Introduction
Were women imprisoned in classical Athens? To search for an answer to this question in the secondary literature is to be met with deafening silence. Few scholars have examined evidence for the incarceration of women in the ancient Mediterranean, and the little work that has been done remains focused in such marginal (from the vantage of traditional classics departments) areas as Late Antique studies and early Christianity. When classicists speak of prisoners and prisons, we mean men and the ways men control men.
Why? Part of the answer rests on the nature of the ancient evidence. Prisoners in antiquity are always difficult to discern, and female inmates are doubly shrouded by evidentiary and gendered filters that make non-elites—from whose ranks prisoners are likely to have come—imperceptible and the experiences of women challenging to recover. Yet imprisonment of women in the ancient Mediterranean is reasonably well documented. Incarceration of women in Ptolemaic Egypt is attested in the Zenon archive, a cache of Greek and Demotic administrative documents from the third century BCE. The archive contains numerous letters written by, or on behalf of, the spouses of inmates, male and female.Footnote 1
Imprisonment of women is also attested in Imperial and Late Antique Rome.Footnote 2 After the fall of Seianus from imperial favor in 31 CE, his friends and supporters were systematically prosecuted; those who did not flee in exile were rounded up and executed in the Tullianum, the principal carcer in the city Rome, or hurled down the Capitoline, their bodies cast into the Roman Forum and later the Tiber. Victims of the purge included knights and senators, men and women (Dio Cass. 15.2). In the absence of legal statute permitting capital punishment of virgins, Seianus’ daughter was first raped by her executioners.Footnote 3 So says Dio Cassius (58.11). Tacitus’ less gruesome account leaves her strangled, but unviolated, next to the noose (Ann. 5.9). She (and her brother) died in prison. The memoir of St. Perpetua and St. Felicity suggests that imprisonment of (Christian) women was not an irregular occurrence, and accommodations were made to allow mothers to nurse in jail (Pass. Perp. 6). Felicity gave birth in prison, and the two women were executed three days later. Roman law also points to routine imprisonment of women. An edict by the emperor Constantius Augustus (r.337–61) prohibits the practice, ostensibly commonplace, of jailing ‘criminals intermingled [sc. by sex]’ (permixtos…criminosos, CTh. 9.3.3) in a single room. Although men and women share the same guilt for the same crime, the edict declares, they are to be held in separate prisons. Intermixing of male and female inmates seems therefore to have been sufficiently frequent (and problematical) to require intervention from the highest echelons of imperial authority. Moreover, numerous sources point to the existence of laws suspending the execution of pregnant women until delivery.Footnote 4 If the Passion of St. Perpetua and St. Felicity gives any indication, such women might be held in prison (Pass. Perp. 15).
Imprisonment of men was certainly the more frequent occurrence (in this respect, the ancient Mediterranean exhibits obvious continuities with subsequent periods), and classical authors tend to commemorate only the most sensational instances; Perpetua, Felicity, and Seianus’ daughter get all the attention. But if a cursory survey turns up evidence for women in prison, neglect among classicists cannot be attributed to the ancient sources alone. The implicit assumptions and interpretive categories we bring to bear in the analysis of prisons also warrant careful scrutiny. The last thirty years have witnessed a thoroughgoing reappraisal of prisons in the ancient Mediterranean. In the 1990s, Lovato and Krause began questioning the adequacy of Roman criminal law—the epistemological framework within which prisons and imprisonment had been interpreted since the nineteenth century—to account for the diverse uses of prisons attested in the historical record.Footnote 5 Since then, numerous publications, particularly among Continental scholars, have called for alternatives to the traditional classification of imprisonment in Greece and Rome as custodial, coercive, and (more problematically) punitive—a classification associated with Mommsen's Römisches Strafrecht.Footnote 6 (‘Custodial’ incarceration refers to imprisonment prior to trial or after conviction and while awaiting execution of sentence, ‘coercive’ to the practice of detaining convicted persons in jail pending payment of debts, and ‘punitive’, often thought to be distinctly post-classical, to imprisonment per se as a penalty.) A parallel strand in the scholarship explores literary depictions of bondage and incarceration as recurrent nodes of philosophical and, later, religious inquiry—prison as a topos, in both spatial and metaphorical senses, deployed, for instance, in the Platonic dialogues and early Christian narratives to envisage alternatives to prevailing ideological orders.Footnote 7 Whether historical or literary in focus, much recent scholarship on ancient prisons emphasizes political dimensions of incarceration, which the traditional model of ancient imprisonment as custodial, coercive, or punitive obscures. The result is a new vision of prisons in the ancient Mediterranean, one that has been made available by a series of theoretical and evidentiary reorientations: from law, juristic commentary, and systematic jurisprudence (the old), to literature, archaeology, and political sociology (the new). We now recognize the δεσμωτήριον, the state prison in Athens, as a mechanism of popular sovereignty and as an institution weaponized, in symbolic and material terms, in periods of heightened faction and break-down in intra-elite cooperation.Footnote 8 In the Roman context, prison is understood as an instrument of imperial management, legally and functionally connected to Roman slavery, forced labor, and rituals of execution.Footnote 9 The traditional model of imprisonment as custodial, coercive, and punitive has not been supplanted, but it has been displaced and recontextualized, updated, and rebranded with the post-legalism and post-positivism that characterize current trends in ancient history and political theory.
Where do (imprisoned) women fit in all this? Nowhere. At the very least, Roman law and professional jurisprudence had something to say about women in prison—special accommodations for nursing mothers, temporary suspensions of execution during pregnancy, sex segregation in jail—even if this material was of little interest to late nineteenth- and twentieth-century legal historians. But it is more surprising that the recent turn in ancient prison studies away from law and jurisprudence toward political sociology and literary representation has also written women out. In Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, the focus of our study, politics—in the Weberian sense of work of government and legitimately monopolized violence—is what citizen men did and women could not. Reframing incarceration in Greece and Rome as a political act has led scholars to reinscribe the gendered elisions and silences in ancient (and some modern) understandings of politically relevant agents and agency. In this respect, classical scholarship tracks neatly with much twentieth- and twenty-first-century literature on incarceration in post-classical societies, which has been widely criticized for construing the male inmate as natural and normative.Footnote 10 The danger is obvious: offering a history of the prison that effaces the carceral experiences of women.
