In Revolts and the Military, Sean Burns argues that military structure is the most decisive factor in accounting for outcomes of regime transitions in Tunisia, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Iran. When faced with mass uprisings the military decides whether or not to “risk its reputation and its troops’ loyalty by killing large numbers of peaceful civilians” (18). This decision derives from the military's “distinctiveness and subordination,” while its success in executing the decision is based on its “internal structure.”
According to Burns, the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries were highly distinct from their respective regimes. They therefore had no reason to save Zine al-Abidine Ben ‘Ali or Hosni Mubarak. Both militaries remained unified when they sided with the uprisings – ousting the autocrats in what amounted to coups – because of their strong internal structures (high cohesion). There were no defections save for sporadic gun fights in Tunisia between the army and Ben ‘Ali's feared security services. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, the Bahraini military remained loyal to the crown due to the al-Khalifa family's Sunni (albeit foreign) conscription patterns, which rendered the military's interests and identity indistinct from the regime. As in Tunisia and Egypt, however, Bahrain's strong internal military structure kept it intact while executing a violent crackdown on behalf of the royal family.
In 1979, the Iranian military had to choose between the Shah and millions of Iranians protesting in the streets. The army's leadership was distinct from and subordinate to the regime, so it was “in the military's best interest to overthrow him [the Shah]…” (252). The military collapsed, however, because its weak internal structure “meant that the leading officers could not agree to do so…” (252). The factionalized structure of the Iranian security forces should have led to splits within the army in 2009, but the regime's repression prevented the spread of protests quickly and with only its most loyal units. Thus, Burns offers the keen insight that if Iran were to experience another sustained uprising the regime may prove weaker than previously thought.
The framework that Burns advances improves our knowledge of Middle East militaries and of the 2011 uprisings that swept the region. Impressively, the author condenses a lot of history without overgeneralizing about any of his case studies. His case studies will prove invaluable to undergraduate and graduate students looking for a place to start making sense of the 2011 uprisings and the trajectories of each country thereafter.
Perhaps the most compelling and useful empirical contribution of the study is Burns’ treatment of the three civil war cases of Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Loyal units defended autocrats because their interests and identity were not “distinct” from or “subordinate” to the regime, such as with Alawi units in Syria. These militaries’ weak internal structures, or “factionalization,” resulted in civil war, however, because many units defected and took up arms against regime loyalists.
Burns takes seriously earlier models of military decision-making, but he couples this approach with a framework that explains the outcomes of military decisions. The “divisive” (12) case of Syria, for instance, is said to be an example of Alawi loyalty to Bashar al-Assad. Au contraire, Burns demonstrates that narrowly focusing on the Alawi units’ “decision” to back Assad ignores the case's “outcome,” which was widespread Sunni troop defection, military collapse, and civil war.
The fact of Sunni defections, however, did not inevitably produce a prolonged civil war. Burns acknowledges this when he introduces additional variables, like international intervention. In short, Burns’ distinction between “outcomes” and “decision-making” is not a neat one and might not entirely overcome the problem his book identifies. Instead, he might have framed the problem by asserting a need to investigate military “decisions” during uprisings (1) in the immediate and intermediate term and/or (2) by focusing on a variety of units or ranks (e.g., loyalist officers, rank-and-file, etc.).
The use of international intervention as an explanatory variable further illustrates the difficulty of using military structure to explain the long-term trajectory of an uprising. Burns claims international intervention (or its absence) was decisive in all three cases of civil war (Syria, Libya, and Yemen). This suggests that a country's regime trajectory has less to do with military structure beyond its influence on officers’ initial responses to an uprising. The relative weight Burns gives to international intervention in a number of important cases (even in Bahrain) softens the book's core claim: that military behavior accounted for “the most important difference between the various outcomes in the series of revolts against authoritarian regimes… known as the ‘Arab Spring’” (1–2). Revolts and the Military explains the army's initial responses to uprisings impressively well but runs into trouble explaining what comes after those decisions. Given the thrust of the book's argument about military responses to mass uprisings, Burns probably does not need to explain long-term outcomes of civil wars.
Finally, the book is sometimes unclear about the outcome it seeks to explain. In the non-civil war cases, for instance, the army's decision not to repress protestors is not the same as choosing democracy. On Tunisia, against which Burns compares the remainder of the 2011 uprisings, the author strongly suggests that the mere fact of military non-intervention is the most powerful explanation for Tunisian democratization, but a quartered army is a requisite, not a cause, of democratization. Burns’ argument accounts well for the Tunisian military's decision to (in effect) oust Zine al-Abidine Ben ‘Ali in response to a mass uprising (18). Tunisian democratization, however, took more than the fact that the military, “unlike in Egypt…did not end the democratization process” (my emphasis, 85).
