The business corporation appears with increasing frequency on the stage of political theory, usually dressed all in black or all in white, as political villain or economic hero. The great merit of Abraham Singer's The Form of the Firm is to make the corporation into a more believable character with faults and virtues mingled, as they are for all of us. Drawing especially on economist Ronald Coase, Singer builds a compelling account of the business firm as distinct from both market and state. It is in the market but not of the market, and likewise dependent upon the state without being a mere creature of politics. By playing off the economic and sociopolitical aspects of the corporation against each other, Singer draws an overall picture of the role and prospects of the corporation that is far more plausible than any account focused narrowly on efficiency or on equity. His admirable study ought to command the attention of all the disciplines that study the business firm.
The book's elegant first section recounts a stylized history of economic thought as to why business corporations exist at all, and their moral standing. The large corporate firm only came into its own in the late nineteenth century, and its likely influence in the free market was under- and overrated by Adam Smith and J.S. Mill, respectively. Karl Marx intuited both the indispensable role and limits of the corporation but, in Singer's account, it was Ronald Coase in the 1930s who first grasped its fundamental logic. For Coase and the school of transaction-cost economics that eventually followed him, it is sometimes simply cheaper or more efficient to coordinate economic activity by means of authority in a firm than by prices in a market. This is true particularly when greater investment or mutual commitment are needed than the anonymous, opportunistic market can provide. So the visible hand of the firm, even though it is a potential site of illiberal power, can be licensed as a rational outgrowth of the invisible hand guiding a “socially efficient” economy (137). But Coase's focus on efficiency left the door open for the intellectual counterattack of the Chicago school, which Singer calls “the most comprehensive and influential political theory of the corporation” (262) and casts as the principal antagonist of the book. Armed with the idea that “what is optimal is market-based” (89), Chicago law and economics has reinterpreted the corporation as a type of private market, which is ultimately nothing more than a “nexus of contracts.” The longevity of the corporate form suggests that it is an efficient way for investors, managers, and workers to contract with one another for mutual benefit. If it is efficient, on the Chicago account, it must be a type of market. Thus the distinctiveness of the corporation disappears from view, and with it both the problem of internal authority and the main grounds for normative critique. The only quibble to raise with Singer's history is that he does not steadily distinguish between the firm as an economic association and the corporation as a particular legal form. Nonetheless, his even-handed and concise account deserves to become a first point of reference for scholars interested in the main historical views of the business firm.
The intellectual hinge of the book is Singer's idea of “norm-governed productivity,” which bridges between economic efficiency and the nonmarket nature of firms. Against the Chicago school, Singer argues that it is precisely the “norms and social relationships” (3) within the firm that allow it to outperform the open market. But if the relational elements of the firm are the basis of its market efficiency, then thicker normative assessment of the firm can be grounded in its economic rationale rather than in rival external concerns. Its constitutive norms can be appraised and, to some degree, altered without compromising its competitiveness. The idea of norm-governed productivity cuts both ways, however. While the cooperative reform proposals favored by academics do hook onto an essential element of the business firm, Singer argues that market survival sets a ceiling or a “maximal viability horizon” (156) on how communal the firm could plausibly become. This ceiling can be raised, opening a larger space in firms for the liberal values that Singer commends, but that is a political or cultural project that cannot be pressed against individual actors. The book's signal contribution, in my view, is to elaborate the supple but necessary link between the “economic” and the “political” dimensions of the firm and its environment.
The book's third section assesses the normative possibilities of the firm as to corporate law, governance, and ethos in light of its “efficiency mandate” (201). Singer advocates a direction of reform familiar to political theorists—away from stockholders and self-interest, towards worker responsibility—but with a sobriety and analytical style reminiscent of the economist. Market constraints mean that firms can only move so far down the cooperative road. Liberal society would be best served if firms were “governed by those who relate most closely” to them (161), but Singer argues on grounds of free choice and economic viability that such changes will and should come about through changing background conditions rather than legal mandate. What is more immediately needed, he maintains, is a business ethos that does not take advantage of the market's failure to secure efficiency or political failures to secure justice.
Singer's fluency with and reliance on the discourse of economics leads to the book's best insights but also its main obscurities. Key ideas do not survive the translation from formal models into the world of political theory nor, perhaps, the real world. The most salient example is “efficiency,” which Singer uses as a synecdoche for the demands and the outcomes of market exchange. Of course, firms’ viability and society's prosperity are important, and Singer's account is the more grounded because he keeps such concerns front and center. But the economist's idea of Pareto efficiency, with its formalistic baggage, cannot be used as a practical guide of action. As Singer himself argues against the Chicago school (134–35), there can be no free-standing “economic” standard of efficiency in social contexts that change the preferences of their participants, as firms and markets surely do. Similarly, the jargon of “market failure” (228–36), which Singer makes central to the ethical corporation, presupposes that ideal markets are those that conform to the assumptions of economics textbooks. Without a clearer political context of judgment, such terms ring in a decidedly technocratic key. Perhaps difficulties of translation are unavoidable when multiple disciplines converge within the covers of a single book. And the pride of place that Singer gives to economists’ concepts, if not their conclusions, may be less a tribute to economics and more an indictment of political theory's neglect of the practical realities of the corporation and the market. His book addresses this lacuna admirably.
The large thesis of The Form of the Firm is compelling, the writing is brisk, and the argument is grounded in the key works of several disciplines. The book will make a fine sparring partner and resource for the ongoing task of describing and appraising the business corporation.