The aims of this essay are thus evidential and theoretical. Subsequent sections survey historical, legal, and literary evidence for the imprisonment of women in classical Athens, with particular focus on biography, law, and Plato's Laws—there are lots of women imprisoned in Plato's second-best city.Footnote 11 My definition of what constitutes evidence of imprisonment is narrowly circumscribed. Our search is for women in jail—not in a house, a bedroom, a hole, a cave, or a crevasse. As restrictive and irksome as these forms of confinement might have been, there is something special about prison as a formal mechanism in the state's legal and punitive institutions; metaphoric or analogical imprisonment of women is therefore not considered. The essay's theoretical aim is to correct gendered biases that characterize the resurgent interest in ancient Mediterranean incarceration, and thereby to write women back into the history of the classical Athenian prison. Yet pursuing both goals, we shall observe, presents perhaps insurmountable challenges; for the prejudices I have identified in the secondary literature are original, endemic within the ancient sources, and, more significantly, the laws and institutions of the classical Athenian polis.
An additional aim of the essay is to complement the political and philosophical orientation of Abolafia's contribution in this volume with a dose of hard-nosed historicism. Abolafia traces interconnections between citizenship as a conceptual construct and penal imprisonment as a remediative practice in ancient political philosophy. In Plato, his essay shows, notions of just, participatory, but non-democratic self-governance on the one hand, and rehabilitative penology and corrective imprisonment on the other, develop in tandem. Moreover, Plato in the Gorgias and Laws magnifies a strand of classical Athenian ideology, also apparent in Demosthenes, according to which the polis and the prison are complementary and interdependent. Like its counterpart, the present study eschews the conventional legal and archaeological concerns that have dominated the secondary literature on the prison in Athens, and it too identifies the relationship between citizenship and the prison as one of reciprocity, the latter delineating and shoring up the contours of the former. But the picture I trace of citizenship and the prison is drawn in relief, limned by filling in shadows outside the Athenian political centre and its most vocal critics. I concentrate instead on the nearly imperceptible lives of incarcerated women, lives outside the main currents of Athenian political history and literary-philosophical production. My claims are, first, Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE developed the institutional, legal, and conceptual resources to imprison women; but, second, how often these resources were put into action is exceedingly difficult to ascertain with any degree of confidence, for there is a striking scarcity of reliable evidence for the imprisonment of women in classical Athens; and, finally, such scarcity is in itself significant, illuminating the coevolution of the history of the prison and the history of women's political and economic enfranchisement.
Historical Evidence for Imprisonment of Women in Classical Athens
That women were in and about the Athenian prison is indisputable. Socrates met with (and dismissed) his wife Xanthippe on the day of his execution (Pl. Phaed. 60a, 116b). Lysias records a harrowing scene in which citizens and metics arrested by the Thirty were permitted to bid farewell to female relatives before being assassinated (13.39). Yet our search for women as inmates must begin with caution. In contrast to the Roman material discussed above, no extant Athenian legal statute envisages, much less enumerates special procedures for, custodial detention of women. Omission need not entail interdiction; no law explicitly prohibits women from undergoing arrest and incarceration. Yet the silence begs the question. Identifying female inmates, moreover, requires getting past sociocultural norms governing discourse and the gendering of space, which shielded (at least respectable citizen) women from public view, commemoration, and thus the historical record. Imprisonment is by definition a public action in response to public (or at least publicized) behavior, which enacts the collective will of the politically participant (male citizen) community. Domestic seclusion and discursive silencing of women in Athenian public space worked to keep (again, respectable) women both outside the legal institutions in which terms of imprisonment were decided and sequestered (at least notionally) from the political and economic arenas in which activities that led to prosecutable crime (and thus to imprisonment) occurred.
Several features of Athenian law might also have rendered imprisonment of women unlikely. The first is the right, guaranteed to every Athenian citizen and protected in the Bouleutic Oath—an oath taken annually by elected members of the democratic Council (boulê)—to supply sureties. Only in exceptional legal circumstances might this right be suspended: persons arrested while committing treasonable conspiracy or attempting to subvert the democracy were denied bail, as were tax farmers, sworn sureties, and tax collectors in default.Footnote 12 According to Antiphon (5.17f.), the purpose and effect of such legal mechanisms to forego imprisonment were to minimize overall incidence and duration of pre-trial custody and to allow defendants to prepare for trial—at least for anyone sufficiently trustworthy and connected to produce three persons of equal status to vouch on his or her behalf. Footnote 13 For our purposes, the allegations under which the right to offer guarantors was suspended merit consideration. Pledging oneself as surety, tax farming, and collecting taxes are roles unlikely to have been available to women, who had no right independently to own and manage property or to represent themselves in court; and, to my knowledge, no record survives of woman in Athens ever having been formally accused of treason or of seeking to subvert the democracy. This touches on another salient feature of Athenian law: the legal juniority of citizen women. The principle inherent in Athenian law that construed women as minors also made it unusual for litigants to bring cases against citizen women in the first place. And if a woman, citizen or not, were brought under accusation, her male next of kin would have been expected to make the necessary legal arrangements, including, we may surmise, keeping her out of jail. Perhaps for similar reasons we hear nothing of children imprisoned in Athens (not so Rome).
Despite these systemic impediments to the imprisonment of women in classical Athens, the evidence is not non-existent. It is surveyed below.
