaders “decide everything,” who believe that political leaders' decisions should be followed because they are in a position like the head of a family, and who do not actively participate in politics are more likely to accept that the government may disregard the law in exceptional circumstances, need not be vigorously checked and limited by institutions of separation of powers and judicial independence, and may legitimately exercise a power of censorship in the public interest. Given the logical or conceptual connection between the survey questions on “Confucian” political values and the questions on “nonliberal” democracy, the data of the opinion survey does not necessarily point to the author's conclusion that attachment to the political legacies of Confucianism has a causal relationship with, and impact negatively upon, the degree of popular support for liberal (as distinguished from nonliberal) democracy. Third, as far as the question of cause and effect is concerned, instead of attachment to “Confucian” values being viewed as a cause of popular support for nonliberal (as distinguished from liberal) democracy, it is equally possible, or even more plausible, that the socioeconomic and political factors discussed in this book (such as levels of education and income and experience of democratic politics at work) are the main causes both of people holding or not holding values of meritocracy and paternalism and of people supporting or not supporting liberal or nonliberal democracy.