Slave Women (415 BCE)
At the height of the Peloponnesian War in 415 BCE, as Athens prepared to open a new front against Sparta by launching a major expedition into Sicily, the Herms statues—stone pillars featuring the head of the god Hermes and male genitalia—were discovered mutilated. It was also alleged that the Eleusinian mysteries had also been performed in private and thereby profaned. All of this, according to Thucydides (6.27.1–29.3, 6.60.1–6) and Andocides (1.44–55), led to general fear of an oligarchic and tyrannical conspiracy. As many as forty-eight were arrested and held in jail until Andocides confessed and informed on fellow collaborators. In On the Mysteries, Andocides claims that the Prytanes also ‘apprehended the slave women’ (τὰς θεραπαίνας ἔλαβον, 1.64) of the house in which the conspirators in the mutilation of the Herms met. We do not know where these women were held before offering testimony, but prison cannot be ruled out; forms of λαμβάνειν regularly denote arrest leading to imprisonment and, as both On the Mysteries and Thucydides make abundantly clear, confinement in prison served as a primary means by which the democracy counteracted perceived threats of sedition in 415 BCE.
It is notable that the imprisonment of slave women (if that is in fact what Andocides records) occurred in a period of extreme political crisis, with widespread fear of imminent coup-d’état, allegations of political subversion and collusion to overthrow the democracy, and hence the legal conditions in place to suspend the right to post sureties. Equally notable is that among the numerous persons imprisoned—including several members of Andocides’ family—in response to the crisis of 415 BCE not one is said to be a citizen woman. Can it be that only slave women, who, unlike wives, frequented homosocial male spaces such as symposia, might have had insight into the political activities of seditious elite men? Obviously not. In the same speech, Andocides observes that in exchange for immunity from prosecution a citizen woman by the name of Agariste gave information (through her husband, Alcmaeonides) on Alcibiades, Axiochus, and Adeimantus (1.16, cf. 1.11, 26). That she received such protections suggests she might otherwise have been a target for inquisition, accusation, and litigation, with all that that entails—imprisonment and execution included. On the other hand, the extant sources (especially Thucydides) are eager to point up the irrationality and incommensurability of the Athenian response to the mutilation of the Herms and profanation of the mysteries. We might therefore expect arrest of citizen women to receive some mention. There appear to have obtained protections—legal, sociocultural, or otherwise normative—shielding citizen women from imprisonment. Slaves enjoyed no such inviolability; Andocides seems unsurprised by the arrest, torture, and possible imprisonment of the nameless therapainai—this in a speech notable for calling out prisoners by name and dramatizing the outrage of their internment.
A separate category comprises women who faced prosecution and, we may surmise, were imprisoned before or after trial or both.
Theoris of Lemnos (Sometime Before 338 BCE)
According to [Demosthenes], Theoris of Lemnos, a sorceress (or ‘medicine woman’, φαρμακίς), was executed along with her ‘entire family’ (τὸ γένος ἅπαν) sometime before 338 BCE (25.79f.; cf. Plut. Dem. 14.4).Footnote 14 The precise allegation and its connection (if any) to her activities as a sorceress remain controversial (murder and impiety are most plausible), but many scholars conclude that Theoris’ metic status is likely to have made her vulnerable to prosecution.Footnote 15
Theoris’ foreign origins are never questioned in the secondary literature, but the evidence (such as it is) is far from certain. In Against Agoratus I 25.79 she is labelled Λημνίαν, but perhaps we ought not read that tendentious snipe quite so literally; [Demosthenes] had reasons to impugn an opponent's witness, and implying connections to low-class foreign women is a recurrent strategy in the speech. Lemnian women are, of course, the stuff of myth: cursed, malodorous, and abandoned by the men on the island, they slaughter all but one of the latter—irresistible material for prosecutorial vituperation. In fifth- and fourth-century Athens, moreover, the term ‘Lemnian’ was already proverbial, a slur for (the misdeeds of) scurrilous women (see Aesch. Cho. 630–4; Hdt. 6.138.4; LSJ s.v. Λῆμνος). In our context, it appears within a tricolon crescendo of invective (not locative) appositionals: ‘that accursed woman, that Lemnian, that witch’ (τὴν μιαρὰν Θεωρίδα, τὴν Λημνίαν, τὴν φαρμακίδα). Notably, according to Plutarch Demosthenes 14.4, Theoris is neither Lemnian nor a sorceress;Footnote 16 and the account in Aesop (Perry 56), which shares numerous thematic and verbal resonances with [Dem.] 25.79f., also makes no mention of foreign origins. Theoris’ ‘Lemnian’ birth might therefore reveal less about the state of immigrants in Athens and more about the Athenian rhetoric of ethnic and bigoted denigration. A metic magician caught selling poison is one thing, a native Athenian priestess ritually purged for leading a coterie of insurrectionist slaves is another. The difference has legal implications. If Theoris was not Lemnian but Athenian, we might have evidence for the juridical imprisonment of a citizen woman. Such speculations must remain precisely that, but, in any event, if the execution followed Athenian convention, the sentence would have been carried out in prison.
Ninon (Late Fifth, Early Fourth Century BCE)
Ninon is nowhere said to be foreign.Footnote 17 Demosthenes (39.2, 40.9) twice cites her arrest as proof of his opponent Menecles’ program of slanderous prosecution. The scholia on Dem. 19.281 add that she was a priestess, made love potions for the youth, and was therefore executed, a sentence that would have been carried out in prison.
Unknown γυνὴ μάγος (‘Magical Woman, Enchantress’)
Aesop (Perry 56) provides a fictional (?) account of a magician, tried and condemned for ‘innovating in divine matters.’ As she was taken to prison, she was taunted for claiming to control the gods while unable to persuade the jury. Aesop has little uncontested historical value. Yet the narrative shows the emergence of the trial and execution of women engaged in magic as a topos, and it reveals the extent to which the language of formal legal procedure—accusation (γραψάμενοι), arrest (ὑπήγαγον), judgment and sentencing (κατεδίκασαν αὐτὴν θανάτῳ), and carrying off to prison (ἀπαγομένην)—shaped the literary imagination.
The lives of courtesans provide a rich tradition in which to explore the imprisonment of women—or, rather, its absence—in classical Athens.
Leaena (Later Sixth Century BCE)
When Hippias died, Hipparchus had Aristogeiton's courtesan Leaena tortured to extract information on the plot, including names of co-conspirators (Paus. 1.23.1f.; Plin. NH 7.23, 34.72; Plut. Mor. 505e–f; Ath. 596f.). Leaena revealed nothing and died in agony. Once the tyranny was overthrown and democracy established, the Athenians dedicated a statue of a tongueless ‘lioness’ (Gr. λέαινα—punning off her name) on the Acropolis to commemorate her heroic silence. The vocabulary ancient writers use for Leaena's interrogation (Plut.: ἀνακρινομένη) and torture (Paus.: εἶχεν ἐν αἰκίᾳ; Plin.: excruciata; Ath.: αἰκιζομένη) often denotes official legal procedure. We might therefore imagine a scenario, not unlike the arrest of slave women in 415 BCE, in which Leaena might have been formally apprehended and detained in prison prior to being tortured. However, the degree to which Athenian tyrants followed legal procedure remains uncertain (particularly following an assassination), and, as McClure observes, the (invariably late) sources for Leaena's biography ‘may indicate the circulation of an oral tradition…surrounding the actual statue that sought a fanciful explanation for its mutilated condition.’Footnote 18
Aspasia (Fifth Century BCE)
Pericles’ paramour and later wife became the target of a campaign to undermine his career by ensnaring friends and dependents in politically motivated litigation: ancient ‘law-fare’.Footnote 19 Impiety was the main charge against her, but allegations also included pimping for Pericles. With the best (and most unscrupulous) legal representation money (or sex) could afford, she was in no danger of imprisonment, pre- or post-trial—unless the prosecution had succeeded in securing a conviction (which it did not).
Neaira (c.343 BCE)
The Demosthenic Against Neaira is the only surviving speech from a case in which a courtesan was put on trial. Neaira was, of course, not a citizen, and that was the crux of the litigation; she represented herself as one and tried to enrol her children in the citizen registry. Whether public trials for persons accused of arrogating citizenship (known as xenias graphê, lit. ‘charge of foreign status’) entailed pretrial arrest and detention in prison is unclear; no mention of it is made in the speech. Yet we must assume that her husband Stephanus, qua legal guardian, would have been expected to vouch for her. It is precisely this supposition that led the speaker to prosecute Neaira in the first place; as the speaker admits at the outset, the trial is a proxy battle in a feud among politically active men with a long history of enmity ([Dem.] 59.1–14). We do not know the outcome, but if Neaira was convicted, would she have been held in prison prior to the penalty? Probably not. Her crime carried a sentence of being sold into slavery. Given the breakneck speed of Athenian justice, her journey from the court to the auction block would likely have allowed little time for prison along the way.
Phryne (c.371 BCE)
Athenaeus (567e, 583b–c, 590d–1f; cf. [Plut.] Mor. 849e; Quint. Inst. 2.15.9, 10.5.2) preserves a dramatic account of the trial of Phryne, a fantastically rich courtesan from Thespiae. Renowned for her wealth, monumental dedications, and beauty—she modeled for Praxiteles—Phryne was indicted by Hermippus and represented by Hyperides (scrappy fragments of a speech by the latter in defense of a Phryne survive). When it seemed clear that the jury intended to convict Phryne, Hyperides marshalled her into the courtroom, stripped off her clothing, stared at her breasts (giving the audience the opportunity to do the same), and performed a ritual lament. It worked. Moved to pity for the ‘interpreter and ministrant of Aphrodite’, the jury pronounced her innocent. Had she not been acquitted, Phryne would have been executed in prison.Footnote 20
Laïs (of Corinth or Hycara; Fourth Century BCE)
That Lysias is said to have written a speech either against or for Laïs (the sources are ambivalent) raises the possibility that she too might be counted among prosecuted courtesans (Ath. 586e, 592e). Yet little is known of the trial, and doubts regarding the authenticity of the speech have been raised since antiquity.
Although tangled in the web of Athenian justice, none of the courtesans surveyed above seems to have been in real danger of imprisonment. Perhaps the reasons for this are historical. By virtue of their independent wealth, professional activity, domestic independence, connections to multiple powerful men, and non-native birth, hetairai were more likely than most women to become marks for litigation. For the same reasons, however, they were uniquely positioned to sidestep pre-trial detention and conviction. Before reaching any historical conclusions, however, we need to consider the nature of the source material and the sociocultural forces by which it is shaped. In a seminal essay on persecution of intellectuals in classical Athens, Dover dismisses Aspasia's trial as a by-product of posthumous (and prurient) misreadings of old comedy: parody recast as biography.Footnote 21 Whether he is right is a matter of debate, but the point remains that evidence for courtesans must be approached with sensitivity to the influence of generic convention and accretion in the formation of the biographical tradition. Consider, for instance, the similarities between the trials of Aspasia and Phryne. As Cooper observes, Phryne's prosecution mimics (and amplifies) dimensions of the Aspasia paradigm: Aspasia begged off the jurists one by one, Phryne one-upped her by stripping to win the jury's compassion; Pericles wept, Hyperides broke out in ritual lament.Footnote 22 In a similar vein, Kurke notes that many sayings attributed to hetairai in Athenaeus—our principal source for evidence of courtesans— are ‘not just crude popular entertainment but a literate, learned version thereof (and in that sense, typically “Hellenistic”).’Footnote 23 The upshot is that the lives of courtesans, as a literary subtype, are agglutinative; everything sticks. The more salacious the anecdote, the more it clings and the more likely it is to circulate among and become attached to other prominent figures in the tradition. In this respect, Against Neaira is not (entirely) an exception. The prosecution's job is to present a winning argument—a position, not the facts; details of Neaira's biography are, in their own way, by-products of a prosecutor's literary invention and slant.
Against this backdrop, the absence of prisons in biographies of hetairai is significant. Caution is in order when arguing from silence but, had a courtesan somehow ended up in prison, it would be surprising for no record of it to survive. Many (especially of Athenaeus’) sources revel in scurrility, invective, and voyeurism; and imprisonment is precisely the type of bracing detail that the biographers of courtesans are likely to have glommed on to—or invented whole cloth. Yet prison and women—even scandalous, litigated women—belong in such disparate referential and symbolic frames that not even courtesans could make them come together.
The Pregnant and the Condemned: Legal Considerations
As we observed above, Roman law granted special protections for expectant women sentenced on capital charges. Several testimonia suggest the existence of similar laws and norms in Greece. Each source shares a recognition of special penological problems posed by the inculpability of the foetus—what to do with pregnant women gone bad? Ancient authors agree that these laws and norms were inorganic, learned, and imported from non-Hellenic, typically Egyptian and North African, societies. But it is not always entirely pellucid in which city-states they were to be found: according to some accounts, Athenian law suspended execution for expectant criminals; others identify the principle as a feature of Greek law in general. We cannot, therefore, establish with certainty how much of this material pertains specifically to classical Athenian history. Still, some sources raise the possibility of prenatal imprisonment of women awaiting execution in Greece and perhaps in fifth- and fourth-century Athens. Yet, as we shall observe, there are reasons to be sceptical of parallels between Greek and Roman law, and the dubious and late nature of the evidence ought to discourage reaching any conclusions regarding imprisonment of pregnant women as a legal principle, much less a historical fact, in classical Athens.Footnote 24
i. Philo compares the prohibition in Leviticus 22.28 against sacrificing a mother and her offspring on the same day to secular (i.e. Hellenic) law:
For this reason some of their legislators seem to me to have introduced the law, which pertains to condemned women, which stipulates that pregnant women, if they commit anything deserving of death, are ‘to be held in custody’ (φυλάττεσθαι) until they give birth, so that when the women are executed the life inside the womb is not destroyed as well.
(De Virtutibus 139f.)ii. In De Sera Numinis Vindicta 552d–e Plutarch observes that divine providence often delays punishing the misdeeds of disreputable figures to effectuate greater cosmic good in the longue durée. Greek law, he continues, emulates providence's foresight and restraint:
Does it not seem to you some Greeks acted appropriately when they copied the Egyptian law which stipulates that a pregnant woman under sentence of death is ‘to be held in custody’ (φυλάττειν) until she gives birth?
(De Sera 552d)Both in language and rhetorical strategy—positing analogies between divine (or Jewish) and mortal (or Hellenistic) law—the passage closely resembles De Virtutibus above.Footnote 25 Commentators often assume that, when Plutarch wrote De Sera Numinis Vindicta, he was working from a handbook of Platonist doctrine.Footnote 26 Philo, it seems, had a copy.
iii. Aelian had a different source:
When the council of the Areopagus ‘apprehended’ (συνέλαβον) a certain ‘witch’ (φαρμακίδα) and was about to put her to death, it did not execute her before she gave birth, because she was pregnant when ‘she was arrested’ (συνελήφθη). The innocent child they absolved of the sentence; only the guilty did they punish with death.
(VH 5.18)Aelian departs from other sources in one important respect: suspension of execution pending parturition is not said to be characteristic of some Greek city-states or Hellenic law in general; the legal precept at issue is specifically Athenian.
iv. Diodorus Siculus provides both the earliest mention of a Hellenic law prohibiting execution of pregnant women and the most complete justification for its institution. The passage is notable for the way juridical theories of culpability and just desert sit alongside philosophical notions of embryology and criminal intent:
Of the women who were sentenced to death [in Egypt], those who were pregnant were not executed until they delivered. ‘Many Greeks’ (πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων) also introduced this ‘legal convention’ (νόμιμον), believing that it is entirely unjust for that which committed no injustice to share with the offending party the same punishment; when there is one illegality to exact a penalty from two; moreover, when the injustice is brought about by a base intention, to punish a being with no intelligence whatsoever; and, the greatest consideration of all, that in so far as the guilt attaches individually to the pregnant women it is in no way appropriate that the child, which is common to father and mother, should be destroyed. For one might deem equally base judges who save someone who is liable for murder and who destroy something entirely innocent.
(Diod. Sic. 1.77.9–11)Procedures for delayed executions (in the case of Socrates, for instance) conventionally involved custodial detention in prison. Would it have been the same for pregnant women; in other words, might we compare Greek law to Roman laws suspending execution for the pregnant and condemned (see above)? Not necessarily. None of the authors above mentions prison per se. Philo and Plutarch come closest with the verbs φυλάττεσθαι and φυλάττειν, respectively, terms that denote keeping under guard or in custody but need not imply prison; indeed φυλάττειν and its cognates more frequently designate military custody.Footnote 27 If Hellenic law allowed suspension of penalty to preserve the life of the child, it is not unimaginable that other accommodations might have been made for mothers-to-be—particularly if Diodorus Siculus is right to insist that the prerogatives of the father were regarded as having overriding legal importance; condemned pregnant women might, for instance, have been held at home. In this context, one comparand, albeit late and imperfect, merits consideration: the Late Antique custom of confining women in domestic space (discussed above in the introduction).
But perhaps even to search for historical parallels requires too naïve a trust in the ancient sources. There are reasons to doubt the historicity of the law cited in these passages. Notably, the nature of the (Egyptian?) statute that ‘many’ (πολλοί, Diodorus) Greeks—or is it only ‘some’ (ἔνιοι, Plutarch, Philo), or simply the Athenians (Aelian)?—implemented is imprecise and inconsistent. Philo and Plutarch, whose interdependency we noted, reference a ‘law’ (νόμος), but in Diodorus temporary suspension of execution is a less formal ‘custom’ (νόμιμον). Aelian gives no legal justification for the Areopagite decision. Vagueness bespeaks hearsay and invention. Moreover, all the sources above are late and therefore potentially influenced by Roman law and professional juristic commentary, in which imprisonment of women is better attested.Footnote 28 In this respect, the unanimous agreement regarding the foreignness of these laws is significant.
The key observation is also the most obvious: arresting, convicting, sentencing pregnant women to execution, and holding them in custody prior to punishment, is likely to have been so exceedingly rare that there would simply not have been the necessity for written laws covering the situation.Footnote 29 That need not have stopped the jurisprudential mind from imagining, and elaborating extant legal principles to cope with, every scenario. Some minds are drawn to omission, gaps that need filling. And the advent of progymnasmata and controuersiae as central features of rhetorical education encouraged juristic speculation precisely on legal lacunae and situations in which legitimate claims of law—the necessity to punish with dispatch, the rights of the innocent foetus, legal personhood as singular and indivisible—would be brought into conflict. In sum, there is reason to interpret reports of a codified Athenian or Hellenic law, analogous to Roman statute, requiring carceral detention of women pregnant and convicted on capital offenses as a legal fiction.
Now, if, as I have argued, neither Greek nor Athenian law imagined or adapted the prison to scenarios such as St. Felicity's gravid incarceration or imported such laws from abroad, we might wish to know which conditions must be in place for ancient societies to do as the Romans did and extend the use of the prison to address problems posed by the inculpability of the unborn in the convict's womb. We return to this line of inquiry in the conclusion.
Plato's Carceral Fantasy
On the subject of legal fiction, let us consider Plato's Laws, the most sustained classical Athenian treatment of the penological operations of imprisonment outside the corpus of Attic oratory. As Abolafia shows, Plato's understanding of imprisonment in the Laws is at once reliant upon and transformative of Athenian practice.Footnote 30 Prison in Magnesia, the ideal city envisaged in the Laws, serves custodial and coercive roles, just as it did in Athens. Any citizen of Plato's second-best city, whether male or female, caught up in litigation would therefore be subject to arrest, detention (in the absence of supporting sureties), and post-trial custody while awaiting other punishments such as execution. At the same time, however, Plato envisions long-term prison sentences as forms of punishment independent of fines and penalties, and as opportunities for psychological intervention and remediation. As we observe below, moreover, Plato further departs from historical Athenian practice by mapping the city's carceral geography on diverse urban and rural topographies.Footnote 31
i. Leg. 8.847a–b. Magnesia prohibits professional multitasking. Citizens devote themselves to virtue, and any caught seeking to make money either by vocation or as a side hustle are punished with symbolic diminutions of social and political status. Likewise, non-citizens are permitted to practice a single craft or profession and, should they be convicted of engaging in two, they are to be disciplined with sentences of imprisonment, fines, and expulsions, so that they might learn to be one person not many.
ii. Leg. 9.855b–c. The next reference to the prison appears in a discussion of the law of temple robbery, in which the interlocutors delineate general principles of punishment, including the near-inalienability of allotments. Each citizen of Magnesia is allotted a standard and equally productive heritable ‘lot’ (κλῆρον) of arable land. If a person is fined beyond what his allotment allows him to pay, and none of his friends are willing to offer themselves as surety or band together to pay the fine, he is not to lose his allotment nor to be so destitute as not to be able to cultivate it. Rather, he must be punished with long public imprisonment and additional acts of humiliation. In the same context, we read that the complete roster of approved penalties in Magnesia includes death; terms of ‘imprisonment’ (δεσμούςFootnote 32); lashings; seats, stations, or exposures in temples or at the city's furthest boundaries; and monetary fines, as well as temporary disenfranchisement and degradation—a significant diversification of Athenian usage. Plato's penology is gentler in its treatment of slaves and non-citizens than of citizens who should know better. Foreigners or slaves caught committing some terrible wrong against gods, parents, or the city are to be branded on the forehead and sent out naked beyond the city's borders; whereas citizens who, despite having received the best education and statutory support from infancy, are found guilty of the same will be deemed incurable; death will be the least consequential penalty they suffer (see 9.853d–4a, 9.854d–5a).
iii. Leg. 9.857a–b. A person convicted of stealing private property is required to pay double the value of the stolen commodity, if he possesses enough property over and above his original allotment with which to pay. If not, he is to be imprisoned until the debt has been paid or the accuser is persuaded to grant his release. Analogous principles obtain in cases of theft of public property: the thief is held in prison until he has repaid his debt or the city allows him to be freed from prison. The thief in this passage is presumed to be a citizen; only citizens inherit allotments (5.738a–e).
iv. Leg. 9.864c–5a (see 9.865a–7c). For any citizen accused of temple robbery, treason, or seeking to destroy the laws with the intent to overthrow the existing constitution who is found to have committed these deeds in a state of insanity—this person must repay the exact cost of the damages and will be acquitted of all other charges (except murder) and exiled for one year. Should he return before the stipulated time, the law wardens will arrest and imprison him in the public jail for two years. In cases of involuntary manslaughter or murder committed in conditions of legally pardonable insanity, citizens convicted of returning prematurely from exile are to be executed immediately. Two years in prison is the kinder punishment for the less serious offense.
v. Leg. 9.880b–d. A citizen convicted of striking anyone twenty years or more his (or her?) elder is to be imprisoned for no less than one year—more if the court assesses a penalty of a longer term. A non-resident foreigner guilty of the same is to be imprisoned for no fewer than two years, and a metic no fewer than three.
vi. Leg. 11.919e–20. A citizen found guilty of engaging in commerce, trade, retail, or menial labor is to be imprisoned for a year. Should she or he relapse, the sentence doubles with each instance of recidivism.
vii. Leg. 11.932a–c. The passage is remarkable for the way it proposes parallel judicial procedures for men and women. Children, male or female, convicted of neglecting parents are to be punished with ‘lashings and imprisonments’ (πληγαῖς καὶ δεσμοῖς). Such cases are to be judged by a board of three law wardens and three women in charge of marriage, a combination of legally appointed statutory officials that reflects the composite (public and private) nature of the infraction, as well as the separate governmental and domestic domains these officials oversee. Men are to be judged and punished in this manner until the age of thirty, whereas women up to forty ‘receive the same punishments’ (κολαζέσθωσαν ταῖς αὐταῖς κολάσεσι). If prosecutable neglect continues beyond these respective ages, the case is to be tried in front of an ad hoc panel of jurists, consisting of the oldest one hundred and one citizens. No discrimination according to sex is stipulated for the latter. Women are therefore envisaged as participating at every level of the trials: from being victims of, committing, adjudicating, judging, and being punished (and therefore imprisoned) for criminal parental neglect.
Leg. 11.932a–c should dispel any doubt whether Plato anticipated long-term, punitive imprisonment of women. But is this an exception or the rule in Magnesia? The jury of law wardens and overseers of marriage is extraordinary in the Laws, as is the board of superannuated citizens; neither body plays a regular role in Magnesia's judicial system. And unlike some other infractions we have surveyed, which, Plato suggests, merit imprisonment, the crime in question is uniquely androgynous and unpropertied. One need not occupy the status or enjoy the privileges of male citizenship (that is, inheritance of original lots, accumulation, management of owned property) to neglect one's parents. It remains unclear whether the peculiar procedures for prosecuting and punishing criminal dereliction of duty to parents may be extrapolated to other scenarios that involve custodial, coercive, punitive, or remedial imprisonment.
viii. Leg. 12.954e–5a. Should anyone prevent a free person from appearing at trial as a litigant or witness, the action is nullified and the person who commits obstruction is to be imprisoned for a year and held liable on a charge of kidnapping.
ix. Leg. 10.908a–9c. We encounter the longest and most detailed treatment of the city's prison system, appended to the grand law of impiety in Book 10, a sweeping account of the origins and structure of the cosmos which stipulates penalties for the impious who would cast doubt upon its providential nature. Nominally designed for citizens convicted of impiety, Plato's prison, as Hunter shows, is in fact adapted to any person arrested, undergoing remediation, or deemed incurable.Footnote 33 There are no fewer than three prisons: one near the agora for custodial detention of bodies; second, a reformatory adjacent to the meeting place of the Nocturnal Council; and a third in the most wild and desolate reaches of the borderlands. Of the two general classes of the impious—those who disbelieve the existence of the gods but are constitutionally temperate and just, and those who while atheistical are also intemperate and opportunistic—the former are sentenced to the reformatory prison for five years, and executed if irremediable; the latter, deserving not one death but two, are exiled to the third prison, where they are administered to by slaves. When atheists of the second variety decease, their bodies are thrown unburied beyond the borders, and any free person discovered burying them is also prosecuted for impiety. From the day of their parent's conviction, children of intemperate atheists are raised by officials responsible for the care and maintenance of orphans.
The conceptual origins of the Laws’ reformative approach to imprisonment in Plato's earlier punitive philosophy and its departures from Athenian custodial practice are the foci of Abolafia's illuminating study and therefore need not be addressed at length in the present context. For our purposes, it is noteworthy that, although Plato nowhere states outright that the target of punishment for impiety includes women, there are reasons to infer (albeit with caution) that imprisonment of women is a subtext in this passage. Consider the types of persons Plato expects to find in the third, outermost prison. From intemperate atheists spring not only tyrants, demagogues, generals, and sophists—civic roles and identities uniformly occupied by men in classical antiquity—but also ‘many who set themselves up as “prophets” (μάντεις) and meddle in “magical arts” (μαγγανείαν) of all sorts’ and those who ‘plot against others with private mystic rites’ (τελεταῖς δὲ ἰδίαις ἐπιβεβουλευκότες, 10.908d). Compare Aesop's ‘enchantress’ (γυνὴ μάγος, discussed above) and the allegations of witchcraft and sorcery against women in classical Athens discussed above. False prophesy, magical arts, intrigues, cultic rites—all were associated with miscreant women in Athenian history. Or perhaps it is the other way around: women who ran afoul of the law in Athens gained reputations for magic, religious innovation, and voodoo plotting.
To step back from particular passages, three general features of Plato's approach to prisons stand out. First, although Athens provides the model for much that Plato has to say about prisons, the uses of imprisonment that depart most notably from Athenian custom—longer than usual (by Athenian standards) prison sentences, punitive and corrective imprisonment, and a carceral geography dispersed throughout the city's variegated topography—are the more frequently discussed. For the most part, explicit references to prison in the Laws find no exact historical parallel, and even uses that draw close to contemporaneous Athenian practice involve significant extension. A substrate of Athenian law underpins Magnesia's conceptualization of the ideal prison system, but it is primarily dimensions of this substrate that Plato or the Athenian Stranger—as it is impossible to delineate with precision which parts of the Laws reflect the author's commitments and which his character's—believed require most extensive revision that receive sustained treatment.
Second, the textual location of the discussion of Magnesia's prison system immediately following a cosmology which the interlocutors present as an alternative to Hesiod's Theogony (cited by title at 10.886c) is noteworthy and intentional. Prison caps Plato's vision of the origins and order of the cosmos for reasons having to do with the Laws’ indebtedness to the poetic tradition and the overarching design of Book 10. In its structure and emplotment, Laws 10 emulates Hesiod's portrayal of the foundations of three successive divine regimes, each of which draws to completion with the subterranean confinement and incarceration of Uranus’, Chronos’, and Zeus’ respective rivals (see Hes. Th. 154–60, 453–62, 501–25, 617–23, 712–21); atheists in Plato's ideal city are what Hesiod's Titans are to Zeus: contenders for politico-cosmological authority, buried and expelled.Footnote 34 Much recent scholarship has called attention to the Laws’ allusive texture and deliberate self-positioning vis-à-vis the fourth-century literary traditions.Footnote 35 Whereas [Aeschylus], for instance, casts Prometheus bound ‘in an inaccessible desert’ (ἄβατον εἰς ἐρημίαν, PV 1) and confined in ‘savage bonds’ (ἀγρίων δεσμῶν, 155; cf. the fantasized description of Zeus ‘savagely approaching with inescapable bonds’, δεσμοῖς ἀλύτοις ἀγρίως πελάσας, 174f.), Plato situates the third prison in a ‘place that is deserted and as savage as possible’ (ἔρημός τε καὶ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος ᾖ τόπος, 10.908a). We cannot rule out the possibility of direct, intertextual allusion in these passages. The Laws’ account of the prison thus looks to both Athenian law and the earlier Platonic corpus (esp. Gorgias), but the overarching argumentative structure of the Book 10 and, with it, Magnesia's carceral geography are inspired by mythological eschatology.
The larger point is that Plato wrote of prisons with poetry in mind. In Book 10, Sophoclean and specifically Antigonean undertones are especially striking: laws of sacral impurity; imprisonment understood as (social) death, exile, and alienation from family and kin; bodies cast out and left unburied; punishments for those who seek to inhume the impious and the dead; statutory concern for orphans of the condemned; and all of this in a context of heightened intertextual resonance. Nor is this an isolated occurrence. Elsewhere in the Laws, Plato makes recourse to Athenian tragedy as a model for social and sexual regulation, reprising—with the precise vocabulary of Sophocles’ Antigone—the drama's overriding theme: the transpolitical, obligatory force of ‘unwritten law’ (ἄγραπτα…νόμιμα, Ant. 454f.; cf. ὁ αὐτὸς νόμος ἄγραφος, Leg. 8.838b). In sum, Plato's treatment of impiety mobilizes the legal, cultural, and literary frames with which ancient Athenian society made prosecution, imprisonment, and (domestic) confinement of women imaginable. It is the convergence of Athenian legal convention with tropes from epic and tragedy that enabled Plato to envision imprisonment of women with a degree of definitiveness and institutional elaboration unimagined (or at least not explicitly articulated) elsewhere in fourth-century literature.
At the same time—and this is the final notable feature—the case for imprisonment of women in the Laws is a study in ambiguity. On the one hand, the founders of the colony and the heirs of initial lots are male heads of household: ‘the basic partition [into which the city is divided] is a man and his allotment’ (γενόμενα ἀνὴρ καὶ κλῆρος συννομή, 5.737e). Inheritance, possession, and control of allotments and accumulated wealth are assigned to adult male citizens (11.923d–4a). Property has penological relevance; it is often the target of, and the scale by which to calibrate, Magnesia's retributive justice. With a single exception, moreover, Plato follows the Athenian custom of requiring women to be represented in court by male next of kin (11.937a–b). The exception is free, unmarried women over forty, who may bear witness in a trial and bring a legal action. Married women over forty may only offer testimony, and women under forty, irrespective of marital status, require male representation.
On the other hand, responsibility for crime—and therefore punishment—remains inalienable, and culpable women are never said to be spared imprisonment. Indeed, we have observed scenarios in which long-term remediative detention of women is mandated. Nor is there any indication of significant procedural differences for the prosecution, conviction, and punishment of women, each of which might entail imprisonment. In the domain of criminal statute, moreover, Magnesia consistently maintains equality before the law without discrimination according to the sex of either plaintiff or defendant.Footnote 36 And Plato's conceptualization of the penal status of women must be contextualized within a broader program in the second-best city to regulate within a single invariant law code and constitution all dimensions of life for citizens, male and female (see esp. 6.781b), the result of which is a substantial expansion of women's public and private activities, including commensal ritual (6.780c–1d), gymnastic education and military training (7.804a–6c, 7.813e2–14a5), and musical performance (7.796c–d).
In prison we therefore confront a variant of the ambivalence that, Susan Okin observes, characterizes Plato's treatment of women in the Laws as a whole:
Having made the general proclamation that the law should prescribe the same education and training for girls as it does for boys and that ‘the female sex must share with the male, to the greatest extent possible, both in education and in all else’—should ‘share with men in the whole of their mode of life’—Plato's Athenian legislator fails to apply these precepts, in many of the most crucial instances.Footnote 37
Okin attributes the divergence between normative principle and legal implementation to the retention of private property and family in Magnesia. Mutatis mutandis the prison: the Laws develops institutions and normative penological principles to put women in jail, and in some instances delineates procedures for their prosecution and imprisonment; but, at the same time, it imports from Athenian practice the legal architecture, especially in respect to property and the family, to make it unlikely that they would end up there—though less unlikely than in Athens.
Conclusion
The search for women imprisoned in classical Athens turns up a few slaves apprehended in 415 BCE and two women sentenced to execution. Even this short list rests on inferences drawn from legal procedure. We might add Aesop's enchantress, late and revisionist juristic reports, and Plato's legal ruminations, but the historical value of such refractive material is uncertain. Indeed, the exceptional visibility of women's incarceration in the Laws compared to their near-invisibility in reliable historical sources underscores Abolafia's contention that Plato's approach to imprisonment exhibits a high degree of invention and departure from Athenian norms.
Such paucity of evidence demands explanation. We cannot dismiss the possibility that the elite-centrism and gendered orientation of the ancient evidence might have ablated female inmates from the historical record. Yet, the proclivity in the sources to home in on—and fabricate—scandal and deviance shows, inter alia, that there were at play equally compelling interests to make it unlikely for imprisoned women to have gone entirely unnoticed. To return to the question posed at the outset of this essay, the absence of scholarship on the imprisonment of women in classical Athens appears to reflect not only scholarly neglect but also absence of evidence arising from absence of practice.
Perhaps, then, we should be asking a different question: not why imprisonment of women is poorly attested but why so few women were imprisoned in Athens in the first place. Crucial in this context is the ancillary function of the Athenian prison. What distinguishes ancient from modern incarceration is not merely the evolution in the latter of a punitive and remediative operation. It is also that prison in Greece (and Rome) was for the most part ‘in-process’ rather than a process in itself. In the cases we have discussed, women were imprisoned (if in fact they were) because they were to be executed; jail was on the way. Determining whether women were imprisoned thus requires probing conditions under which women might be prosecuted, held in custody, sentenced on capital charges, or fined and remanded. In Athens, there were structural features—institutional, economic, political, and legal—to keep women out of the judicial process. The dissimilarity to Ptolemaic Egypt and Rome, where women were held responsible for fiduciary malfeasance and ran afoul of political manoeuvring, is telling. Love poetry for women is said never to be found in societies in which women cannot own property. This much poetry and prison have in common. In grim contrast to the global North, in which we now witness accelerating rates of female incarceration, the absence of women in jail in classical Athens is a measure of their disenfranchisement.
